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Abstract 
 
The object of study of this research is the right to Personal Data Protection 
within the framework of the EU-US E-Market legal regime. Its characteristics, as well 
as the features of the main actors participating into that E-Market, make possible to 
consider it as a proper basis for the development of an International/Universal legal 
system treaty-based. 
The Actors and Relations included by the research are the duty bearers of 
Personal Data Protection law, both State and Private Entity Activities. Nonetheless, the 
Informal Power Relation between State and Private organization is also taken into 
account since there are some informal agreements or coordination between State 
Agencies and IT Corporations on data sharing and processing. The time frame of the 
research is 2001-2016 (after the terrorist’s attack in USA on 9/11 until the most recent 
reform of the EU-US E-Market regime in 2016).  
The research’s point of departure is International Human Rights Law, as far as it 
recognizes a general framework to support and regulate personal data protection on 
cyberspace realm. Nonetheless, the distinctive characters of cyberspace demand a well 
designed, at universal level, specific regulation and mechanisms to guarantee such 
fundamental rights relating personal data protection internationally. Accordingly, 
Research Hypothesis is represented in double issues: first, effective personal data 
protection on cyberspace needs the establishment of an International/Universal legal 
system treaty-based; second, EU Regime on personal data protection in cyberspace and 
current EU-US agreements on this issue can be used as a model for initiating such 
International/Universal Treaty. 
The structure of the thesis is divided into six chapters, being Chapter 1 the 
research design and Chapter 6 the conclusions and recommendations coming from the 
research. So, Chapter 2 analyzes Universal Legal Instruments, EU Laws and EU-US 
Agreements in force before 5th June 2013 (critical turning point date because of the 
revelations of Mass Electronic Surveillance presented then on World Wide Web). 
Within this legal framework, Chapter 3 studies hard cases about personal data 
protection in US domestic courts and in the Court of Justice of European Union, in 
order to search for precise interpretation of the right to personal data protection in 
cyberspace that, later, had to be taken into account by US and EU in their further legal 
reforms. Chapter 4 analyses and reviews the legal instruments enacted through the 
reform of the EU personal data protection regime and the new EU-US Bilateral 
Agreements currently in force. Finally, Chapter 5 evaluates the possibility to initiate an 
International Treaty for regulating data using across borders. Considering the initiatives 
of either international governmental organizations or non-governmental movements in 
the field, the chapter shows how a set of principles can be extracted from the reforms in 
the EU and EU-US regime and how they can be used to create an International Regime 
for protection of personal data in cyberspace. 
Keywords: Personal data protection; Cyberspace; E-Market; Human Rights; EU; USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La Protección de Datos Personales en el Ciberespacio: el régimen del 
Mercado Electrónico de Unión Europea – Estados Unidos 
 
Resumen 
 
El objeto de estudio de esta investigación es el derecho a la protección de los 
datos personales en el marco del régimen jurídico aplicable al mercado electrónico UE-
Estados Unidos. Sus características, así como las de los principales actores que 
intervienen en este mercado, permiten considerar este régimen jurídico como una base 
adecuada para el posible desarrollo de un tratado internacional de vocación universal 
sobre protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio. 
Los actores y las relaciones incluidas en la investigación son los responsables de 
las obligaciones jurídicas en materia de protección de datos personales, tanto entidades 
públicas como privadas.  No obstante, también se tienen en cuenta las ‘relaciones 
informales de poder’ entre Estado y organizaciones privadas, dada la existencia de 
acuerdos informales o coordinación entre ambos para el intercambio y procesamiento de 
datos. El marco temporal de la investigación es 2001-2016 (después de los atentados del 
9/11 en Estados Unidos y hasta la más reciente reforma del régimen UE-EEUU 
culminada en 2016). 
El punto de partida de la investigación es el Derecho Internacional de los 
Derechos Humanos, que contiene el marco general para el apoyo y regulación de la 
protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio. Sin embargo, los caracteres 
distintivos del ciberespacio exigen una regulación y mecanismos específicos bien 
diseñados, a nivel universal, para garantizar internacionalmente tales derechos 
fundamentales relativos a la protección de datos personales. Consecuentemente, la 
hipótesis de investigación se formula del siguiente modo: en primer lugar, la protección 
eficaz de los datos personales en el ciberespacio necesita el establecimiento de un 
sistema jurídico internacional de alcance universal basado en tratados; en segundo lugar, 
el régimen de la UE sobre protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio y los 
actuales acuerdos UE-Estados Unidos sobre esta cuestión pueden utilizarse como 
modelo para la elaboración de dicho Tratado Internacional. 
La estructura de la tesis se divide en seis capítulos, siendo el Capítulo 1 el 
\diseño de la investigación y el Capítulo 6 las conclusiones y recomendaciones que se 
desprenden de la investigación. Así, el Capítulo 2 analiza los Instrumentos Jurídicos 
Universales, las normas de la UE y los acuerdos UE-EEUU vigentes antes del 5 de 
junio de 2013 (fecha crítica debido a las revelaciones sobre Vigilancia Electrónica en 
Masa presentadas mundialmente ese día). Dentro de ese marco jurídico, el Capítulo 3 
realiza un análisis jurisprudencial y analiza una selección de casos sobre protección de 
datos personales suscitados ante los tribunales internos de Estados Unidos y ante el 
Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, con el objetivo de identificar la interpretación 
precisa del derecho a la protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio que, 
posteriormente, ha debido tener en cuenta la reforma normativa en Estados Unidos y en 
la UE sobre esta materia. El Capítulo 4 analiza y revisa los instrumentos jurídicos 
promulgados en virtud de la reforma del régimen de protección de datos personales de 
la UE y los nuevos acuerdos bilaterales entre la UE y los Estados Unidos actualmente 
en vigor. Por último, el Capítulo 5 evalúa la posibilidad de elaborar un Tratado 
Internacional de alcance universal que garantice el derecho a la protección de datos 
personales que ‘circulan’ en el ciberespacio. Teniendo en cuenta las iniciativas 
formuladas por organizaciones gubernamentales internacionales y por los movimientos 
no gubernamentales especializados, el capítulo muestra cómo se pueden extraer un 
conjunto de principios de las reformas de la UE y del régimen aplicable en el espacio 
UE-EEUU y cómo esos principios pueden utilizarse para la creación de un régimen 
internacional de protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio. 
Palabras clave: Protección de datos personales; Ciberespacio; Mercado electrónico; 
Derechos Humanos; Unión Europea; Estados Unidos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La Protecció de Dades Personals en el Ciberespai: el règim del Mercat Electrònic 
UE-EE.UU 
 
Resum 
 
L'objecte d'estudi d'aquesta recerca és el dret a la protecció de les dades 
personals en el marc del règim jurídic aplicable al mercat electrònic UE-Estats Units. 
Les seves característiques, així com les dels principals actors que intervenen en aquest 
mercat, permeten considerar aquest règim jurídic com una base adequada per al possible 
desenvolupament d'un tractat internacional de vocació universal sobre protecció de 
dades personals en el ciberespai. 
Els actors i les relacions incloses en la recerca són els responsables de les obligacions 
jurídiques en matèria de protecció de dades personals, tant entitats públiques com a 
privades. Malgrat això, també es tenen en compte les ‘relacions informals de poder’ 
entre Estat i organitzacions privades, donada l'existència d'acords informals o 
coordinació entre tots dos per a l'intercanvi i processament de dades. El marc temporal 
de la recerca és 2001-2016 (després dels atemptats del 9/11 a Estats Units i fins a la més 
recent reforma del règim UE-EUA culminada en 2016). 
El punt de partida d’aquesta recerca és el Dret Internacional dels Drets Humans, que 
conté el marc general per al suport i regulació de la protecció de dades personals en el 
ciberespai. Ara bé, els caràcters distintius del ciberespai exigeixen una regulació i 
mecanismes específics ben dissenyats, a nivell universal, per garantir internacionalment 
els esmentats drets fonamentals relatius a la protecció de dades personals. 
Conseqüentment, la hipòtesi de recerca es formula de la següent manera: en primer lloc, 
la protecció eficaç de les dades personals en el ciberespai necessita l'establiment d'un 
sistema jurídic internacional d'abast universal basat en tractats; en segon lloc, el règim 
de la UE sobre protecció de dades personals en el ciberespai i els actuals acords UE-
Estats Units sobre aquesta qüestió poden utilitzar-se com a model per a l'elaboració 
d'aquest Tractat Internacional. 
L'estructura de la tesi es divideix en sis capítols, essent el Capítol 1 el disseny de la 
recerca i el Capítol 6 les conclusions i recomanacions que es desprenen de la recerca. 
Així, el Capítol 2 analitza els Instruments Jurídics Universals, les normes de la UE i els 
acords UE-EUA vigents abans 5 de juny de 2013 (data crítica a causa de les revelacions 
sobre Vigilància Electrònica en massa, presentades mundialment aquest dia). Dins 
d'aquest marc jurídic, el Capítol 3 realitza una anàlisi jurisprudencial i analitza una 
selecció de casos sobre protecció de dades personals suscitades davant els tribunals 
interns d'Estats Units i davant el Tribunal de Justícia de la Unió Europea, amb l'objectiu 
d'identificar la interpretació precisa del dret a la protecció de dades personals en el 
ciberespai que, posteriorment, ha hagut de tenir en compte la reforma normativa a Estats 
Units i en la UE sobre aquesta matèria. El Capítol 4 analitza i revisa els instruments 
jurídics promulgats en virtut de la reforma del règim de protecció de dades personals de 
la UE i els nous acords bilaterals entre la UE i els Estats Units actualment en vigor. 
Finalment, el Capítol 5 avalua la possibilitat d'elaborar un Tractat Internacional d'abast 
universal que garanteixi el dret a la protecció de dades personals que ‘circulen’ pel 
ciberespai. Tenint en compte les iniciatives formulades per organitzacions 
governamentals internacionals i pels moviments no governamentals especialitzats, el 
capítol mostra com es poden extreure un conjunt de principis de les reformes de la UE i 
del règim aplicable a l'espai UE-EUA i com aquests principis poden utilitzar-se per a la 
creació d'un règim internacional de protecció de dades personals en el ciberespai. 
 
Paraules clau: Protecció de dades personals; Ciberespai; Mercat electrònic; Drets 
Humans; Unió Europea; Estats Units 
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La Protección de Datos Personales en el Ciberespacio: el  régimen del Mercado 
Electrónico UE-EE.UU 
 
Resumen ejecutivo 
 
1. Introducción 
En esta sección se describirán todas las cuestiones preliminares, los conocimientos 
previos, y el marco de referencia de la investigación, sobre la protección de datos personales 
en el ciberespacio.  
 
1.1. El ciberespacio desde una perspectiva jurídica 
El ciberespacio suscita importantes angustias para sus usuarios, especialmente en lo 
que se refiere a las lagunas de su legislación reguladora. Esta sección inicialmente dilucidará 
los factores de influencia que tal régimen de regulación debe tener en cuenta, es decir, la 
posibilidad sobre la protección de los derechos de los sujetos de datos por entidad diversa de 
la comunidad estatal, empresarial e internacional, explorando cualquier precaución para 
aplicar la regulación a diferentes relaciones y el Mercado electrónico relativo. Por lo tanto, 
investigará críticamente cómo las características de la variedad del ciberespacio han afectado 
cualquier entorno jurídico que se relaciona con él. Más concretamente, demostrará cómo las 
tesis homólogas de los teóricos, a saber, los excepcionalistas y los noexcepcionalistas, han 
descrito sus puntos de vista en contra de tales características. Finalmente, utilizando diversas 
perspectivas incluyendo la perspectiva de los Derechos Políticos, Económicos, Sociales y 
Culturales, examinará las situaciones complejas sobre cómo el ciberespacio está creando un 
lugar necesitado de  regulación transfronteriza en términos de protección del derecho, 
obligación del titular y aplicación de la ley. 
Desde el final de la Guerra Fría, los términos 'ciberespacio' y 'globalización' han sido 
prevalentes. El internet desencadenó un nuevo orden de interconexión y descentralización. En 
cuanto a los impactos del espacio cibernético sobre el derecho, los resultados de la ignorancia 
tecnológica en la comunidad jurídica pueden ser devastadores, con casos decididos y 
perdidos sobre la base de argumentos poco fundados de las partes o de un razonamiento 
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desacertado por los tribunales.1 Así, el Juez Frank Easterbrook provocativamente declaró que 
el estudio de la ciber-ley como un campo de estudio independiente no sería diferente de 
estudiar la "ley del caballo" en el siglo XIX. 2 Su declaración refleja explícitamente que sólo 
requiere "reglas generales" sin la necesidad de inventar un nuevo régimen jurídico, sin desear 
nada específicamente llamado "ciber-ley". 
No obstante, las discusiones sobre los derechos y la libertad en el ciberespacio se 
preocupan por las amenazas a los Derechos Fundamentales planteadas por el poder privado 
mencionado por Paul S. Berman que ubica entre los riesgos del ciberespacio "el papel del 
poder económico arraigado, la importancia de los regímenes jurídicos incrustados, el papel 
del Estado, la importancia de las comunidades no estatales en la construcción de normas"3 
implicando las necesidades de sensibilidad en la regulación del ciberespacio. 
En contraste con los "non- excepcionalistas", los "excepcionalistas" del ciberespacio 
argumentaron que el medio mismo creaba problemas radicalmente nuevos que requerían un 
nuevo trabajo analítico.4 En consecuencia, las nuevas tecnologías que alteran la cultura son 
precisamente los tipos de cambios que tienden a dar lugar a cambios en principios jurídicos 
bien establecidos.5 
Los impactos del ciberespacio adoptan un enfoque estructural, haciendo hincapié en 
las fuerzas culturales, económicas, políticas y jurídicas a gran escala que son más 
fundamentales que el modo en que determinadas reglas jurídicas se aplicarán a determinados 
tipos de interacciones6 pero cómo manejaría la comunidad jurídica este espacio a través de la 
transformación. 
Además, hay un gran número de estudios de casos para apoyar los cambios y desafíos 
que causan obstáculos a las regulaciones del ciberespacio. Ya que la revolución de la tercera 
                                                          
1 Svantesson, Dan J B. "The Times They Are a-Changin'(Every Six Months)--the Challenges of Regulating 
Developing Technologies." Forum on public policy: A journal of the Oxford Round Table, Forum on Public 
Policy, 2008. 
2 Easterbrook, Frank H. "Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse." U. Chi. Legal F., 1996, pp. 207-216. 
3 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xix. 
4 Ibid, p. xiv. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p. xxiii. 
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ola ha continuado, el Estado Nación y la Comunidad Internacional se han preocupado si el 
principio universal del derecho puede aplicarse o no al Ciberespacio adecuadamente. 7 
Hay una mutabilidad en el principio de Persona en la "Sociedad Netizen"8 porque los 
individuos en el Ciberespacio pueden cambiar o encubrir sus identidades para "crear 
múltiples identidades electrónicas que están enlazadas sólo por su progenitor común, que 
enlazar, invisible en el mundo virtual, es de gran importancia.” 9 En este sentido, el Estado 
tiene el deber de asegurar la trazabilidad de la persona en caso de crimen o terrorismo. Sin 
embargo, el derecho a la privacidad y el derecho a saber y los datos personales deben ser 
corroborados también. 
Las relaciones en el ciberespacio parecen ser vagas cuando tenemos que aplicar la ley 
a una línea virtual para las actividades de comunicación, ya sea en la esfera pública o privada. 
Ha mostrado el paisaje cambiante del derecho y también su consecuencia, que reduce la 
brecha entre la vida privada y pública. Además, obliga a  proporcionar opciones para la 
construcción de marcos jurídicos con los que proteger y promover los derechos de los 
miembros de Social Media10 para manejarlo con seguridad, suprimiendo los daños. En 
consecuencia, se deben trazar nuevas fronteras para establecer un alcance de certidumbre 
entre la esfera pública, en la cual la persona puede expresar su intimidad con responsabilidad 
hacia los demás, y la esfera privada, plenamente fundamentada sobre la base del derecho a la 
privacidad. 
El desplazamiento más predominante es la jurisdicción sobre "lugar" porque las 
actividades en el ciberespacio son transfronterizas o relevantes para más de un Estado, 11 de 
modo que se pueden producir muchas situaciones de conflictos de leyes. En el pasado, los 
principios de jurisdicción legal "bien establecidos" veían la jurisdicción como arraigada casi 
                                                          
7 Lloyd, Ian J. Information Technology Law. Oxford University Press, UK, 2011, p. 182. 
8 Cavanagh, Allison. Sociology in the Age of the Internet. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, Delhi, 2010, pp. 76 and 
120. 
9 Basu, Subhajit and Jones, Richard. "Regulating Cyberstalking." Journal of Information Law & Technology, 
vol. 22, 2007, p. 10. 
10 Barwick, Hamish. "Social Networking Websites May Face Government Regulation." Computerworld, 16 
Mar. 2012, www.computerworld.com.au/article/418730/social_networking_websites_may_face_ 
government_regulation/. Accessed 4 Nov. 2013. 
11 Fuchs, Christian. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. Routledge, London, 2007, p. 
119. 
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exclusivamente en el poder territorial del soberano,12 pero ahora el principio absoluto 
llamado "doctrina de efectos" ha sido difícil de aplicar a la interacción en línea porque el 
material de un sitio web potencialmente crea efectos en cualquier lugar13 independientemente 
del territorio del Estado. 
Internet podría proporcionar una oportunidad a la gente pero garantizar el derecho al 
"Medio" es crucial. Además, la oportunidad de competir en una comunicación de alta 
tecnología es una clave antimonopolio14 en todas las perspectivas. Aunque la penetración de 
Internet y la proporción de digitalización se difunden entre diferentes sociedades, dependen 
de las condiciones socioeconómicas: habilidades informáticas, alfabetización, ingresos y 
entornos regulatorios,15 lo que podría afectar su capacidad de asimilación. Sin embargo, es 
imposible eliminar o bloquear el tráfico porque las técnicas de los controles intermedios son 
generalmente menos efectivas en las naciones pequeñas16, y tienen una matriz más grande de 
intermediarios para remontarse a las naciones superpotentes. 
Con respecto a la posesión de "Tecnología", la comercialización en productos y 
servicios en mercancías17 o bienes públicos es el punto del ciberespacio. Debido al derecho a 
la información, ‘Internet Society’ debe proporcionar a los individuos los medios para 
participar en la producción y distribución de la cultura.18 En realidad, la libertad de expresión 
se encuentra en una relación incómoda con la ley de derechos de autor, ya que efectivamente 
censura el discurso en nombre de proporcionar incentivos para crear.19 Por otra parte, podría 
                                                          
12 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xiv. 
13 Ibid, p. xv. 
14 Fuchs, Christian. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. Routledge, London, 2007, p. 
120. 
15 Klang, Mathias and Murray, Andrew. “Internet Service Providers and Liability.” Human Rights in the Digital 
Age. Psychology Press, 2005, p. 88. 
16 Goldsmith, Jack and Wu, Tim. Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World. Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2006, pp. 81-82. 
17 Fuchs, Christian. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. Routledge, London, 2007, p. 
139. 
18 Balkin, Jack M. "Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society." NYUL rev., vol. 79, 2004, pp. 1–58. 
19 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xxi. 
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dar un poder al propietario de los derechos de autor para perseguir sus bienes mediante la 
detección de dispositivos. 
El poder de las Corporaciones informáticas y la Autoridad del Estado provienen de la 
posesión de la "Tecnología" que luego comercializan en productos y servicios20 pero la 
cuestión de si son bienes privados o bienes públicos es punto crucial de la regulación del 
ciberespacio. Debido al derecho a la protección de datos personales, la Internet Society debe 
proporcionar a los individuos los medios para participar en la producción y distribución de la 
cultura.21 De hecho, la libertad de expresión se encuentra en una relación difícil con el 
derecho de propiedad intelectual, ya que este último censura la expresión en base al interés de 
proveer incentivos a la creación.22Aún más, podría dar un poder al propietario de la 
tecnología para maximizar el beneficio de sus bienes mediante el uso de dispositivos de 
rastreo. 
Internet constituye una tecnología vital de la comunicación que está transformando en 
profundidad muchos aspectos de la vida humana.23 En consecuencia, hay algunas 
características de los retos en 4 perspectivas principales: los derechos políticos, los derechos 
económicos, los derechos sociales y los derechos culturales, que el Estado y la comunidad 
internacional deben incorporar como consideraciones previas. 
El principal argumento a este respecto es el enfrentamiento entre Autoridad y Poder 
con Liberación y Resistencia.24 La Autopista de Información afecta al mundo mediante el 
acceso a la red 24 horas, generando comunicación bidireccional con participación múltiple 
individual sin  obstáculos geográficos.25 Se desencadena así la "democracia digital" mediante 
la información y la plena participación, sin embargo, los obstáculos contra la adhesión a 
                                                          
20 Fuchs, Christian. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. Routledge, London, 2007, p. 
139. 
21 Balkin, Jack M. "Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society." NYUL rev., vol. 79, 2004, pp. 1–58. 
22 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xxi. 
23 Cavanagh, Allison. Sociology in the Age of the Internet. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, Delhi, 2010, p. 2. 
24 Terranova, Tiziana. Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age. Pluto Press, London, 2004, p. 135. 
25 Bryan, Cathy and Tatam, James. “Political Participation and the Internet.” Liberating Cyberspace: Civil 
Liberties, Human Rights & the Internet. Pluto Press, London, 1999, p. 162. 
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Internet podrían degenerar en "la aristocracia de la información"26 de modo que la minoría de 
los proveedores privados ricos y el Estado podrían monopolizar la Arena Política. 
En sentido económico, podría ser descrito por la confrontación de Monopolio y 
Dividendo con Asignación y adhesión.27 La neutralidad de la red sería el punto sobre la 
competencia leal entre los proveedores de servicios,28 sin embargo, en algunos casos de IT 
Corporaciones que tienen poder sobre el mercado podría recoger una gran cantidad de datos29 
e implicar la comercialización directa y masiva de vigilancia electrónica. 
El reto que internet crea para la sociedad se resume en el planteamiento de Clase 
fragmentada y Exclusión con Redes e Inclusión.30 La vida cibernética genera al Estado 
situaciones difíciles para el control de la violencia y los grupos criminales, lo que obliga al 
Estado a implementar normas de control y sanción al tiempo que debe permitir que las 
sociedades civiles disfruten de la necesaria libertad. También abre la puerta a la 
autorregulación por parte de empresarios y entes similares.31 
El ciberespacio crea "comunidades virtuales" que podrían generar algún debate en 
varios casos entre Conservador y Dominación versus Diversidad y Pluralismo.32 Internet 
podría ser utilizado por comunidades potencialmente marginadas dejando beneficios en la 
esfera cada vez más lucrativa de mundos simulados con multijugadores. Por otra parte, podría 
permitir a los extremistas no liberales encontrar una comunidad transnacional.33 
                                                          
26 Carter, Dave. "Economic Regeneration and the Information Economy." The governance of cyberspace: 
Politics, technology and global restructuring, vol. 136, 1997, p. 137. 
27 Cavanagh, Allison. Sociology in the Age of the Internet. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, Delhi, 2010, p. 64. 
28 Mahabadi, Ladan. “Price of Monopoly and Democracy, Internet and Democracy Blog.” Price of Monopoly 
and Democracy, 19 Aug. 2008, https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/idblog/2008/08/19/price-of-monopoly-and-
democracy/. Accessed on 20 Nov. 2012. 
29 Solum, Lawrence B. “Models of Internet governance.” Internet Governance: Infrastructure and Institutions, 
Lee A. Bygrave and Bing, Jon. (eds), Oxford University Press, UK, 2009, pp. 88-89. 
30 Cavanagh, Allison. Sociology in the Age of the Internet. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, Delhi, 2010, pp. 112-
115. 
31 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xxiii. 
32 Fuchs, Christian. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 
333-334. 
33 Berman, Paul S. "Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace." Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2007, p. xxii. 
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Esta tesis dibuja un marco de vigilancia de comunicaciones por parte de los Estados 
para el ejercicio de los Derechos Humanos a la intimidad y a la protección de datos 
personales. Al considerar el impacto de los avances tecnológicos significativos en las 
comunicaciones, el Estado puede necesitar emplear un sistema jurídico y un mecanismo para 
apoyar la integridad de la protección de datos personales en diferentes niveles; nacional, 
regional e internacional. 
Estos impactos y sus  retos derivados, a su vez, llevaron a la cuestión adicional del 
"régimen de regulación adecuado".34 Sin embargo, no existe una solución única para la 
protección de datos. Las medidas adecuadas que sean apropiadas para su organización 
dependerán de sus circunstancias, por lo que la investigación posterior adopta un enfoque 
basado en los derechos para decidir qué nivel de régimen de protección se puede sugerir. 
 
1.2. Impacto del procesamiento de datos sobre la protección de datos personales 
Las implicaciones económicas y políticas del procesamiento de datos afectan a todos 
los derechos relacionados con la protección de datos personales. Particularmente, cuatro 
preguntas son relevantes: ¿Necesita la economía del conocimiento datos personales para 
procesar y el gobierno ahorrará muchos costes si permite que dicha recolección suceda y 
pueda explotarse? ¿Es aceptable la actitud de 'Zero Privacy'? ¿Es el "derecho fundamental" 
un obstáculo para el proyecto de sociedad de la información de Estados Unidos y la UE? Y 
¿Necesita la protección de datos personales de una institución específica? 
En primer lugar, no sólo existen las necesidades de los negocios, que prefieren un 
amplio margen para sus actividades comerciales a fin de crear un nuevo producto en forma de 
servicios de procesamiento de datos, sino que también existen necesidades de los propios 
gobiernos de los Estados (eficiencias y ahorro de costes). Sin embargo, existen argumentos 
sobre las condiciones económicas35 y sociales "inevitables", que se contraponen a una 
política estricta de protección de datos. 
                                                          
34 Goldsmith, Jack and Wu, Tim. Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World. Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2006, pp. 179-184. 
35 Ruddick, Graham. "Online Shopping to Grow by £320bn in Three Years." The Telegraph, 7 Jun. 2015, 
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11657830/Online-shopping-to-grow-by-
320bn-in-three-years.html. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
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El ciberespacio es apto para probar la teoría de la "gubernamentalidad" de Michel 
Foucault que revela la tecnología de poder del Estado moderno que penetra al individuo a 
través del espacio y la actividad pública.36 Desde el estado ansioso por cambiar la línea al 
espacio privado anterior combinado con la ampliación de los espacios de comunicación 
pública, la Sociedad Legal tiene el deber de responder a los problemas sobre si los medios 
sociales son una esfera pública o un verdadero espacio privado. En este sentido, el sistema de 
procesamiento de datos de las autoridades estatales y las empresas privadas se utilizará como 
un poderoso dispositivo de vigilancia electrónica masiva. 
El mismo problema se da para equilibrar el poder de los derechos estatales e 
individuales bajo algunas condiciones; la seguridad del Estado, la seguridad pública, los 
intereses monetarios del Estado o la supresión de delitos y la protección de los derechos de 
los demás. Estas excepciones son vagas y fáciles de usar como excusa para interferir en la 
esfera privada del individuo. Desde que la recopilación de datos y el procesamiento  de la 
posmodernidad pasan a manos privadas de Corporación de IT,37 poniendo a las autoridades 
estatales al borde del dilema. Por un lado Estado puede cooperar con los sectores privados 
para ganar más poder sobre la gente, por otro lado se mantienen en su posición para regular 
los malos comportamientos de las corporaciones, con la dificultad de que el Estado a menudo 
carece de poder técnico más avanzado para acceder a los datos. Los sueños de las personas de 
tener un Estado decente que proteja a las personas mediante la regulación de las empresas 
privadas pueden parecer ingenuo.  
En lo que respecta a la armonización del mercado electrónico de la UE y los Estados 
Unidos, la intención de crear y ampliar el Gobierno Electrónico proviene de la cuestión del 
anonimato. En ese sentido, a pesar de que el anonimato es un derecho individual, supone una 
tremenda dificultad para gestionar a la población en el ciberespacio.38 Por lo tanto, las 
amenazas a la protección de datos personales  se  originan también desde la vigilancia que se 
ha construido sobre la base del orden social. 
                                                          
36 Loader, Brian. The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring. Psychology 
Press, Brighton, 1997, pp. 12-14. 
37 Koops, Bert-Jaap and Sluijs, Jasper P. "Network Neutrality and Privacy According to Art. 8 Echr." European 
Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 2, no. 3, 2012, p. 7. 
38 Ogura, Toshimaru. "Electronic Government and Surveillance-Oriented Society." Theorizing surveillance: The 
Panopticon and Beyond, Willan Publishing, London, 2006, p. 291. 
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Los instrumentos jurídicos sobre protección de datos personales se crean a partir de 
1980, época en que Interrnet aún no se había expandido demasiado, así que cabe preguntase 
¿cómo se aplican esos instrumentos a los problemas posteriores al milenio que suceden en 
casos de Corporationes de IT transnacionales; Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, 
etc.? En consecuencia, las Autoridadades Internacionales, Regionales y Domésticas para la 
Protección de Datos deben interpretar y aplicar el derecho a casos específicos sobre la base 
del dinamismo, pero la independencia de esas instituciones debe garantizarse de modo 
transparente. 
En cuanto a la evaluación de las Autoridades de Protección de Datos (DPA), esta 
investigación mostrará las decisiones tomadas por las DPA o los Tribunales en muchos casos 
en que hubo acusaciones de cooperación entre las Agencias de Seguridad Nacional y los 
Proveedores de Tecnología de la Información; Corporaciones de IT. La interacción entre 
ellos podría implicar alguna evidencia sobre la eficacia y transparencia de las DPA. 
La investigación presentará los estudios de casos relevantes para escudriñar el éxito de la 
UE y los EE.UU. en la política de protección de datos. En consecuencia, dichos casos serán 
punto de referencia necesario para cualquier desarrollo normativo posterior adoptado o 
posible. 
 
2. Diseño de la investigación 
 
Esta sección ilustra el diseño de la investigación diferenciando 3 secciones. En primer 
lugar, se describirá el objeto de estudio y la Hipótesis de Investigación. En segundo lugar, se 
explican los principales métodos y metodologías que se tienen en cuenta para la investigación 
y cómo se ha accedido a las fuentes y materiales. Por último, se describirá la estructura en la 
que se ha organizado la investigación. 
 
2.1. Objeto de estudio e  hipótesis de investigación 
Esta sección plantea el objeto de la investigación, alcance de la tesis y por último la 
hipótesis de investigación que contiene las preguntas de investigación para el estudio. Estos 
componentes ilustrarán el panorama general de toda la investigación. 
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El objeto de la investigación es el derecho a la protección de datos personales en el 
ciberespacio y sus limitaciones en el marco de la regulación del mercado electrónico UE-
EE.UU. Por lo tanto, las limitaciones del régimen jurídico de la UE y los Estados Unidos para 
cumplir con el derecho a la protección de datos personales son cuestiones que pueden 
suponer un problema para los titulares de tales derechos. Por otra parte, la naturaleza del 
Mercado electrónico, que está dominado por las Corporaciónes de IT de EE.UU. que 
transfieren y procesan datos personales de los ciudadanos de la UE a través del Atlántico, 
genera más situaciones complicadas para iniciar un régimen común que proteja los datos 
personales entre EU y EE.UU. El nuevo régimen propuesto debe abordar dos grandes retos: 
1) Excepciones sobre la base del estado de emergencia; Seguridad Nacional, Seguridad 
Pública, Moralidad, etc.,  al ejercicio del derecho a los datos personales, especialmente en el 
caso de ciudadanos no estadounidenses, 
2) Las entidades estadounidenses, sometidas al sistema jurídico estadounidense y no al de la 
UE, deben garantizar la aplicación del derecho a la protección de datos personales en el 
mercado único UE-EE.UU. 
Esta tesis se concentrará en la Protección de Datos Personales - no Privacidad –desde 
la perspectiva de los Derechos Humanos. Se centrará así mismo en los beneficios de 
seguridad internacional y los Derechos Humanos de los usuarios de Internet en todo el 
mundo. 
Los actores y las relaciones incluidas en la investigación son los responsables de las 
obligaciones jurídicas en materia de protección de datos personales, tanto entidades públicas 
como privadas.  No obstante, también se tienen en cuenta las ‘relaciones informales de poder’ 
entre Estado y organizaciones privadas, dada la existencia de acuerdos informales o 
coordinación entre ambos para el intercambio y procesamiento de datos. El marco temporal 
de la investigación es 2001-2016 (después de los atentados del 9/11 en Estados Unidos y 
hasta la más reciente reforma del régimen UE-EEUU culminada en 2016). Su ‘ambito 
espacial’ es el ciberespacio, especialmente el mercado electrónico, la transferencia de datos 
por Internet internacionalmente. No sólo estudia los instrumentos jurídicos propios de la UE, 
sino también de las relaciones transatlánticas, UE-EE.UU. 
La Investigación selecciona 2 Áreas de estudio; UE y UE-EE.UU., y se basará en las 
evidencias de la práctica en cada área y otros análisis; Revisiones documentales y opiniones 
de expertos. Además, la información cualitativa; sentencias, resoluciones y opiniones de 
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organizaciones o de las autoridades estatales serán tomadas como pruebas o interpretaciones 
básicas.  
Hipótesis de la investigación 
El punto de partida de la investigación es el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos, que contiene el marco general para el apoyo y regulación de la protección de datos 
personales en el ciberespacio. Sin embargo, los caracteres distintivos del ciberespacio exigen 
una regulación y mecanismos específicos bien diseñados, a nivel universal, para garantizar 
internacionalmente tales derechos fundamentales relativos a la protección de datos 
personales. Consecuentemente, la hipótesis de investigación se formula del siguiente modo: 
en primer lugar, la protección eficaz de los datos personales en el ciberespacio necesita el 
establecimiento de un sistema jurídico internacional de alcance universal basado en tratados; 
en segundo lugar, el régimen de la UE sobre protección de datos personales en el 
ciberespacio y los actuales acuerdos UE-Estados Unidos sobre esta cuestión pueden utilizarse 
como modelo para la elaboración de dicho Tratado Internacional. 
Preguntas de investigación 
La hipótesis anterior puede transformarse en las siguientes preguntas para la 
realización de la investigacion: 
1) ¿Cómo han regulado la protección de datos personales en el mercado electrónico las 
normas de la Unión Europea, los Estados Unidos de América y el acuerdo UE-EE.UU? 
2) ¿Cómo se han resuelto los problemas cuando existen conflictos entre los Derechos 
Humanos protegidos de los individuos y la utilización por los Estados de datos procesados 
por las Corporaciones de IT? 
3) ¿Cómo se han expresado las decisiones judiciales relativas a Corporaciones IT? ¿Y hasta 
qué punto establecen un precedente para el derecho a la protección de datos personales? 
4) ¿Cuáles son los cambios sobre protección de datos que aportan las reformas de la UE y los 
Estados Unidos en la regulación de mercado electrónico? 
5) ¿Qué debería ser formulado como Régimen Universal para regular el procesamiento de 
datos de las Corporaciones Transnacionales IT y las Autoridades del Estado de modo que 
posibilite el cumplimiento del derecho a la protección de datos personales a nivel nacional, 
regional e internacional? 
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2.2.  Métodos y metodología de investigación 
La investigación emplea la doctrina jurídica en el  estudio sobre la historia de las 
normas sobre protección de datos y de su desarrollo al hilo del progreso de la tecnología de la 
información. 
Sin embargo, parte de la investigación emplea un estudio jurídico no doctrinal para 
ilustrar la complejidad de la práctica de las Corporaciónes de IT y las agencias estatales y 
demostrar cómo la violación de derechos individuales se produce también por el 
desconocimiento de las autoridades del Estado. 
En términos de investigación empírica, esta investigación emplea un estilo 
cuantitativo y cualitativo para reunir los datos en diferentes estudios de casos en 
circunstancias difíciles. 
En cuanto al aspecto cuantitativo, los números estadísticos, informes y casos serán 
categorizados y representarán la operación y cooperación entre Corporación de IT y el 
Estado. 
En el aspecto cualitativo, se tienen en cuenta la revisión de la literatura, entrevistas y 
comunicados de prensa de las partes interesadas, decisiones judiciales, informes oficiales y 
opiniones de las organizaciones de expertos a fin de  identificar los problemas y perspectivas 
de la protección de datos personales. 
Asímismo, el análisis de Estudio Jurídico Crítico sobre la economía política entre 
Estados y corporaciones se utilizará como marco principal para describir la relación entre 
ellos que debería estar sujeta por ciertos regímenes jurídicos para la protección de datos. 
Finalmente, la investigación prescriptiva se empleará como marco para analizar las 
reformas del régimen de protección de datos de la UE y los Estados Unidos. En 
consecuencia, los estudios comparativos permitirán sintetizar los requisitos previos 
deducibles del régimen de la UE - EE.UU. que pueden servir de posible punto de partida para 
la progresiva realización de un Régimen Universal del derecho a la protección de datos 
personales de escala mundial. 
El plan de investigación para completar el proyecto de investigación consta de 
1) Revisión de la literatura jurídica. 
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2) Recopilación de datos empíricos para probar el procesamiento de datos por parte de las IT 
Corporations y su cooperación con el Estado en la recolección, procesamiento y compartición 
de datos. 
3) Análisis de Economía Política sobre la legitimidad de la relación entre las IT Corporations 
y los Estados a partir de la evidencia empírica. 
4) Análisis Socio-Legal sobre antiguas normas de protección de datos personales y su 
ejecución. 
5) Investigación prescriptiva sobre jurisprudencia de los estudios de casos de la Corte 
Suprema y Tribunales de los Estados Unidos y Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. 
6) Investigación Normativa sobre nuevas normas de protección de datos personales. 
7) Síntesis de las perspectivas de promover un régimen de protección de datos personales a 
partir de la investigación. 
Para cumplir con el plan de investigación necesité pasar tiempo en muchos lugares y 
visitar varios espacios para acceder a fuentes de material; 
1) Bibliotecas; Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Barcelona, Facultad de Economía y 
Empresa de la Universidad de Barcelona, Facultad de Derecho de laUniversidad de 
Chiangmai. Estas bibliotecas no sólo permiten el acceso a los libros de papel y revistas 
académicas, sino también proporcionar el catálogo de la biblioteca digital que se describe a 
continuación.  
2) Portales de Internet, Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, Social Science Research Network (SSRN) y 
Legal Scholarship Network (LSN) 
3) Sitio Oficial de las Organizaciones de Competencia, Naciones Unidas, Oficina del Alto 
Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Foro de Gobernanza de 
Internet (IGF), Unión Europea, Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, Comisión Europea 
Misión de Justicia, Comisión de Libertades Civiles, Justicia y Asuntos De Interior Comisión; 
Puerto Seguro, Escudo de Privacidad, Biblioteca del Congreso, Tribunales Gobierno de 
EE.UU.  
4) Seminario anual internacional del Foro de Gobernanza de Internet de las Naciones Unidas. 
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2.3. Estructura de la investigación 
La investigación se divide en 6 capítulos. El primer capítulo recoge el diseño de la 
investigación y el  último engloba las conclusiones y las recomendaciones que pueden 
formularse a partir de la misma. Indicaremos a continuación los contenidos fundamentales de 
los capítulos 2, 3, 4 y 5 de la tesis en los que se recoge el desarrollo y resultados de nuestra 
investigación. 
1) El antiguo régimen de Protección de Datos Personales 
El capítulo 2 analiza los instrumentos universales, las normas de la UE y los 
acuerdos entre UE y EE.UU. antes del 5 de junio de 2013, partiendo de los antecedentes 
históricos de la protección de datos personales, la cristalización de la protección de datos 
personales a nivel institucional con diferentes estatutos jurídicos, junto a sus disposiciones 
sustantivas. Juntos forman parte del entorno regulador contemporáneo de protección de datos 
internacionales. En este capítulo, la investigación considera el STATUS QUO del régimen de 
protección de datos personales vigente antes del proceso de reforma en la UE y EE.UU. A 
pesar de la proliferación de las fuentes internacionales de las normas de protección de datos, 
su aplicación sigue siendo a nivel estatal. En efecto, dependiendo de las restricciones 
nacionales, corresponde a los gobiernos nacionales decidir si se debe introducir la legislación 
sobre protección de datos, qué modelo internacional aplicar, cómo aplicarlo y cómo 
equilibrarlo con otros derechos humanos u otras consideraciones; el régimen e importancia de 
la seguridad del estado, la lucha contra el crimen y el terrorismo. Consecuentemente, el 
régimen estadounidense de protección de datos personales se convierte en relevante, como se 
analiza en el Capítulo 2. 
2) Principales Casos sobre protección de datos personales en la práctica y 
ante los  Tribunales 
Como las Corporaciones IT son los principales actores en el dilema entre 
Procesamiento de Datos y Protección de Datos, la relación entre los proveedores de servicios 
(SP) y las autoridades del Estado son cruciales para el análisis. Las amenazas a la protección 
de datos personales planteadas por agencias estatales o actores no estatales, en este caso 
Corporación de IT, proceden de la acumulación y posesión de grandes almacenes de datos 
trazables. El capítulo 3 reflejará los problemas existentes mediante la selección de las 
políticas y prácticas de la Agencia de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos que penetran en los 
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sistemas de  contenidos de las Corporations IT Transnacionales. Con el fin de buscar una 
interpretación precisa de la protección de datos personales, se estudian las decisiones 
judiciales en los tribunales nacionales de EE.UU. y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión 
Europea en aplicación de este conjunto normativo, antes de que se produjera la reforma. En 
ellos es posible encontrar un claro precedente sobre cómo se aplicó el derecho a la protección 
de datos personales en diversos escenarios. Dichos precedentes jurisprudenciales podrán 
servir de puntos de referencia para la reforma y creación del nuevo régimen de protección de 
datos personales en diferentes niveles; Nacional, Bilateral, Regional e Internacional. 
3) Reformas de la UE y la UE-EE.UU. sobre la protección de datos 
personales en el ciberespacio 
En el capítulo 4,  se analiza el nuevo régimen de protección de datos 
personales de la UE y los acuerdos bilaterales UE-EE.UU. , fruto de las reformas operadas 
desde el 6 de junio de 2013. En primer lugar, el régimen nacional estadounidense de 
transición sobre protección de datos personales en el ciberespacio. El Gobierno de los 
Estados Unidos había lanzado una serie de iniciativas legislativas para reformar su actividad 
de vigilancia y proporcionar a los ciudadanos no estadounidenses un reforzamiento de sus 
derechos sobre protección de datos personales ante los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos. A 
continuación, la amplia revisión de los nuevos regímenes de la UE y EE.U.U., la UE aprueba 
el Reglamento General de Protección de Datos (GDPR) y la Directiva sobre asuntos 
judiciales y penales. Luego, la UE instó al gobierno de los Estados Unidos a firmar un nuevo 
acuerdo bilateral para aplicar esas normas; el Privacy Shield UE-EE.UU. Para la protección 
general de datos y el Acuerdo Conjunto UE-EE.UU. sobre asuntos judiciales y penales. Sin 
embargo, no ha habido un Tratado Internacional para la Protección de Datos de Carácter 
Personal. Los estudios sobre los regímenes de la UE y los Estados Unidos darán perspectivas 
sobre la eventualidad de iniciar la elaboración de instrumentos universales y regionales de 
protección de datos personales y otras medidas de derecho interno. 
4) El enfoque universal para la creación de un nuevo Régimen de Protección 
de Datos Personales 
Finalmente, el quinto capítulo evalúa la posibilidad de elaborar un Tratado 
Internacional de alcance universal que garantice el derecho a la protección de datos 
personales que ‘circulan’ en el ciberespacio. Teniendo en cuenta las iniciativas formuladas 
por organizaciones gubernamentales internacionales y por los movimientos no 
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gubernamentales especializados, el capítulo muestra cómo se pueden extraer un conjunto de 
principios de las reformas de la UE y del régimen aplicable en el espacio UE-EEUU y cómo 
esos principios pueden utilizarse para la creación de un régimen internacional de protección 
de datos personales en el ciberespacio. 
 
3. Conclusiones y recomendaciones 
Los usos de los datos personales de Internet ya no se no se limitan a interacciones en 
la esfera local, ni siquiera en espacios fícios bien delimitados.. Además, el procesamiento 
transfronterizo de datos personales se ha personalizado. Los organismos controladores de 
datos nacionales ya no son necesarios para que los sujetos titulares de los datos puedan 
transmitirlos a través de fronteras a otros controladores de datos de modo que se produzcan 
intercambios transfronterizos.39 Hoy en día, las aplicaciones de redes sociales permiten a los 
usuarios subir sus datos personales a la "cuenta" o "página web", yendo y viniendo de un 
destino no identificado. En este contexto, por lo que se refiere a la protección de datos, debe 
decidirse cómo, en todo caso, los datos pueden ser protegidos en la misma medida en el 
ciberespacio que en el mundo "real".40 Es habitual que los intentos de crear una sociedad 
"conectada" y segura resulten aún más difíciles que en un entorno sin conexión porque la 
cantidad de datos procesados es mucho mayor que en el pasado. En este contexto de 
problemas y retos generales, nuestra investigación permite extraer algunas conclusiones y 
formular recomendaciones que pueden ayudar a su solución y gestión. 
 
3.1. Conclusiones  
 
3.1.1. Protección de datos personales en el marco del régimen jurídico de la UE y 
del mercado electrónico de UE-EE.UU. antes de 2013: deficiencias y 
problemas principales 
Si bien el objetivo de esta investigación es armonizar la provisión e implementación 
de la Protección de Datos Personales para la creación del Régimen Internacional, el punto de 
                                                          
39 De Hert, Paul and Papakonstantinou, Vagelis. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p. 271. 
40 Metcalf, Katrin N. "Legal Aspects of Privacy Law and Data Protection." The Right to Privacy as a Human 
Right and Everyday Technologies, Institute of Human Rights NGO, 2014, p. 83. 
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partida muestra la superposición e insuficiencia de los instrumentos antiguos. 
Específicamente, el viejo conjunto de normas sobre protección de datos personales, 
promulgado antes del proceso de reforma de la UE y los Estados Unidos, se había basado en 
gran medida en la aplicación nacional del mismo.41 
3.1.1.1.  Predominio de las entidades estadounidenses y sus efectos sobre 
los  Global Netizen  
Destacadamente, los recelos y críticas sucitados por el sistema estadounidense  
en relación a la protección de datos personales se pusieron de manifiesto a raíz de la 
operación de inteligencia de EEUU. en el ámbito de la Seguridad Nacional.42 La intención del 
gobierno Norteamericano de llevar a cabo una vigilancia electrónica masiva en las 
actividades relacionadas con el terrorismo, especialmente sobre extranjeros que están fuera de 
la protección constitucional norteamericana, puede conducir a los usuarios de Internet en todo 
el mundo a situaciones más que complicadas, desde el punto de vista de la protección de sus 
derechos sobre sus datos personales.43 El hecho de que la mayoría de las principales 
corporaciones de IT se hallan radicadas en  los EE.UU. o transferieren datos personales a 
servidores ubicados en territorio de EE.UU. implica que la principal amenaza para los 
usuarios de Internet no ciudadanos de los EE.UU, sería el acceso a la defensa de sus derechos 
en este país. 
Las Corporación IT de EE.UU. está sujetas a las leyes internas de los Estados 
Unidos mientras que los derechos de los Global Neitizen entran al ámbito de la jurisdicción 
de los Estados Unidos cuando dichos datos se transfieren a territorio o entidades 
estadounidenses y pudiendo entonces  verse comprometidos por el ejercicio de poderes de las 
autoridades estadounidenses. 
El Controlador de Datos, Corporación IT de EE.UU., tiene la obligación de 
asegurar su sistema de datos y notificar a los sujetos de los datos ya  la Autoridad de 
Protección de Datos de Estados Unidos (DPA), cualquier  violación de los mismos que llegue 
                                                          
41 De Hert, Paul and Papakonstantinou, Vagelis. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p. 275. 
42 Galetta, Antonella and De Hert, Paul. A European perspective on data protection and access rights. Vrije 
Universiteit, Brussels, 2013, p. 4. 
43 Weiss, Martin A and Archick, Kristin. "US-EU Data Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield." 
Congressional Research Service, 2016, p. 8. 
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a producirse. US DPA, la Comisión Federal de Comercio bajo el Ministerio de Comercio, 
tiene el deber de proporcionar consejos44 preparatorios y de apoyo, especialmente cuando 
hubiese una amplia difusión masiva electrónica de vigilancia de datos por la Agencia de 
Seguridad Nacional de EE.UU. 45Antes de las revelaciones del 5 de junio de 2013, tanto la 
DPA de EE.UU. como la Corporación IT no habían hecho nada. Para cumplir el Criterio de 
Adecuación de la UE,46 la transferencia de datos a través del Atlántico había estado bajo la 
provisión del Acuerdo de  Safe Harbor UE-EE.UU., legalizando los flujos de datos 
transfronterizos. 
La eficacia de los regímenes de aplicación de la legislación en diversos países 
se basa en el alcance de la interpretación judicial y en otros aspectos comparativos de las 
leyes de protección de datos.47 Existen procedimientos de solución de controversias en la UE, 
pero no en el Acuerdo de Safe Harbor.48 La transferencia masiva de datos de ciudadanos no 
estadounidenses a empresas y autoridades estadounidenses y la falta de un mecanismo de 
reparación apropiado para tratar esta eventualidad  es un tema de extrema preocupación.49 
Los reguladores de protección de datos de la UE habían iniciado una 
investigación sobre las prácticas de retención de datos y privacidad de Google, que se 
extendió también a otros motores de búsqueda.50 En 2012, el EPIC apeló ante el Tribunal de 
Distrito de los Estados Unidos  en el Distrito de Columbia en busca de la divulgación de 
cualquier comunicación entre la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional (NSA) y Google Inc. en 
                                                          
44 Boehm, Franziska. "Confusing Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe: Loopholes in Europe’s 
Fundamental Rights Protection Exemplified on European Data Protection Rules." University of Luxembourg, 
Law Working Paper Series, Paper no. 2009-01, 2009, p. 17. 
45 Dowling Jr, Donald C. “International Data Protection and Privacy Law.” Practising Law Institute treatise 
International Corporate Practice, 2009, p. 16. 
46 Reding, Viviane. "The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European Union." International Data 
Privacy Law, vol. 1, 2011, pp. 3-5. 
47 Greenleaf, Graham. "Sheherezade and the 101 Data Privacy Laws: Origins, Significance and Global 
Trajectories." Journal Of Law, Information & Science, 2013, p. 26. 
48 Dowling Jr, Donald C. "Preparing to Resolve Us-Based Employers' Disputes under Europe's New Data 
Privacy Law." J. Alt. Disp. Resol., vol. 2, 2000, p. 31. 
49 Moraes, Claude. “Working Document on the US and EU Surveillance programmes and their impact on EU 
citizens fundamental rights.” LIBE Committee Inquiry on electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens, Justice 
and Home Affairs, 2013, p. 72. 
50 Global Privacy Counsel. Article 29 Working Party Letter to Mr. Peter Fleischer on Google. 16 May 2007. 
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relación con el cifrado y la seguridad cibernética.51  Muchos casos dieron a conocer  la 
cooperación entre la NSA y la Corporación de TI y sus efectos sobre la Protección de Datos 
Personales. 
Dado que el proyecto PRISM de NSA recopila datos de las corporaciones de 
TI más poderosas del mundo, como Google,52 Yahoo, Facebook, etc. la identificación del 
lugar y la actividad de las personas podía rastrearse ordenadamente desde la Gran Colección 
de Datos [Big Data Collection]53 que se recoge del Ciberespacio, incluyendo a ciudadanos no 
estadounidenses fuera del territorio estadounidense. 
Los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos han tomado decisiones que sientan  
precedente sobre Recolección y Compartición de Datos de la Corporación de TI y la 
Autoridad Estatal ya que ambos sujetos se encuentran bajo la jurisdicción de los Estados 
Unidos.54 El 16 de diciembre de 2013, el Tribunal de Distrito de los Estados Unidos 
dictaminó en Klayman v. Obama que la recopilación a gran escala de registros de detalle de 
llamadas telefónicas nacionales probablemente violaba la Cuarta Enmienda (derecho a la 
privacidad y protección de datos personales).55 Este caso reivindicaba el goce pleno de los 
derechos constitucionales de un ciudadano de los Estados Unidos, pero la protección de los 
ciudadanos no estadounidenses permanece en el aire.56 
Desdel otro lado del Atlántico, el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea 
CJUE había adoptado una serie de decisiones relativas a la protección de datos personales por 
parte de la Corporación de TI y el Estado, especialmente el caso de Entidades de nacionalidad 
estadounidenses. Puesto que existía el Informe LIBE sobre Vigilancia Electrónica en Masa, el 
programa MUSCULAR, que recoge más del doble de puntos de datos comparados con 
                                                          
51 United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Case 11-5233 EPIC vs. NSA. Document #1373260. 
05 Nov. 2012. 
52 Lopez-Tarruella, Aurelio. "Introduction: Google Pushing the Boundaries of Law." Google and the Law, 
Springer, 2012, Preamble. 
53 Ingram, Mick."Google Publishes Figures on Government Requests for Data" World Socialist Web Site, 26 
Apr. 2010, www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/04/goog-a26.html. Accessed 31 Oct. 2013. 
54 Fahey, Elaine and Curtin, Deirdre. A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the 
Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders. Cambridge University Press, UK, 2014. 
55 United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Case 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 Klayman v. Obama. 16 Dec. 
2013. 
56 Kerr, Orin S. “The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet.” GWU Law School Public Law Research 
Paper No. 2014-30, 2014. 
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PRISM. El programa MUSCULAR no requiere órdenes judiciales57 y opera mediante la 
coordinación con el Reino Unido; por tanto Reino Unido, como Estado miembro de la UE, 
había violado los datos personales de los interesados en todo el mundo. 
El usuario de Facebook, que afirma que sus datos fueron violados por las 
Agencias de Estados Unidos, dio lugar al llamado Caso Schrems.58 El fallo del TJUE 
determinó que los requisitos de seguridad nacional, de interés público y de aplicación de la 
ley de los Estados tienen "primacía" sobre los principios de Puerto Seguro y que las empresas 
estadounidenses están obligadas a ignorar, sin limitación, las normas protectoras establecidas 
por este régimen cuando entran en conflicto con tales requisitos.59 Por consiguiente, el TJUE 
observó que el régimen Safe Harbor "permite la interferencia" de las autoridades 
estadounidenses "con los derechos fundamentales de las personas cuyos datos personales son 
o podrían ser transferidos de la UE a los Estados Unidos.”60 
El TJEU llegó a la conclusión de que la normativa de Safe Harbor y de los 
Estados Unidos no contempla la posibilidad de que un particular recurra a la vía judicial a fin 
de tener acceso a los datos personales que le atañen o para obtener la rectificación o el 
borrado de dichos datos, lo que compromete la esencia de su derecho fundamental a la 
intimidad, componente  esencial del Estado de Derecho.61 Por lo tanto, la Decisión de Safe 
Harbor no contenía una medida correctiva suficiente para el individuo en caso de violación 
por Corporación de IT o la Autoridad Nacional del Estado. 
Consecuentemente, TJEU invalidó el Acuerdo de Safe Harbor el 6 de octubre 
de 2015, colocando a UE y EE.UU. en la necesidad de renegociar un nuevo acuerdo para 
regular los flujos de datos entre ambos lados del Atlántico. 
                                                          
57 Bowden, Caspar. “Directorate General For Internal Policies.” The US Surveillance Programmes and Their 
Impact on EU Citizens' Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 18. 
58 Weiss, Martin A and Archick, Kristin. "US-EU Data Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield." 
Congressional Research Service, 2016, p. 7. 
59 Gavilán, Elisa U. "Derechos Fundamentales Versus Vigilancia Masiva. Comentario a La Sentencia Del 
Tribunal De Justicia (Gran Sala) De 6 De Octubre De 2015 En El Asunto C-362/14 Schrems." Revista de 
Derecho Comunitario Europeo, no. 53, 2016, pp. 261-282.  
60 Ramos, Mario H. "Una Vuelta De Tuerca Más a Las Relaciones En Materia De Protección De Datos Entre La 
Ue Y Los Estados Unidos: La Invalidez De La Decisión Puerto Seguro." Revista General de Derecho 
Europeo, no. 39, 2016, pp. 27-31. 
61 CJEU. Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 6 Oct. 2015, para. 95. 
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En conclusión, las dificultades provenían del fracaso del sistema jurídico 
estadounidense para proteger los datos personales de los interesados. El sistema 
estadounidense  no satisfacía las necesidades normativas europeas referentes a la protección 
de datos personales. El programa del gobierno de los Estados Unidos para llevar a cabo la 
vigilancia electrónica en masa de las actividades relacionadas con el terrorismo, 
especialmente de los extranjeros no cubiertos por la protección constitucional EEUU, implica 
difíciles escenarios para los usuarios de Internet a nivel mundial en la defensa de sus 
derechos. 
 
3.1.1.2. Estándares diferentes y las dificultades de una  jurisdicción 
fragmentada 
La protección de datos personales ha sido reconocida en diversos 
instrumentos, desde el seno de la Comunidad Internacional,  hasta el Bloque Regional de la 
UE y el Acuerdo Bilateral UE-EE.UU. A causa de este escenario, las consecuencias jurídicas 
vinculantes de cada instrumento normativo difieren las unas de las otras porque dependen de 
la naturaleza jurídica de cada uno.62 Las diferencias en la naturaleza jurídica de la legislación 
sobre protección de datos entre las culturas y los sistemas jurídicos han hecho más difícil 
llegar a un consenso internacional sobre el tema.63 
Los puntos comunes y sobre todo las diferencias de definición y alcance en las 
diversas fuentes, trae complicaciones a la implementación de la protección de datos 
personales. Muchas actividades en el sector público o privado están bajo el alcance de los 
instrumentos de protección de datos personales que cubren gran cantidad de información.64 
Sin embargo, esto ha traído problemas a los individuos para ejercer sus derechos en otros 
países.65  El principal inconveniente a efectos de  jurisdicción  es que el actor más poderoso 
que controla y procesa datos personales, la Corporación de IT, una Persona Jurídica 
                                                          
62 Kuner, Christopher. "An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects." Computer 
law & security review, vol. 25, no. 4, 2009, p. 307. 
63 Kirby, Michael. "The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 Oecd Guidelines on Privacy." 
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, pp. 6-14. 
64Cate, Fred H. "The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles." Consumer Protection in the Age of the 
Information Economy, 2006. 
65 Kuner, Christopher. "Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, 
Present, and Future." TILT Law & Technology Working Paper No. 016/2010, 2010, p.  30. 
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Multilateral, está bajo la aplicación de la Ley de un territorio específico pero sus actividades 
son transfronterizas.66 
Los instrumentos que reconocen el derecho a los datos personales han sido 
creados durante décadas, por lo que hay algunas disposiciones obsoletas en tales instrumentos 
jurídicos. Cuanto más avanza la tecnología, más complejidad trae en térinos jurídicos.67 La 
aplicación del derecho de los interesados a la protección de los datos personales es cada vez 
más complicada debido a la naturaleza de los datos que se descentralizan a diversos tipos de 
organizaciones.68 
El principio ‘justo y lícito’ proporciona una ‘lente’ a través de la cual deben 
interpretarse las demás disposiciones de la Directiva sobre protección de datos.69 En la 
medida en que el procesador de datos no tiene ninguna obligación directa con respecto a los 
datos, ello afectará la forma en que se tratan los problemas de protección de datos en los 
negocios de procesamiento de datos y el intercambio de datos para la prevención y represión 
del crimen y el terrorismo,70 especialmente cuando el Tercero es Sujeto a Jurisdicción 
Diferente.71 
La jurisdicción de las normas de la UE y la aplicación extraterritorial de la 
legislación de protección de datos de la UE se reafirmó con mayor fuerza en el Caso Google 
España.72Al constatar que la ley de protección de datos de la UE se aplicaba en este caso, el 
Tribunal de Justicia observó que la Directiva debe interpretarse en el sentido de que tiene un 
                                                          
66 Kuner, Christopher. "European Data Protection Law." Corporate Compliance and Regulation, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2007, ch.2.37. 
67 De Hert, Paul and Schreuders, Eric. "The Relevance of Convention 108." Proceedings of the Council of 
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alcance territorial particularmente amplio.73 El TJUE también consideró que el derecho a 
suprimir datos en virtud de la Directiva de protección de datos de la UE se aplica a los 
resultados de los motores de búsqueda en Internet74 (‘derecho al olvido" o ‘derecho a 
borrar’). Estos precedentes ofrecen a los usuarios de Internet de la UE un camino para ejercer 
sus derechos con las Corporaciones de IT transfronterizas, incluso aunque estas personas 
jurídicas no sean nacionales de la UE. 
En la Unión Europea, diversos instrumentos jurídicos proporcionan a los 
individuos y a los reguladores un marco que permite la afirmación de derechos en relación 
con el procesamiento de datos en la UE. Por lo tanto, las autoridades de protección de datos 
de la UE están obligadas a cooperar entre sí,75 y a menudo lo hacen en la práctica.76 Las 
decisiones judiciales de un Estado miembro de la UE también pueden aplicarse con relativa 
facilidad en otro Estado miembro.77 Sin embargo, los mismos instrumentos jurídicos no se 
aplican a situaciones en las que está implicado un país no perteneciente a la UE, lo que 
significa que no es posible que se realice esta cooperación reglamentaria reforzada ni que 
tampoco haya la misma facilidad de ejecución.78 La dificultad de hacer valer los derechos en 
el extranjero no es exclusiva de la protección de datos, sino que deriva del hecho de que no 
existe un marco jurídico global para la afirmación de los derechos de los consumidores en el 
ciberespacio ni para el reconocimiento y la ejecución de decisiones judiciales en otros países. 
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3.1.1.3. Exenciones vagas y falta de supervisión de la vigilancia de datos en    
el procedimiento penal 
Al igual que otros Derechos Humanos, el derecho a la protección de datos 
personales no es absoluto. Puede ser restringido en ciertas situaciones en especial cuando 
colisione  con otros derechos.79 En la mayoría de los casos se trata de la relación entre el 
estado de emergencia y la protección de datos personales.80 Las autoridades estatales y los 
tribunales deben sopesar las razones para acceder a ciertos datos y el efecto potencial sobre 
una persona de tal vigilancia estatal.81 Se debe prever una condición previa y una solución 
proporcionada, en la que se tengan en cuenta los intereses del Estado y del público, así como 
los intereses de la persona afectada.82 Sin embargo, las corporaciones de IT más poderosas se 
encuentran bajo las leyes de seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos, Ley Patriota, Ley de 
Seguridad Nacional y Ley de Vigilancia de Inteligencia Extranjera, que pueden comprometer 
el pleno disfrute de la protección de datos personales. 
La mayoría de los instrumentos de protección de datos imponen una 
obligación similar a las autoridades públicas y a las personas privadas.83 Después de todo, los 
Derechos Humanos tienen como objetivo principal limitar las acciones de las autoridades 
públicas a fin de proteger las actividades de las personas  privadas, incluido el tratamiento de 
datos personales, de la interferencia del Estado.84 Sin embargo, la efectividad del control de 
acceso de las excepciones de seguridad nacional es relevante para la existencia de puertas 
traseras u otros medios de acceso  a datos personales no cifrados y abiertos por el proveedor 
de servicios, la Corporación de IT. 
                                                          
79 Galetta, Antonella and De Hert, Paul. A European perspective on data protection and access rights. Vrije 
Universiteit, Brussel, 2013, p. 4. 
80 Nowak, Manfred. United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Ccpr Commentary. Engel, 
Lancaster, 1993, p. 462.   
81 Human Rights Committee. Communication No. 488/1992 Toonan v Australia. 1992, para. 8.3; see also 
communications Nos. 903/1999. 1999, para.7.3; and 1482/2006. 2006, paras.10.1 and 10.2.   
82 Mendel, Toby et al. Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression. UNESCO, Paris, 2012, 
pp. 53 and 99.   
83 Kokott, Juliane and Sobotta, Christoph. "The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Jurisprudence of the Cjeu and the Ecthr." International Data Privacy Law, vol. 3, no. 4, 2013, p. 226. 
84 Masing, Johannes. "Herausforderungen Des Datenschutzes." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 65, no. 33, 
2012, pp. 2305-2306. ; Grimm, Dieter. “Der Datenschutz vor einer Neuorientierung” Juristenzeitung, 2013, p. 
585. 
25 
 
En el caso Centro de Información de Privacidad de Eletrónica v. Agencia de 
Seguridad Nacional, el Circuito DC sostuvo que la respuesta Glomar de la NSA (permanece 
en silencio cuando la consulta es cara a cara) satisfizo suficientemente los requisitos de 
exención de la Ley de Libertad de Información porque la evaluación de amenaza es una 
función indiscutible de la NSA y esta no estaba obligada a confirmar o negar la existencia de 
ningún registro de respuesta.85 Este caso afirmó el poder de excepción de Seguridad Nacional 
para ejercer la misión en secreto por encima de la protección de los derechos civiles. 
Los problemas surgidos del conjunto de Leyes de Seguridad fueron dejados a 
la interpretación, en procedimientos secretos, en manos de órganos administrativos como el 
Tribunal de Vigilancia de Inteligencia Extranjera (FISC y el tribunal de revisión superior 
FISCR) cuyos jueces son nombrados exclusivamente por el Presidente del Tribunal Supremo. 
Parece que los tribunales de la FISA están de acuerdo con el argumento del gobierno de que 
es común en las investigaciones que algunos corpus de registros indefinidamente grandes 
sean considerados "pertinentes", a fin de descubrir las pruebas reales.86 En consecuencia, la 
falta de supervisión es la principal amenaza para la protección de datos personales en todo el 
mundo, ya que se basa en decisiones administrativas relacionadas con los tribunales 
estadounidenses. Además, el ciudadano no estadounidense no tiene derecho a apelar en la 
Corte de los Estados Unidos por tales violaciones. 
En el Caso de Digital Rights Ireland, cabe señalar en particular el principio de 
limitación del objetivo,87 el derecho de acceso de los particulares a sus datos personales y el 
control por parte de las autoridades independientes de protección de datos.88 En ese sentido, 
se señaló que la retención de datos necesita un fragmento de evidencia que sugiera que su 
conducta podría estar relacionada con un crimen grave y nadie está exento de esta regla. Se 
aplica incluso a aquellos cuyas comunicaciones están sujetas al secreto profesional, de 
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acuerdo con las normas nacionales.89 Posteriormente, la Directiva sobre retención de datos 
fue invalidada por el TJUE el 8 de abril de 2014, ya que no cumplía el principio de la UE de 
excepciones proporcionadas y necesarias. 
 
3.1.2. Mejoras y límites en la protección de datos personales tras las reformas de 
2013 del régimen jurídico del Mercado electrónico de UE y UE-EE.UU.. 
Después de que todos las cuestiones suscitadas ante los tribunales de EE.UU. y la UE 
en los casos anteriores, el Gobierno de EE.UU. y la Unidad de Legislación de la UE pusieron 
en marcha un conjunto de normas en interés de la reforma. 
Los EE.UU. y la UE nombraron una  comisión para crear cambios a fin de lograr la 
mejor solución en el manejo de los problemas. Con este punto de partida, la UE aprobó el 
Reglamento General de Protección de Datos (GDPR) y la Directiva sobre asuntos judiciales y 
penales, luego consiguió que los Estados Unidos firmaran un acuerdo para aplicar las normas 
del UE-EE.UU. Privacy Shield para la protección general de datos en ambos territorios. Estas 
reformas tuvieron lugar desde abril de 2016 y entrarán plenamente en vigor en 2018. 
Sin embargo,  la génesis de estas reformas se remonta a los cambios provocados por 
Estados Unidos desde finales de 2013 debido a la presión internacional sobre los programas 
mundiales de vigilancia electrónica masiva de su Gobierno, especialmente la ejercida por la 
UE, su principal contraparte en el mercado único electrónico. 
 
3.1.2.1. Respuestas de los Estados Unidos relativas a la protección de datos 
personales para ciudadanos no estadounidenses 
Hay iniciativas de EE.UU. y la UE para abordar el problema de la protección 
de datos personales en la era digital. El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos había lanzado un 
conjunto de leyes para reformar su actividad de vigilancia y proporcionar a los ciudadanos no 
estadounidenses una mayor protección de sus datos personales. 
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En marzo de 2014, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos adoptó seis principios de 
privacidad para regular  la vigilancia. Este marco Norteamericano declarado por el Presidente 
Obama en la Directiva Política Presidencial 28 (PPD-28) pretende proteger mejor los datos 
personales de todas las personas, incluidos los no ciudadanos de los EE.UU. en todo el 
mundo. 90 
La mejora fundamental es la Ley de reparación judicial, que extiende a los 
ciudadanos de la UE los mismos derechos de que disfrutan los ciudadanos de los EE.UU. en 
virtud de la Ley de Privacidad de 1974 con respecto a las obligaciones de los Estados Unidos 
en materia de protección de datos. Además, la Ley de Reparación Judicial otorga a los 
ciudadanos de la UE el acceso a los tribunales de los Estados Unidos para hacer cumplir los 
derechos de privacidad en relación con los datos personales transferidos a los Estados Unidos 
para fines de aplicación de la ley.91 
El GDPR se aplica a las organizaciones establecidas en un tercer país si 
ofrecen bienes y servicios o vigilan el comportamiento de los individuos en la UE.92 También 
introduce algunos nuevos instrumentos para las transferencias internacionales. Así mismo 
proporciona elementos más precisos y detallados que deben tenerse en cuenta al evaluar el 
nivel de protección de datos proporcionado en el ordenamiento jurídico de un tercer país.93 
En virtud del Privacy Shield, el mecanismo de reparación informará a un 
denunciante de que un asunto de acceso o vigilancia ha sido debidamente investigado y 
obligado por ley estadounidense. En el caso de incumplimiento se solucionará 
adecuadamente.94 Los ciudadanos de la UE tienen la capacidad de presentar quejas 
directamente a sus DPA locales. Los recursos y el modo en como se hayan establecidos 
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determinan el período para las respuestas planteadas por los sujetos. El Privacy Shield 
también crea un nuevo derecho de arbitraje para las quejas no resueltas.95 
No obstante, el Acuerdo marco no prevé la igualdad de derechos y recursos 
para los nacionales de la UE y de los Estados Unidos en los Estados Unidos de América  y lo 
que es peor aún, los ciudadanos de terceros países que viven en Estados miembros de la UE 
que no son nacionales del Estado miembro afectado y cuyos datos pueden haber sido 
enviados a los EE.UU. no se contemplan en el Acuerdo.96 
 
3.1.2.2. Armonizar la norma jurídica transatlántica 
El GDPR se aplica a las organizaciones establecidas en un tercer país si 
ofrecen bienes y servicios o vigilan el comportamiento de los individuos en la UE.97 
Establece un régimen de sanciones eficaz armonizando las competencias de las autoridades 
nacionales de supervisión de la protección de datos (DPA). Sus facultades alcanzan a la 
imposición de multas de hasta 20 millones de euros o hasta un 4% del volumen de negocios 
sobre el total anual de una empresa.98 
Los principios básicos de la protección de la intimidad entre la UE y los 
Estados Unidos son los mismos que en el Safe Harbor armonizando la protección de datos 
dentro del mercado único europeo. El Privacy Shield incluye declaraciones con respecto a 
órgano de cumplimiento, un nuevo derecho de arbitraje, así como respecto a revelaciones a 
las autoridades públicas y la responsabilidad de la compañía por transferencias posteriores.99 
La Directiva de la UE sobre asuntos penales y judiciales incluye normas 
armonizadas para las transferencias internacionales de datos personales en el contexto de la 
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cooperación en la aplicación de la legislación penal.100Permitirá a las autoridades policiales y 
judiciales cooperar más eficazmente, tanto entre los Estados miembros como entre los 
Estados miembros y sus socios internacionales, para luchar contra la delincuencia y el 
terrorismo.101 Insta al Estado a que proporcione autoridades nacionales independientes de 
protección de datos que ofrezcan a las personas recursos judiciales eficaces.102 
Las garantías y salvaguardias del acuerdo marco UE-Estados Unidos se 
aplicarán a todos los intercambios de datos que tengan lugar en el contexto de la cooperación 
transatlántica en materia penal a todos los niveles. La disposición abarca todos los principios 
sustantivos de protección de datos de la UE; Normas de procesamiento, salvaguardias y 
derechos individuales.103 El Acuerdo proporciona a los titulares  de los datos derechos de 
reparación judicial relativos a las reformas del derecho interno estadounidense para apoyar al 
ciudadano de la UE. Sin embargo, contiene algunas deficiencias amenazantes para el estándar 
de protección de datos de la UE,como una definición diferente, acerca de los derechos del 
sujeto que reclame protección para sus datos personales, en especial cuando este sea nacional 
de un tercer Estado.104 
 
3.1.2.3. Equilibrar los intereses entre los titulares del derecho y la 
autoridad estatal en materia penal 
Tras una revisión por un grupo de independientes nombrado por el Presidente 
Obama, el ejecutivo de Estados Unidos hizo cambios significativos para mejorar el 
cumplimiento de sus prácticas de inteligencia extranjera adecuándolas al derecho 
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internacional y a los Derechos Humanos. Estos cambios incluyen sobre todo definiciones más 
específicas de los propósitos para los cuales se puede realizar la vigilancia.105 
Desde marzo de 2014, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos adoptó la Directiva 
28 (PPD-28), Marco de los Estados Unidos, para regir la vigilancia con seis principios de 
privacidad. Impone importantes limitaciones para las operaciones de inteligencia. Especifica 
que la recolección de datos por parte de los servicios de inteligencia debe tener un objetivo 
concreto. Adicionalmente, el PPD-28 limita el uso de la recolección de datos a gran escala a 6 
propósitos: Detectar y contrarrestar las amenazas de espionaje, terrorismo, armas de 
destrucción masiva, amenazas a las Fuerzas Armadas o amenazas criminales 
transnacionales.106 Los seis principios respaldados por los Estados Unidos son: 1) el estado de 
derecho; 2) el propósito legítimo; 3) la no arbitrariedad; 4) la autoridad externa competente; 
5) la supervisión significativa; y 6) el aumento de la transparencia y la responsabilidad 
democrática.107 Sin embargo, permanecen algunos solapamientos entre el Marco General 
EEUU y estos Principios que, en la práctica, puede llevar a incumplimientos por parte 
estadounidense, muy especialmente si se tiene en cuenta que el precendente del caso Glomar 
Response sigue vigente. 
Además, Estados Unidos ha revisado la USA Freedom Act, impidiendo la 
recolección masiva de datos pues se exige un nexo a una investigación, aportando claridad a 
la Sección 215 de la Ley Patriota, aumentando la supervisión del FISC e introduciendo un 
defensor especial, aumentando la capacidad de las compañías para revelar solicitudes de 
datos de seguridad nacional gubernamental, e incrementando el poder de los órganos de 
supervisión interna, así como añadiendo controles externos.108 
La mejora fundamental es la Ley de reparación judicial, que extiende a los 
ciudadanos de la UE el disfrute de la Ley de Privacidad de 1974 con respecto a las 
obligaciones de los Estados Unidos en materia de protección de datos. Sin embargo, su 
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aplicación es limitada porque hay muchas excepciones y la inseguridad jurídica respecto de 
los organismos encargados de la aplicación de la citada Ley de reparación judicial no 
satisfacen el requisito de ofrecer un mecanismo de reparación efectivo a todas las personas 
involucradas en casos de vigilancia dirigidos desde Seguridad Nacional.109 Además, la Ley de 
Reparación Judicial otorga a los ciudadanos de la UE el acceso a los tribunales de los Estados 
Unidos para hacer cumplir los derechos de privacidad en relación con los datos personales 
transferidos a los Estados Unidos para fines de aplicación de la ley.110 Quienes no sean 
ciudadanos de la UE no tienen derecho a disfrutar de estos derechos. 
El GDPR proporciona excepciones exhaustivas, detalladas y transparentes a la 
transferencia de datos personales fuera de la UE. La reforma aclara esas reglas de muchas 
maneras.111 Las disposiciones sobre la independencia, las funciones y los poderes de las APD 
de la UE se expresan con más detalle y se mejoran sustancialmente. Esto incluye 
expresamente el poder de suspender los flujos de datos a un receptor en un tercer país o a una 
organización internacional.112 
El Privacy Shield tiene límites de retención de datos claros, restricciones, 
salvaguardas y mecanismos de supervisión para el acceso de las agencias estatales con  
propósitos de aplicación de la ley y seguridad nacional. Transforma el sistema de supervisión 
de autorregulación a un sistema más activo y proactivo. La certificación y el proceso de 
recertificación anual permanecen, pero el Departamento de Comercio supervisará su 
cumplimiento mediante cuestionarios detallados.113 Por otra parte, la Comisión Federal de 
Comercio mantendrá una "Flag List" para las organizaciones que están sujetas a la FTC o a 
órdenes judiciales en casos relativos al Privacy Shield. 
La Directiva de la UE en materia penal establece normas transparentes, 
detalladas y exhaustivas para la transferencia de datos personales a terceros países, incluida la 
facultad de suspender los flujos de datos a un destinatario en un tercer país o a una 
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organización internacional que no cumple la norma de adecuación.114 La nueva Directiva 
elevará el nivel de protección de las personas.  Las víctimas, los testigos y los sospechosos de 
crímenes están protegidos en el contexto de una investigación penal o de una acción de 
aplicación de la ley. La supervisión está garantizada por las autoridades nacionales 
independientes de protección de datos.115  
El Acuerdo Paraguas UE-EEUU no contiene una cláusula general de Derechos 
Humanos que prohíba la "compartición" o "transferencia" de datos sobre personas de la UE, 
sujetos al Acuerdo, con otros organismos, en los EE.UU. Ello podría dar lugar a graves 
violaciones de los Derechos Humanos, como la retención y la detención arbitrarias, la tortura 
o incluso las ejecuciones extrajudiciales o "desapariciones" de los interesados u otras 
personas.116 También expande a todo el ámbito de la aplicación de la ley el principio de 
supervisión independiente, incluyendo poderes efectivos para investigar y resolver quejas 
individuales.117 Sin embargo, en términos de transparencia y supervisión, no cumple con las 
exigencias fundamentales de protección de datos y de Derechos Humanos en Europa, ya que 
las personas afectadas no pueden presentar su recurso ante el FISC. 
Las reformas del régimen de la UE y de la UE-Estados Unidos establecen una 
normativa armonizada que puede servir de modelo para países liberales con una economía de 
mercado. La Comunidad Internacional podría utilizar este conjunto de normas como 
fundamento para redactar un Instrumento Internacional sobre Protección de Datos de 
Carácter Personal para su firma y adhesión. El enfoque más incluyente resolvería el problema 
de jurisdicción y haría posible el cumplimiento de la protección de datos personales a 
diferentes jurisdicciones. 
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3.2. Recomendaciones  
Debido a la rápida difusión de Internet en las últimas dos décadas, ahora surge una 
nueva situación en la que las Corporaciones de TI multinacionales recogen una gran cantidad 
de datos personales directamente, pues  el usuario pone sus datos en la Red Social y más aún 
indirectamente mediante la información alamacenada en la memoria de los buscadores o en la 
barra de pestañas. Muchas entidades privadas, incluidas corporaciones gigantes de TI o 
agencias estatales, tienen su propia "Regla" y diferentes estructuras para autorregular su 
sistema de información. Pero estas son las políticas que las propias organizaciones consideran 
apropiado promulgar y se basan principalmente en la autoverificación de tales Entidades. 
Además, la legislación nacional se promulga independientemente del hecho de que las 
empresas sean multinacionales y puede ser difícil buscar un vínculo directo con una 
jurisdicción determinada en un caso específico.118 Esta diversificación de normativa entre la 
norma del Estado y la de la Corporación Internacional sumada a los problemas fácticos para 
determinar la competencia de la jurisdicción puede conducir con peligrosa facilidad a un 
punto muerto, desde la perspectiva de la protección de datos. 
 
3.2.1. Conjunto único de normas comunes 
Si bien la legislación sobre protección de datos tiene una dimensión transfronteriza, su 
posterior desarrollo adquirió características nacionales y regionales distintas. Con el fin de 
dar cabida a la cooperación internacional entre sistemas jurídicos de protección de datos 
fundamentalmente diferentes, se han emprendido una serie de iniciativas,119 especialmente 
durante la última década. 
El interesante esquema legal aplicado para el intercambio transatlántico de 
información personal es, en efecto, una solución legal de mosaico construida sobre bases 
bilaterales UE-EE.UU. Incluye el Escudo de Privacidad para intercambios fundamentales de 
datos personales y el Acuerdo Paraguas para la protección de las personas físicas con 
respecto al tratamiento de datos personales por las autoridades competentes con fines de 
                                                          
118 Metcalf, Katrin N. "Legal Aspects of Privacy Law and Data Protection." The Right to Privacy as a Human 
Right and Everyday Technologies, Institute of Human Rights NGO, 2014, p. 85. 
119 De Hert, Paul and Papakonstantinou, Vagelis. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data 
Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 
2013, p. 293. 
34 
 
prevención, investigación, detección o enjuiciamiento de delitos o la ejecución de sanciones 
penales . 
En cada lado del Atlántico, disposiciones en gran medida diferentes rigen el 
tratamiento respectivo una vez que se han transmitido los datos personales. El ejemplo UE-
EE.UU. es un argumento poderoso para las ventajas de la introducción de un único 
instrumento internacional de protección de datos que hubiera salvado a ambas partes de una 
multitud de arreglos complejos y difíciles de seguir y, en última instancia, un importante 
desperdicio de recursos en la respectiva negociación y los procesos de redacción.120  
A fin de cuentas, proporcionar un conjunto único de normas que se apliquen con 
uniformidad por las autoridades de supervisión de todo el mundo eliminaría los problemas 
presentes en muchos casos anteriores,121 incluidas las disposiciones relativas a la situación de 
conflicto de leyes aplicables en diferentes jurisdicciones. 
 
3.2.2 Regular una entidad transfronteriza de alta capacidad 
Dado que las sentencias judiciales utilizaron en muchos casos el principio de 
territorialidad y el "Principio de adecuación" para abordar efectivamente la jurisdicción, la 
posibilidad de que algunas corporaciones de IT tendieran a seleccionar artificialmente la 
legislación nacional que debían cumplir y la autoridad nacional de protección de datos 
suponía un grave problema. Cuanto más se pueda introducir el "Principio de rendición de 
cuentas" para rastrear y perseguir la actividad de las Corporaciones Transnacionales de TI y 
las Agencias de Inteligencia Nacionales o Internacionales mayor seguridad habrá para los 
usuarios.  
 
3.2.2.1. Regular una Corporación Transnacional de IT 
Para emplear el principio de adecuación, se pueden utilizar las marcas de 
confianza relacionadas con la protección de datos, en particular los sellos web, representan la 
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extensión práctica de los intentos de autorregulación por parte de las contrapartes del 
comercio electrónico. Mediante la colocación de sellos web en páginas de Internet, los 
miembros verifican el cumplimiento de las normas de protección de datos y las mejores 
prácticas más o menos de la misma manera que la notificación del tratamiento a las 
autoridades de protección de datos confirma su legalidad en el mercado electrónico. Véase el 
modelo de EE. UU. y  su programa de sellos web TRUSTe (originalmente E-Trust) que se 
utiliza en un intento de convencer a la UE sobre la idoneidad de su protección de datos y más 
tarde en las negociaciones para la conclusión del Acuerdo Safe Harbor122 así como Privacy 
Shield que permite que una empresa se registre. El Privacy Shield está controlado y 
garantizado por la Comisión Federal de Comercio de los Estados Unidos.123 
Al adaptar el Principio de Rendición de Cuentas del Modelo de la OCDE, las 
organizaciones internacionales y regionales han publicado diversas leyes y normas de 
protección de datos personales. Estos códigos de conducta vienen en varios formatos y 
tipos.124 Abarcan desde instrumentos de autorregulación de cumplimiento voluntario sin 
mecanismos de vigilancia o ejecución, hasta estrictas normas introducidas en cooperación 
con las autoridades nacionales de protección de datos e incluso ratificadas por la ley en 
estrictos sistemas de protección de datos similares a la UE. En efecto, se trata de códigos de 
conducta universales adoptados por grupos multinacionales de empresas y ratificados por las 
autoridades nacionales competentes en materia de protección de datos que definen la política 
global de protección de datos del grupo con respecto a las transferencias internacionales de 
datos personales dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial a entidades situadas en países que 
pueden no proporcionar un nivel adecuado de protección, según las normas de la UE.125 
 
 
                                                          
122 Farrell, Henry. "Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce—the EU-US Safe Harbor 
Arrangement." International Organization, vol. 57, no. 02, 2003, p. 278. 
123 De Hert, Paul and Papakonstantinou, Vagelis. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data 
Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 
2013, p. 299. 
124 Kuner, Christopher. "Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, 
Present, and Future." TILT Law & Technology Working Paper No. 016/2010, 2010, p. 17 
125 See the relevant EU Commission data protection webpages, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/binding_rules/index_en.htm. 
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3.2.2.2. Regulación de la Agencia Estatal de Inteligencia 
La parte encargada de la protección de datos para la policía y la justicia penal, 
especialmente las unidades de inteligencia nacionales e internacionales que combaten la 
delincuencia organizada y el terrorismo, debería tener en cuenta las necesidades específicas 
de la aplicación de la ley.126 Debería proteger a todos, independientemente de que sean 
víctimas, delincuentes o testigos, y el Código de Inteligencia Internacional propuesto debería 
estar sujeto a serias consideraciones.127 Todo proceso de aplicación de la ley en un Estado 
Parte debe cumplir con los principios de necesidad, proporcionalidad y legalidad, así como 
con las salvaguardias adecuadas para los individuos. La supervisión está garantizada por las 
autoridades nacionales de protección de datos, y así mismo deben proporcionarse recursos 
judiciales eficaces. Además, se aclaran las normas para la transferencia de datos personales a 
terceros países y los Estados parte pueden introducir un mayor nivel de protección en sus 
propias legislaciones nacionales.128 Sin embargo, debe respetar las diferentes tradiciones 
jurídicas de los Estados Partes y ajustarse plenamente a los Tratados Internacionales de 
Derechos Humanos.129 
 
3.2.3. Establecer la Institución Internacional de Protección de Datos 
El régimen universal o internacional debería contener procedimientos innovadores e 
inventivos para la cooperación, la asistencia mutua, las operaciones conjuntas y un 
mecanismo de cooperacion.130 Además, todas las autoridades nacionales de protección de 
datos deberían presentar anualmente informes de actividad, que se harían públicos.131 Todo 
ello tiene por objeto garantizar la coherencia en la aplicación de la normativa por parte de las 
autoridades nacionales. El Régimen Universal debe imponer que el incumplimiento podría 
                                                          
126 Milanovic, Marko. "Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age." Harv. Int'l 
LJ, vol. 56, 2015, pp. 88-93. 
127 Omtzigt, Pieter. Mass Surveillance DOC.13734. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Session, 
Brussels, 2015, p. 33. 
128 European Commission. EU Data protection reform on track: Commission proposal on new data protection 
rules in law enforcement area backed by Justice Ministers. Luxembourg, 9 Oct. 2015 
129 UN. A/HRC/RES/17/4. 2011. 
130 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016. Articles. 60-76. 
131 Ibid, Article 59. 
37 
 
conducir a sanciones. Si las empresas no cumplen en la práctica se enfrentan a sanciones y la 
eliminación de la lista,132 como Trustmark Emblems. 
El Régimen Universal debe resolver la cuestión de la ventanilla única, las empresas y 
los individuos solo tendrán que lidiar con una sola autoridad supervisora. La ventanilla única 
para un denunciante individual sería un camino importante para un remedio eficaz y brindaría 
una mejor oportunidad al usuario de Internet de ponerse en contacto con el mecanismo de 
supervisión. Los mecanismos accesibles y asequibles de solución de controversias son 
ideales, a través de ellos la queja será resuelta por la propia compañía/autoridad, o por vías de 
soluciones de Resolución de Disputas Alternativas (ADR) gratuitas. El ADR debe ofrecerse 
si se trata de un caso de agotamiento del recurso interno; como último recurso habrá un 
mecanismo de arbitraje.133 Además, la posibilidad de reparación en el ámbito de la seguridad 
nacional para los ciudadanos del Estado Parte debería ser manejada por un Defensor del 
Pueblo independiente de los servicios de inteligencia nacionales que participan. 
La protección de datos para las autoridades policiales y de justicia penal necesita de la 
supervisión de autoridades nacionales independientes de protección de datos o de tribunales 
no parciales, capaces de proporcionar recursos judiciales eficaces para los afectados.134 
El reconocimiento del poder de investigación de la autoridad nacional e internacional 
de supervisión debe diseñarse como un procedimiento para señalar las irregularidades a nivel 
internacional. Siempre que haya habido una constatación de incumplimiento, a raíz de una 
queja o una investigación, la Corporación de TI debe estar sujeta a una investigación 
específica de seguimiento135 posterior. 
 
 
 
                                                          
132 European Commission. EU Commission and United States agree on new framework for transatlantic data 
flows: EU-US Privacy Shield. Strasbourg, 2 Feb. 2016. 
133 European Commission. European Commission launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: stronger protection for 
transatlantic data flows. Brussels, 12 July 2016. 
134 European Commission. Questions and Answers on the EU-US data protection "Umbrella agreement". 
Brussels, 1 Dec. 2016. 
135 European Commission. Restoring Trust in EU-US data flows - Frequently Asked Questions. Brussels, 27 
Nov. 2013, p. 4. 
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Chapter 1 Designing the Research 
 
The first chapter describe the structure of the research by differentiate into 7 sections. 
Primarily, the important words and legal terms will be defined within the context of personal 
data protection studies. Second, reviewing the effects Cyberspace has brought into Legal 
Atmosphere and the changes arise from various legal points. Third, the classical conflict 
between Human Rights and their limitations on the basis of Security will be explored. Forth, 
reflect the impacts Data Processing might put on the right to personal data protection. Five, it 
will describe how the research have been investigating through the next 5 chapters. The last 
two sections explain the main Methods and Methodologies taken into account for the 
research, the delimitation of our objective of study, and the Research Hypothesis. 
 
1.1. Keywords, Terms and Definition  
This section will make a clear perception on what to be mention in the rest of thesis 
by providing the explicit definition of important word relating personal data protection, 
Cyberspace and E-Market. These terms have different meaning in various contexts but the 
research will choose only the relevant definition for personal data protection studies. The 
definitions of the key words which are included are as follows;  
 
1) Internet 
Internet is a global computer network providing a variety of information and 
communication facilities which consisting of interconnected networks using standardized 
communication protocols.1 
It is a network of networks that consists of millions of private, public, academic, 
business, and government networks, of local to global scope, that are linked by a broad array 
of electronic, wireless, and optical networking technologies. The Internet carries an extensive 
range of information resources and services, such as the inter-linked hypertext documents 
                                                          
1 "Internet - Definition of Internet in English | Oxford Dictionaries", Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/internet. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
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and applications of the World Wide Web (WWW), the infrastructure to support email, 
and peer-to-peer networks for file.2 
2) Cyberspace 
Cyberspace is "the notional environment in which communication over computer 
networks occurs."3 The term was first used in science fiction and cinema in the 1980s, was 
adopted by computer professionals and became a household term in the 1990s. During this 
period, the uses of the internet, networking, and digital communication were all growing 
dramatically and the term "cyberspace" was able to represent the many new ideas and 
phenomena that were emerging.4  
The parent term of cyberspace is “cybernetics”, derived from the Ancient Greek 
κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs, steersman, governor, pilot, or rudder), a word introduced by Norbert 
Wiener for his pioneering work in electronic communication and control science.5 
As a social experience, individuals can interact, exchange ideas, share information, 
provide social support, conduct business, direct actions, create artistic media, play games, 
engage in political discussion, and so on, using this global network. Cyberspace is defined 
more by the social interactions involved rather than its technical implementation.6 The 
term cyberspace has become a conventional means to describe anything associated with the 
Internet and the diverse Internet culture. Amongst individuals on cyberspace, there is 
believed to be a code of shared rules and ethics mutually beneficial for all to follow, referred 
to as cyberethics.  Many view the right to privacy as most important to a functional code of 
                                                          
2 "Internet: Need to Cite Wikipedia since It Is the Biggest Open “internet” Access Website for Common 
Definition", Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet:_Need_to_cite_Wikipedia_since_it_is_the_biggest_open_%E2%80%9
8internet%E2%80%99_access_website_for_common_definition. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
3 “Cyberspace - Definition of Cyberspace in English | Oxford Dictionaries”, Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/cyberspace. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
4 Strate, Lance. “The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and Delimitation”, Western Journal of 
Communication, Vol.63, 1999, pp. 382–3. 
5 Crofton, Isaak. Crypto Anarchy. Lulu, 2015, p. 84. 
6 Morningstar, Chip and Randall, Farmer R. “The Lessons of Lucasfilm's Habitat.” The New Media Reader. Ed. 
Wardrip-Fruin and Nick Montfort: The MIT Press, 2003, Massachusetts, pp.  664-667. 
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cyberethics.7 Such moral responsibilities go hand in hand when working online with global 
networks, specifically, when opinions are involved with online social experiences.8  
 In the views of users, the computational medium in cyberspace is an augmentation of 
the communication channel between real people; the core characteristic of cyberspace is that 
it offers an environment that consists of many participants with the ability to affect and 
influence each other. They derive this concept from the observation that people seek richness, 
complexity, and depth within a virtual world.9 
 
3) E-Market 
E-Market is a Market in electronic form, especially the use of electronic data transfer 
for information exchange and economic transactions via the Internet.10 By using the internet, 
E-Market is a space where organizations and consumers exchange information and do 
business.11  
E-Market is open to several buyers and several sellers by being a trading platform, the 
E-Market itself does not sell nor buy goods or services traded on the platform but it has at 
least one trading function. Sometime supplier directories support companies in establishing 
new business relationships but no actual trade takes place at these platforms. E-markets and 
supplier directories are also called Business to Business (B2B) Internet platforms. Such 
platforms include all Internet-based technical solutions that aim at facilitating the 
establishment of new trading relationships between companies or at supporting existing 
relationships.12 Many sharing economy platforms are in fact peer to peer (P2P) marketplaces. 
                                                          
7 Spinello, Richard A. Cyberethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace. Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 
Massachusetts, 2014. 
8 White House. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 2003. 
9 Crofton, Isaak. Crypto Anarchy. Lulu, 2015, p. 84. 
10 "E- market- Definition of E-market in English | Oxford Dictionaries", Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/e-market. Accessed 1 May 2014. 
11 "E-Marketplace Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary", 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/e-marketplace. Accessed 1 May 2014. 
12 “What Is an Electronic Marketplace?: Learn How Your Company Can Use E-Markets to Expand Your 
Business”, eMarket Services, www.emarketservices.com:80/start/Knowledge/index.html. Accessed 1 May 
2014. 
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Also called "switch" marketplaces, sharing economy platforms' users will characteristically 
switch between buying and selling services or goods.13  
In this research the information about activities done in E-market is the object of the 
studies since many Service Providers collect these data for processing. 
 
4) Personal Data  
Personal Data means data14 or information15 relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person,16 understanding identifiable natural person is one who can be identified,17  
directly or indirectly,18 in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, location 
data, an online identifier,19 an identification number or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person.20 Personal Data might be recorded in any form.21 This definition covers both side of 
Trans-Atlantic relations, EU and EU-US. 
Personally identifiable information (PII), some countries such as USA use the PII as a 
legal concept,22 not just a technical concept. Because of the versatility and power of modern 
                                                          
13 Hamari, Juho et al. "The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative Consumption." Journal 
of the Association for Information Science and Technology, vol. 67, no. 9, 2016, pp. 2047–59 
14 EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(a). 
15 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1); EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 2(1). 
16 EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(a); EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 2(1). 
17 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1); EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(a). 
18 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1); EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 2(1). 
19 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1). 
20 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1); EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 2(1). 
21 EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(a). 
22 De Montjoye, Yves-Alexandre et al. "Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility." 
Scientific reports, vol. 3, 2013, p. 1376. 
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re-identification algorithms,23 the absence of PII data does not mean that the remaining data 
does not identify individuals.24 While some attributes may be uniquely identifying on their 
own,25 any attribute can be identifying in combination with others.26 This definition is 
important because it reflects the personal data protection law of the US which heavily 
influence to the study of this research. 
 
5) Data Subject 
Data Subject is a living individual to whom personal data relates.27 Data Subject is an 
identifiable natural person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.28 
 
6) Data Controller 
Data Controller means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data29; where the purposes and means of such processing are 
                                                          
23 Narayanan, Arvind and Vitaly Shmatikov. "Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets." Security 
and Privacy, IEEE Symposium, 2008, pp. 111-125. 
24 Narayanan, Arvind and Vitaly Shmatikov. "De-Anonymizing Social Networks." Security and Privacy, 2009 
30th IEEE Symposium, 2009, p. 173. 
25 Narayanan, Arvind and Vitaly Shmatikov. "Myths and Fallacies of Personally Identifiable Information." 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 6, 2010, p. 24. 
26  Ohm, Paul. "Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization." UCLA 
Law Review, no.197, 2009. 
27 "What Is a Data Subject? // A Definition from the Opt-4 Data Protection Dictionary", www.opt-
4.co.uk/dictionary/DataSubject.asp. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
28 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(1). 
29 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(7); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(8); EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(c). 
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determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its 
nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law.30 
 
7) Data Processor 
Data Processor means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body 
which processes personal data on behalf of the controller. 31 
 
8) Third Party 
Third Party means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or body other 
than the data subject, controller, processor and persons who, under the direct authority of the 
controller or processor, are authorized to process personal data.32 
 
9) Data Collection 
Data Collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of 
interest, in an established systematic fashion that enables one to answer stated research 
questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes. The goal for all data collection is to 
capture quality evidence that then translates to rich data analysis and allows the building of a 
convincing and credible answer to questions that have been posed.33  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(7); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(8). 
31 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(8); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(9). 
32 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(10); 
33 Lescroël, Amélie et al. "Antarctic Climate Change: Extreme Events Disrupt Plastic Phenotypic Response in 
Adélie Penguins." PloS one, vol. 9, no. 1, 2014, p. e85291. 
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10)  Data Processing 
Data Processing means any operation or set of operations34 which is performed on 
personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.35 Data Processing is involving 
collection, maintenance, use, alteration, organization or structuring, disclosure or 
dissemination, or disposition.36  
 
11)  Automated data processing 
Automated Data Processing including Profiling means any form of automated 
processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that 
natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.37 
 
12)  Data Transfer 
Data Transfer or ‘cross-border processing’ means either: (a) processing of personal 
data which takes place in the context of the activities of establishments in more than one 
Member State of a controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor is 
established in more than one Member State; or (b) processing of personal data which takes 
place in the context of the activities of a single establishment of a controller or processor in 
                                                          
34 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(2); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(2); EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(b); EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, 
Article 2(2). 
35 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(2), Article 4(1); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 
2016/680. 2016, Article 3(2); EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Overview para. 8(b). 
36 EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 2(2). 
37 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(4); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(4). 
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the Union but which substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in 
more than one Member State.38 
 
13)  Data Surveillance 
Data Surveillance is a careful continuous observation of a place, person, group 
especially of a suspected spy or criminal.39 It is an ongoing activity in order to gather 
information40 especially by the police or army, because of a crime that has happened or is 
expected. 41  
Data Surveillance is the monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing 
information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or 
protecting them.42 This can include observation from a distance by means of electronic 
equipment, or interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet 
traffic or phone calls); and it can include simple, relatively no- or low-technology methods 
such as human intelligence agents and postal interception. The word surveillance comes from 
a French phrase for "watching over" ("sur" means "from above" and "veiller" means "to 
watch"), and is in contrast to more recent developments such as sousveillance.43  
 
14)  Pseudonymisation 
Pseudonymisation means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of 
additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is 
                                                          
38 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(23) 
39 “Surveillance - Definition of Surveillance in English | Oxford Dictionaries”, Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/surveillanc. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
40 "Surveillance | Define Surveillance at Dictionary.com", www.dictionary.com/browse/surveillance. Accessed 2 
May 2014. 
41 “Surveillance Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary”, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/surveillance. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
42 Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 1. 
43 Clarke, Roger. "Information Technology and Dataveillance." Communications of the ACM, vol. 31, no. 5, 
1988, pp. 498-512; Michael, Katina et al. "Planetary-Scale Rfid Services in an Age of Uberveillance." 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 98, no. 9, 2010, pp. 1663-1671; Minsky, Marvin et al. "The Society of 
Intelligent Veillance." Technology and Society (ISTAS), IEEE International Symposium, 2013, pp. 13-17. 
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subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not 
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.44 
 
15)  Data Base 
Data Base or ‘filing system’ means any structured set of personal data which are 
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a 
functional or geographical basis.45 
 
16)  Cyber Security 
Cyber Security or Computer security or IT security is information security as applied to 
computing devices such as computers and smart-phones, as well as computer networks such 
as private and public networks,46 including the Internet as a whole. Data Security is the 
prevention or protection of personal data against breach or damage. Personal data breach 
means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise 
processed.47  
 Most of the definitions come from the legal concept which is written in various 
official legal documents; EU instruments, EU-US instruments and the US law, while some 
definitions are selected from the credible dictionary or well reputation website relating the 
specific terms. The rest of definitions extracted from the relevant books contain the content 
related to the concept of particular words. The scope of definition is the personal data 
protection on Cyberspace of the EU and EU-US legal regime. 
                                                          
44 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(5); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016. Article 3(5). 
45 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(6); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(6). 
46 Peters, Sarah. 2009 Csi Computer Crime and Security Survey. Computer Security Institute, 2009. 
47 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4(12); EU. Directive on Criminal Matters 2016/680. 
2016, Article 3(11). 
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These specific keywords with the definition as given above will be used throughout 
the research from the start until the end. 
 
1.2. Understanding Cyberspace in Legal Atmosphere  
The section is reflected in anxiety. An anxiety is composite of the nature of the 
cyberspace while realizing the necessity for its regulation. This section will initially elucidate 
upon the influence actors such a regime must concern, i.e. the protection of data subject’s 
rights by a various entities; State Authority, IT Corporation and International Community. 
Therefore it will explore any precaution for implementing regulation to different relations or 
crafting trans-border E-Market regulation. Accordingly, it will critically inquire how the 
specific characteristics of the cyberspace have impacted any legal atmosphere relate to it. 
More particularly, it will demonstrate how the counterpart wings of theorists, namely the 
exceptionist and unexceptionist, have described their contesting intellectual standpoints 
toward such characteristics. Finally, using diverse perspectives including Political, Economic, 
Social and Culture Rights perspective, it will review the complicated situations as to how the 
cyberspace is testing a space for trans-border regulation in terms of right protection, duty 
bearer obligation and law enforcement. 
 
1) Actors in the Arena and their main interests 
During the third wave revolution, there are actors which involve with information 
technology (IT) are performing via internet medium such as IT Corporations, States, 
Individual Internet users. The Internet has facilitated increased possibilities for 
communication and freedom of expression, enabling anonymity, rapid information sharing, 
and cross-cultural dialogues. At the same time, changes in technologies have also provided 
new opportunities for State surveillance and intervention into individuals’ private lives.48 
Thus the role of each actor and the relations among them should be analyzed under the legal 
framework. 
 
 
                                                          
48 UN. A/HRC/23/40. 2013, para. 11. 
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1.1) IT Corporation (Legal Person, Service Providers - SPs) 
Either IT Corporations or Service Providers are applied to the State’s 
regulation while State Authorities are obliged to respect and fulfill individuals’ rights. State 
Agencies are under the obligation to protect individuals’ rights from the abusive actions done 
by non-State actors including corporation entities.49 The private sector bears equal 
responsibility for respecting human rights, particularly given the key role it plays in 
designing, developing and disseminating technologies; enabling and providing 
communications; and - where required - cooperating with State surveillance activities. 
Nevertheless, the scope of the present duties is limited to the obligations of the State50 which 
has limited jurisdiction due to the nature of Modern State. 
 
1.2)  State 
States seeking access to both communications content and communications 
metadata is rising dramatically, without adequate scrutiny.51 When accessed and analyzed, 
communications metadata may create a profile of an individual's life, including medical 
conditions, political and religious viewpoints, associations, interactions and interests, 
disclosing as much detail as, or even greater details than would be discernible from the 
content of communications.52 Despite the vast potential for intrusion into an individual’s life 
and the chilling effect on political and other associations, legislative and policy instruments 
often afford communications metadata a lower level of protection and do not place sufficient 
                                                          
49 La Rue, Frank. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, 2011. 
50 International Coalition of Civil Organizations on Internet Freedom. International Principles on the 
Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance. 2014, Preamble. 
51 For example, in the United Kingdom alone, there are now approximately 500,000 requests for 
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restrictions on how they can be subsequently used by agencies, including how they are data-
mined, shared, and retained.53 
In evaluating the invasiveness of State communications surveillance, it is 
necessary to consider both the potential of the surveillance to reveal protected information, as 
well as the purpose for which the information is sought by the State.  
 
1.3) Individual (Natural Person) 
Communications surveillance that will likely lead to the revelation of 
protected information that may place a person at risk of investigation, discrimination or 
violation of human rights will constitute a serious infringement on an individual’s right to 
privacy, and will also undermine the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, including the 
right to free expression, association, and political participation. This is because these rights 
require people to be able to communicate free from the chilling effect of government 
surveillance.54 A determination of both the character and potential uses of the information 
sought will thus be necessary in each specific case. 
Any measure must not be applied in a manner which discriminates on the basis 
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.55 
 
1.4)  Relations between relevant actors 
The Research will analyze how to design the regime and governance for 
solving the problems which base on 7 potential relations between State, Corporation and 
Individual; 
 
a)  IT Corporation claim to Individual 
The claims from Corporation to Individual are on the basis of 
Contractual relations; Terms and Conditions, Compulsory Consent. (Unfair contract – instant 
contract) 
                                                          
53 International Coalition of Civil Organizations on Internet Freedom. International Principles on the 
Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance. 2014, Preamble. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, Legitimate Aim. 
51 
 
b)  Individual claim to IT Corporation 
The claims from Individual to Corporate are on the basis of Customer 
Rights; Consumer Protection on Personal Data, Client Confidential, ISO 27001, Right to 
Technology, Private property, Right to integrity and privacy on communication and personal 
domain. 
 
c) State claim to IT Corporation 
The claims from State to Corporation are on the basis of 
Administrative Law on Public Service; Regulation and Governance on Internet Service 
Providers, Cyber Crime Control, E-Commerce Regulations, Standard, and Right to Regulate 
both Domestic and International level. 
 
d) IT Corporation claim to State 
The claims from Corporation to State are on the basis of Private 
freedom to conduct business activities in Liberal Legal State; Freedom of access, movement, 
interconnects, exchange, distribute, provide services in market. States Non-Arbitrary 
intervene to Market either on Domestic and International level. 
 
e) State claim to Individual 
The claims from State to Individual are on the basis of Legitimacy 
Power to Govern; Surveillance, Command and Control on the activities, communications and 
movements of criminal or terrorist in the name of “Security”. State employs power by 
creating a reason “Society must be defended” to justify the act of Government. 
 
f) Individual claim to State 
The claims from Individual to State are on the basis of Personal 
Human Rights; Right to Personal Data Protection, Right to Information, Right to enjoy full 
utility of Technology, Right to basic public service (Communication Infrastructure), and 
Consumers’ Rights. 
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g)  State co-operation with State 
The Co-operations between State to State are on the basis of 
International Security and Criminal Cooperation Agreement; Organized Crime, International 
Anti-Terrorism, Bi-lateral Secret Intelligence Agreement, Diplomatic Protection. Besides 
there are some International Economic Agreements or Treaties about E-Trading or E-
Services or Trans-border data flows. 
 
The Research will Investigate the positivism evidences of the relations 
between those actors especially STATE-STATE, STATE-CORPORATION. This Thesis will 
undertake either on the formal policy and informal practice. 
 
2) Legal issues arising from the distinctive characteristic of Cyberspace 
Since the end of the Cold War, the terms ‘cyberspace’ and ‘globalization’ have been 
prevailed. Internet triggered a new world order of interconnection and decentralization. In 
terms of impacts of Cyberspace on Legal atmosphere, the ‘results of technology-ignorance in 
the legal community can be devastating, with cases being decided and lost based on unsound 
arguments from the parties and/or unsound reasoning by the courts’.56 Hence, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook provocatively stated that studying cyber law as a separate field of study would be 
no different from studying the ‘law of the horse’ in the nineteenth century57.  His statement 
reflects explicitly that it requires only ‘general rules’ without the need to invent a new legal 
regime, without desiring anything called ‘cyber law’ specifically.  
Notwithstanding, the discussions of rights and freedom in Cyberspace are concerned 
about threats to fundamental rights posed by private power, and not just state as Paul S. 
Berman mentioned that ‘the role of entrenched economic power, the importance of embedded 
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legal regimes, the ubiquitous role of the state, the significance of non-state communities to 
the construction of norms’58 imply the needs of sensitivity on cyberspace regulation. 
In contrast with “Unexceptionalist”, it is obvious that online medium creates a new 
problem depends in large part on what some lawyers have questioned, cyberspace 
‘exceptionalists’ argued that the medium itself created radically new problems requiring new 
analytical work to be done59. Accordingly, new technologies that alter the culture are 
precisely the sorts of changes that tend to result in shifts to well-settled legal principles60. 
From the arguments will be described below, cyberspace impacts take a structural 
approach, emphasizing large-scale cultural, economic, political and legal forces that are more 
fundamental than just how particular legal rules will apply to particular sorts of interactions61 
but how would legal community manage this space through transformation. 
In addition, there are large numbers of case studies to support the idea that changes 
and challenges may cause obstacles to Cyberspace Regulating. Since the third wave 
revolution have been continuing, Nation State and International Community have been 
concerned whether the universal principle of Law could apply to Cyberspace properly62, or 
not. Specifically, it creates impacts on 5 categories of legal atmosphere; which are as follows; 
 
a) Person and Legal Entities 
There is mutability on the principle of Person in “Netizen Society” 63 because 
individuals in Cyberspace can change or undercover their identities to ‘create multiple 
electronic identities which are linked only by their common progenitor,  that link, invisible in 
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the virtual world, is of great significance.’64 In this respect, state has the duty to assure the 
traceability of person in case of crime or terrorism. 
   An effort to create and to enlarge E-Government comes from the anonymity 
issue, while anonymity65 is an individual rights, it is a formidable difficulty to manage 
population.66 Thus, surveillance-oriented societies have been constructed on the excuse of 
freedom protection. 
  In the first case, A Homeland Security Department spokesman was held on 
charges of sexually preying on 14-year-old girl, which is really an undercover detective, 
whom he hunting through explicit online conversations related to sexually graphic 
conversations. He thought the counterpart was a teenage girl, who actually was undercover 
detective.67 Hence the pedophile crime case confirms the need of state surveillance on 
Internet by using undercover agent. 
  In contrast, the webmaster of Norporchor-USA was found guilty of criminal 
charges by Thai Computer Crime Act. As well as Joe Gordon,68who was famous from his 
translation on notorious book “The King Never Smile”, was distributed as anonymous via 
above website. These controversial cases bring suspicion on right to be forgotten, to be 
unknown or unidentifiable or annonymised. Anonymity is required especially during a time 
of political conflict when confidentiality is important for active citizen who want to express 
their opinion out loud but still can keep their privacy. 
Moreover, the right to privacy and right to know and correct personal data should be 
corroborated as well. 
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b) Relationship in Networks: Public or Private sphere? 
The relationship in cyberspace seems to be vague when we have to apply law 
to a virtual line for communication activities whether it is public or private “Sphere”. 
Cyberspace is suitable for proving the “Governmentality” theory of Michel 
Foucault which reveals the Modern State’s technology of power that penetrates to the self of 
individual through Public space and activity.69 Since the state eager to shift the line to the 
former private space combining with the enlargement of public communication spaces, Legal 
Society has a duty to answer the problems about whether Social Media is a Public Sphere or 
truly Private Space. 
In an Ashley Cole’s astonishing Twitter attack on the Football Association 
(FA) case, even he then deleted the message and issued a statement apologizing for his 
outburst but still was fined by FA.70 It has shown the changing landscape of law and also its 
consequence, which narrows the gap between private and public life. Furthermore, it should 
provide choices for constructing legal frameworks to protect and promote the rights of Social 
Media members71 in account to handle it to suppress harms and support responsibly freedom 
of expression. It affirms that power of surveillance is widespread and decentralized to other 
organization like the FA.  
From above cases show the competence of cyberspace as a communication 
tools which can penetrate to private sphere both by the first party who spread the content and 
the reflects react by any others in era of digitalization. Consequently, new boundaries should 
be drawn to make a certainty scope between the public sphere, in which person can express 
their intimacy with responsibility to others, and private sphere, full capable to speak and be 
protected on the basis of right to privacy. 
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c) Jurisdiction for Legal enforcement 
The most predominance shift is Jurisdiction on “place” because activities in 
cyberspace, which are cross-border or relevant to more than one state72, could produce many 
conflicts of laws situations.  
In the past, ‘well-settled’ principles of legal jurisdiction saw jurisdiction as 
rooted almost exclusively in the territorial power of the sovereign73 but right now the absolute 
principle so-called ‘effects doctrine’ has been difficult to apply to online interaction because 
material on a website potentially creates effects anywhere74 regardless state territory. 
In this case, online Gamble falls into technically illegal in most of the United 
States, however the prosecution and conviction of individual players is very difficult because 
they are gambling from home. Interestingly, most online casinos are located in other 
countries.75 There are issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty, which make gambling laws even 
more paralyzed. These situations require a state measures to combat against organized crime 
as human trafficking in Internet. 
From the changing nature of the countless trans-border transactions, 
International Community should be considering non-state-based constitutionalism more and 
recognizing the importance of autonomous social systems apparatus as another one law-
making force among many76to balance freedom and order in online world. 
 
d) Communication Channels 
Internet could provide an opportunity to people but the entitlement to 
“Medium” is crucial. Additionally, opportunity to compete in a high-technology 
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communication is an anti-monopoly key77 on every perspective. Though Internet penetration 
and digitalization ratio diffuse among different society, they depend on socio-economic 
conditions: computer skills, literacy, income and regulatory environments78, which could 
affect their absorptive capacity. 
In Web browser case, EC believes that the company has abused its monopoly 
by deeply linking Internet Explorer with its operating system,79 which prevents competitors 
to access this market. Relatively, in Google case, they offers services and applications to 
attract Internet traffic to their website/brand so they could collect tons of information and 
generate revenues from the sponsors by processing users’ personal data.80 These cases imply 
the power over market and data processing of private corporations. 
However, it is impossible to eliminate or block the traffic because the 
techniques of intermediary controls are generally less effective in small nations81, and they 
have a larger array of intermediaries to trace back in super power nations. 
 
e) Property Regimes 
With regards to possession of “Technology”, the commercialization in 
products and services into commodities82 or public goods is the point of cyberspace. Because 
of right to information, Internet Society should provide individuals the means to participate in 
the production and distribution of culture.83 Indeed, freedom of expression sits in an uneasy 
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relationship with copyright law because it effectively censors speech in the name of 
providing incentives to create84. Moreover, it could give a power to the copyrights owner to 
pursue their goods by detecting devices. 
  In Creative-Commons case, the Commons will release a software application 
this fall that permits a work to be copied under certain conditions.85 As Ginsburg argues that 
we need to strengthen authorial control over digital distribution of creative works to provide 
the incentives necessary to give the public access to more material (Unexceptionist)86. In 
contrast, ‘untamed anarchic digital sharing’ through peer-to-peer networks is a superior 
distribution mechanism so we ought to encourage the new form rather than use strongly 
author - based copyright protection, (Exceptionist).87 It implies that the first owner should 
own capacity to follow their works but should not have an absolute individual right as 
tradition Intellectual Property Law stance. 
 
3) Challenges, cyberspace brings to legal atmosphere 
The Internet has been a vital communication Technology which is providing facilities 
to many aspects of human life88. Accordingly, there are some features of the challenges that 
could be described by 4 main perspectives; which are political rights perspectives, economic 
rights perspectives, social rights perspectives and cultural rights perspectives. 
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a) Political Rights Perspective:  
The main argument on this respect is the clash between Authority and Power 
VS Liberation and Resistance89. Like China who dominates the “Internet Enemies” list by 
every measure90 but In Arab countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab 
Spring used social networking which have broken the psychological barrier of fear by helping 
many to connect and share information.91 
Information Superhighway impacts the world by network accessing, 24-hour 
medium, two-way communications with multiple-individual participation and non-
geographical obstacles.92 It triggers ‘digital democracy’ by providing information and full 
participation, however, the obstacles against internet accession could engender ‘information 
aristocracy’93 which the minority of wealthy private providers and state could monopolize the 
Political Arena. 
Information and comprehension of public affairs are vital if autonomous and 
free choices are to be made by individual electors.94 Hence, the state and privates are able to 
govern internet by the capacities of: designed codes and applications, guardians of it and 
develop and implement the decisional principles,95 in term of facilitating Internet 
communication. 
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b) Economic Rights Perspective:  
In this sense, it could be described by the confrontation of Monopoly and 
Dividend VS. Allocation and Accession96, as Business Model of Google challenges the 
various Laws, without strictly checked and balanced, in economic fields such as competition, 
consumer protection and Intellectual Property Law.97 It deters other marketers to utilize 
cheap promotional device98 which SMEs would establish a global presence.  
Consequently, Digital Divide or Digital Inequality have a roots from low-
quality equipment, incompetence command of use, lack of social support networks, less 
experience, impotence ICTs using.99 The incompetence could be diminished by the 
progressive realization measure supported by State as the right-based approach human 
development projects. In a Finland case, government has recognized 1Mb Broadband internet 
access as a legal right100. 
Net Neutrality should be protected by fair competition between service 
providers101, however, in some cases ISPs who have power over market could collect a lot of 
data102 and imply that direct marketing and mass electronic surveillance have came from 
those data. 
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c) Social Rights Perspective:  
The challenge internet creates to society are the strike between Class 
fragmented and Exclusion VS Networks and Inclusion103. Cyber social life makes it difficult 
to govern such communities or State should let them exercising their own forms of 
governance, jurisdiction and sanction104. As shown in notorious LambdaMOO, ‘cyber-rape’ 
in an early online community, as the group efforts to build fledgling governance structure to 
address online misbehaviour105. 
However, In outrage prime example: "Social Sanction," a Facebook group 
recently deleted because it was deemed hate speech, posted phone numbers and addresses of 
Red Shirt protesters and urged its followers to physically attack one of them106. So both state 
and private have a duty to observe and suppress such hate speech websites. But State should 
leave social entrepreneur website: they encourage new forms of connection, contribution and 
participation107, alone. 
 
d) Cultural Rights Perspective:  
Cyberspace creates ‘virtual communities’ which could have some debate in 
various cases among Conservative and Domination VS Diversity and Pluralism108. 
Internet could be used by potentially marginalized communities and the 
increasingly lucrative sphere of multiplayer simulated worlds. On the other hand, it could 
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empower of illiberal extremists to find transnational community109. This reflects and 
transforms the social life that migrates there: problem of racism and xenophobia was growing 
over the Internet110. It supports individuals to insulate themselves from competing views will 
make it more difficult for societies to inculcate shared understandings of reality and ignores 
the significance of multiculturalism111. Somehow, it legitimizes the state surveillance on 
Cyberspace. 
The ability of Internet on increasing racial anonymity, interracial social and 
destabilize the significance of racial categories112 should not be deterred by Authority, 
especially minorities.  
 
These challenges in turn led to the further question of “proper regulation regime”. It 
must be inquired capability of Nation State to apply domestic law to trans-border activities in 
various perspectives113. On the Regional Level, the Assembly of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and European Union (EU) could only provide guidelines114 but could not oblige 
member states to implement and enforce it effectively. On International Level, United 
Nations could not pursue state into specific treaty for harmonizing Cyberspace Regulation 
Policies as it will be described next. 
 
 
1.3. Human Rights and the Discourse of Security  
This section draws a framework of States’ surveillance of communications for the 
exercises of the human rights to privacy, personal data protection. While considering the 
impact of significant technological advances in communications, State employ on behalf of 
state and international security. The research underlines the urgent need to further study new 
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modalities of surveillance and to revise International Regime and National laws regulating 
these practices in line with human rights standards. 
 
1) Discourse of Human Rights 
As technologies that facilitate State surveillance of communications advance, States 
are failing to ensure that laws and regulations related to communications surveillance adhere 
to international human rights and adequately protect the rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression. This research attempts to explain how international human rights law applies in 
the current digital environment, particularly in light of the increase in and changes to 
communications surveillance technologies and techniques.115 Personal Data Protection can 
provide civil society groups, industry, States and others with a framework to evaluate 
whether current or proposed surveillance laws and practices are consistent with human rights. 
These principles are the outcome of a global consultation with civil society groups, 
industry and international experts in communications surveillance law, policy and 
technology. 
 
a) Right to Privacy 
Privacy is a fundamental human right, and is central to the maintenance of 
democratic societies. It is essential to human dignity and it reinforces other rights, such as 
freedom of expression and information, and freedom of association, and is recognized under 
international human rights law.116 Activities that restrict the right to privacy, including 
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communications surveillance, can only be justified when they are prescribed by law, they are 
necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and are proportionate to the aim pursued.117  
At both the international and regional levels, privacy is also unequivocally 
recognized as a fundamental human right. The right to privacy is enshrined by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (art. 12), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR, art. 17), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 16), and the 
International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (art. 14). At the regional level, the right to privacy is protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (art. 8) and the American Convention on Human Rights (art. 
11)118 but there is no provision on right to privacy in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, while Asia has no regional Human Rights instrument. 
 
b) Right to Personal Data Protection 
Before public adoption of the Internet, well-established legal principles and 
logistical burdens inherent in monitoring communications created limits to State 
communications surveillance. In recent decades, those logistical barriers to surveillance have 
decreased and the application of legal principles in new technological contexts has become 
unclear. The explosion of digital communications content and information about 
communications, or "communications metadata" -- information about an individual’s 
communications or use of electronic devices -- the falling cost of storing and mining large 
sets of data, and the provision of personal content through third party service providers make 
State surveillance possible at an unprecedented scale.119 Meanwhile, conceptualizations of 
                                                          
117 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 29; General Comment No. 27, Adopted by The Human 
Rights Committee Under Article 40, Para. 4, Of The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 
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existing human rights law have not kept up with the modern and changing communications 
surveillance capabilities of the State, the ability of the State to combine and organize 
information gained from different surveillance techniques, or the increased sensitivity of the 
information available to be accessed.120 
State should ascertain whether the information likely to be procured falls 
within the ambit of "protected information" before seeking it, and should submit to the 
scrutiny of the judiciary or other democratic oversight mechanism. In considering whether 
information obtained through communications surveillance rises to the level of "protected 
information", the form as well as the scope and duration of the surveillance are relevant 
factors.121 Because pervasive or systematic monitoring has the capacity to reveal private 
information far in excess of its constituent parts, it can elevate surveillance of non-protected 
information to a level of invasiveness that demands strong protection.122 
c) Freedom of Expression 
Innovations in technology have increased the possibilities for communication 
and protections of free expression and opinion, enabling anonymity, rapid information-
sharing and cross-cultural dialogues. Technological changes have concurrently increased 
opportunities for State surveillance and interventions into individuals’ private 
                                                          
120 International Coalition of Civil Organizations on Internet Freedom. International Principles on the 
Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance. 2014, Preamble. 
121 Ibid. 
122 "Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a 
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can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the 
authorities. That is all the truer where such information concerns a person's distant past…In the Court's 
opinion, such information, when systematically collected and stored in a file held by agents of the State, falls 
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Rotaru v. Romania, 2000, para.43-44. 
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communications.123 The research concerns the unprecedented impact of the Internet on 
expanding the possibilities of individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.  
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is guaranteed under articles 19 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which affirm that everyone has the right to hold opinions without 
interference, and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through any 
media and regardless of frontiers. At the regional level, the right is protected by the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 9), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(art. 13); and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(art. 10).124 
d) Right to due process in Justice Procedure 
Due process requires that States respect and guarantee individuals’ human 
rights by ensuring that lawful procedures that govern any interference with human rights are 
properly enumerated in law, consistently practice, and available to the general public. 
Specifically, in the determination on his or her human rights, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent, competent and impartial tribunal 
established by law,125 except in cases of emergency when there is imminent risk of danger to 
human life. In such instances, retroactive authorization must be sought within a reasonably 
practicable time period. Mere risk of flight or destruction of evidence shall never be 
considered as sufficient to justify retroactive authorization. 
State seeks access to or use of protected information obtained through 
communications surveillance in the context of a criminal investigation, it must establish to 
the competent, independent, and impartial judicial authority that:126 
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1) there is a high degree of probability that a serious crime has been or will be 
committed; 
2) evidence of such a crime would be obtained by accessing the protected 
information sought; 
3) other available less invasive investigative techniques have been exhausted; 
4) information accessed will be confined to that reasonably relevant to the 
crime alleged and any excess information collected will be promptly 
destroyed or returned; and 
5) information is accessed only by the specified authority and used for the 
purpose for which authorization was given. 
In order to determine related the legitimacy of authorized communications surveillance, the 
judicial decision must be made by a competent judicial authority that is impartial and 
independent. The authority must be:127 
1) separate from the authorities conducting communications surveillance; 
2) conversant in issues related to and competent to make judicial decisions 
about the legality of communications surveillance, the technologies used 
and human rights; and 
3) have adequate resources in exercising the functions assigned to them. 
 
2) Discourse of Security 
The dynamic nature of technology has not only changed how surveillance can be 
carried out, but also “what” can be monitored. In enabling the creation of various 
opportunities for communication and information-sharing, the Internet has also facilitated the 
development of large amounts of transactional data by and about individuals. This 
information, known as communications data or metadata, includes personal information on 
individuals, their location and online activities, and logs and related information about the e-
mails and messages they send or receive. Communications data are storable, accessible and 
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searchable, and their disclosure to and use by State authorities are largely unregulated. 
Analysis of this data can be both highly revelatory and invasive, particularly when data is 
combined and aggregated. As such, States are increasingly drawing on communications data 
to support law enforcement or national security investigations. States are also compelling the 
preservation and retention of communication data to enable them to conduct historical 
surveillance.128 
The Sense of “Security” of Western Civilization, especially in the Pact Britannica-
Americana, is on the basis of “Preparing for the worst condition” so it constructs the 
perception of “Collection” or accumulation of capital, information is included. The 
perception of “Collectivism” is to accumulate everything as the supply ready to be used in 
crisis.129 This perception is the foundation logic of Capitalism Society (Neo-Liberalism) 
which is progressed by Modern State transformation.130 As well as the way government rule 
population on behalf of State Security, State Authority use information about population to 
exercise the power of the ruler over people.131 The more State collect information the more 
secure State feel, hence the Superpower Nation enlargement of territory by pushing 
Globalization via IT revolution is the strategy to extend State power to watch Netizen 
globally. For understanding security on Cyberspace, the research will analyze the relations 
between Human Rights and Security in 3 levels; International Community, State and 
Individual. Further the specific area of information security will be analyzed too. 
 
a) International Community Security 
As Internet penetrate through physical boundary, the old school concept of 
Modern State sovereignty on territory could not smoothly apply to Cyberspace’s activity such 
as International Data Processing and Espionage. Thus International Community must initiate 
the International Regime or Global Governance to regulate such trans-national activities on 
Internet.  
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129 Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. International, New York, 1867. 
130 Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformationthe Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Farrar&Rinehart, 
New York, 1944.  
131 Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population (Michel Foucault: Lectures at the College De France). 
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The responsible person and any processing service provider must protect the 
personal data subject to processing with the appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to ensure, at each time, their integrity, confidentiality and availability. These 
measures depend on the existing risk, the possible consequences to data subjects, the 
sensitive nature of the personal data, the state of the art, the context in which the processing is 
carried out, and where appropriate the obligations contained in the applicable national 
legislation.132 
In response to the increased data flows across borders and the fact that 
majority of communications are stored with foreign third party service providers, a number of 
States have begun to adopt laws that purport to authorize them to conduct extra-territorial 
surveillance or to intercept communications in foreign jurisdictions.133 This raises serious 
concern with regard to the extra-territorial commission of human rights violations and the 
inability of individuals to know that they might be subject to foreign surveillance, challenge 
decisions with respect to foreign surveillance, or seek remedies.  In 2012, the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute created draft standards for interception of foreign 
cloud-based services by European Governments.134 These developments suggest an alarming 
trend towards the extension of surveillance powers beyond territorial borders, increasing the 
risk of cooperative agreements between State law enforcement and security agencies to 
enable the evasion of domestic legal restrictions. 
 
b) State Security 
The metadata has been collected, mined and processed as a routine operation. 
The data Surveillance on targeting suspects were shift to Mass Surveillance on every people 
without legitimate permission. The abuses of power, State exercise power by compulsory 
sharing individual data with Corporations, have been disclosed in the case of Super Power 
State’s Security Agency. The arbitrary data sharing among them is illegal. Moreover, the 
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accusation of NSA intercept data, from the middle way of internet traffic, by ISPs is the back-
door unlawful spying as well.135 
State made the “Risk” by creating an image of Horrors; crime, terrorism and 
chaos, which may threats to society. Then state arbitrary embedded a 
Panopticon/Governmentality136 to watch people in the name of “Security”. The cooperator is 
Corporation, who own the technology which adapts to serve consumer in vast majority 
purpose in everyday-life practice. Corporation, ISPs, share the information of people with 
State. The Cooperation is constructed on the basis of power of state, law, or on economic 
benefits which might be the non-transparent pact among them. 
Modern surveillance technologies and arrangements that enable States to 
intrude into an individual’s private life threaten to blur the divide between the private and the 
public spheres. They facilitate invasive and arbitrary monitoring of individuals, who may not 
be able to even know they have been subjected to such surveillance, let alone challenge it. 
Technological advancements mean that the State’s effectiveness in conducting surveillance is 
no longer limited by scale or duration. Declining costs of technology and data storage have 
eradicated financial or practical disincentives to conducting surveillance. As such, the State 
now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale 
surveillance than ever before.137 
The Potentiality of State to panoptical watching on peoples in all space at any 
time makes the State feels “Secure” to Control and intervene Situations. The ability of 
Corporate to research on consumers in all space at any time makes the Corporation feels 
“Secure” to design and launch marketing strategies. 
 
3) Human Security 
Internet users can enjoy relative anonymity on the Internet, States and private actors 
also have access to new technologies to monitor and collect information about individuals’ 
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11 Nov 2013. 
137 UN. A/HRC/23/40. 2013, para. 33. 
71 
 
communications and activities. Such technologies have the potential to violate the right to 
privacy, thereby undermining people’s confidence and security on the Internet and impeding 
the free flow of information and ideas online.138 The responsible person and those involved at 
any stage of the processing shall maintain the confidentiality of personal data. This obligation 
shall remain even after the ending of the relationship with the data subject or, when 
appropriate, with the responsible person.139 
Human desires to connect with Info/people. They access/communicate by creating 
connection channel/device. The issue they would like to engage covers various 
Technological, Social and Cultural Contents. Internet generates the space for connection then 
ISPs supply Social Media, Search Engine and Internet Application. Desire to Connect is the 
demand in Information Market.140 The Competence to connect to information/people of 
individual makes them felt “Secure” in different circumstance: from Mega Disaster to minor 
Everyday-life practice stuffs.141 
The ownership on mode of production is the basis of Power over Market. The Capital 
Accumulation is the source of such power. In New Information Market, data is key-bases 
node of capital since it could turns to valuable information. The collecting, mining and 
processing of data are the value-added process from internet user information.142 This 
phenomenon is necessary for developing E-Commerce Market not only on trading but also 
marketing and researching. The more people use internet the more data flood in then it 
enlarges E-Market and create more sophisticate Information Society.143 The actor who 
innovate Internet and Construct the data processing is IT Corporation.  
These IT Corporations make all Internet services in order to supply those demand 
from Internet users. However, all markets and society needs certain rules and administrations 
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so the cooperation with Authority is needed. The data sharing between State and Corporate is 
a form of such cooperative action and policy.144 
The Strategy of Security Authority to counter the Risk is filling everything into data 
system. This type of Governmentality is the heritage from Modern State which tries to 
implant Bio-Power to every single human that they were watching by State.145 Then watched 
people will control themselves in order by the feeling of being watched. State also feels 
secure because they think that tracing back to find the data of everyone is possible since they 
keep personal data in their data mine. 
The most important question is How to balance the “Security” between State, 
Corporation and Individual. While we are in the phrase of priority on State Security, the 
Human Security is threatened by the arbitrary sharing of data among state agencies and ISPs. 
“The security of the State on a state of Human Insecurity” 
 
4) Information security 
This Research will offer an overview of what the Personal Data Protection requires in 
terms of security, and aims to help to decide how to manage the security of the personal data 
someone hold. This part identifies the main points and information security principle. 
The Human Rights Committee analyzed the content of the right to privacy (art. 17) in 
its General Comment No. 16 (1988), imposes specific obligations relating to the protection of 
privacy in communications, underlining that “correspondence should be delivered to the 
addressee without interception and without being opened or otherwise read”. “Surveillance, 
whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of 
communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations, should be prohibited”.146 It also 
indicates that “the gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks 
and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be 
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regulated by law.”147 The impact of advances in information and communications 
technologies on the right to privacy was barely understood.148 
There is the seventh data protection principle.149 In practice, it means you must have 
appropriate security to prevent the personal data you hold being accidentally or deliberately 
compromised. In particular, you will need to:150design and organize your security to fit the 
nature of the personal data you hold and the harm that may result from a security breach; be 
clear about who in your organization is responsible for ensuring information security; make 
sure you have the right physical and technical security, backed up by robust policies and 
procedures and reliable, well-trained staff; and be ready to respond to any breach of security 
swiftly and effectively. 
 
 
1.4. Reflection on Data Processing and its Impact on Personal Data Protection  
The title of this section is reflected in curiosity. A curiosity is composite of the nature 
of the data protection while realizing the necessity for its regime. This section will initially 
critically inquire how the variety economics of the data processing have impacted any legal 
rights relate to it. More peculiarly, it will demonstrate how the counterpart supporters of 
political standpoints, namely the Neo-liberal and human rights protector, have described their 
contesting intellectual evidences toward such characteristics. Secondly, it will review the 
results as to how the IT Corporation is testing an arena for state regulation in terms of 
development, freedom and law enforcement. Thirdly, it will indicate why reality manipulates 
“data of individuals is even more tightly collected”, not a monopolized state but a state of 
monopoly that encourages a fragmented, multi-layered/stakeholder regime of data protection. 
Finally, it will manifest upon the possible prospects such a policy will accomplished, i.e. the 
possibility on the participation of peoples and society by a various sphere of multi players, 
therefore claiming any precarious for risk. 
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According to the theme of the above Question, it is important to argue with first four 
relevant questions which are: Do the Knowledge Economy need a personal data to process 
and government will save numerous cost from letting it happen and exploiting it at last? Is the 
attitude of ‘Zero Privacy’ acceptable? Is the ‘fundamental right’ an obstacle to the US and 
EU’s Information Society project? and How have the data protection institution done? 
Relatively, the essay will introduce the case studies relevant with “Google” to scrutiny the 
success of EU and US on Data Protection policy and practice in some parts. 
 
1) Does the Knowledge Economy need personal data to process? 
At First, not only there are obviously needs of business which prefer a wide open for 
commercial activities to create a new products in a form of data processing services, but also 
government whom aroused by private sectors for reforming their efficiency and savings cost 
for Personal Data Processing. However, there is an argument on the ‘unavoidable’ economic 
and social conditions151 whether it needed to ignore the important of data subjects’ protection. 
 From global economic trend, it leads to data processing reformation in vast majority 
countries in Western whose economic depend on E-activity more than ever since all 
manufacturing has been transfer to new major economy countries such as China, Brazil and 
India. USA, as a leader in ICT business for a long time, is prominently promote the freedom 
of ICT Corporations but bound itself with Safe Harbor Agreement.152 The treaty with EU on 
personal data processing trans-border was constructed as an obligatory manner since US 
needs to undertake business in EU Market. 
 However, the globalization of everything include the data transferring, sharing and 
collecting of personal data, without proper regulation and people-participation, seems to be 
an violation to abundant data subjects. This concerns leads to the second question about 
privacy of individual. 
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2) Is the attitude of ‘Zero Privacy’ acceptable? 
On behalf of Privacy, this quote is a controversial one “You have zero privacy. Get 
over it”153, since there are many promoters who campaign for integrated global E-Market. 
This argument could generate effects on the attitude of internet users towards data protection 
because they try to settle a social norm for accepting “Zero Privacy”. 
On the contrary, information and comprehension of public affairs are vital if 
autonomous and free choices are to be made by individual electors.154 Hence, the state and 
privates are able to govern internet by the capacities of: designed codes and applications, 
guardians of it and develop and implement the decisional principles,155 in term of boosting 
trust in E-Market. 
Nevertheless, it has already been shown of what was government really intents, to 
promote economic flourishing by any means but lack of protection on data subject’s rights. In 
this respect data collection or data processing without consent of data subjects might lead to 
massive infringement of Human Rights.  
Here withstands, Cyberspace is suitable for proving the “Governmentality” theory of 
Michel Foucault which reveals the Modern State’s technology of power that penetrates to the 
self of individual through Public space and activity.156 Since the state eager to shift the line to 
the former private space combining with the enlargement of public communication spaces, 
Legal Society has a duty to answer the problems about whether Social Media is a Public 
Sphere or truly Private Space. With this regards, the data processing system of state 
authorities and private companies will be used as a powerful Massive Electronic Surveillance 
device. 
 
 
 
                                                          
153 McNeally, Scott. SUN Microsystems. 1999. 
154 Walker, Clive. "Cyber-Constitutionalism and Digital Democracy." The Internet, Law and Society, Longman, 
London, 2000, p. 127. 
155 Bygrave, Lee A and Michaelsen, Terje. Governors of Internet. Oxford University Press, UK, 2009, pp. 93-
94. 
156 Loader, Brian. The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring. Psychology 
Press, Brighton, 1997, pp. 12-14. 
76 
 
3) Is the ‘fundamental right’ an obstacle to the Digital Economy Project? 
Notwithstanding, the discussions of Human Rights in Cyberspace are concerned about 
threats to freedom posed by private power, IT Corporation. Not just the threats from the 
State, as Paul S. Berman mentioned that ‘the role of entrenched economic power, the 
importance of embedded legal regimes, the ubiquitous role of the state, the significance of 
non-state communities to the construction of norms’157 imply the needs of sensitivity 
regulation, cover all influent actors, on cyberspace. 
The same old problem on balancing the power of state and individual rights by some 
conditions; State security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression 
of criminal offences and protecting the rights of others, stills continued. These exceptions are 
vague and easy to be used as an excuse to interfere the private sphere of individual. Since the 
competent data collector and processor are the private IT Corporation.158 While the State 
Authority are on the edge of dilemma because on one hand State may cooperate with private 
sectors to gain more power over people, on the other hands they stand still on their position to 
regulate the misbehaviors of corporation. Due to the low technical capability of State to 
regulate the data processing, the dreams of people to have a decent state who protect 
individual by controlling the private company might be naïve. 
With regards to EU and EU-US E-Market Harmonization, an intention to create and 
to enlarge E-Government comes from the concerns on anonymity issue. While anonymity is a 
part of individual right to privacy, it is a formidable difficulty to manage population159of 
Government. Thus, threats to personal data protection are the surveillance-oriented society 
which has been constructed on the plea of social order.  
 
4) Does Data Protection need explicit institution to regulate  
On the basis of personal data protection implementation, the balance of Individuals 
freedom and State interference is relevant to characteristics of specific chosen Regulation 
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Model. Although the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace propose the radical 
independent from state and its legal concepts,160 which against the eager of governments and 
corporations mobilized to regulate and control online activities. Even though, the cyberspace 
could not legitimately regulate by IT Corporation who own technology, or effectively be 
governed by Centralized-State regulation, there are needs for protection of personal data by 
some certain of State intervention in combating cybercrime. 
 For acknowledgement, the legal instruments relating personal data protection were 
created since 1980’s, the time internet was not widespread. So how could International 
Community apply the old regime to the post-millennium because of the problems caused by 
Trans-National IT Corporations; Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, etc.. 
Accordingly, the forthcoming International, Regional and Domestic laws and Data Protection 
Authority must interpret and apply the law to specific case on dynamism basis but the 
independent of such institutes should be guaranteed in transparent manner. 
In terms of Data Protection Authority (DPA) assessment, this research will show the 
decisions made by DPAs or the Courts in many cases when there were accusations of 
cooperation between the National Security Agencies and Information Technology Providers; 
IT Corporation. The decisions of the Authority could imply some evidence on DPAs 
efficiency and transparency. The case studies which have been selected are from the EU and 
USA which will be shown in Chapter 3. 
 
 
1.5. Object of study and research hypothesis  
This Section consists of the object of study, scope of the thesis and lastly the research 
hypothesis that gives the research questions for studies. These components will illustrate the 
big picture of the whole research investigation. 
Since the object of study is the researches of personal data protection on cyberspace 
and its limitations in the EU and EU-US E-Market regulation. Thus the limitations in the EU 
and EU-US legal regime to fulfill right to personal data protection is the matter because such 
restrictions might put the difficulties to all duty bearers to fulfill data subjects’ rights. While 
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IT Corporations and State Authorities have an obligation to protect right to personal data of 
data subjects but those limitations may give the opportunity to State Agencies or IT 
Corporations to exercise extra interference against those obligations. Moreover, the nature of 
E-Market, which are dominated by US IT Corporations who transfers and processes personal 
data of EU citizen across Atlantic, it brings further complicated situations to initiate a 
common regime to protect personal data between EU and US.  
The new proposed regime must deal with 2 main difficult circumstances; 
1) Exceptions on the basis of state of emergency; National Security, Public Safety, 
Morality, etc. to exercise right to personal data especially in the case of Non-US 
citizen, 
2) Enforcing US entities who are obliged with US legal system not the EU in order to 
implement right to personal data protection in the Single E-Market of EU and EU-
US blocs. 
 
This thesis will concentrate on Protection of Personal Data not Privacy, especially on 
Human Rights purpose, not economic-interest realm. It will focus on the benefit of 
International Security and Human Rights of internet users around the world not the security 
of State on the state of human insecurity worldwide. 
The Actors and Relations included by the research are the duty bearers of Personal 
Data Protection law, both State and Private Entity Activities;  
1) State Authority who may conduct activities against the integrity of personal data 
protection; Data Surveillance, Communication Interception of Traffics and 
Collection of Data. 
2) IT Corporation who control and process of data subject’s personal data and may 
fail to fulfill the obligation by undertaking illegitimate Data Collecting, Processing, 
Mining, Sharing. 
The Informal Power Relation between State and Private organization will be brought into 
account since there is some informal agreement or coordination between State Agency and IT 
Corporation on data sharing and processing. Hence, the research would find the formal 
governance of the problem and extend to the informal included regime around the issue.   
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The time frame of this research is 2001-2016 (After the terrorist’s attack in USA on 
9/11 until the year the set of EU and EU-US reforms have been launched in 2016). The most 
critical turning point time that used for separating old regime from new regime is June 5th 
2013 since the revelations of Mass Electronic Surveillance was presented on World Wide 
Web. 
The Space of studies covers Cyberspace, Virtual Space on Internet or Online World, 
especially the E-Market, Internet Traffic in International data transfer. Not only of the EU 
which have the common regime on Regional Security but also the Trans-Atlantic, EU-US 
Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield and Umbrella Agreement, which affected and predominated by 
US Entities. Consequently the Domestic Regulations of USA will be included. 
The Research selects 2 Areas for studying; EU and EU-USA E-Market. The research 
will base on the evidences from practices of each area and others’ analysis; documentary 
reviews and experts’ opinions. Moreover, the qualitative information; judgments, resolutions 
and opinions of the official organization or state authority will be held as the basic proves or 
interpretations.  
There are 3 main issues on personal data protection for the comparative study: Right, 
Obligation and Implementation. In all 3 issues the study will categorize into 12 subsections; 
Legal Approval, Definition and Scope of Personal Data Protection, Content of Data Subjects’ 
Rights, Exception to the exercise of Right, Basic Duty of Data Controller and Processor, 
Condition and Requirement of Data Collection and Processing, Data Security, Data 
Retention, Transfer of Data to Third Party, Supervisory Authority, Individual Remedy and 
Enforceability. In each section the analysis will test 3 levels orderly; Universal, Regional and 
Bi-lateral levels.  
 
Research Hypothesis 
International Human Rights Law recognizes a general framework to support and 
regulate personal data protection on cyberspace realm. Nonetheless, the distinctive characters 
of cyberspace demand a well designed, at universal level, specific regulation and mechanism 
to guarantee such fundamental rights relating personal data protection internationally. 
Accordingly, Research Hypothesis is represented in double issues: 
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1) Effective personal data protection on cyberspace needs the establishment of an 
International/Universal legal system treaty-based 
2) EU Regime on personal data protection on cyberspace and present EU-US agreements on 
this issue can be used as a model for initiating such International/Universal Treaty. 
 
Research Questions 
From the Hypothesis above, it can be transformed to questions for undertaking 
research which are: 
1) How had the laws of European Union, United States of America and EU-US 
agreement on personal data protection regulated the E-Market?   
2) How the problems had been carried out when there are conflicts between the 
protecting Human Rights of Individuals and the States’ using of IT Corporation’s processed 
data? 
3) How did the court decisions relating IT Corporation express? And to what extent 
does it set precedent for the right to personal data protection? 
4) What are the changes that EU and EU-US data protection reforms bring to their E-
Market regulation? 
5) What should be formulated as the Universal Regime to regulate the data processing 
of Trans-National IT Corporations and State Authorities for fulfilling right to personal data 
protection on Domestic, Regional and International levels? 
 
 
1.6. Research Methods and Methodology 
The research applies minor doctrinal legal study on history of data protection law 
which has been developed to keep up Information technology progress. 
However, some of research employs Non-Doctrinal legal study to illustrate the 
complexity of IT Corporations and State Agencies practice in order to demonstrate the 
violation on individual rights which was infringed by the ignorance of State Authorities. 
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In terms of Empirical Research, this research handles both Quantitative and 
Qualitative style for gathering the data in different case studies in difficult circumstances. 
With regards to Quantitative, the static, report and case study numbers will be 
categorized and represent the operation and cooperation between IT Corporation and State. 
On behalf of Qualitative, the literature review on various documents; interviews and 
press releases from stakeholders, court decisions, official reports and expertise organizations’ 
opinions will be constructed and identify the problems and prospects on personal data 
protection in different issues. 
Aftermath, Critical Legal Study analysis on the political economy among states and 
corporations will be used as main framework for describing the relationship between them 
which should be obliged by certain legal data protection regimes. 
Ultimately, Prescriptive Research will be employed as a framework to analyze the 
reforms of EU and EU-US data protection regime. Consequently, the comparative studies to 
synthesis the prerequisite requirements from EU and EU-US regime for initiating the 
Universal Regime to support the progressive realization on right to personal data protection 
of data subjects worldwide. 
Researching plan for completing research project consist of 
1) Literature Review. 
2) Empirical Data will be collected to prove the data processing of IT Corporation and 
their cooperation with State on data collecting, processing and sharing. 
3) Political Economy analysis on the legitimacy of IT Corporation and State 
relationship from empirical evidence.  
4) Socio-Legal analysis on old personal data protection laws and enforcements. 
5) Prescriptive Research on Jurisprudence from Court Case Studies; US Courts and 
Court of Justice of European Union. 
6) Normative Research on new personal data protection laws and enforcements. 
7) Synthesis the prospects to promote personal data protection regime from research. 
 
For fulfilling the research plan I need to spend time in many places and visit various 
spaces to access sources of material; 
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1) Libraries; Facultat de Dret de la Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de economia i 
empresa de la Universitat de Barcelona, Faculty of Law Chiangmai University. 
These libraries not only allow the access to paper books and academic journals but 
also provide the catalog of digital library will be described below. 
2) Internet Portals; Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
and Legal Scholarship Network (LSN). 
3) Official Website of Competence Organizations; United Nations, Office of the UN 
High Commissioner of Human Rights, Internet Governance Forum (IGF), 
European Union, Court of Justice of European Union, European Commission 
Justice Mission, European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, justice and 
Home Affairs, US Federal Trade Commission; Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield, 
Library of Congress, US Courts Gov. 
4) International Annual Seminar of United Nation Internet Governance Forum. 
 
 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
The research divided into 6 Chapters, first Chapter is the research designing and the 
last is conclusion and recommendation, as Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 contain the result of the 
research on 4 main issues. In this Section the structure of all Research Contents will be 
illustrated as well as the short introduction to each issue. 
 
a) The old regime on Personal Data Protection 
The Chapter 2 analyzes Universal Instruments, EU Laws and EU-US 
Agreements before 5th June 2013. By starting with the historical background of personal data 
protection, then the crystallization of personal data protection institutionally or less formally 
and have variable legal statuses, scope, and substantive provisions. Together they comprise 
the contemporary international data protection regulatory environment. In this chapter, the 
research will estimate the STATUS QUO of personal data protection regime which was 
enacted before the reformation process of EU and Us. Despite the proliferation of 
international sources of data protection norms, implementation remains at state level. In 
effect, depending on national restraints, it is up to national governments to decide whether to 
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introduce data protection legislation, which international model to apply, how to implement 
it, and how to balance it against other human rights or other considerations; state security, 
suppress crime and terrorism. Therefore, for the time being, the domestic personal data 
protection regime of US must be the subject matter, as it will be reviewed this Chapter 2.  
 
b) Hard Cases of Personal Data Protection in practice and in the Court 
As The IT Corporations are the leading actors in this dilemma of Data 
Processing and Data Protection issue, the relationship between Service Providers (SPs) and 
State Authorities are crucial to analysis. The threats to personal data protection posed by 
either state agencies or non-state actors, in this case IT Corporation, are amassing huge stores 
of traceable data they have possessed. Chapter 3 will reflect the problems by picking the 
policy and practice of US Intelligence Agency which penetrate into the filling systems 
contained by Trans-National IT Corporation. In order to search for precise interpretation of 
personal data protection, the court decisions in US domestic courts and the Court of Justice of 
European Union will be brought to study. The Court cases which applied the Old laws, before 
the reformation took place, can give the clear precedent on how right to personal data 
protection was implemented in many scenarios. Subsequently, those precedents the Court 
made could be used as benchmarks for creating the new regime on personal data protection in 
different levels; Domestic, Bilateral, Regional and International. 
 
c) Reforms of the EU and EU-US on Personal Data Protection in Cyberspace 
In Chapter 4, reviewing of the new EU personal data protection regime and 
EU-US Bilateral Agreements will be represented as the outputs of reformation since 6th June 
2013. Firstly, the study of US domestic regime transition, of personal data protection on 
cyberspace. US Government had launched a set of laws to reform their surveillance activity 
and provide Non-US citizen a stronger entitlement to their right to personal data protection in 
US Court. Thereupon, the comprehensive revision of the new EU and EU-US regimes, EU 
approves General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Directive on judicial and criminal 
matters. Then, EU pursued US Government to sign bilateral-agreement to implement those 
standards; EU-US Privacy Shield for general data protection and EU-US Umbrella 
Agreement on judicial and criminal matters. However, there has not been such an 
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International Treaty for Personal Data Protection. But the studies on EU and EU-US regimes 
will give prospects for the further movement to initiate Universal, Regional personal data 
protection instruments and Domestic law. 
 
d) The Universal approach for creating new Personal Data Protection Regime 
Finally, the 5th Chapter will evaluate the possibility to initiate International 
Treaty for regulating data using across border. The result of research might show the 
straightforward balance of control because the politics of law making shift the boundary 
between State Power and Individual right. This boundary would be beneficial outcome for 
Governance Model to Regulate IT Corporation and State Authority. The problems here are 
what State must initiate the changes and what must be done by private company without 
overwhelming state interfering. For particular action, the initiatives of either international 
governmental organizations or non-governmental movements will be studied. By extracting 
the reforms of EU and EU-US regime, there are set of principles in each issue could be 
imported to create International Regime for protection of personal data.  
 
From the 2nd and 3rd Chapter, the research stripes to narrate the problems, old legal 
frameworks, hard cases in the Court and reforms of EU and EU-US E-Market chronically. 
Later, Chapter 4th illustrates the reforms EU and US have taken to handle the problems and 
the 5th Chapter tries to find probability and propose the prospects to constitute the Universal 
Personal Data Protection Regime for harmonizing legal standard in Cyberspace. 
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Chapter 2 Legal Framework on Personal Data Protection before 2013 reform 
 
Information technology converged with telecommunications, creating the current 
interconnected and internationalized environment of personal data processing, the Internet. 
Processing of personal information is no longer performed domestically, or even within well-
defined physical borders. The original ―transborder flows of personal data‖1, which by 
definition included transmission of data from one jurisdiction to another, were soon replaced 
by borderless continuous personal data processing, in which personal data are processed 
somewhere in the ―cyberspace‖, that is, in indistinguishable server-farms installed around the 
world. 
In addition, trans-border personal data processing became individualized. Local data 
controllers are no longer needed to transmit their data subjects‘ data across borders to other 
data controllers in order for trans-border exchanges to occur.
2
 Today, Web 3.0 applications 
enable individuals to upload their personal data to the ―social network‖ or ―webpage‖, going 
to and from unidentified destination. 
Consequently, the need for international governance of data protection is more 
important than ever. However, the means to achieve this still seem to be missing or at least 
the ones at hand do not meet with the necessary international consensus. The first point refers 
to the fact that, the right to data protection is not the same as the right to privacy, and the 
terms ―data privacy‖ and ―information privacy‖ may have different content in different parts 
of the world. Even though the goal of this research is to harmonize the provision and 
implementation of Personal Data Protection, for creating International Regime, but this 
Chapter will show the overlaps of various instruments; universal, European and bilateral EU-
US level, regulating this issue. 
Firstly the development of Personal Data Protection will be scrutinized by the running 
of time through history. 
 
                                                             
1 See the title of the OECD data privacy instrument, ―Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data.‖ 23 Sep. 1980.  
2 De Hert, Paul and Papakonstantinou, Vagelis. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p. 273. 
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2.1.  The History of General, EU and EU-US legal system on Personal Data Protection
 Since the end of Second World War, the concept of a ―right to privacy‖ emerged in 
international law without obviously mentioned about ―personal data protection‖. This first 
arose in a rather weak version in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948. A more substantive protection followed in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. According to which everyone has the right to respect for his 
private sphere. The mentioning of 'home' and 'correspondence' could build on constitutional 
traditions in many countries around the world, as a common heritage of a long development, 
sometimes during many centuries, but the focus on 'privacy' and 'private life' was new.
3
 It 
was an obvious reaction to what had happened; secret police, wiretapping and mass 
surveillance on population, during the time of transition in European Politic Society at the 
early 1900 until WWII. Thus, the interference with the right to respect for private life, must 
base on adequate legal basis; clear, accessible and foreseeable, and it was necessary and 
proportionate for the legitimate interests at stake. 
Privacy and Personal Data Protection, to be more precisely: the right to respect for 
private life and the right to the protection of personal data, have crucial interrelated. They are 
both fairly recent expressions of a universal thought with strong ethical perspectives: the 
dignity, autonomy and unique value of every human being. However, there are also important 
differences. The concept of ― personal data protection‖ was developed in order to provide 
structural legal protection to individuals against the inappropriate use of information 
technology for processing information relating to them, regardless of whether that processing 
would be within the scope of the right to respect for private life or not. The consequence set 
of safeguards, in essence a system of checks and balances, consisting of substantive 
conditions, individual rights, procedural provisions and independent supervision, applies in 
principle to all processing of personal data.
4
 
Data protection as a separate topic in legal science discourse and legislative practice 
arose in the 1970s and 1980s, in the era in which computerized automatic data processing 
became popular. With technological progress, data has been very valuable and important. 
Mass volumes of data can be used to provide different services; this was not possible before 
                                                             
3 Hustinx, Peter. EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation. 2014, p. 3. 
4 Ibid, p. 50. 
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automated processing. Data exchange and cross-use are important for public and private 
services based on various data. Still, the nature of data protection should be related to the 
content of the data and not to their form. In practice, it could mean key differences that the 
legal system must take into consideration to ensure that the rules are suitable in different 
situations. With regard to data protection, it must be decided how, if at all, data can be 
protected to the same extent in the cyberspace as in the ―real‖ world. 5 It is usual that attempts 
to create a safe online society result in even harder than in an offline environment because the 
amount of processed data is far greater than the past.
 
 
Due to the technology development in early 1970's the Council of Europe concluded 
that Article 8 ECHR had a number of shortcomings in the light of new developments, 
particularly in view of the growing use of information technology: the uncertainty as to what 
was covered by 'private life', the emphasis on protection against interference by 'public 
authorities', and the lack of a more pro-active approach, also dealing with the possible misuse 
of personal information by companies or other relevant organizations in the private sector.
6
 
Since 1997 the European Court of Human Rights has ruled in a number of cases that the 
protection of personal data is of 'fundamental importance' for a person's enjoyment of the 
right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR, and has derived yardsticks from the 
Convention for determining the extent to which that right had been infringed.
7
 This suggests 
that the Court is increasingly inclined to assess compliance with the Convention - at any rate 
for 'sensitive data' - within the context of Article 8 ECHR. This resulted to the Member States 
to take all necessary steps to give effect to certain principles on the protection of the privacy 
of individuals in the private and the public sector.
8
  
The world‘s first law on data protection was adopted in Hessen, local government 
administration in Democratic Republic of Germany, in 1970. Sweden was the first country to 
                                                             
5 Metcalf, Katrin N. "Legal Aspects of Privacy Law and Data Protection." The Right to Privacy as a Human 
Right and Everyday Technologies, Institute of Human Rights NGO, 2014, p. 83. 
6 Council of Europe. Explanatory Report to Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Strasbourg, 1973, para. 4. 
7 European Court of Human Rights. ECHR 1997-I  Z v Finland, Application 22009/93, p.  95. 
8 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals 
vis-a-vis electronic data banks in the private sector. 1973; Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy 
of individuals vis-a-vis electronic data banks in the public sector. 1974. 
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adopt a national law on data protection in 1973,
9
 then it was followed by legislations in a vast 
majority countries. In December 1983, the Constitutional Court of Germany adopted a 
decision under which certain aspects of a census were considered to run counter to 
fundamental liberties due to the inviolability of personal privacy.
 10
 All of this happened at a 
time when more computer-based data processing began to be used. Technology showed the 
importance of data protection, as it was possible to process a very large amount of data to 
obtain some useful information from them. Technology can be used to glean meaning from a 
large set of detailed data, various data can be collated so that insignificant data take on 
importance, and data can be gathered and disseminated worldwide.
 11
 Information 
Technology is undisputedly responsible for creating a new context in which personal data 
protection regime must be implemented.  
The first major international document that expressed the main principles of data 
protection, such as expedience and proportionality, was the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in 1980.
12
 Nevertheless, the 
first binding instrument on the subject is the product of The Council of Europe which 
invested time in the preparation of an international agreement. After four years this resulted 
in the adoption of the Data Protection Convention in 1981 at Strasbourg
13
, Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, also known 
as Convention 108. 
 During the 1990s, and within the European Communities framework, European 
Commission therefore submitted a proposal for a Directive in order to harmonize the national 
laws on data protection in the private and most parts of the public sector.
14
 After half-decade 
of negotiation, this resulted in the adoption of the Directive 95/46/EC32. The consequence is 
                                                             
9 Fokus, Fraunhofer. (Hoepner, P and Strickand, L and Löhe, M.). Historical Analysis on European Data 
Protection Legislation. 2012, pp. 11-12.  
10 Ibid, p. 12.  
11 Fuster, Gloria González et al. "From Unsolicited Communications to Unsolicited Adjustments." Data 
Protection in a Profiled World, Springer, 2010, pp. 105-117. 
12 The OECD Data Privacy Instrument, ―Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data.‖ 23 Sep. 1980. 
13 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981. 
14 European Commission. COM (90) 314 final - SYN 287 and 288. Brussels, 13 Sep. 1990, p. 4. 
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that the Directive has led to a much greater consistency between Member States, but certainly 
not to identical or fully consistent solutions.
15
  
 In 2008 also to Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA with general rules on the 
protection of personal data processed in the context of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, including EUROJUST and EUROPOL. It reflects the forthcoming matters 
in criminal justice that need more and more processed personal data to prevent and suppress 
crime but the concerns on confidential breached by State Authority has arisen as well. 
The EU Directive 95/46/EC has set out rules for transferring personal data from the 
EU to third countries for two decades. Under these rules, the Commission may decide that a 
non-EU country ensures an "adequate level of protection". These decisions are commonly 
referred to as "adequacy decisions" which set standard among EU Member State and between 
EU and other country since 1995. Until 2000, EU adopted a Decision recognizing the "Safe 
Harbour Privacy Principles" and "Frequently Asked Questions", issued by the Department of 
Commerce of the United States,
16
 as providing adequate protection for the purposes of 
personal data transfers from the EU to US. The bilateral data protection agreement had 
created a significant Bloc of Digital Single Market within liberal democratic regime country. 
 Due to the rapid progress of ICT in the last two decades, a new situation has now 
arisen whereby private IT Corporations possess a large amount of data on people – data they 
have obtained from the individuals themselves – either directly, though the people putting the 
data in Social Network (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) or people using an Internet service that 
allows various things to be found out about them (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft Network). Many 
companies, including major international IT Corporations such as Facebook and Google, 
have their own ―Terms&Conditions‖ and different structures for implementing the rules. But 
these are rules the companies have themselves seen fit to establish and are mainly based on 
the goodwill of the respective IT Corporations. In addition, national legislation is in force 
regardless of the fact that the companies are multinationals and it may be difficult to establish 
                                                             
15 Hustinx, Peter. EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation. 2014, p.  9. 
16 European Commission. Restoring Trust in EU-US data flows - Frequently Asked Questions. Brussels, 27 Nov. 
2013, pp. 2-3. 
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a direct link to a given jurisdiction in a specific case.
17
 Nonetheless, laws could, in fact, prove 
difficult to apply effectively due to obstacles related to jurisdiction. 
 The short history of universal data protection has shown the desires in different places 
to construct Universal, Regional, Bilateral and Domestic norms for protecting the right to 
personal data of internet users on one hand and to support the enlargement of E-Market on 
the other hand. As we will analyze in the following section, these old regimes for protecting 
the right to personal data are not enough to protect internet users in past era. There are 
obvious needs for creating a harmonized standard for Single E-Market on the basis of liberal 
democratic society. 
 
 
2.2. Legal Analysis of the Instruments relating to Personal Data Protection 
Apparently a multitude of supranational sources of data protection norms exist, both 
at an international and at a regional level. The crystallization of data protection may be 
institutional or less formal and have variable legal statuses, scope, and substantive provisions. 
Together they comprise the contemporary international data protection regulatory 
environment. Despite the proliferation of international sources of data protection norms, 
implementation remains at state level. In effect, depending on national restraints (for 
instance, participation or not in an international organization), it is up to national 
governments to decide whether to introduce data protection legislation, which international 
model to apply (i.e. UN, OECD, Council of Europe, EU, or the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)), how to implement it, and how to balance it against other human rights 
or other considerations (state security, finance, etc.). Therefore, for the time being, 
international governance of personal data protection retains a horizontal character: it sets the 
agenda and formulates broad principles, but leaves the implementation at the local level.
18
 
The regulatory regime, as it will be reviewed in Chapter 2 of this research, has reached its 
limits through contemporary Information Technology applications. 
                                                             
17 Metcalf, Katrin N. "Legal Aspects of Privacy Law and Data Protection." The Right to Privacy as a Human 
Right and Everyday Technologies, Institute of Human Rights NGO, 2014, p. 85. 
18 De Hert, Paul and Vagelis Papakonstantinou. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p.275. 
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In this chapter, the research will analyze the STATUS QUO of personal data 
protection regime which was enacted before the reformation process of EU and US since 6
th
 
June 2013. 
 
2.2.1. Individual’s Right to Personal Data Protection 
The structure of the content in right to personal data protection of individual will be 
differentiated into 4 sections. First of all, the research will explore how legal documents 
recognize personal data protection in various sources; universal, regional and bilateral 
instruments. Secondly, the crystallization of personal data protection by vast majority 
instruments in order to illustrate definition and scope of this legal issue. Third, the 
development of right to personal data protection on behalf of individual, data subjects‘ right, 
for evaluating the consistence and overlap between data protection instruments. Ultimately, 
comparative study on the restrictions to exercise personal data protection from different 
instruments for framing up the conditions IT Corporation and State Authority may limit the 
data subjects‘ right. These are legal issues the research tries to point out as the problems from 
the old personal data protection regime. 
 
2.2.1.1. Legal Approval of Personal Data Protection  
This section will describe the recognition of Personal Data protection in 
diverse instruments from International Organization to EU Regional Bloc then Bilateral EU-
US agreement. Accordingly, the legal binding consequence of each agreement is different 
because the legal nature of each one is up to the manner of its launching institution. 
International human rights law provides the universal framework against 
which any interventions in individual privacy rights must be assessed. Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that ―no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon 
his honour and reputation.‖19 Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks
20
 since it is a part of Individual‘s right to privacy. The rapid and 
                                                             
19 UN. UDHR. 1948, Article 12. 
20 UN. A/HRC/27/37, 2014, para. 12. 
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monumental changes to communications and information technologies experienced in recent 
decades have also irreversibly affected our understandings of the boundaries between private 
and public spheres.
21
 
The UDHR has been recognized as International Customary Law so the right 
to privacy and the non-interfere of communication is the fundamental rights of human. Not 
only it shall apply to any States whether consent has been given or not, but also be the legal 
basis for any other international instruments relate to personal data protection. UDHR has 
affirmed the right to privacy of person since 1948 and apply to every States of the world. 
The right to privacy is often understood as an essential requirement for the 
realization of the right to freedom of expression. Undue interference with individuals‘ 
privacy can both directly and indirectly limit the free development and exchange of ideas. 
Restrictions of anonymity in communication, for example, have an evident chilling effect on 
victims of all forms of violence and abuse, who may be reluctant to report for fear of double 
victimization.
22
 
As freedom of Expression is guaranteed in Article 19 of UDHR
23
, it has 
reaffirmed the relevance to freedom of expression to hold opinions and access information 
without interference through any means across frontiers. 
Since the Internet is the Technology for human communication, the right to 
participate in technological development is relevant to activities of the people via Information 
and Communication Technology. Thus, Article 27of UDHR
24
 can be interpreted as a legal 
baseline for individual to utilize full enjoyment of information technology without arbitrary 
interference on privacy. 
Therefore, the arguments of IT Corporation and State that they told the people, 
who aware of privacy and data protection on Internet, to avoid using the communication 
                                                             
21 UN. A/HRC/23/40. 2013, para. 21. 
22 Ibid, para. 24. 
23 UN. UDHR. 1948, Article 19. “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers‖ 
24 UN. UDHR. Article 27. ―(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, 
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.‖ 
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technology, is incompatible with the article 27. Since the enjoyment and utilization of the 
technology are a basic Human Rights of every person. Hence the balance between Data 
Protection and Technology Participation should be constructed through various forms of legal 
policy and development practice. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by 
167 States,
25
 provides in article 17 that ―no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on his or her honour and reputation‖. It further states that ―everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.‖26 The ICCPR has obliged member 
states and protect the rights of person from the violations of any entities.  
As well as UDHR, ICCPR recognize the interdependence of right to privacy 
on communication with freedom of expression. In its General Comment No. 34 (2011) on the 
right to freedom of expression, the Human Rights Committee indicated that States parties 
should take account of the extent to which developments in information and communication 
technologies have substantially changed communication practices. The Committee also called 
on States parties to take all necessary steps to foster the independence of these new media. 
The General Comment also analyses the relationship between the protection of privacy and 
freedom of expression, and recommends that States parties respect that element of the right of 
freedom of expression that embraces the limited journalistic privilege not to disclose 
information sources.
27
 
International and regional human rights treaty bodies, courts, commissions and 
independent experts have all provided relevant guidance with regard to the scope and content 
of the right to privacy, including the meaning of ―interference‖ with an individual‘s privacy. 
In its general comment No. 16, the Human Rights Committee underlined that compliance 
with article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights required that the 
integrity and confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed de jure and de facto. 
                                                             
25 Update until 19 Feb. 2015, http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
26 UN. International Covenant on Civil and Political Right. 1966, Article 17. 
27 UN. CCPR General Comment No. 34. 2011. 
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―Correspondence should be delivered to the addressee without interception and without being 
opened or otherwise read‖.28 
The United Nations adopted General Assembly resolution 45/95 on December 
14, 1990. The resolution, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, 
set out Fair Information Practices for the use of personal data. The United Nations General 
Assembly recommended that governments incorporate the privacy guidelines into legislation 
and administrative regulations.  The UN Guidelines 1990
29
 thus form an adequate data 
protection regulatory Framework.
30
  
The UN Guidelines have received undeserved criticism for being of ―limited 
practical relevance,‖31 mostly due to their non-legally binding character. This is probably 
exaggerated: the OECD Guidelines are non-binding, but there is a general consensus as to 
their global influence and central importance. Perhaps the root of such criticisms is related to 
the timing of the UN Guidelines. They came at a time, in 1990, when the OECD Guidelines 
and Convention 108 had already formed a concrete basis in the data protection field, and the 
UN Guidelines did not offer much added value. Nevertheless, their greatest advantage was a 
vastly larger circle, placing them at a unique starting point for becoming the only truly 
universal instrument
32
 for data protection governance. 
Even in the International Economic Law under WTO provision, General 
Agreement on Trade of Services (GATS), recognizes the significance of ensuring privacy of 
individuals and the protection of sensitive personal data in Article XIV (c) (ii).
33
  
                                                             
28 Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/43/40). 1989, annex VI, 
para. 8.   
29 Regardless of the fact that their elaboration took more than ten years to complete, the UN level took perhaps 
an unnecessarily long time to complete, something that does not sit well with the contemporary pace of 
technological developments. 
30 De Hert, Paul and Vagelis Papakonstantinou. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p.281. 
31 Kuner, Christopher. "An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects." Computer 
law & security review, vol. 25, no. 4, 2009, p. 314. 
32
 De Hert, Paul and Vagelis Papakonstantinou. "Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency." ISJLP, vol. 9, 2013, p. 282. 
33 WTO. GATS. 1995, Article XIV: General Exceptions   
―Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised 
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At regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is the 
most advance International Human Rights Instrument which describe the advantageous 
provision on Private Life Protection in the time it was declared in 1950. The detail Article 
834 is scoped on protecting everyone‘s right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. Furthermore, the ECHR Article 1035 provide the relationship 
between right to respect for private and family life and the Freedom of expression as the 
integrity of communication and confidence in Privacy support freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. As CJEU decision case 4-73 ensures that fundamental rights are an 
integral part of the general principles of European Union which every member states and 
organization must respect and fulfill.
36Accordingly, all EU Member States‘ organizations and 
officers or Council of Europe instruments must incorporate Human Rights, right to privacy; 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures:… 
(c)      necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement including those relating to:… 
(ii)     the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data 
and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.‖… 
34 ECHR Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 
―1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.‖ 
35 ECHR Article 10 Freedom of expression 
―1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.‖ 
36 CJEU. Case 4-73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities. 
14 May 1974. 
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data privacy, personal data protection, as a common ground for those provisions and its 
implementation. 
The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe of 1981 (Convention 108) extended the 
safeguards for everyone's rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the 
respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow across frontiers of personal data 
undergoing automatic processing.
37
  
Moreover, Convention 108 is the first Legal-Binding International Instrument 
in the field of Personal Data Protection on Computerized Data Process and Dominate 
International Standard since the first Era of Internet Technology across Border and Trans-
Atlantic. All members of the Council of Europe have ratified the treaty, except San Marino 
and Turkey (Turkey signed the Convention in 1981). Uruguay has also ratified the treaty. The 
Convention 108 had created International Standard since the first Era of Internet Technology 
across Border and Trans-Atlantic. 
At EU level, the EU Directive 95/46/EC encompasses all key elements from 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states its intention to respect 
the rights of privacy in personal and family life, as well as in home and in personal 
correspondence.
38
 The Directive is based on the 1980 OECD "Recommendations of the 
Council concerning guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows 
of Personal Data"
 39
. A key purpose of the OECD Guidelines 1980 was to ―advance the free 
flow of information between Member countries and to avoid the creation of unjustified 
obstacles to the development of economic and social relations among Member countries‖ 
they therefore intended to improve international cooperation rather than national law 
harmonization.
40
 The 1995 Data Protection Directive set a milestone in the history of the 
protection of personal data in the European Union. The Directive reflects two of the 
                                                             
37 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981, Preamble. 
38 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Preamble. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Kirby, Michael. "The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 Oecd Guidelines on Privacy." 
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011. 
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important foundation pillars of the European integration process: the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and in particular the fundamental right to data 
protection, on the one hand, and the achievement of the internal market – the free flow of 
personal data in this case – on the other. The EU data protection Directive 1995 mandated 
that the member states pass their local data laws by October 25, 1998, but in fact full 
implementation took several years more.
41
 
Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications, otherwise 
known as E-Privacy Directive, is an EU directive on data protection and privacy in the digital 
age. It presents a continuation of earlier efforts, most directly the Data Protection Directive.
42
 
It deals with the regulation of a number of important issues such as confidentiality of 
information; treatment of traffic data, spam and cookies, which ensure that the automatic 
processing of personal data will be regulated on the basis of legal rights protection. This 
Directive has been minor amended by Directive 2009/136 in 2009, which introduces several 
changes, especially in what concerns ―cookies‖,43 that are now subject to prior consent. The 
EU Cookie Directive (Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) 
is an amendment of the Directive 2002/58/EC, which concerns the protection of data and 
privacy on the web.
44
 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1
st
 December 2009 gives place 
to important novelties as regards personal data protection in the EU. First, a new legal base is 
introduced in the current article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU,
 45
 recognizing 
the right of everyone to the protection of personal data concerning them and establishing the 
                                                             
41 Dowling Jr, Donald C. "Preparing to Resolve Us-Based Employers' Disputes under Europe's New Data 
Privacy Law." J. Alt. Disp. Resol., vol. 2, 2000, p. 31  
42 EU. Directive 2002/58/EC. 2002, Article1. 
43 EU. Directive 2009/136/EC. 2009. 
44 Ibid, Preamble. 
45 EU. Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 2012, 
Article 16 
―1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.  
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when 
carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free 
movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent 
authorities.‖ 
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competence of the EU institutions to lay down the rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within 
the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. The same 
article requires that compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent 
authorities. Second, and taking into account article 6 of the Treaty on European Union,
46
 
those EU rules must comply with the right to the protection of personal data as it is 
understood in article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
47 
Nevertheless, there were needs for an overarching instrument applying to data 
processing operations in all sectors and policies of the Union, ensuring an integrated 
approach as well as seamless, consistent and effective protection. The above challenges 
require the EU to develop a comprehensive and coherent approach guaranteeing that the 
fundamental right to data protection for individuals is fully respected within the EU and 
International Legal Instruments. 
At the Bilateral EU-US level, the exchange of personal data for commercial 
purposes is addressed by the Safe Harbor Decision
48
 which provides a legal basis for 
transfers of personal data from the EU to companies in the U.S. which adhere to the Safe 
Harbor Principles. US-EU Safe Harbor is a streamlined process for EU and US companies to 
                                                             
46 EU. The Treaty of European Union (TEU). 2007, Article 6 
―1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.  
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.  
3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.  
4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.‖ 
47 EU. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2010, Article 8 Protection of personal data 
―1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has 
been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.  
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.‖ 
48 EU Commission. 2000/520/EC. 2000, Preamble. 
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comply with the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
49
 The process 
was developed by the US Department of Commerce in consultation with the EU. Intended 
for organizations within the EU or US that store customer data, the Safe Harbor 
Principles are designed to prevent accidental information disclosure or loss. 
Because safe harbor emerged as a compromise between the EU Commission 
and the US Department of Commerce very different from what both party had originally 
wanted, and because safe harbor is a unique-in-the-world arrangement that applies only to the 
United States, it should not be surprising that safe harbor has attracted criticisms from the 
beginning.
50
 
Personal Data protection has been recognized in diverse instruments from 
International Organization to EU Regional Bloc then Bilateral EU-US agreement. 
Accordingly, the legal binding consequence of each agreement is different because the legal 
nature of each one is up to the manner of its launching institution. Differences in the legal 
nature of data protection law between cultures and legal systems have made it more difficult 
to reach an international consensus on the subject. 
The characterization of data protection as a human right has important legal 
implications, since it means that the law may be more difficult to change and a higher value 
may be placed on the rights of individuals than in jurisdictions where the subject is seen more 
from the point of view of economic efficiency than human rights. Differences in the legal 
nature of data protection law between cultures and legal systems have made it more difficult 
to reach an international consensus on the subject.
51
 The Single E-Market Project need the 
more supranational legal instrument for the sake of harmonized regime to protect personal 
data and support the progress of flourishing economy. 
 
 
                                                             
49 U.S. Department of Commerce. Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, 9 Oct. 
2015. 
50 Rehder, Jörg and Erika C Collins. "The Legal Transfer of Employment-Related Data to Outside the European 
Union: Is It Even Still Possible?." The International Lawyer, 2005, pp. 150-151. 
51 Kirby, Michael. "The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy." 
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011. 
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2.2.1.2. Definition and Scope of Personal Data Protection 
This section review the particular instruments previously mentioned but now 
in order to find the commons and differences of definition and scope which are written in 
those various sources. As the different definition leads to distinctive scope of protection but 
the same make it easy to compliance. Since there are three levels of instrument; Universal, 
Regional and Bilateral, the overlaps of scope and definition may bring complicates to the 
implementation of personal data protection. 
Most data protection national legislation is based on the same international 
documents (such as the UN Framework, OECD Guidelines, Council of Europe Convention 
108, the APEC Privacy Framework, etc.), so that the fundamental, high-level principles of the 
law are similar across regions and national legal systems.
52
 However, the differences in the 
cultural, historical, and legal approaches to data protection mean that once one descends from 
the highest level of standard settings, there can be significant differences in detail. This is not 
surprising, since concepts such as ‗data protection‘ and ‗privacy‘ are derived from national 
legal culture and tradition, and thus vary considerably around the world,
53
 even in systems 
that accept the same fundamental principles. 
The United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files lay out the definition and scope in part A.
54
 Personal Data is ―Information about 
persons‖ and Sensitive Personal Data scope is relating to racial or ethnic origin, colour, sex 
life, political opinions, religious, philosophical and other beliefs as well as membership of an 
association or trade union. The scope of application extends "to all public and private 
computerized files"
 
 and extends to files on legal persons particularly when they contain some 
information on individuals.
55
 Moreover, it enlarges the scope to apply to personal data files 
kept by governmental international organizations either files for internal purposes and 
                                                             
52 Bygrave, Lee A. "Privacy Protection in a Global Context–a Comparative Overview." Scandinavian Studies in 
Law, vol. 47, 2004, p. 347. 
53 International Law Commission. ―Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session (1 May to 9 June and 3 July 
to 11 August 2006).‖ UN Doc A/61/10, New York, 2006, p. 499. 
54 UN. A/RES/45/95. 1990, part A principle 1 and 5. 
55 Ibid, part A principle 10. 
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external purposes concerning third parties
56
 regardless of different jurisdictions
57
 and legal 
traditions. 
Another international instrument is WTO agreement, Article XIV (c) (ii) of 
the GATS
58
 mentions data protection rules ―in relation to the processing and dissemination of 
personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts‖. 
Looking at this wording, it can hardly be assumed that the full scope of data protection rules 
is covered. A question mark would be possible for example in respect to registration 
requirements of data collections.
59
 
The Convention 108 has main purpose to secure Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in the territory of each Party, whatever his nationality 
or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to 
personal data, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him ('data 
protection').
60
 The concept of 'personal data' is defined as 'any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual ('data subject')'.
61
 Furthermore, Convention 108 set out 
additional safeguards in order to protect ―special categories of data‖ 62, revealing racial origin, 
political opinions, religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health, 
sexual life or criminal convictions (also known as ―sensitive data‖). 
In this context, it should be noted that many activities in the public or the 
private sector are nowadays connected, in one way or another, with the collection and 
processing of personal information. The real objective of the Convention is therefore to 
protect individuals (citizens, consumers, workers, etc.) against unjustified collection, 
recording, use and dissemination of their personal details. This may also concern their 
participation in social relations, whether or not in public, and involve protecting freedom of 
expression, preventing unfair discrimination and promoting 'fair play' in decision-making 
                                                             
56 Ibid, part B. 
57 Ibid, part A principle 4. 
58 WTO. GATS. 1995, Article XIV: General Exceptions   
59 Weber, Rolf H. "Regulatory Autonomy and Privacy Standards under the Gats." Asian Journal of WTO & 
International Health Law and Policy, vol. 7, 2012, p. 26. 
60 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981, Article 1. 
61 Ibid, Article 2 sub a. 
62 Ibid, Article 6. 
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processes. Finally the Convention also aimed to reconcile the respect for personal data 
protection and the free flow of information.
63
 The key feature of Convention 108 is it applies 
to every person without discrimination on the basis of nationality or residence, regardless of 
frontiers. 
The most comprehensive and specific instrument for Personal Data Protection 
is EU Directive 95/46/EC. In the context of the Directive, it gives a definition and scope on: 
 Personal data means "any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity".
64
  
 Processing is also broadly defined and involves any manual or automatic 
operation on personal data, including its collection, recording, organization, 
storage, modification, retrieval, use, transmission, dissemination or 
publication, and even blocking, erasure or destruction.
65
 
The ―data protection‖ is broader than ―privacy protection‖ because it also 
concerns other fundamental rights and freedoms, and all kinds of data regardless of their 
relationship with privacy, and at the same time more limited because it merely concerns the 
processing of personal information, with other aspects of privacy protection being 
disregarded.
66
  
EU Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications gives main 
definition of ―Data Subject‖ which the objective of the Directive is to protect the ―right to 
privacy in the electronic communication sector‖ and free movement of data, communication 
equipment and services of Individual. It not only protects the right of natural person but also 
makes it clear that E-Privacy Directive also applies to ―Legal Persons‖.67 The scope given by 
                                                             
63 Ibid, Preamble para. 4. 
64 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Article 2a. 
65 Ibid, Article 2b. 
66 Hustinx, Peter. EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation. 2014, p. 5. 
67 EU. Directive 2002/58/EC. 2002, Articles 1-2. 
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this Directive is very important since the most powerful actor who control and process 
personal data is IT Corporation, Multi-National Legal Person indeed. 
Article 16 TFEU also signaled the emancipation of the right to data protection 
from the right to privacy, a development in itself that was probably also long overdue, and 
included it independently in the fundamental EU human rights list. However, this is not the 
end of a process that began in some European countries some two decades ago. Far from the 
goal, the individual right to data protection is not among other fundamental rights that 
contend themselves into a declaration in a human rights document.
68
 The victory point of 
having harmonized legal definition, to set precise scope for member states, stills need the 
cooperation from EU States to conclude such initiative. 
The EU-US Safe Harbor Principles defined ―personal data‖ or ―personal 
information‖ as data about an identified or identifiable individual that are within the scope of 
the Directive (EU Directive 95/46/EC), received by a U.S. organization from the European 
Union, and recorded in any form.
69
 This means US government adopted the same definition 
as EU did. 
The scope of Safe Harbor covers only U.S. organizations registered with 
the Federal Trade Commission to participate in this voluntary program. This excludes many 
financial institutions, (such as banks, investment houses, credit unions, and savings & loans 
institutions – Financial Tech Industry), telecommunication common carriers, 
including internet service providers, non-profit organizations, online-journalists and most 
insurances.
70
 Although it may include some investment banks by its own volunteer.
71
 The 
USA companies can opt into the program as long as they adhere to the 7 principles and 15 
frequently asked questions and answers per the Directive 95/46/EC.
72 
 
The complicated situations arise when it has to deals with different legal 
regime base various jurisdiction. As the relationship between EU and US depend heavily on 
                                                             
68  De Hert, Paul. ―The Right to Protection of Personal Data. Incapable of Autonomous Standing in the Basic 
EU Constituting Documents?.‖ Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, vol. 1, no. 31, 2015, p. 1. 
69 US Federal Trade Commission. Safe Harbor Principles. 2000. 
70 U.S. Department of Commerce. Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, 9 Oct. 
2015. 
71 U.S. Department of Commerce. FAQ - Investment banking and audits. 29 Jan. 2009. 
72 US Federal Trade Commission. Safe Harbor Principles Annex. 2000. 
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the protection of US legal system. The expectation on protection of personal data of EU 
Nationals may not accomplish since it was out of their reach, in US regime per se. While in 
the EU Member States case which each State had some flexibility in implementing the Data 
Protection Directive's requirements into law locally, and they were also permitted to extend 
the Data Protection Directive's scope (for example, to include the data of non-natural legal 
persons such as companies).
73
 This means there are important national differences in data 
protection laws within the EU - such as on civil liability, and on penalties for non-compliance 
with domestic data protection laws. Thus the question of harmonization of legal definition 
and scope is rising. 
The commons and differences of definition and scope written in various 
sources, brings complicates to the implementation of personal data protection. The most 
common ground is the concept of 'personal data' and the additional safeguards to protect 
―special categories of data‖ , also known as ―sensitive data‖. Many activities in the public or 
the private sector are under scope of personal data protection instruments which cover large 
amount of information. But it has brought troubles to individual for exercising their right in 
other countries. However, the different scopes are on actor and jurisdiction as most powerful 
actor who control and process personal data, IT Corporation; Multi-National Legal Person, is 
under the appliance of the Law of specific territory but their activities are trans-border. 
 
2.2.1.3. Content of Data Subjects’ Right to Data Protection  
The instruments relating to personal data have been creating for decades so 
there is some out-of date provisions maintain in those legal documents. The more advance in 
technology the more complexity it brought into legal atmosphere. Accordingly, further 
affirmation of individual right to personal data protection in detail has been added by many 
legal instruments. This section finds some common contents of legal right in different 
personal data protection instruments and some inconsistence may exist because it affects the 
protection standard either in practice or policy. 
                                                             
73 Kuner, Christopher. "European Data Protection Law." Corporate Compliance and Regulation, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2007, ch. 2.37. 
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The OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data recognize the Rights of Individual in Individual Participation 
Principle
74
 that an individual should have the: 
a) Right to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether   
or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
b) Right to have communicated to him, data relating to him 
i) within a reasonable time;  
ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;  
iii) in a reasonable manner; and  
iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to him; 
c) Right to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and 
d) Right to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to 
have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
Nonetheless, the State Members of OECD are the duty bearers who need to 
implement above rights into their domestic personal data protection law. 
 
The United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files, Principle of interested-person access,
75
 approves data subject:  
 Right to know whether information concerning him is being processed; 
 Right to access and have appropriate rectifications or erasures made in the 
case of unlawful unnecessary or inaccurate entries; 
 Right to gain remedy. 
Guidelines not only mention that the cost of any rectification shall be borne by the person 
responsible for the file. But also emphasize that the principle should apply to everyone, 
irrespective of nationality or place of residence. 
                                                             
74 OECD. Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of Guidelines Governing The Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 23 Sep. 1980, para. 13. 
75 UN. A/RES/45/95. 1990, part B principle 4. 
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The Convention 108 included the special set of data protection rights for 
individuals (to information, access and rectification).
76
 The Convention 108 is influenced by 
the OECD Guidelines. The Convention 108 put the strong additional safeguards for the data 
subject
77
by recognizing that any person shall be entitled: 
 Right to know the existence of an automated personal data file, its main 
purposes, as well as the identity and habitual residence or principal place of 
business of the controller of the file; 
 Right to be informed at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or 
expense confirmation of whether personal data relating to him are stored in 
the automated data file as well as communication to him of such data in an 
intelligible form; 
 Right to access and rectification, as the case may be, rectification or erasure 
of such data if these have been processed contrary to the provisions of 
domestic law giving effect to the basic principles set out in Articles 5 and 6 
of this convention; 
 Right to remedy, to have a remedy if a request for confirmation or, as the 
case may be, communication, rectification or erasure as referred to in 
paragraphs b and c of this article is not complied with.  
The Convention 108 extended protection
78
by emphasize that None of the provisions of this 
chapter shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to 
grant data subjects a wider measure of protection than that stipulated in this convention. 
The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC adopted the inalienable 
substantive rights (information, access, rectification) and introducing a formal, institutional 
mechanism for monitoring
79
 personal data processing in each Member State.
80
 The rights of 
individuals were affirmed by Directive 95/46/EC that it refers to are:
 81
 
                                                             
76 De Hert, Paul and Schreuders, Eric. "The Relevance of Convention 108." Proceedings of the Council of 
Europe Conference on Data Protection, Warsaw, 2001, p. 34. 
77 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981, Article 8. 
78 Ibid, Article 11. 
79 The detail of Supervisory Mechanism will be described later in section 2.2.3.1. 
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 Right to information about when, where, why and how their data be 
collected and processed; 
 Right of access to a copy of the information comprised in their personal 
data; 
 Right to object to processing that is likely to cause or is causing damage or 
distress; 
 Right to prevent processing for direct marketing; 
 Right to object to decisions being taken by automated means; 
 Right in certain circumstances to have inaccurate personal data rectified, 
blocked, erased or destroyed; and 
 Right to claim compensation for damages caused by a breach of the 
Directive. 
EU Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications completes 
the contents of the Right to Personal Data Protection regulating a number of important issues 
such as confidentiality of information, treatment of traffic data, spam and cookies. The 
addressees are Member States, who should prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds 
of interception or surveillance of communication and ―related traffic‖, unless the users have 
given their consent or conditions have been fulfilled.
82
 Furthermore, Directive 2009/136 in 
2009, concerns ―cookies‖,83 that was subject to prior consent of data subject. The content of 
data protection is for the confidentiality of information to be maintained, ―Negative-Right‖ 
base approach must be implemented.  
These EU norms are complemented with the ―Principles on Internet 
Governance‖ adopted by the Council of the European Union on 21 September 2011.84 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
80 Eberlein, Burkard and Newman, Abraham L. "Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated 
Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union." Governance, vol. 21, no. 1, 2008, p.40. 
81
 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Articles 10-12. 
82 EU. Directive 2002/58/EC. 2002, Article 5. 
83 EU. Directive 2009/136/EC. 2009. 
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principles on Internet governance
85
 recognize the right to respect for private life which must 
meet the requirements of international law.
86
 Some principle in the declaration could be used 
as an interpretation of Personal Data Protection on Internet because it has the relevant 
implication with protection of personal data of internet user. 
The EU-US Safe Harbor Principles are designed to protect personal data of 
Data Subject by urging the EU and USA companies to sign-up into the program as long as 
they bind to the Rights of Individual below:
87
 
 Right to be Noticed - Individuals must be informed that their data is being 
collected and about how it will be used. Organizations must notify 
individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use information 
about them. They must provide information about how individuals can 
contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third 
parties to which it discloses the information and the choices and means the 
organization offers for limiting its use and disclosure. 
 Right to make a Choice - Individuals must have the option to opt out of 
the collection and forward transfer of the data to third parties. Organizations 
must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) whether their 
personal information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose 
incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally collected or 
subsequently authorized by the individual. For sensitive information, 
affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given if the information is to 
be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than its original 
purpose or the purpose authorized subsequently by the individual. 
 Right to Access and Rectification - Individuals must be able to access 
information held about them, and correct or delete it if it is inaccurate. 
Individuals must have access to personal information about them that an 
organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information 
                                                             
85 Even this Declaration is Non-Legal Binding but the Council of the European Union has supplanted the 
principles into General Data protection Regulation and Umbrella Agreement with US in 2016, as will see in 
Chapter 4. 
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where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing 
access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy in 
the case in question, or where the rights of persons other than the individual 
would be violated. 
Safe Harbor Agreement contains individual‘s rights which are almost asymmetry with 
Directive 95/46/EC since it was concluded to satisfy the EU market for harmonizing standard 
of data protection in both sides of Atlantic counterparts. However, the implementation of 
Safe Harbor is far more complicated than in EU since the US legal system did not provide a 
constitutional rights relating to personal data protection remedy to Non-US citizen. So it‘s all 
on the burden of US organizations to self-certify themselves without the participation of EU 
citizen and supervisory mechanism. The only concrete compensation or sanction can be 
imposed to IT Corporation that breach the provision in Safe Harbor Agreement is ―delisting‖ 
such organization from the verified list. 
The instruments recognizing right to personal data had been creating for 
decades so there is some out-of date provisions maintain in those legal documents. The more 
advance in technology the more complexity it brought into legal atmosphere. The 
implementation of data subjects‘ right to personal data protection is increasingly complicated 
because the nature of data which is decentralized to various kinds of organizations. 
Furthermore, there are some inconveniences: data controller/processor has either formal or 
informal cooperation with regulators; or the conflict of interest comes from the Self-certified 
system. Hence, the individual‗s appeal for right recourse is complex as well as the monitoring 
of duty bearer, data controller/processor, practice.  
 
2.2.1.4. Exception to the exercise of Right to Personal Data Protection 
Like other human rights, the right to personal data protection is not absolute; it 
can be restricted in certain situations and due to other rights. Most often deal with the 
relationship between state of emergency and personal data protection. The state authorities 
and courts must on the one hand weigh up the reasons for accessing certain data and, on the 
other hand, the potential effect on an individual of such state surveillance. A proportionate 
solution must be provided, in which state/public interests as well as the interests of the data 
subject are taken into consideration. In liberal democratic societies, organizations who behold 
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some public position may employ the measure which has negative impact, information being 
share relating data subject; examples include address, criminal record, religion, ethnic, etc. 
In general, there are exceptions under which states could limit the exercise of 
Right to Personal Data protection in certain restrictions. Using tensions exist between the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, for example, when information 
considered to be private is disseminated through the media. In ICCPR, article 19 (3) provides 
for restrictions on freedom of expression and information to protect the rights of others and 
for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.
88
 However, as it happens for all permissible limitations to the right to freedom of 
expression, the principle of proportionality must be strictly observed, since there is otherwise 
danger that freedom of expression would be undermined.
89
 Particularly in the political arena, 
not every attack on the good reputation of politicians must be permitted, since freedom of 
expression and information would otherwise be stripped of their crucial importance for the 
process of forming political opinions,
90
 advocating for transparency and combating 
corruption The international jurisprudence at regional level indicates that in situations of 
conflict between privacy and freedom of expression, reference should be made to the overall 
public interest on the matters reported.
91
 
In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur takes the position that the right to 
privacy should be subject to the same permissible limitations test as the right to freedom of 
movement,
92
 as elucidated in General Comment 27.
93
 The test as expressed in the comment 
includes, inter alia, the following elements: 
94
 
(a) Any restrictions must be provided ―by the law‖ (paras.11-12);  
(b) The ―essence‖ of a human right is not subject to restrictions (para.13); 
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(c) Restrictions must be ―necessary‖ in a democratic society (para.11);  
(d) Any ―discretion‖ exercised when implementing the restrictions must not be 
unfettered (para.13);  
(e) For a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the 
enumerated ―legitimate aims‖. It must be necessary for reaching the 
legitimate aim (para.14);  
(f) Restrictive measures must conform to the ―principle of proportionality‖, 
they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function, they must be 
the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the 
desired result, and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected 
(paras.14-15). 
By all means of written ICCPR Article17 and 19 combine with Human Rights Committee on 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) General Comments, the Personal Data 
Protection is a part of basic Human Rights for fulfilling Freedom and Human Dignity. It shall 
not be interfered nor arbitrary limit by any illegitimate exceptions. 
Interference with an individual‘s right to privacy is only permissible under 
international human rights law if it is neither arbitrary nor unlawful. In its general comment 
No. 16, the Human Rights Committee explained that the term ―unlawful‖ implied that no 
interference could take place ―except in cases envisaged by the law. Interference authorized 
by States can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant‖.95 In other words, interference that is 
permissible under national law may nonetheless be ―unlawful‖ if that national law is in 
conflict with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
expression ―arbitrary interference‖ can also extend to interference provided for under the law. 
The introduction of this concept, the Committee explained, ―is intended to guarantee that 
even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular 
circumstances‖.96 The Committee interpreted the concept of reasonableness to indicate that 
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―any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the 
circumstances of any given case‖.97 
In specific context, the exceptions to the exercise of Right to Personal Data 
Protection, the United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data 
Files provide exceptions to the protection of personal data. In Principle 5 of part A
98
 Power to 
make exceptions: exceptions can be made if "necessary to protect national security, public 
order, public health or morality . . . [and] the rights and freedoms of others . . ." as well as ". . 
. within the limits prescribed by the International Bill of Human Rights . . ." or other similar 
documents. 
In addition, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provide more 
clear definition on ―restrictions‖ as the prescribe in 2nd paragraph of article 8 that no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of: National 
security, Public safety or The economic well-being of the country, The prevention of disorder 
or The prevention of crime, The protection of health or The protection of morals, The 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. However, The exercise of Right to Privacy by 
article 8 and Freedom of Expression in article 10 which are interdependence, since it carries 
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law as well as restrictions on Right to privacy, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.  
The Convention 108 made some conditions for exceptions and restrictions
99
 
that no exception to the provisions of Quality of data, Special categories of data, and 
Additional safeguards for the data subject shall be allowed except within the compositions 
defined below. The Derogation from these principles is allowed in specific circumstances 
only, provided by national law. Exceptions must also constitute necessary measures in a 
democratic society, ―in the interests of protecting nation security, public safety, monetary 
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interests or the suppression of criminal offences or the protection of the data subject or the 
rights and freedoms of others‖.100 The Convention does not contain a general exemption for 
―National‖ security which vague and vary by State Parties‘ domestic law. 
While the EU Directive 95/46/EC allows Member States may adopt legislative 
measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights when such a restriction constitutes 
a necessary measure to safeguard:
101
 (a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches 
of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an important economic or financial interest of a 
Member State or of the European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; 
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with the 
exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); (g) the protection of the 
data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, data, which are processed 
solely for purposes of scientific research or are kept in personal form for a period and does 
not exceed the period necessary for the sole purpose of creating statistics, can be kept and 
processed.
102
 These conditions were opened for the benefits of scientific development as well 
as written in the Convention 108. 
The Data Retention Directive, more formally Directive 2006/24/EC, make 
data controller obligation of data retention bases on the objective for ―preventing and 
suppressing crime and terrorism‖103. This condition provides an opportunity for legal 
enforcement authority to seek data, kept by data controller/processor, for tracing back to the 
convicts. The operations approved by such Data Retention Directive may contrary to the full 
enjoyment of personal data protection because the interpretation of ―terrorism‖ may prolong 
the time period of collection of some sensitive groups; ethno religious, migrant, international 
student from some regions. 
The Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, contains an 
exception to the purpose limitation principle: the prevention, investigation, detection or 
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101 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Article 13.1. 
102 Ibid, Article 13.2. 
103 EU. Directive 2006/24/EC. 2006, Preamble. 
114 
 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, judicial and 
administrative proceedings directly related to the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, prevention of an 
immediate and serious threat to public security;
104
 to protect public security; to protect 
national security; prevention of serious harm to the rights of individuals.
105
 These exceptions 
are too wide and could open the loophole for Mass Electronic Surveillance.  
The US-EU Safe Harbor is the streamlined protocol for US companies to 
comply with the EU Directive 95/46/EC on protecting personal data.
106
 The procedure was 
developed by the US Department of Commerce in consultation with the EU. The framework 
left domestic organizations within the EU or US to self-monitor the store of customer data. 
So the Safe Harbor Principles are designed to prevent accidental information disclosure or 
loss by the hand of the Data Controllers/Processors themselves. The EU and USA Data 
Controller/Processor must be bind by some other laws which have the limitations to 
individual rights such as National Security conditions in US Patriot Act.  
The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles allows US companies to register their 
certification if they meet the European Union requirements. However, those companies still a 
subject under US domestic laws; Patriot Act, homeland Security Act and Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.
107
 Rights of EU citizen are in the realm of US jurisdiction when such data 
transfer across Atlantic occurs and it may be compromised by the exercise of security laws 
mentioned above.  
Since the goal of human rights is to protect major fundamental freedoms and 
rights and to create a system that ensures that individuals cannot infringe upon the rights of 
others. In the field of personal data protection, the legal instrument has set certain exception. 
In general, state authority practice mandates that any restriction of human rights must be 
stipulated in law, proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. Laws that are not 
proportionate and necessary may infringe on human rights, and situations may occur whereby 
the necessary laws do not exist or are not implemented properly. Those problems can frame 
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up in relation to internet and IT Corporations: inappropriate laws or a deficient legal 
framework. 
As well as other human rights, the right to personal data protection is not 
absolute; it can be restricted in certain situations and due to other rights. Most often deal with 
the relationship between state of emergency and personal data protection. The state 
authorities and courts must weigh up the reasons for accessing certain data and the potential 
effect on an individual of such state surveillance. A necessary precondition and proportionate 
solution must be provided, in which state/public interests as well as the interests of the data 
subject are taken into consideration. Nonetheless, US companies, most influence IT 
Corporations, still a subject under US domestic laws. Hence, the rights of Global Neitizen are 
in the realm of US regime when their data was transferred to US territory or by US entities, 
and it may be compromised by the exercise of US Government as will be shown in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2. Obligation of the Data Controller and Data Processor 
The study on individual right reflects the needs of fulfillment from the duty bearer, in 
this case the Data Controller and Processor. There are 5 points need to be analyzed in order to 
understand the obligation of Data Controller/Processor. The basic duty of IT Corporation and 
State Agency to take care of data subject rights will be the first point. When the organizations 
collect and process personal data they need to meet the principles and conditions which will 
be scrutinized in second point. Data Security is the main goal of third point since there many 
instruments urge Data Controller/Processor to set up measure to guarantee the safety and 
integrity of data when disaster appears. Data Retention is the next point, the time period and 
purpose to retain data from different instruments be investigated. The last point is the 
fragmented standard of data protection in different regimes, when first instance data 
controller want to send data to processor or other data controller, especially when data across 
State border. All 5 points associate with the policy and practice of IT Corporation and State 
Authority, since the legal instruments oblige State to create domestic law and mechanism to 
regulate Data Controller/Processor. 
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2.2.2.1. Basic Duty of Data Controller and Processor 
The intention of this section is to review and evaluate obligations set out for 
data controller/processor in order to guarantee the right to personal data protection. The basic 
duty principles stressing by many forms of legal wording, some are different in vocabulary 
but have the same legal implication. The comprehensive understanding of basic duty 
requirement will give a bright path to data subjects‘ full enjoyment of protection. Not only 
the common but also the differences obligation in vast majority instruments will be reflected 
below. 
The Data Controller and Processor need to provide measures in order to meet 
ICCPR standard, individual right to personal data protection. As the General Comment No.16 
urged member states to implement ICCPR Article 17 to provide guarantee for the right of 
every person to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy 
concretely, It required the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the 
prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right.
108  
The strong opposition to Surveillance is highlighted, whether electronic or otherwise, 
interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communication, wire-tapping and 
recording of conversations should be prohibited
109
since the Article 17 of ICCPR mentions of 
Non-Interference of communication by any means. 
The OECD Guidelines Governing, The Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data
110
, had influenced the Convention 108. Moreover, it has pursued the 
state party to fulfill its provisions in order to boost up the confidence of Internet users and 
trigger the enlargement of E-Commerce. These principles emphasize two basic duties of data 
controller: 
1) Openness Principle: Data controller should adopt general policy of 
openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to 
personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the 
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existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as 
well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.
 111
 
2) Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable for 
complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated 
above.
112
 
In the United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data, it urges that every data controller including governmental international organizations 
and non-governmental international organizations
113
 should guarantee the rights of data 
subjects. Data Controller must acknowledge to data subject that one‘s data is being used and 
also guarantees access to that data in an intelligible form. It requires organizations to supply 
appropriate remedies to rectify unlawful, unnecessary, or inaccurate data
114
 for the victim. 
The Convention 108, written in Duties of the Parties,
115
 requests all the same 
burdens approved in OECD Guidelines and emphasize that each State Party shall take the 
necessary measures in its ―domestic law‖ to give effect to the basic principles for data 
protection set out in this convention. 
EU Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications, the data 
controller should prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or 
surveillance of communication and ―related traffic‖, unless the users have given their consent 
or conditions have been fulfilled.
116
 Moreover, it has prohibiting the use of email addresses 
for marketing purposes. The Directive establishes the opt-in regime, where unsolicited emails 
may be sent only with prior agreement of the recipient.
117
 This Directive has been minor 
amended by Directive 2009/136 in 2009, the important principles in the Directive 
2009/136/EC, mentioning the regulations regarding cookies as Member States shall ensure 
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that the storing of personal data or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the 
terminal equipment of a subscriber.
118
  
The Data Retention Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
communications providers, data controller, retain the necessary data as specified in the 
Directive for a period of between 6 months and 2 years
119
 in order to trace and identify the 
details of a communication.
120
 Data Controller must coordinate with the police and security 
agencies which may request access to details of data subjects‘ communication.121 
In EU Directive 95/46/EC on the principle of lawfulness of processing 
reaffirms that data controllers must stay in line with other legal obligations, even outside of 
the Directive, regardless of whether these obligations are general, specific, statutory or 
contractual.
122
 The ―7 principles Data Protection‖ are founded by EU Directive 95/46/EC as 
basic duties of Data Controller:  
1) Notice: Data Controller shall give notice of such collection to data subjects 
whose data is being collected. 
123
 
2) Purpose: Data Controller must ensure that data collected would be used 
only for stated purpose(s) and for no other purposes.
 124
  
3) Consent: Without consent from its subject(s), Data Controller should not 
disclose or share personal data with third parties.
125
 
4) Security: Data Controller should keep personal data safe and secure from 
potential abuse, theft, or loss. 
126
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5) Disclosure: Data Controller should inform subjects, whose personal data is 
being collected, about the party or parties who collect such data.
 127
  
6) Access: Data Controller should grant data subjects accessing to their 
personal data and allow them to correct any inaccuracies.
128
  
7) Accountability: Data Controller should be held accountable for adhering to 
all of these principles by data subjects.
 129
 
Supplementary, the Council of the European Union has adopted the Principle 
on Internet governance which relevance with Personal Data Protection on Internet as mention 
before. It implies the obligation of Service provider that all public and private actors should 
recognize and uphold human rights in their operations and activities, in the design of new 
technologies, services and applications. They should be aware of developments leading to the 
enhancement of, as well as threats to, fundamental rights and freedoms, and fully participate 
in efforts aimed at recognizing newly emerging rights.
130
 Nevertheless, from the perspective 
of human rights, it merits further discussion as to whether EU secondary data protection 
legislation imposes a similar obligation on public authorities and private parties. After all, 
fundamental human rights primarily aim to limit the actions of public authorities in order to 
protect the activities of private parties, including the processing of personal data, from state 
interference.
131
 
The EU-US Safe Harbor is a procedure for EU and US Data Controller to 
comply with the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
132
 The Safe 
Harbor Principles are designed to prevent personal data breach. The EU and USA companies 
can opt into the program as long as they adhere to 7 principles. 
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These principles
133
 can compare to Directive 95/46/EC as present down here: 
1) Notice - Data Controller must inform Individuals that their data is being 
collected and about how it will be used. Compatible with Notice Principle 
of Directive 95/46/EC. 
2) Choice - Data Controller must grant Individuals to have the option to opt 
out of the collection and forward transfer of the data to third parties. For 
sensitive information, affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given 
if the information is to be disclosed to a third party. Compatible with 
Consent Principle and Disclosure principle of Directive 95/46/EC.  
3) Onward Transfer - Transfers of data to third parties (from data controller 
to data processor) may only occur to other organizations that follow 
adequate data protection principles. This principle of Safe Harbor 
Agreement is completely different from Directive 95/46/EC because it 
gives data subject right to know when their data is transferred. Data 
Transfer across border can be made only when it meet standard adequacy 
principle. 
4) Access - Data Controller must allow Individuals to access information held 
about them, and correct or delete it if it is inaccurate. Compatible with 
Access Principle of Directive 95/46/EC. 
5) Security - Data Controller must make reasonable efforts to prevent loss of 
collected information. Compatible with Security Principle of Directive 
95/46/EC. 
6) Data Integrity - Data Controller must ensure that data is reliable for its 
intended use, accurate, complete, and current. Compatible with Purpose 
Principle of Directive 95/46/EC. 
7) Enforcement - Data Controller must provide effective means of enforcing 
these rules in order to assure compliance with the safe harbor principles. It 
is slightly different from Accountability principle of Directive 95/46/EC 
because Safe Harbor has delisting and verification system in order to 
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sanction the non-compliance organizations. But both EU directive and Safe 
Harbor are relied on domestic court to implement those provisions. 
The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles allows US Data Controller to register their organization 
into the verification list if they meet the European Union requirements then they can transfer 
data of EU citizen back to US territory. 
The effectiveness of measures to prevent persons other than the user from 
accessing the user's stored personal data may affect whether the data are 'personal data' as 
regards those persons. Therefore, it seems that a key factor will be the effectiveness of the 
cloud provider's access control system, which typically only allows authenticated and 
authorized cloud users to use a particular cloud account. By logging into their data system 
account, the user gains the ability to access and operate on the full set of any personal data 
stored.
134
  However, the effectiveness of access control of national security exceptions is 
relevance with the existence of any back doors or other means for a service provider to access 
unencrypted personal data. The indentified data stored in service provider‘s server, may 
affect whether the data are ―personal data‖ in the hands of the provider, even if the provider 
only has limited incidental access to such data. Yet it is worth to skeptic that the utility 
infrastructure providers who may not know the nature of the data stored in their infrastructure 
can be presumed as the controller of ―unidentifiable information‖ or not.135 If there is no 
mechanism to supervise the compliance of such data controller/processor, the data protection 
laws could not be applied in full force or indeed at all. 
The key deficiency from the old regime came from the ambiguous status of 
Data Processor. The old status of data processor is as Third Party, Data Processor has no 
direct obligations as in new regime such as implementing technical and organizational 
measures, notifying the controller without undue delay of data breaches. This includes 
appointing a data protection officer - DPO (if required). The obligation of data processor to 
protect data subject matters are addressed in supply agreements, which is made between data 
controller and data processor, but the data processor has no duty to data subject.  
The basic duty principles stressing by many forms of legal wording, some are 
different in vocabulary but have the same legal implication. Most data protection instrument 
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imposes a similar obligation on public authorities and private parties. After all, fundamental 
human rights primarily aim to limit the actions of public authorities in order to protect the 
activities of private parties, including the processing of personal data, from state interference. 
However, the effectiveness of access control of national security exceptions is relevance with 
the existence of any back doors or other means for a service provider to access unencrypted 
personal data. Besides, the lack of Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default principles from 
obligation of Data Controller/Processor is crucial. 
 
2.2.2.2. Condition and Requirement of Data Collection and Processing 
Data collection and Data Processing are the core activity of E-Market but 
many data protection related instruments draw some baselines for Data Controller/Protector 
to keep up.  The study of condition and requirement of such activity may build the practical 
map for IT Corporation and State Authority to balance either data controller/processor 
benefits or data subject rights. In many instruments, previous data protection laws have been 
influencing to the others as will be seen in the common conditions and requirements they 
contain. Since the state need to build up the framework for interact in single E-Market, the 
common rule to protect personal data of consumer is needed. Meanwhile the differences 
among various instruments are also picked up for further understandings, why do they have 
loopholes in personal data protection, and how to close the gap. 
In General Comment No. 16 to the ICCPR
136
 provides Conditions and 
Requirements on data collection and processing under Article 17. It states, among other 
things, that: 
137
 
Condition 
1) The collection and storage of personal information on computers, in data 
bases or other devices, whether by public or private bodies, must be 
regulated by law;  
2) Any ―interference‖ with these rights must only take place on the basis of 
law which must comply with the Covenant.‖ 
                                                             
136 It was launched in 1988 after the OECD Guidelines 1980 but before UN Guideline 1990. 
137 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/43/40). 1989, annex 
VI, para. 10. 
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Requirement 
3) States and Data Controller must take effective measures to ensure that 
information concerning a person's private life does not reach the hands of 
persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it; 
4) Data Controller must prevent the uses of this information for purposes 
incompatible with the Covenant; 
5) Data Controller must provide individuals the right to determine what 
information is being held about them and for what purposes and to request 
rectification or elimination of incorrect information; 
These conditions and requirements are supplemented by the storing body‘s duty of 
―Transparency‖ with regard to data processing, in particular as regards the provision of 
information, rectification and elimination as vital data protection principles.
138
 This 
Transparency Principle will be the main pillar for other instruments agreed thereafter. 
The OECD Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data was launched in 1980,
139
 it highly dominate the latter instruments 
such as Convention 108. There are principles for data collection and processing found in Part 
Two attached in the Annex that give conditions and requirements to data processing: 
Condition 
1) Collection Limitation Principle
140
: There should be limits to the collection 
of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair 
means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data 
subject. 
2) Purpose Specification Principle
141
: The purposes for which personal data 
are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection 
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such 
                                                             
138 Ibid. 
139 It is a Non-Binding Instruments but many member states adopted the principles for drafting their domestic 
law in order to harmonize with counter-part trade party. 
140 OECD. Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of Guidelines Governing The Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 23 Sep. 1980, para. 7. 
141 Ibid, para. 9. 
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others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on 
each occasion of change of purpose. 
Requirement 
3) Data Quality Principle
142
: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes 
for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those 
purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date. 
4) Use Limitation Principle
143
: Personal data should not be disclosed, made 
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in 
accordance with Paragraph 9 except: a) with the consent of the data subject; 
or b) by the authority of law. 
The OECD Guidelines have been the first fundamental ground that affirmed necessary 
principles to the arena so it was covered by the above General Comment 16.  
The UN guidelines 1990, in part A, lay out the following principles to provide 
minimum guarantees of protection when processing personal data:
144
 
Condition 
1) Principle of non-discrimination: Forbids the collection of data "likely to 
give rise to unlawful or arbitrary discrimination", safe for the exceptions 
under principle 6, such as national security or crime prevention. Covered 
data includes "racial or ethnic origin, colour, sex life, political opinions, 
religious, philosophical and other beliefs as well as membership of an 
association or trade union. 
2) Principle of the purpose-specification: Declares the purpose of the data 
collection to be transparent in order to ensure the data is used only for the 
specified purpose and that the data is only kept as long as it is needed to 
achieve the stated purpose. 
 
                                                             
142 Ibid, para. 8. 
143 Ibid, para. 10. 
144 UN. A/RES/45/95. 1990, part A principle 1-5. 
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Requirement 
3) Principle of lawfulness and fairness: Demands fairness and lawfulness in 
the collection and processing of personal data. 
4) Principle of accuracy: Puts responsibility on the persons doing the data 
collection to ensure the data collected is accurate. 
5) Principle of interested-person access: Data Controller must guarantee the 
right to know that one‘s data is being processed and also guarantees access 
to that data in an intelligible form. It requires appropriate remedies to 
rectify unlawful, unnecessary, or inaccurate data. 
The UN Guideline 1990 is consistent with General Comment 16 and OECD Guideline since 
it was adopted to fulfill the appliance of those instruments to activity which has been growing 
very fast since the 1980s. 
At European regional level, the Council of Europe Convention 108 includes 
the Fair Information Principles
145
. It describes the basic conditions and requirements for data 
processing which are: 
Condition 
1) Special categories of data:146 Personal data revealing racial origin, 
political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data 
concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless 
domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to 
personal data relating to criminal convictions.  
Requirement 
2) Quality of data:
147
 Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be: 
 obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; 
                                                             
145 De Hert, Paul and Schreuders, Eric. "The Relevance of Convention 108." Proceedings of the Council of 
Europe Conference on Data Protection, Warsaw, 2001, p. 34. 
146 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981, Article 6. 
147 Ibid, Article 5. 
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 stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way 
incompatible with those purposes; 
 adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are stored; 
 accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; 
 preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects 
for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data 
are stored. 
The Convention 108 seems like it contains less conditions and requirements but it takes the 
same main stances as other instruments focused. The smaller number of principle reflects the 
scope of Convention 108 which emphasizes only ―Automatic Processing of Personal Data‖. 
At EU level, the conditions and requirements of data processing are set by the 
provision of EU Directive 95/46/EC.  The EU Data Protection Directive 1995 adopted the 
Fair Information Principles.
148
 Personal data should not be processed at all, except when 
certain conditions are met. The first data quality principle provides that personal data must be 
processed ‗fairly and lawfully‘ (article 6(1)a) of Data Protection Directive). Fairness of 
processing is considered an overarching (or ‗primary‘149) principle of data protection law. It 
is a generic principle which has provided the foundation for other data protection 
requirements. As such, the fairness principle provides a ‗lens‘ through which the other 
provisions in the Directive should be interpreted.
150
 Directive 95/46/EC fall into three 
categories: transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality: 
 
 
 
                                                             
148 Eberlein, Burkard and Newman, Abraham L. "Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? 
Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union." Governance, vol. 21, no. 1, 2008, p. 40. 
149
 Bygrave, Lee A. Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits. Kluwer Law Intl, 2002, 
p. 58.   
150 Kuczerawy, Aleksandra and Fanny Coudert. "Privacy Settings in Social Networking Sites: Is It Fair?" IFIP 
PrimeLife International Summer School on Privacy and Identity Management for Life, Springer, 2010, pp. 
237–238.   
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Condition 
1) Transparency, Data may be processed only if at least one of the following 
is true:
 151
 
 when the data subject has given his consent. 
 when the processing is necessary for the performance of or the 
entering into a contract. 
 when processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation. 
 when processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject. 
 processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in 
the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed. 
 processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the 
data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. 
The data subject has the right to access all data processed about him. 
The data subject even has the right to demand the rectification, 
deletion or blocking of data that is incomplete, inaccurate or isn't 
being processed in compliance with the data protection rules
152
. 
The principle of ―Transparency‖ is the fundamental ground of the Directive 
95/46/EC as well as other instruments confirmed. 
2) Legitimate purpose, Personal data can only be processed for specified 
explicit and legitimate purposes and may not be processed further in a way incompatible with 
those purposes.
153
 
 
                                                             
151 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Article 7. 
152 Ibid, Article 12. 
153 Ibid, Article 6b. 
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Requirement 
3) Proportionality, Personal data may be processed only insofar as it is 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed.  
 The data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; 
every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which 
they were collected or for which they are further processed, are 
erased or rectified; The data shouldn't be kept in a form which 
permits identification of data subjects for longer than is necessary 
for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which 
they are further processed. Member States shall lay down 
appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods 
for historical, statistical or scientific use.
 154
  
 When sensitive personal data (can be: religious beliefs, political 
opinions, health, sexual orientation, race, membership of past 
organisations) are being processed, extra restrictions apply.
 155
  
 The data subject may object at any time to the processing of 
personal data for the purpose of direct marketing.
 156
  
 A decision which produces legal effects or significantly affects the 
data subject may not be based solely on automated processing of 
data.
157
 A form of appeal should be provided when automatic 
decision making processes are used. 
 The controller must notify the supervisory authority before he 
starts to process data.
158
 
                                                             
154 Ibid, Article 6. 
155
 Ibid, Article 8. 
156 Ibid, Article 14. 
157 Ibid, Article 15. 
158 Ibid, Article 19. 
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  The open-ended nature of the fairness principle seems to place a general 
obligation on controllers to act in a responsible way. This requirement becomes particularly 
relevant in situations where the extent to which data subjects can exercise control over the 
processing is limited (e.g., because of a significant power imbalance between controllers and 
subjects, because of the complexity of processing, etc.).
159
  
EU Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic Communications, It deals 
with the regulation of data processing issues. When data relating to location of users or other 
traffic can be processed, only be permitted if such data is anonymized, when users have given 
consent, or for provision of value-added services. User must be informed beforehand of the 
character of information collected and have the option to opt out.
160
 The EU Cookie Directive 
―Directive 2009/136/EC‖ is an amendment of the Directive 2002/58/EC, mentioning the 
regiulations regarding the purposes of the processing.
161
 User consent is the priority condition 
that the subscriber or controller must concern. This shall not prevent any technical storage or 
access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an 
electronic communications network, the strict necessary in order for the provider of an 
information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the 
service.
162
 
At EU-US level, the transfer of processed personal data between the EU and 
the U.S. for commercial purposes are addressed by the Safe Harbor Decision
163
 which 
provides a legal basis for integrity of personal data from the EU to companies in the U.S. 
which adhere to the these principles:
164
 Data Integrity, Data must be relevant and reliable for 
the purpose it was collected for. Personal information must be relevant for the purposes for 
which it is to be used. An organization should take reasonable steps to ensure that data is 
reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current. The Safe Harbor had absorbed 
the conditions and requirements contained in Directive 95/46/EC due to its original function 
                                                             
159 Van Alsenoy, Brendan et al. "Search Engines After'google Spain': Internet@ Liberty or Privacy@ Peril?." 
2013, p. 31. 
160 EU. Directive 2002/58/EC. 2002, Article9. 
161
 Ibid, Article5(3). 
162 EU. Directive 2009/136/EC. 2009, Article5(3). 
163 EU Commission. 2000/520/EC. 2000, Preamble. 
164 Ibid, Annex 1 Safe Harbor Principles. 
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as adequacy decision to meet EU standard but the implementation is upon the US legal 
system. 
The conditions and requirements of data processing are set by the provision of 
various instruments. There are many coherence requirements and conditions on data 
processing and collection from diverse instruments. These coherences had been initiated into 
written legal documents relating to personal data protection for harmonization reason. The 
Fair Information Principles, Fairness of processing is considered primary principle of data 
protection law. Personal data should not be processed at all, except when certain conditions 
are met.
 The first data quality principle provides that personal data must be processed ―fairly 
and lawfully‖. It is a generic principle which has provided the foundation for other data 
protection requirements. As such, the fairness principle provides a ‗lens‘ through which the 
other provisions in the Directive should be interpreted. However, there are some differences 
make the harmonization unaccomplished especially the differences from preventing and 
suppressing crime and terrorism which will further analyzed in section 2.2.2.4. Additionally, 
it is harder to use old data protection regime to regulate the out-paced technology. The up-to-
date understanding and the new initiative may give the method to answer customer‘s trust-
concerning question in the near future. Since the creation of Single E-Market needs the 
harmonized legal framework on personal data protection for assuring customer trust. 
 
2.2.2.3. Data Security  
There are needs to secure the data system because processed personal data is 
collected and transferred in and out of the system all the time. A great numbers of data 
subjects are involve with the protective measures of the data controller. IT Corporation and 
State Authority who gather personal data are obliged to the universal, regional and bilateral 
agreements for maintaining the safety of the data collections. Nevertheless, the instruments 
can only give principles for State to commit while the front-line defenders are private 
company or state agency in the field, directly control filing system. Due to the absent of 
International internet security law or even International Cybercrime treaty, the cooperation 
among State Parties of Treaty or Member States of legal instruments are very crucial. The 
consistence of data security standards could affect the efficiency of personal data protection 
when facing against any threats or risks. 
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The United Nations adopted General Assembly resolution 45/95 on December 
14, 1990. The resolution, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files 
lay out the following Principle 7 on security
165
: Requires protection of the data from natural 
disasters and human dangers like theft or misuse including unauthorized access, fraudulent 
misuse of data or contamination by computer viruses. This resolution can be traced back from 
the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of 
Personal Data, on Security Safeguards Principle.
166
 The OECD Guidelines was again 
recognized by UNGA as will be mentioned below. The Guidelines said Personal data should 
be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized 
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution based on the 
Security Guidelines of OECD at the 78th plenary meeting 20 December 2002.
167
 Their 
principles are a widely recognized international policy standard. The Guidelines were also 
reflected in various regional organizations such as the Council of the European Union 
Resolution on a European Approach towards a culture of network and information security 
and the Asia-Pacific ―Strategy to Ensure Trusted, Secure and Sustainable Online 
Environment‖.168 Finally, the Guidelines' principles are annexed to ISO 27001 Information 
Security Management System standard
169
 which "provides a robust model for implementing 
the principles in those Guidelines".  
                                                             
165 UN. A/RES/45/95. 1990, part A. 
166 OECD. Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of Guidelines Governing The Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 23 Sep. 1980, para. 11. 
167 UN. A/RES/57/239. 2003. 
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The Data Security Principles, which were recognized by both UNGA 
resolution and OECD Guidelines as mentioned above, are described in Part III. PRINCIPLES 
which consist of:
 170
  
1) Awareness Principle: In order to foster confidence in information systems, 
owners, providers and users of information systems and other parties should readily be able, 
consistent with maintaining security, to gain appropriate knowledge of and be informed about 
the existence and general extent of measures, practices and procedures for the security of 
information systems. 
2) Responsibility Principle: The responsibilities and accountability of 
owners, providers and users of information systems and other parties concerned with the 
security of information systems should be explicit. 
3) Response Principle: Public and private parties, at both national and 
international levels, should act in a timely coordinated manner to prevent and to respond to 
breaches of security of information systems. 
4) Ethics Principle: Information systems and the security of information 
systems should be provided and used in such a manner that the rights and legitimate interests 
of others are respected. 
5) Democracy Principle: The security of information systems should be 
compatible with the legitimate use and flow of data and information in a democratic society. 
6)  Risk Assessment Principle: Measures, practices and procedures for the 
security of information systems should encompass key internal and external factors, such as 
technology, physical and human factors, policies and third-party services with security 
implications. Because of the growing interconnectivity of information systems, risk 
assessment should include consideration of the potential harm that may originate from others 
or be caused to others. 
7) Security Design Principle: Measures, practices and procedures for the 
security of information systems should be coordinated and integrated with each other and 
with other measures, practices and procedures of the organization so as to create a coherent 
system of security. 
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8) Security Management Principle: Security levels, costs, measures, 
practices and procedures should be appropriate and proportionate to the value of and degree 
of reliance on the information systems and to the severity, probability and extent of potential 
harm, as the requirements for security vary depending upon the particular information 
systems. 
9) Reassessment Principle: The security of information systems should be 
reassessed periodically, as information systems and the requirements for their security vary 
over time.  
At European level, the Council of Europe Convention 108 give a guarantee for 
Data security
171
 by mention that Data Controller/Processor must procure the appropriate 
security measures for the protection of personal data stored in automated data files against 
accidental or unauthorized destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorized 
access, alteration or dissemination.
172
 
While in EU the EU Directive 95/46/EC urges Member States to secure of 
data processing by employ guarantee measures:
173
 
1) Controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves 
the transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of processing. 
2) Controller must choose only a processor who providing sufficient 
guarantees in respect of the technical security measures and organizational measures 
governing the processing to be carried out, and must ensure compliance with those measures. 
3) The carrying out of processing by way of a processor must be governed by a 
contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller. 
This provision of Directive 95/46/EC has shown the advantage point as it 
requires data controller to protect the integrity of personal data to all ―Life-Cycle‖ of data 
                                                             
171 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data Convention108. 1981, Article 7. 
172 Galetta, Antonella and De Hert, Paul. A European perspective on data protection and access rights. Vrije 
Universiteit, Brussel, 2013, p. 4. 
173 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. 1995, Article 17. 
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processing. But the data subject still does not entitle to claim their right directly to data 
processor. Only the data controller can regulate the data processor by using legal binding 
contract between them. 
Due to the security of personal data transfer between the EU and the U.S. for 
commercial purposes are ensure by the Safe Harbor Decision
174
, it complies with 
the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
175
 The Safe Harbor 
Principles are invented, designed and established to prevent accidental information expose or 
damage. EU and USA Data Controller/Processor can opt into the program as long as they 
adhere to the Security Principle.
176
 The Data Controller/Processor must make reasonable 
efforts to prevent loss of collected information. Organizations must take reasonable 
precautions to protect personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration and destruction. 
The challenge to data security comes from the disaster made by the hand of 
human
177
due to the penetration to data system in pursuance of data surveillance and monitor 
on the basis of terrorism prevention and crime suppression. The common security challenges 
will be shifted from national to international level because of the nature of internet. However, 
the old regime put heavy burden to national data protection authorities to supervise private 
actors whether they have developed an appropriate precautionary measure to meet the 
requirement. There is another urgent need to provide preparatory and support advice to 
national data protection authorities in order to meet these challenges
178
 especially when there 
are wide spread of massive electronic data surveillance worldwide. Whereas the filling 
system administrator has many burdens to undertake to meet with the security protocol, the 
incompetence to monitor the act of data controller stills remained. The more solid legal 
obligation to secure the system is in demand for defending infiltration. 
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2.2.2.4. Data Retention 
There are needs of personal data collection to create data base that can trace 
back to individual who may be convicted as a criminal or a terrorist. The demand of legal 
enforcement authority, to pursuit personal data to fulfill their duty, reflects in the cooperation 
with IT Corporation. From the flourishing of internet, as the popular medium for 
communicating and spreading ideas, the governmental agency put their request in a form of 
data retention clause. This section will investigate the instruments in domestic, regional and 
international levels as provision of data retention is a part of many data protection 
instruments. Since the time period, purpose and conditions of collecting the personal data are 
the main issue of data controller/processor obligation. The bigger collection and longer 
period to be kept the more risky of data breach it may happen. Thus, the study on the scope 
and condition of data retention may elucidate the vulnerable point which might occur from 
arbitrary and unnecessary retention of data. The most important characteristic of data 
retention functions in a form of relationship between state authority and data 
controller/processor regardless their legal status; private organizations, public agencies, or 
level of relations; domestic, regional and international. The solid scope and condition of data 
retention will balance the full enjoyment of right to personal data and the effectiveness of 
legal enforcement. 
In practice, data retention, involves the storage of information, whether 
personally identifiable or not, for specified or unspecified ―periods of time‖. Data Retention 
is a form of surveillance and depends on the technologies they involve; these types include 
watching, listening, locating, detecting, and personal data monitoring (―dataveillance‖).179  
Data retention is intrinsically involved with surveillance, more precisely to 
data surveillance, since it enables states to collect data related to their citizens‘ activities and 
to use these data to understand and control or assist the subjects of monitoring.
180
 The 
retention of traffic and location data perfectly meets the definition of surveillance as 
presented by David Lyon: ―a focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details in 
                                                             
179 Raab, Charles D and Jones, Richard. A report presenting a review of the key features raised by the political 
perspectives of surveillance and democracy. 2013, p. 38. 
180 Roberts, Hal and John Palfrey. "The Eu Data Retention Directive in an Era of Internet Surveillance." Access 
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the end to individuals for the purposes of influencing and protecting those whose data have 
been garnered‖.181 
The observation of Internet activities represents a uniquely powerful form of 
surveillance, since the web provides multiple spaces for individuals to be engaged in personal 
activities: contacting each other, sharing personal ideas, engaging in business transactions, 
shopping, etc.
182
 European data retention law does not allow the retention of the content of 
communications,
 183
  and ―only‖ location records and traffic data are to be stored;184 these can 
be used for creating clear tracking profiles of targeted persons.
185
 
There are no specific universal instruments which contain the provision of 
data retention not even UDHR and ICCPR. Unless, there are negative clauses contain in the 
UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files which allow state 
authority to limit the full enjoyment of personal data protection in emergency situations; 
national security, public safety, morality…or protect others‘ rights etc.. The most likely 
provision is the basic duties of data controllers to collect data for legitimate purposes. 
In regional level, the ECHR has the same standard as mentioned above in 
international level. Whereas, the Convention 108 give more concrete provision relating to 
data retention but does not extend Quality of Data principle
186
 beyond the ―specified and 
legitimate purposes‖ clause. Moreover, state authority must give reasonable claim that meet 
the conditions of restriction lay down in Restrictions and Exceptions principle
187
 such as state 
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security or the suppression of criminal offences. In addition, those restrictions, for retention 
the personal data, need to be provided by the law. 
On the contrary, at EU level data retention has been specifically regulated. The 
first mention can be found in EU Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications. The directive obliges the providers of services to erase or anonymise the 
traffic data processed when no longer needed, unless the conditions have been fulfilled. 
Retention is allowed for billing purposes but only as long as the statute of limitations allows 
the payment to be lawfully pursued. Data may be retained upon a user‘s consent for 
marketing and value-added services. For both previous uses, the data subject must be 
informed why and for how long the data is being processed.
188
 
Later, a very different perspective has been introduced in the Data Retention 
Directive, more formally "Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC" was a Directive issued by 
the European Union and related to telecommunications data retention.
189
 
Directive requires Member States to ensure that communications providers 
retain the necessary data as specified in the Directive for a period of between 6 months and 2 
years
190
 in order to:
191
 
 Trace and identify the source of a communication; 
 Trace and identify the destination of a communication; 
 Identify the date, time, and duration of a communication; 
 Identify the type of communication; 
 Identify the communication device; 
 Identify the location of mobile communication equipment. 
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Under the directive the police and security agencies will be able to request access to details 
such as IP address and time of use of every email, phone call and text message sent or 
received.
192
 A permission to access the information will be monitored by Supervisory 
Authority.
193
 
Given the wide scale of data surveillance tools existing today in the EU 
surveillance regime, the Data Retention Directive of 2006 has given rise to the most intense 
controversy. Until 2004 the issue of a common approach for countering organized crime and 
terrorism did not gain prominence on the EU policy agenda.
194
 
The EU was reluctant to harmonize the diverging data retention regimes until 
2004 despite external pressure. The radical change was triggered by the terrorist bombing 
attacks in Madrid and London that directed lawmakers‘ attention to EU mechanisms for the 
intensification of the collection, storage and exchange of personal data.
195
 Adopting the 
Directive in 2006 was a direct legal manifestation of this attempt. The main point of its 
adoption was the standardization of national regulations of the way in which traffic data are 
stored by Communication Service providers (CSPs). By choosing the form of a Directive 
from the range of possible legally binding instruments, lawmakers provided considerable 
leeway for Member States in implementing the mandatory data retention requirements. The 
Directive obliges telephony suppliers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to retain, for up to 
2 years, communication traffic and location data, and information about subscribers, for the 
purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crime.
196
 
The traffic and location records might be quite important in law enforcement 
procedures by providing key information both for detecting organized crime activities and for 
granting evidences of guilt (or even innocence) before the courts. Indeed, it is without doubt 
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that these records might play an especially important role in identifying criminals, especially 
those who use screen names or pseudonyms on the Internet.
197
 Nonetheless, there are massive 
doubts have been raised about the reliability of the retained data by non-oversight authority or 
company. 
The EU instrument for the protection of personal data in the areas of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The 
Framework Decision is an important step forward in a field where common standards for data 
protection were very much needed. However, further work needs to be done until meeting on 
27-29 November 2008
198
 and the final text was published on the Official Journal as the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
The Framework Decision only applies to the cross-border exchange of 
personal data within the EU and not to domestic processing operations in the Member States. 
This distinction is difficult to make in practice and can complicate the actual implementation 
and application of the Framework Decision.
199
 
Also, the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA contains too wide an exception 
to the purpose limitation principle.
200
 Another shortcoming is the lack of provisions that 
different categories of data should be distinguished in accordance with their degree of 
accuracy and reliability, that data based on facts should be distinguished from data based on 
opinions or personal assessments,
201
 and that a distinction should be made between different 
categories of data subjects (criminals, suspects, victims, witnesses, etc.), with specific 
guarantees laid down for data relating to non-suspects.
202
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In addition the Framework Decision does not replace the various sector-
specific legislative instruments for police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters 
adopted at EU level
203
, in particular those governing the functioning of Europol, Eurojust, the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Customs Information System (CIS)
204
, which 
either contain particular data protection regimes, and/or which usually refer to the data 
protection instruments of the Council of Europe. For activities within the area of police and 
judicial cooperation all Member States have subscribed to the Council of Europe 
Recommendation No R (87) 15, which sets out the principles of Convention 108 for the 
police sector. However, this is not a legally binding instrument. 
This situation may directly affect the possibilities for individuals to exercise 
their data protection rights in this area (e.g. to know what personal data are processed and 
exchanged about them, by whom and for what purpose, and on how to exercise their rights, 
such as the right to access their data). 
The Framework Decision is thus applicable to cross-border exchanges of 
personal data within the framework of police and judicial cooperation. The instrument 
contains rules applicable to onward transfers of personal data to third countries and to the 
transmission to private parties in Member States. The decision also allows the EU states to 
have higher-level safeguards for protecting personal data than those established in this act. 
The outcome of the introduction of data retention rules in terms of their 
intended and unintended costs has led to widespread European criticism from many different 
groups and for many different reasons. Central to these criticisms, the questions of necessity 
and proportionality of the mandatory storage of all traffic and location data relating all EU 
individuals in the European Union especially for such a long time that is prescribed by the 
Data Retention Directive (6-24 months).
205
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The pervasive surveillance performed by data retention changes individuals‘ 
social behaviour, jeopardizes their autonomous decision-making, discourages their 
participating in public debate, and chills their personal activities. Data retention may result in 
all the potential harms that are associated with privacy invasive tools in general in the 
academic literature.
206
 The practical experience of the implementation of the Directive led 
even the European Data Protection Supervisor itself to conclude that the Directive is ―the 
most privacy invasive instrument ever adopted by the European Union.‖207 
The negative impacts of data retention on freedoms of expression and the 
press are also suggested. Traffic data can easily be misused to spy on journalists and to 
expose their sources and whistleblowers. What makes matters worse from this perspective is 
the lack of guarantees of high data security in order to guard against misuses.
208
 
The Data Retention Directive 2006 may negatively impact upon competition 
and other economic policies in the EU by leading consumers to use international webmail 
services (that is, non-EU providers), and new (and even existing) market participants to take 
their businesses elsewhere. In all, Maria-Helen Maras found the Directive a disproportionate 
measure.
209
 On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the 
Directive ―invalid‖ in response to a case brought by Digital Rights Ireland against the Irish 
authorities and others.
210
 Afterward, the EU needs to re-initiate a new Directive of Data 
Retention since the old one was invalidated by Court decision. The progression of drafting 
new directive will be described in the Chapter 4 on ―New Umbrella Agreement 2016‖211 
which has been launched in 2016. 
At EU-US level, in 23 November 2009, the EU and US High Level Contact 
Group (HLCG) have agreed to launch Report on information sharing and privacy and 
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personal data protection. The Report consist of 12 principles relate to EU Directive on Data 
Protection 1995, the principles‘ text of which is attached as an annex to this report, define the 
following privacy and personal data protection requirements in 12 issues: 
212
 
1) Purpose Specification/Purpose Limitation;  
2) Integrity/Data Quality;  
3) Relevant and Necessary/Proportionality;  
4) Information Security;  
5) Special Categories of Personal Information (sensitive data);  
6) Accountability;  
7) Independent and Effective Oversight;  
8) Individual Access and Rectification;  
9) Transparency and Notice;  
10) Redress213;  
11) Automated Individual Decisions;  
12) Restrictions on Onward Transfers to Third Countries. 
 
In response to the final report from the High-Level Contact Group, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor suggested a number of principles that should guide an 
EU–US sharing agreement. Most were at least partially included in the European 
Commission negotiating mandate, but some remain controversial with the US government:
214
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 Clarification as to the nature of the instrument, which should be legally 
binding in order to provide sufficient legal certainty; 
 A thorough adequacy finding, based on essential requirements addressing 
the substance, specificity and oversight aspects of the scheme. The EDPS 
considers that the adequacy of the general instrument could only be 
acknowledged if combined with adequate specific agreements on a case by 
case basis. 
 A circumscribed scope of application, with a clear and common definition 
of law enforcement purposes at stake; 
 Precisions as to the modalities according to which private entities might be 
involved in data transfer schemes; 
 Compliance with the proportionality principle, implying exchange of data 
on a case by case basis where there is a concrete need; 
 Strong oversight mechanisms, and redress mechanisms available to data 
subjects, including administrative and judicial remedies; 
 Effective measures guaranteeing the exercise of their rights to all data 
subjects, irrespective of their nationality; 
 Involvement of independent data protection authorities, in relation 
especially to oversight and assistance to data subjects. 
 
While Private companies and State Authorities must comply with security 
maintaining obligation, State Parties in these treaties must guarantee, through the police, 
courts, criminal law, etc., the adequate implementation of those treaties. 
As the analysis throughout this section shows, there are controversial 
arguments from either side of the debates. The legal enforcement authority demands greater 
capacity to detain and trace back the data, while human rights advocates appeal for strict 
condition and tighten scope. Furthermore, the requirement of power to manipulate data 
controller organization from the State Authority brings some concerns to many personal data 
protection organization so they urge for independent oversight on relationship between state 
authority and data controller/processor. Another problem comes from the practical situation 
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that most of IT Corporations are American organization and under the mandate US State 
Authorities.
215
 The old regime has not provided durable shield to protect the full enjoyment 
of data subject rights. To achieve the full integrity of data protection, the solid legal 
instrument which contain enough preventive measure, supervisory mechanism and stricter 
restrictive clause, are required. 
 
2.2.2.5. Data Transfer  
Internet creates prominent effects to Modern Law because of its transcendence 
nature, one action across different jurisdictions produce multiple legal consequences. 
Harmonizing data transfer standard is necessary for constructing Single E-Market space as 
the priority step. To achieve this goal, many International Economic Organizations, Regional 
organization and Bilateral Inter-Parties agreements have adopted data transfer principle base 
on different legal theories. The Adequacy principle and Accountability principle are legal 
menifestions which were adapted into instruments. The Adequacy principle requires States to 
lift up their domestic law to meet the standard otherwise they may face countermeasure. 
While Accountability principle urges States to monitor their legal entities, whether they 
comply national law of their head quarter, when act aboard. The contrasting approaches can 
pursue peculiar state implementation so the design of data transfer laws can determine the 
progression of Single E-market project. 
In General Comment No. 16 to the ICCPR, it provides specification on data 
protection requirements under Article 17. The Comment longs for taking care of the possible 
violation by Third-party, the Private entities. States parties are under a duty themselves not to 
engage in interferences inconsistent with article 17 of the Covenant and to provide the 
legislative framework prohibiting such acts by natural or legal persons.
216
 As the rise of Data 
Processing has been developing by Transnational IT Corporation so the vulnerable groups, 
whose personal data may be breached, are not just a people under Totalitarian State Regime 
but also the customers of those Private Actor. Then United Nations adopted General 
Assembly resolution 45/95 in 1990. This resolution, Guidelines for the Regulation of 
Computerized Personal Data Files, guarantees of protection for personal data. In part A, 
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Trans-border data flows, only allowed for free circulation between countries when those 
countries have "comparable safeguards for the protection of privacy."
217
 
The fundamental right to personal data protection recognized by the General 
Agreement on Trade of Services (GATS) of WTO. It provides the protection of personal data 
of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data that remain 
governed by Article XIV of the GATS. The trade and investment in Service Sectors 
especially the Telecommunication and Financial services might be confronted with certain 
national requirements realizing a specific degree of confidentiality; in particular, the technical 
security of communications is an indispensable element of any transaction.
218
 Otherwise the 
Service Providers from non-adequate criterion State may face non-tariff measure against 
them such as restrict of market access. The absent of compliance by State or IT Corporation 
lead to the prohibition of data transfer to such territory. However, it stresses that member 
party data protection legislation cannot be deemed an ‗arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination‘ in the application of Article XIV of the GATS. So the domestic data 
protection law must base on the standard of relevant data protection instruments; OECD, UN 
Guidelines etc. 
The first global instrument that influenced later international laws is OECD 
Guideline 1980 Part Five listed a series of recommendations to member countries (for 
instance, to make known among them details of their observance of the Guidelines, to 
introduce simple procedures for trans-border data flows, etc.), which aimed to facilitate 
transnational information exchanges but from a national law point of view
219
 by making 
cooperation among state members. At the time the OECD Guidelines were approved, trans-
border data flows were typically understood to refer to point-to-point transfers such as the 
‗exchange of internal company administrative information, response to requests for service 
by customers, and maintenance of records concerning or describing customers or subjects‘220. 
By contrast, many trans-border data flows today involve multiple computers communicating 
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through a network in a distributed fashion
221
 (As known as ‗Web 2.0‘, online social 
networking, search engines, and cloud computing). 
At European regional apparatus, the Council of Europe Convention 108 lead 
the world by launching the first Legal-Binding International Instrument, regulates data 
transfer across border of state party and a baseline for Trans-Atlantic data transfer. The 
Convention has an important role to protect Trans-border flows of personal data and propose 
an implementation to state member domestic law
222
. The Protection of transfer across 
national borders obliges whatever medium, of personal data undergoing automatic processing 
or collected with a view to their being automatically processed. By employing Accountability 
Principle, a Party shall not prohibit or subject to special authorization trans-border flows of 
personal data going to the territory of another Party. Party shall be entitled to derogate from 
the above obligation unless:
223
 
1) its legislation includes specific regulations for certain categories of personal 
data or of automated personal data files except where the regulations of the 
other Party provide an equivalent protection; 
2) when the transfer is made from its territory to the territory of a non-
Contracting State through the intermediary of the territory of another Party. 
These exceptions are up-to-date because the communication via internet, across border right 
away and massively, makes it hard to prepare for each transfer. Moreover, the regulation on . 
Nevertheless, there are many territories involve in one single communication as data 
controller may send the personal data to data processor in Non-State Party territory so the 
guarantee of protection in all step of data life cycle might be impossible.  
In the EU, the EU Directive 95/46/EC created International Standard through 
its adequacy criterion.
224
 In this way, the EU has triggered the introduction of data protection 
legislation to several third countries that wish to do business with it.
 225
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In the EU Directive 95/46/EC ―Third countries‖ is the term used in legislation 
to designate countries outside the European Union. Personal data may only be transferred to 
third countries if that country provides an adequate level of protection.
 226
 Some exceptions to 
this rule are provided, for instance when the controller himself can guarantee that the 
recipient will comply with the data protection rules.
 
The Directive's Article 29 created the 
"Working party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data", commonly known as the "Article 29 Working Party".
227
 The Working Party gives 
advice about the level of protection in the European Union and third countries.
 228
  The 
Working Party negotiated with United States representatives about the protection of personal 
data, the Safe Harbor Principles were the result. According to critics the Safe Harbor 
Principles do not provide for an adequate level of protection, because they contain fewer 
obligations for the controller and allow the contractual waiver of certain rights. 
The Flows  of Trans-border Personal Data to a third country, which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer, may take place if only the 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection.
229
 This Directive is the most influence 
legal instruments on Personal Data Protection for nearly two decades, not only in EU member 
state, but also word wide counter-parts around the globe, since it constructs the standard for 
Personal Data Protection to any Actors who transfer data across EU border.  
Indeed, the EU Directive has influenced the works in the Council of Europe 
and has been the frame for bilateral agreements EU-US: 
The Council of Europe furthered its Convention 108 (1981) through the 2001 
release of an additional protocol regarding supervisory authorities and trans-border data flows 
(significantly influenced by the EU Data Protection Directive).
230
 A potentially significant 
development in international governance is the fact that the Council of Europe opened up the 
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ratification process of its Convention 108 to nonmembers.
 
This supposedly will pave way for 
the Convention 108 to replace a still-missing international treaty on data protection,
 231
 
though with 38 countries having ratified the Convention to date, remarkable progress would 
be needed. 
In the scope of the thesis, the US has applied this Directive by adopted Safe 
Harbor Agreement guarantee Personal Data Protection of EU citizen which are transferring to 
US territory or US subjects companies. 
The Exchange of personal data between the EU and the US for commercial 
purposes are addressed by the Safe Harbor Decision
232
 which provides a legal basis for 
transfers of personal data from the EU to companies in the U.S. which adhere to the Safe 
Harbor Principles. The Safe Harbor is a streamlined process for EU and US companies to 
comply with the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
233
 Intended for 
organizations within the EU or US that store customer data, the Safe Harbor Principles are 
designed to prevent accidental information disclosure or loss. EU and USA companies can 
opt into the program as long as they adhere to the principle of onward transfer. 
Onward Transfer, principle of Safe Harbor, has written that transfers of data to 
third parties may only occur to other organizations that follow adequate data protection 
principles. To disclose information to a third party, organizations must apply the notice and 
choice principles. When an organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is 
acting as an agent, it may do so if it makes sure that the third party subscribes to the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding. As an 
alternative, the organization can enter into a written agreement with such third party requiring 
that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the 
relevant principles.
234
 
From the Safe Harbor Agreement, Companies operating in the European 
Union are not allowed to send personal data to countries outside the European Economic 
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Area unless there is a guarantee that it will receive adequate levels of protection. Such 
protection can either be at a country level (if the country's laws are considered to offer equal 
protection) or at an organizational level (where a multinational organization produces and 
documents its internal controls on personal data). 
The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles allows US companies to register their 
verification-list if they meet the European Union requirements. 
As we have seen the regulation of transborder data flows has gradually 
evolved over the last several decades. The first such laws enacted in the 1970s tended to 
make transborder data flows contingent on strict conditions being fulfilled, such as that the 
transfer was approved by the local data protection authority.
235
 Later instruments added 
further options for legalizing transborder data flows (such as the use of standard contractual 
clauses). Recently more sophisticated instruments have been developed to provide protection 
for transborder data flows across organizations, such as binding corporate rules (BCRs) in the 
European Union. 
Some important regional data protection instruments (such as the EU Data 
Protection Directive) are currently being renewed, with a view to making the legal regime for 
transborder data flows under them more effective and efficient.
236
 Discussions are also 
ongoing between data protection regulators, civil society groups, international organizations, 
and multinational companies about how the principle of accountability could be used as a 
way both to facilitate data flows in a globalised world and to protect the personal data and 
privacy of individuals. 
Moreover, the very word ‗accountability‘ seems to have no precise translation 
in many languages, so that its legal status in non Anglo-American legal systems remains 
uncertain.
237
  But it seems that the concept of accountability may prove useful in helping to 
bridge the various approaches to the governance of transborder data flows.
238
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Regulation of transborder data flows focuses on policies such as preventing 
circumvention of the law and guarding against data processing risks where the data are 
received, and if these policies are not implicated (for example, because the law of the 
countries of export and import have been harmonised), then the necessity of regulating 
transborder data flows is lessened or eliminated. Such regulation thus performs a protective 
function designed to prevent the fundamental principles of data protection and privacy law 
from being circumvented, but regulation of transborder data flows is not itself a fundamental 
principle of the law.
239
 
The laws and instruments also differ in the ‗default position‘ that they take 
regarding transborder data flows. Some instruments (such as the OECD Guidelines and 
Convention 108) presume that data flows should generally be allowed, but give regulators the 
power to block or limit them in certain circumstances, while others (most notably the EU 
Directive) proceed from the assumption that personal data may not flow outside the 
jurisdiction
240
 unless a particular legal basis is present. However, the number of national data 
protection laws has increased dramatically, thus reducing the chances that data can be 
transferred to a jurisdiction where no privacy protection applies, and so far there has been 
little hard evidence of a widespread transfer of data processing to ‗data havens‘ without data 
protection legislation.
241
 Accordingly, the ―Default Position‖ is deficient because OECD 
Guidelines and Convention 108 were thinking of data transfer between State parties while EU 
Directive 95/46/EC approach emphasize on data transfer from an EU State, with strong 
national data protection laws, to a Third Party in Non EU Member State. 
Many instruments on transborder data flows show the influence of multiple 
approaches, and even those as seemingly divergent as the EU‘s ‗adequacy‘ approach and the 
‗accountability‘ approach used in the OECD member countries are likely to grow closer over 
time. For example, the Article 29 Working Party, established by the EU Directive 95/46/EC, 
has called for the principle of accountability to be explicitly incorporated into EU data 
protection law,
242
 and some national Data Protection Authority (DPAs) in Europe has also 
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expressed interest in it. Some jurisdictions using the accountability approach also recognize 
that the flow of personal data across national borders may raise concerns about the level of 
privacy protection.  
In practice, the subjects of transborder data flow regulation and applicable law 
are often intertwined, and countries may use rules on applicable law to protect data 
transferred beyond their borders. In EU, personal data may generally not be transferred 
outside the geographic boundaries of the EU without a legal basis, which may require the 
continued application of EU law to the processing of the data in other countries. Thus, under 
EU law, certain legal bases for international data transfers (e.g., signature of EU-approved 
standard contractual clauses between data exporter and data importer that impose data 
processing obligations based on EU law) result in the application of EU data protection 
standards in other countries where personal data are processed.
243
 Moreover, EU standards 
are then also applied to further transfers from the data importer to third parties (so-called 
‗onward transfers‘) as presented in EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement. 
 
2.2.3. Implementation of Personal Data Protection 
This section will reflect how personal data protection law in old regime have 
transformed itself into action by implanting the mechanism to monitor, remedy and sanction 
the legal provision. In the first part, Supervisory mechanism, there are some oversight bodies 
in a form of quasi-judiciary or judicial institution. For individual‘s remedy, it has shown that 
not only adjudicative tribunal but also independent reparation unit is created to restore the 
damage of data subject. On sanctions, there were certain administrative measures or civil 
compensations or criminal penalties awarded as the enforcement of written law in some 
cases. 
2.2.3.1. Monitoring Body and Supervisory Authority  
To supervising personal data protection implementation, Data protection 
Authority is required in every levels; International, Regional, Bilateral and domestic. The 
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estimation of supervisory mechanism is required under right to personal data protection 
implementation. In order to provide a legal basis and supervisory body for regulating data 
processing or trans-border data flows. Some countries, particularly those subject to the EU 
Directive, require that bureaucratic formalities be observed before the transfer takes place, 
such as that the transfer be registered with the data protection regulator before personal data 
may be transferred.
244
 Other countries that do not specifically restrict trans-border data flows 
may impose compliance responsibilities on entities that transfer personal data outside the 
country‘s borders. 
At universal level, monitoring and control mechanisms over States compliance 
of the right to Personal Data Protection rely on the UN system, specifically on Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR) and the Universal Periodic Report (UPR). 
The implement measures of United Nations are General Assembly Resolutions 
by the recommendation of Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Report procedure and 
National Report of ICCPR member states. The strongest measure is of presenting national 
report for undermining and having some feedback recommendations.
245
 The Committee 
mentioned that State party reports should also contain information on complaints lodged in 
respect of arbitrary or unlawful interference, and the number of any findings in that regard, as 
well as the remedies provided in such cases.
246
 The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) can 
take only a review with the friendly resolutions for asking States to fulfill the obligation of 
Covenant.  
In general, United Nations has Universal Periodic Report (UPR) procedure to 
call up the State Members to present their national report in every 4.5 years.
247
 The Right to 
Privacy, personal data protection issue, will be covered for review by other UN Member 
States, Expertise Organizations and NGOs. The State who submitted the UPR report must 
pledge their intent to develop its domestic implementation in specific problem then come 
back with the response in the next UPR round.  
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In General, There is no specific International sanction to enforce Right to 
Personal Data protection on Natural Person or Legal Persons; IT Corporation and State 
Authority. The implement measures of United Nations are General Assembly Resolutions 
which cannot directly compel individual person or private company. The strongest sanction is 
of presenting national report for undermining and having some feedback 
recommendations.
248
 Even The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) can take only a review 
with the friendly resolutions for urging States to fulfill the obligation of Covenant but nothing 
at all to compel individual or private organizations. Some State Parties may send the 
communication to the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) that the specific State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant.
249
 Then Committee shall hold closed 
meetings to examine the practice of the complained State. When examining result is out the 
committee will provide friendly resolutions for State to fulfill the obligation of Covenant.  
Besides those mechanisms, main international guidelines and documents 
highlight the need of national monitoring bodies and authorities. So, the United Nations 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files lays out the principle on 
Supervision and Sanctions in part A.
250
 It requires the designation of an authority responsible 
for supervising observance of the principles set forth above. The authority shall offer 
guarantees of impartiality, independence vis-a-vis persons or agencies responsible for 
processing and establishing data, and technical competence. 
Since the quantity of internet using is rising, there is also a growing need for 
international data protection authority to regulate the data processing of IT Corporations. 
More importantly, the monitoring of data exchange among State Authorities for the purposes 
of preventing and combating transnational crime and terrorism become the requirement. In 
this context, clear and consistent rules on data protection at EU level will help fostering co-
operation between such authorities. 
The EU Directive 95/46/EC require each member state to set up a supervisory 
authority, an independent body that will monitor the data protection level in that member 
state, give advice to the government about administrative measures and regulations, and start 
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legal proceedings when data protection regulation has been violated.
 251
 The Directive also set 
up the organization called ―Article 29 Data Protection Working Party‖252 which has an 
advisory status and acts independently in adhere with all provisions of the Directive.  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is composed of: 
 a representative of the supervisory authority(ies) designated by each EU 
country; 
 a representative of the authority(ies) established for the EU institutions and 
bodies; 
 a representative of the European Commission. 
The Working Party elects its chairman and vice-chairmen. The chairman's and vice 
chairmen's term of office is two years. Their appointment is renewable. The Working Party's 
secretariat is provided by the Commission. 
The EU Data Protection Directive 1995 requires the establishment of 
institutional mechanism for monitoring personal data processing in each Member State.
 253
  In 
practice, the data controller must notify the supervisory authority before he starts to process 
data. The notification contains at least the following information:
 254
 
 the name and address of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
 the purpose or purposes of the processing; 
 a description of the category or categories of data subject and of the data or 
categories of data relating to them; 
 the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data might be 
disclosed; 
 proposed transfers of data to third countries; 
 a general description of the measures taken to ensure security of processing. 
This information is kept in a public register. 
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 The Data Retention Directive gives State authority permission to access the 
information but will be monitored by national supervisory authority.
255
 The dismissal of such 
permission by national court remains question as there are different domestic laws of member 
states. 
The European Union‘s Article 29 Working Party is the most influential 
organization of DPAs, both because it has a formal role under the European Data Protection 
Directive and because of the quality and diversity of its Opinions On data privacy issues. Its 
membership is coextensive with that of the EU, but is separately reflected in the Table. It may 
increasingly have a rival for influence in the Council of Europe Convention 108, Consultative 
Committee (to be renamed ‗Convention Committee‘), as an outcome of the Convention‘s 
‗modernization‘ process.256 However, this is technically not a committee of data protection 
authority, it is one of the representatives of State Parties to the Convention,
257
 although nearly 
half of the State Representatives are DPAs. 
A larger and also influential body is the Conference of European Data 
Protection Authorities (EDPAs),
258
 which holds a ‗Spring Conference‘ almost every year, 
resolutions are usually passed.
259
 From Charles Raab‘s analysis, the conference is significant 
to the development of data protection policies in Europe.
260
 According to one of its member 
DPAs, ‗one of the most important tasks of the European Data Protection Authorities Consists 
in advising the authorities involved in legislative matters on data protection issues, by 
pointing out the risks that legislative initiatives might entail and by proposing alternatives 
which would be more respectful of individual's rights with regard to the processing of their 
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personal data‘.261 EDPA Has quite strict accreditation rules, requiring its members to operate 
under a law of a State Implementing either Council Of Europe Convention 108 Or the EU 
Data protection Directive, And having independence and appropriate functions and 
powers.
262
 
From the perspective of the Safe Harbor Decision, USA private organization 
can opt into the program as long as they have competent self-monitor system.
263
 The Self-
Regulate system means registered companies must employ data protection officers or agency 
to monitor the data leaks and breaches. There must be effective means of enforcing these 
rules in order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles.  
As Safe Harbor Agreement is a self-certification system, it has no mandatory 
independent verification of what a business actually does. Safe harbor companies can have an 
independent body check their compliance up front and annually thereafter, but independent-
body checkups are not required, and few companies seem to do them. The fact that safe-
harbor enforcement tends to be complaint-driven, rather than overseen by regulators, and the 
fact that US enforcement agencies seem rarely if ever to initiate proceedings to enforce safe 
harbor on the US side, make Europeans nervous—especially in light of Europeans‘ fear that 
US data processors are less concern about complaints coming from across the Atlantic.
264
 The 
Safe Harbor registered companies must employ data protection officers or agency to monitor 
the data leaks and breaches
265
 where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so 
provide. 
To the bottom line, the judicial procedure and domestic court of the State 
Party or Member State is the last available resort for appealing. The court can dismiss the 
illegitimate orders which could violate the protection of personal data if the violator is 
National Entity. Despite, the competence of domestic court, adjudicative authority at national 
level, to compel the organization out of their jurisdiction is low. Likewise, the National Data 
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Protection Authority who has the same scope of power as the domestic court is available for 
oversight or supervisory mission but the limitation of jurisdiction stills remain. 
In many cases the supervisory authorities may not have sufficient resources or 
personnel to properly monitor compliance with trans-border data flow regulation. For 
example, one study found that eleven out of twenty-seven national data protection authorities 
in the EU Member States were unable to carry out the entirety of their tasks because of a lack 
of financial and human resources.
266
 This suggests that the authorities are only able to enforce 
data transfer requirements on a piecemeal basis. 
 
2.2.3.2. Redress Mechanism and Individual Remedy  
The tough affair of personal data protection implementation is individual‘s 
remedy. As this right is not an absolute right but wide spread breaches may occur 
internationally. Proportionately, the architecture of complaint and remedy channel lay out by 
different treaties may arrange vary paths for data subjects. The next complexity is to pursuit 
remedy from the organization located outside the victim‘s territory. The exploration of 
possible way to gain the remedy is the vital part to succeed the full enjoyment of right to 
personal data protection. 
Usually the remedy of individual‗s damage must start at the most local point 
of state service body then file a suitcase to the local and national court as such State provided. 
After the sufferer has been through all of domestic remedy system he may bring the court to 
higher level mechanism. The principle ―Exhaustion of Domestic Remedy‖ must be the 
baseline and spring board for victims who want to bring their case to the Regional or 
International level. 
Start with Universal Individual‘ remedy, due to the breaches on right to 
personal data protection, Member States of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) can take appropriate action immediately, including court action, against the 
breach of their sovereignty, and thereby the violation of general public international law, 
perpetrated through the mass surveillance programmes; calls further on Member States to 
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make use of all available international measures to defend EU citizens‘ fundamental rights, 
notably by triggering the inter-state complaint procedure under Article 41 of ICCPR. 
Next, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1996 (ICCPR Optional Protocol 1)
267
 , ratified by 115 state parties
268
, has the 
international remedy channel for individuals, who have exhausted all available domestic 
remedies, to file their complaints directly to the Human Right Committee.
269
 Individuals who 
were violated will be undercover anonymously
270
 throughout the process 
More specific remedy on Personal Data Protection, the United Nations 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files In part A, principle 8 
Supervision and sanctions,
271
 it requires every country to create system for the event of 
violation of the provisions of the national law to accuse criminal offences and provide with 
the appropriate remedies for data breach victim. 
Come down to European regional level, the Convention 108 put the strong 
additional safeguard for the data subject
272
 by recognizing that any person shall be enabled to 
have a remedy if a request for confirmation or, as the case may be, communication, 
rectification or erasure as referred to in paragraphs b and c of this article is not complied with. 
To find the closer remedy channel for individual, the EU Directive 95/46/EC 
provides a right for Individuals to lodge complaints about violations to the supervisory 
authority
273
 or in a court of law for compensations from the suffered.
 
However, the controller 
may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he proves that he is not responsible 
for the event giving rise to the damage.
274
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The protection of personal data is closely linked in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, but they 
should not be considered to be identical.
275
 
While there are the EU data processing dispute resolution procedures in 
general but there has not been any international redress organization in the Safe Harbor 
Agreement for EU Nationals.
276
 
The effectiveness of the enforcement regimes in various countries even EU 
members is on the extent of judicial interpretation of these laws and on other comparative 
aspects of data privacy laws.
277
 All of this requires an accurate account of the incidence, 
growth and distribution of the Global data protection regime. 
In the case of EU Data Retention Directive, EU citizens brought their cases to 
domestic constitutional system. The highest judicial authorities of several Member States 
have ruled that the implementation of the Directive in domestic law was unconstitutional, 
such as the Constitutional Court of Romania, Germany, the Czech Republic, as well as the 
Irish High Court.
278
 All these courts concluded that the relevant national laws did not ensure 
adequate safeguards in order to balance between the serious infringement of the right to 
privacy and other freedoms affected, on the one hand, and the legitimate purpose of 
combating crime, on the other.
279
 The Data Retention gives state authority permission to 
access the information but the national court may dismiss such permission.
280
 However, the 
different domestic laws of member states will give individual a non-harmonized standard in 
disparate jurisdictions. Later, the illegitimate Data Retention Directive ‘case that EU citizen 
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appealed was brought European Court of Justice and Court has disapproved the Directive in 
2014. 
Maria-Helen Maras shows that the Directive may negatively impact upon 
competition and other economic policies in the EU by leading consumers to use international 
webmail services (that is, non-EU providers), and new (and even existing) market 
participants to take their businesses elsewhere. In all, she found the Directive a 
disproportionate measure.
281
  
An effective remedy is a fundamental right under the EU Charter and the 
ECHR, awarded to all persons, regardless of their nationality, also applicable to cases where 
data protection rights have been violated. The ECJ has also established, as a basic principle, 
that remedies must be available in all cases of breach of EU law. All these EU safeguards are 
in direct contrast to the legal framework in the US which reciprocally denies European 
citizens, who are not resident in the US, the right to an effective remedy. If EU citizens are 
under surveillance for any lawful reason they must have the right to challenge the information 
by intelligence authorities. Given the mass international transfer of data of EU citizens to US 
companies and authorities, the lack of appropriate redress mechanism for European citizens is 
an issue of extreme concern.
 282 
The Safe Harbor Decision which provides a legal right for personal data 
subject from the EU to companies in the U.S. which adhere to the Safe Harbor Principles.
 
283
  The US-EU Safe Harbor provides procedure for individual‘s remedy due to comply with 
the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
284
 The Safe Harbor 
Procedures are developed to prevent accidental information disclosure or loss. The US 
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private organization can opt into the program as long as they have effective remedy 
procedure. These principles urge IT Corporation to respect and fulfill these issues: 
285
 
 Notice - Individuals must be provided information about how individuals 
can contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints.  
 Enforcement - There must be effective means of enforcing these rules. In 
order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles, there must be 
procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to adhere 
to the safe harbor principles have been implemented. 
Data subject must have ready access to affordable procedures for safeguarding his rights 
under safe harbor.
286
 Therefore, safe harbor companies must build dispute-resolution 
machinery, and offer it to European data subjects who have grievances.
287
 At a minimum, this 
machinery must be included but there has no existence organization. 
As Safe Harbor Agreement is a self-certification system but the safe harbor 
enforcement tends to be complaint-driven.
288
 The Safe Harbor organization must employ data 
protection officers or agency, readily available and affordable independent recourse 
mechanisms, so that each individual's complaints and disputes can be investigated and 
resolved and damages awarded
289
 where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so 
provide. 
The channels for data subjects to file complaints, which the safe harbor 
company then actually investigates and resolves, awarding damages or other real remedies if 
there was a violation (these procedures should not be a ―show trial‖—a widespread 
perception in Europe sees the chief failing of safe harbor as American data processors too 
often sweeping European data subjects‘ complaints under the rug).290 
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Data protection authorities have received complaints from individuals and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) regarding data transfers abroad, though the number 
does not seem to be large.
291
 The increasing complexity of data processing on the Internet 
caused by phenomena such as cloud computing and outsourcing can make it difficult for 
individuals to obtain information as to where their personal data are being processed and 
stored, which may lead to a loss of confidence. On the other hand, some studies demonstrate 
a lack of interest by individuals in the regulation of trans-border data flows.
292
 
The enforcement of right to personal data protection is increasingly based on 
formal or informal cooperation between regulators outside of traditional legal assistance. 
There is also ever-increasing use of internal dispute resolution mechanisms in both the 
private and public sectors,
 293
 which may enhance the ability of individuals to assert their 
rights in other countries. 
Even though, the Safe Harbor gives a right to access for Individuals to their 
personal information that an organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that 
information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing access 
would be disproportionate to the risks to the data subjects in the case in question, or where 
the rights of persons other than the individual would be violated. However, it is not easy to 
undertake for example in the case of normal internet users in EU claim their right to the IT 
Corporation located in Texas. It is even harder if the Non-EU citizen want to appeal for 
reparation from US company when they are surfing online market in EU territory. 
 
2.2.3.3. Enforceability of Rights  
Enforceability of right to personal data protection is the hardest feature of 
implementation because many case studies comprehend different jurisdiction. The compatible 
sanction and the solution for conflict of laws induced by vast majority legal apparatus will be 
shown. Most enforcements sanctioned by domestic court but there is some measures can be 
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imposed internationally. Consequently, the survey for available sanction in numerous data 
protection laws would be useful to the sufferer. 
The point of departure for the specific Personal Data Protection enforceability 
can be found in the United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files In part A, principle 8 Supervision and sanctions,
294
 as far as it requires every 
country to prepare for the event of violation of the provisions of the national law. State must 
be able to enforce criminal or other penalties and should be envisaged together with the 
appropriate individual remedies. 
That requirement has been developed by the Convention 108 which pursues 
each party to establish appropriate sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of 
domestic law giving effect to the basic principles for data protection set out in this chapter.
295
 
Specifically within the EU framework, two norms are of interest. First, the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC urges that Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full 
implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay down the 
sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted pursuant to this 
Directive.
296
 
Second, under the Data Retention Directive, it depends on national court 
power to dismiss the permission to access. Nonetheless, the procedure and conditions of 
provoking the permission, remedy the damage or punishment the violator will be diverse due 
to the different domestic laws of member states.
297
 
As a step towards reciprocity, the US must explore the most appropriate 
mechanisms to extend at least the legal protection afforded to persons within the US also to 
Global citizens outside the US, in order to provide an effective legal redress mechanism for 
Global citizens whose data has been held or accessed by the US authorities and companies. 
Most importantly, the reparation to victim violated by US entities especially the US public 
authorities such as National Security Agency or National Intelligence Agency. 
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In between relationship of EU and US, the Safe Harbor Decision, provides 
procedure for individual‘s remedy due to the eager to comply with the EU Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.
298
 The Safe Harbor Procedures are developed to 
prevent accidental information disclosure or loss. The EU and US private organization can 
opt into the program as long as they provide effective redress measures. 
The Safe Harbor registered Corporation must prepare: 
 follow-up procedures, conducted either by self-assessment or outside 
compliance review, verifying that what the safe harbor company claims 
about its privacy practices is accurate and in place;
299
 and 
 methods to fix problems, and, for violations, sanctions with teeth.300  
 There are two options a safe harbor company can build this machinery 
which are:
 301
 
 to buy a prepackaged privacy enforcement program that incorporates the 
safe harbor principles, or 
 submit to legal/regulatory supervisory authorities, such as European data 
protection authorities (DPAs), that have dispute-resolution machinery 
already in place. 
The enforcement principle urges organization to have effective means of enforcing the rules 
of Safe Harbor. In order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor provisions, there must be 
obligations to remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with the principles. 
Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by the organization.
302
 The Safe 
Harbor organization must employ data protection officers or agency to investigate 
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individual's complaints and disputes so that can be resolved and sanctioned compensation.
303
 
Organizations that fail to provide annual self certification letters will no longer appear in the 
list of participants and safe harbor benefits will no longer be assured. 
The complexities of implementation to Safe Harbor Agreement by company 
discussed above can obscure the fact that, procedurally, safe harbor status is amazingly easy 
to get.
304 
All a company need do is log onto the Department of Commerce website and fill 
out a one-page form, or send a letter self-certifying that it has adequate procedures and 
protections up and running.
305
 Specifically, this self-certification merely needs only basic 
details to disclose but SMEs or Start-up business may found this is hard to follow since they 
might have not had system to support data protection policy yet.
306
 Due to the Red-Tape that 
the Agreement had putted in front of the data transfer across border, some SME companies 
may loss their opportunity to access EU market. But if SMEs need to prepare for accession, 
the cost of transaction and set up system might make them less competitive when compare 
with Multi-national Corporation. 
State Members that export personal data across national borders may also not 
comprehend the ubiquity of trans-border data flows: for example, in a study by the European 
Commission published in 2008, only a small percentage (10%) of data controllers stated that 
their companies transferred personal data outside the European Union,
307
 a figure that must 
be too low given the widespread use by companies of e-mail and the Internet. 
In addition, rules on applicable law and jurisdiction with regard to data 
protection and privacy law are notoriously unclear,
308
 which can create problems in particular 
for individuals, who often may not be able to determine which law applies to the processing 
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of their personal data, and to which national regulatory authorities they may turn if a problem 
arises. 
Despite the large number of laws regulating trans-border data flows, it is 
questionable how widely such regulation is enforced because ‗many unauthorised and 
possibly illegal transfers are being made to destinations or recipients not guaranteeing 
adequate protection. Yet there is little or no sign of enforcement action by the supervisory 
authorities‘.309 The fact that some of the largest economies in the world (such as China and 
Japan) have not been the subject of a formal EU adequacy decision means that there must be 
substantial non-compliance at least with regard to data flows from the EU to those 
countries.
310
 
 
 
2.3.  Failures due to limitations of US Domestic System relate to Personal Data 
Protection 
The legal system of US for protecting personal data is the real matters because the 
most of prominent trans-national IT Corporations are subjected to the obligation of US 
jurisdiction. Most of IT Corporations‘ servers are located in US territory or the personal data 
of users is transfer to US territory. Consequently, the US regime on personal data protection 
is the regulation, governs the acts of US IT Corporations and State Authorities, which may 
effect to the personal data protection standard of internet users in other States. Accordingly, 
there were the limitations on rights of global internet user arising from the exercise of US 
entities. The power of US State Authority over the US IT Corporation, or the cooperation 
between both actors, might put the obstacles to the full enjoyment of right to personal data 
protection of Internet Citizen worldwide. 
Unlike the EU, however, the United States does not have a single, overarching 
personal data protection framework.
 311
  The fundamental law to protect personal data in 
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United States has a decentralized and multi-layers legal framework for personal data 
protection:
 
 
• Constitutional protections. The U.S. Constitution, above all the Fourth 
Amendment (protecting against government ―searches and seizures‖)312, and well-
settled U.S. Supreme Court law grounded in the Bill of Rights provide strong 
baseline protection for personal data. 
•  Federal statutes. Several federal privacy laws regulate the collection, use and 
disclosure of information on a sectoral basis, including information in the finance 
and information related to consumer credit and commercial email. Additionally, 
the Privacy Act of 1974 protects against the improper use of personal data by 
government agencies
313
, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
regulates the interception of electronic communications
314
, and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) imposes criminal penalties on unauthorized access 
to information stored on computers. 
•  Federal Enforcement Authority. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
broad authority under the FTC Act to address ―unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting Commerce‖, and it has used this authority in a variety of privacy 
and data security contexts to protect consumers by bringing enforcement actions 
against companies engaging in unfair practices harmful to consumers regarding the 
collection, use and disclosure of information.
 315
 
•  State law protections. There are numerous additional data protections under U.S. 
state law providing an expanded scope of data protections
316
, including explicit 
provisions relating to a right to data protection in several state constitutions, and 
laws to protect individuals‘ personal data in various areas, including requiring 
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companies to disclose details of their data sharing with third parties, limiting 
unauthorized access to network accounts, and security breach notification laws 
requiring companies to disclose any computer breaches resulting in unauthorized 
access to consumers‘ personal data. 317 
On the contrary, there is the Executive Order 12333, an Executive Order intended to 
extend powers and responsibilities of U.S. intelligence agencies and direct the leaders of U.S. 
federal agencies to co-operate fully with CIA requests for information.
318
 This executive 
order entitled United States Intelligence Activities; government surveillance, including mass 
electronic surveillance activities. As Professor Francesca Bignami has explained, "the 
National Security Agency - NSA's original mandate was considerably elaborated and 
extended in Executive Order 12333, promulgated by President Reagan in 1981."
319
 the 
government's reliance on EO 12333, particularly the reliance on Section 1:12(b)(13), which 
authorizes the NSA to provide "such administrative and technical support activities within 
and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections 
(1) through (12) above, including procurement."
 320
  This provision appears to have opened 
the door for the NSA's broad and unwarranted surveillance of U.S. and foreign citizens. 
Moreover, the further bulk collection of intelligence information is allowed under 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act since 2001 right after the 9/11 attack.  This section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act is controversial because the order may be granted ex parte (without 
notice to the other party – surveillance target), and once it is granted, in order to avoid 
jeopardizing the investigation
321
, the order may not disclose the reasons behind why the order 
was granted.  
Nonetheless, Personal Data Protections, extend to surveillance by law enforcement 
and national intelligence/security authorities, are regulated by:
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• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Congress passed FISA in 1978 to 
govern surveillance activities, including to: (1) establish a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) (Staffed with independent judges with life tenure); (2) 
require a warrant issued by aFISC judge for electronic surveillance, to ensure high-
level approval of narrowly-tailored and targeted requests; and (3) create the Senate 
and House Intelligence Committees, to provide oversight of the Executive Branch.
322
 
• Section 702 of FISA provides additional protections regarding surveillance of 
non-U.S. persons. Section 702 contains important limitations, oversight, and 
accountability provisions, including FISC approval of surveillance requests only 
after several safeguards have been met, including that the government: (1) have a 
valid ―foreign intelligence purpose;‖ (2) follow FISC targeting procedures; (3) use 
specific identifiers to limit collections and avoid overly broad queries; and (4) 
employ minimization procedures to destroy raw data between two and five years 
after collection.
323
  
• Protections under U.S. federal case law. Courts have routinely interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment and other legal provisions to: (1) restrict the scope and 
circumstances of law enforcement wiretaps; (2) require a warrant before a national 
security wiretap; (3) exclude evidence obtained from illegal police searches; and (4) 
require a warrant before police may search cell phones or use tracking devices
324
, 
among other protections. 
However, there are some critiques from what have happened in US system when the 
protection of personal data versus the power of State to surveillance on matters of National 
Security or Public Safety:
 325
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1) Under US law, a number of legal bases allow large-scale collection and processing, 
for foreign intelligence purposes, including counter-terrorism, of personal data that has been 
transferred to the US or is processed by US companies. The US has confirmed the existence 
and the main elements of certain aspects of these programmes, under which data collection 
and processing is done with a basis in US law that lays down specific conditions and 
safeguards. Other elements remain unclear, including the number of EU citizens affected by 
these surveillance programmes and the geographical scope of surveillance programmes under 
Section 702.
 326
  
2) There are differences in the safeguards applicable to EU data subjects compared to 
US data subjects, namely:
 327
  
 Collection of data pertaining to US persons is, in principle, not authorised under 
Section 702. Where it is authorised, data of US persons is considered to be "foreign 
intelligence" only if necessary to the specified purpose. This necessity requirement 
does not apply to data of EU citizens which is considered to be "foreign 
intelligence" if it relates to the purposes pursued. This results in lower threshold 
being applied for the collection of personal data of EU citizens.  
 The targeting and minimisation procedures approved by FISC under Section 702 
are aimed at reducing the collection, retention and dissemination of personal data 
of or concerning US persons. These procedures do not impose specific 
requirements or restrictions with regard to the collection, processing or retention of 
personal data of individuals in the EU, even when they have no connection with 
terrorism, crime or any other unlawful or dangerous activity. Oversight of the 
surveillance programmes aims primarily at protecting US persons.  
 Under both Section 215 of Patriot Act and Section 702 of FISA, US persons 
benefit from constitutional protections (respectively, First and Fourth 
Amendments) that do not apply to EU citizens not residing in the US.  
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3) Moreover, under US surveillance programmes, different levels of data protection 
safeguards apply to different types of data (meta-data vs. content data) and different stages of 
data processing (initial acquisition vs. further processing/analysis).
 328
  
4) A lack of clarity remains as to the use of other available legal bases, the existence 
of other surveillance programmes as well as limitative conditions applicable to these 
programmes. This is especially relevant regarding Executive Order 12333
329
 which may 
occur even after the reforms in 2014.  
5) Since the orders of the FISC are classified and companies are required to maintain 
secrecy with regard to the assistance they are required to provide, there are no avenues, 
judicial or administrative, for either EU or US data subjects to be informed of whether their 
personal data is being collected or further processed. There are no opportunities for 
individuals to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or administrative or judicial 
redress.
 330
  
6) Various layers of oversight by the three branches of Government apply to activities 
on the base of Section 215 of Patriot Act and Section 702 of FISA. There is judicial oversight 
for activities that imply a capacity to compel information, including FISC orders for the 
collection under Section 215 and annual certifications that provide the basis for collection 
under Section 702. There is no judicial approval of individual selectors to query the data 
collected under Section 215 of Patriot Act or tasked for collection under Section 702 of FISA. 
The FISC operates ex parte and in camera. Its orders and opinions are classified, unless they 
are declassified. There is no judicial oversight of the collection of foreign intelligence outside 
the US under Executive Order 12333, which are conducted under the sole competence of the 
Executive Branch.
 331
  
Many U.S. officials and industry representatives maintain that the U.S. approach to 
data protection is more nimble than what they view as the EU‘s ―one-size-fits-all‖ approach. 
They also contend that the U.S. approach helps to promote and sustain U.S. technological 
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innovation.
332
 Nevertheless, some U.S. privacy advocates argue that there are significant gaps 
in this ―patchwork‖ approach, especially in terms of data collection online, and have long 
urged Congress to enact comprehensive data protection legislation.
333
 
 The discontents US system brought to the personal data protection recourse came 
from the directly clash with the State intelligence operation in National Security realm. The 
intention of US government to conduct mass electronic surveillance on activities relate to 
terrorism, especially on foreigner who is out of the full constitutional protection, may put 
further complicated situation for internet users around the world. Since most of prominent IT 
Corporations have US nationality status or transfer personal data to the servers in US 
territory, the different standard would be the main threat to Non-US citizen internet users 
therefore. 
 
2.4.  Lesson Learnt from the Old Regime 
After the end of WWII, the concept of a ―right to privacy‖ emerged in international 
law but there is no solid universal legal instrument about ―personal data protection‖. These 
rights have the sense of Negative Rights, interference with the right to respect for private life, 
must base on adequate legal basis; clear, accessible and foreseeable. As well as the 
prerequisite of necessary and proportionate for the legitimate ground to intervene at baseline.  
The right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data, not 
only have connections but also differences. The concept of ― personal data protection‖ was 
developed in order to provide structural legal protection to individuals against the 
inappropriate use of information technology for processing information relating to them, 
regardless of whether that processing would be within the scope of the right to respect for 
private life or not.  
 Data protection as a specific issue in legal policy and legislative practice arose since 
the 1970‘s, in the era in which computerized automatic data processing became widespread. 
In practice, it could mean key differences that the legal system must take into consideration to 
ensure that the rules are suitable in different situations. However, the deliberation to create a 
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safer online society is even harder than in an offline world because the overwhelming of data 
processing is heavier than the paper document era. 
In 1980‘s, the first binding international instrument on personal data protection was 
launched with regard to automatic processing of personal data across border. Later, the 
proliferation of data sharing in the area of criminal and judicial matters reflects result in 
needs to protect personal data in the case of criminal procedure undertaken by State Agency.  
The eager to construct International regime to protect right to personal data of data 
subjects to support the development of Single E-Market on the basis of liberal democratic 
society are the goal. Notwithstanding, the old personal data protection regime, has shown that 
there are incompetence conditions, need reforms in order to create more harmonize standard.  
A range of potential trans-border personal data protection standards have been 
developed by various initiatives and organizations, courts and civil societies such as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor. These cover data processing, sharing of private entities 
and the oversight of surveillance activities by State intelligence agencies. The principal 
opportunities for implementing them are in EU and EU–US negotiations over a data sharing 
privacy agreement and the further Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the 
future. The Council of Europe and state–state negotiations over intelligence sharing are also 
possible venues. 
Even at that time (Mid-2013) trans-border flows of personal data were taking place at 
an increasing pace. International business cooperation became difficult; the need for some 
regulations on automated personal data processing was felt, but not everybody shared the 
same enthusiasm for the introduction of formal data privacy acts.
334
 The institutional 
internationalization of the data protection law-making process became necessary to 
encourage and formalize a possibly broad adoption of the new field of law. 
Beyond this, there are opportunities to introduce new standards through the Council 
of Europe‘s data protection convention, and encourage ratification by non-European states, as 
well as introducing new personal data protections in the General Data Protection Regulation 
and Data Protection Directive on criminal procedure.
335
 More difficult will be efforts to make 
intergovernmental intelligence sharing agreements transparent. Outside the USA and EU, 
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forums at the UN, OECD, Privacy Commissioners‘ Conference, WTO and WIPO could also 
play a role, although they present challenges of scope and enforcement. 
Despite, the difficulties come from the failure of US legal system for protecting 
personal data of data subjects around the world. Since most of prominent trans-national IT 
Corporations are under the obligation of US jurisdiction and there are plenty of personal data 
had been transferring to servers located in US territory. Accordingly, the US regime on 
personal data protection became the main regulation to govern the acts of US IT Corporations 
and State Authorities. The limitations to full enjoyment of right to personal data due to the 
exercise of State Authority‘s power over the IT Corporation or the cooperation between both 
sectors are the risky threats to data subjects worldwide. The inadequacy of US system 
brought deteriorates to the personal data protection. The program of US government to 
conduct mass electronic surveillance on activities relate to terrorism, especially on foreigner 
who is out of the full US constitutional protection, may put further obscure scenario for 
internet users globally.  
Following a review by an independent panel appointed by President Obama
336
, the US 
executive branch has recently made significant changes to improve the compliance of its 
foreign intelligence practices with international human rights law. These include more 
specific definitions of the purposes for which surveillance can be undertaken, and—
significantly—greater protections for non-US citizens and residents.337 There remains an 
opportunity for democratic states to further improve and entrench human rights protections 
for their citizens through the implementation of the standards
338
 which will be described in 
Chapter 4 and 5. 
The deficiencies of personal data protection instruments on universal and EU regional 
level are:
339
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• the inconsistencies in national laws; 
• the unbalanced standard to provide better privacy protection for individuals; 
• outdated-law to address contemporary personal data challenges, such as those 
posed by the Internet, Social media, mobile apps, cloud computing, ―Big data,‖ and 
State Agency data sharing, that were in their infancy when the Data Protection 
Instruments were drafted; 
• Costly administrative burdens for companies dealing with multiple data protection 
authorities. 
• Incompetence oversight and supervisory mechanism when deal with trans-border 
problems. 
• Almost impossible for common data subjects to lodge their complaint and gain 
feasible remedy in the multi-national case. 
In the European Union, various legal instruments and obligations provide individuals 
and regulators with a framework that allows the assertion of rights with regard to EU-based 
data processing. Thus, EU data protection authorities are obliged to cooperate with each 
other,
340
 and often do so in practice.
341
 Court decisions from one EU Member State can also 
be enforced in another Member State with relative ease.
342
 However, the same legal 
instruments do not apply to situations where a non-EU country is involved, meaning that such 
enhanced regulatory cooperation and ease of enforcement are not possible to fulfill.
 343
 The 
difficulty of asserting legal rights abroad is not unique to data protection and privacy law, but 
results from the fact that there is no global legal framework for the assertion of consumer 
rights, or for the recognition and enforcement of court decisions in other countries. 
The Critique on Safe Harbor Agreement from multinationals‘ point of view is that it 
insulates only EU-to-US data transfers, and as such is useless when a conglomerate wants to 
roll out a globally accessible data base, such as a global information system, or else to 
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transfer data beyond the United States.
 
Quite apart from that data-controller-perspective 
shortcoming, however, are the criticisms of safe harbor as ineffective in safeguarding the 
rights of EU data subjects
344
 or any other Non-US Citizen data subjects. 
One of the problems around personal data protection on E-Market comes from an 
obvious paradox: Internet is an issue/object with an exclusive and unique international nature. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted to national regulations and, specifically, to the US national rules 
because of the physical location of most enterprises providing internet services. 
While data protection legislation has a cross-border dimension, its subsequent 
development acquired distinct national and regional characteristics. Perhaps most 
importantly, in European countries a new field of law emerged, data protection, which gained 
in depth and width and claimed its independence from the traditional right to privacy.
345
 
However, the European approach was not shared elsewhere in the world—perhaps most 
notably in the US Given, however, the globalization of transactions, as well as the national 
security imperatives, personal data need to travel across borders now more than ever. In order 
to accommodate the international cooperation of fundamentally different data protection legal 
systems,
346
 a series of initiatives have been undertaken, particularly during the last decade. 
As with new information technologies, it is quite complicate to see if and how a 
certain activity can be impacted with laws and other rules due to nature of jurisdiction, the 
fact that it is difficult to implement existing legislation to new and complicated technologies, 
or for national security reasons. There are many scenarios in which public feel that certain 
situation must be regulated, that something should be banned, that it should be possible to 
impede a certain activity and so on, even though the legal system actually does not have the 
necessary regime to success this. In liberal democratic state, respect human rights and human 
dignity, it is still important to permit everything that is not specifically prohibited by 
legislation. Otherwise the concrete legislation, which gives precise scope of what activities 
are illegal and when such limitation may employ, is needed. 
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The likelihood that a legally-binding data protection instrument of global application 
will be enacted in the foreseeable future appears insufficient for a variety of reasons, in 
particular because of the difficulty of agreeing on the form of the legal framework, selecting 
the standards on which such an instrument would be based, determining the scope of the 
instrument, and agreeing on an international organization to coordinate the work.
347
 Some 
other tactics to proliferate the recognition of personal data protection may be desired. 
 
In the next Chapter 3, various cases will show the practice and interpretation of EU 
and EU-US regime, when it has to handle the Trans-National IT Corporations and National 
Intelligence Agencies. Thus, theses problems are needed to be tackled by proposing the new 
set of data protection laws. As reforms have been launching since Mid-2013, it has triggered 
changes not only to EU regime but also EU-US regime. The results of such reforms will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 Personal Data Protection analysis in Hard Case Study 
 
In this chapter, IT Corporation and State National Security Authority will be brought 
into highlight as the case study to understand the operation of Personal Data Protection 
Regime prior reforms. Both IT Corporation Policy and Practice in their own regulate realm 
and the External relationship with society and State Agency is on the radar of scrutiny. 
Moreover, the Chapter also investigates into cases which were decided by various courts, 
Regional and Domestic in EU and USA, in order to reflect shifting paradigms from arbitrary 
interference to more transparency. As Right to Personal Data Protection is a mainstream 
attention of International Community since the most notorious revelations of the Century in 
June 2013, the recognition of vast majority judicial/oversight mechanism will be the hard 
evidences to draw the line between legitimate data processing and illegal penetration in data 
collection on cyberspace. The most controversial issue the chapter will discuss is the 
complicated argument on Human Rights in one hand and National Security on the other. 
 
3.1.  The Nature of Information Technology Corporation relate to Personal Data 
Protection 
The prominent Information Technology (IT) Corporation has launched the vast 
majority of inventive products and services into the information market. Thus, IT Corporation 
has encountered legal concerns since some applications such as the search engine, web 
browser, and visual map have a critical impact on individual rights directly and indirectly. 
These applications were invented and developed by ongoing data processing of users‘ 
personal data; however, they outspokenly have claimed that "Corporate does no evil". 
Furthermore, IT Corporation is the mega power in information-based society which could 
provide various services to world-wide internet surfers then turn users into their products by 
data processing. Howbeit, the efficiency of governance models on Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) is relevant with diverse conditions. For implement the data protection regime, the 
penetration and collection of personal data by IT Corporation is unpredictably high and 
extensive in the long run and must be taken into account. 
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IT Corporation is increasing clout as the ultimate arbiter of commercial success ("to 
exist is to be indexed by a search engine"
1
) and as a central database for users' personal 
information, not only logging their search queries but also storing their e-mail, map (Street 
View), web browser, operating system, calendars, photos storage, videos port website, blogs, 
documents saving, social networks, news feeds, credit card information, in short, the ―entire 
digital lives‖. 
IT Corporation's access to and storage of vast amounts of personal data create a 
serious privacy problem, as Edward Felten recently called "perhaps the most difficult privacy 
[problem] in all of human history."
2
 Every day, millions upon millions of users provide IT 
Corporation with unfettered access to their interests, needs, desires, fears, pleasures and 
intentions.
3
 The information is logged and maintained in a form which may facilitate the 
identification of specific users for various purposes, including not only their targeting with 
effective advertising but also prosecution by the government or pursuit by private litigants.
4
 
The "Database of Users‘ Intentions" in the description of John Battelle, "link by link, click by 
click, search is building possibly the most lasting, ponderous, and significant cultural artifact 
in the history of humankind: the Database of Intentions."
5
 It constructs a honey pot for 
various actors, not only State Agencies such as NSA and FBI which spent billions dollars on 
online surveillance, to penetrate in, IT Corporation 's information treasure mine, but also 
hackers and data thieves, who deliberately try to sneak information security systems no 
matter how tight. 
How did IT Corporation evolve from being a benevolent giant seeking to "do no evil" 
into a privacy menace, an unruly private sector "big brother" reviled by human rights 
advocates worldwide?
6
 Is the skeptic of IT Corporation's dominant presence justified or 
                                                             
1
 Introna, Lucas D and Nissenbaum, Helen. "Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines 
Matters." The information society, vol. 16, no. 3, 2000, pp. 169, 171. 
2
 ‗"Inside the Googleplex." The Economist, 30 August 2007, www.economist.com/node/9719610. 
Accessed 10 May 2017. 
3
 Tene, Omer. "What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines." Utah Law Review, 
Forthcoming, 2007, p. 1432. 
4
 Ibid, pp. 1435. 
5
 Battelle, John. The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed 
Our Culture. Penguin, 2005, p.6. 
6
 Avet, Traci. "Who's Afraid of Google?." Library Journal, vol. 131, no. 10, 2006, p. 154. 
181 
 
overstated? What personal data should IT Corporation allowed to control and process? What 
rules should regulate access to IT Corporation's data mine? What were the court cases take 
place and were they sufficient to represent the personal data protection crisis? These are the 
main issues mentioned in this Chapter. 
 
3.1.1. The impact of Internet Services on the user’s right to personal data 
protection 
At First, there are obviously needs of business to improve their capacity to operate in 
New Informative Market, E-Commerce Society. Furthermore, The Corporate prefers a wide 
open Market Society for freedom on commercial activities. For accomplish their goal, the 
Private Sector has been proposing for less State intervention in order to boost the creativity to 
invent new products. The new products and services in forthcoming market are Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT)‘s off springs which have been invented by employing 
various forms of data processing services. Moreover, Governments have been stimulated by 
private sectors to reform their efficiency and save corporate cost on processing Personal Data. 
Hence, there is an evident on the ‗unavoidable‘ economic and social conditions which could 
be proved by the economic figures
7
 that Western States must support their private sector to 
generate more productivity in a time of Economic Regression. 
IT Corporation is the recently new mega power in information-based society which 
could provide various services to a vast majority of internet surfers and turn users into their 
products
8
 by data processing. However, the penetration and collection of personal data by IT 
Corporation are unpredictable high and deep in long run. 
IT Corporation‘s success was built on the commercial surveillance of civilians 
through ―services‖: web search, email, social networking, et cetera. But IT Corporation‘s 
development in recent years has seen it expand its surveillance enterprise by controlling 
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mobile phones and tablets. The Overshadow of IT Corporation on Internet users is enormous 
because surfers make some applications as the default web-browser or search engine.
 9
   
Moreover, IT Corporation has a dominant smart phone operation system (IOS of 
Apple, Android and Microsoft) to promote their web browser. The success of Google‘s 
mobile operating system, Android, launched in 2008, has given Google an 80 percent share 
of the smart-phone market. Google claims that over a billion Android devices have registered 
themselves, at a rate now of more than a million new devices a day.
10
 Through Android, 
Google controls devices people carry on their daily routine and use to connect to the internet. 
Each device feeds back usage statistics, location, and other data to Google. This gives the IT 
company unprecedented power to surveil and influence the activities of its user base, both 
over the network and as they go about their lives extending IT Corporation‘s surveillance 
capabilities farther into the space around their users.
11
 
The prominent book ‗Google and the Law; Empirical Approaches to legal aspects of 
knowledge-economy business models‘12 addresses various effects IT Corporation brings to 
legal atmosphere. Nonetheless, the vital issue on data processing and data mining are missed 
out. Howbeit, the efficiency of governance models on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is 
relevant with diverse conditions. In different States and Regions, The design and 
implementation of regulatory regime are significant conditions. 
Due to various human rights defenders reports, Privacy International, recently ranked 
IT Corporation 's privacy practices including Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Amazon and eBay 
are merely meet Personal Data protection standard set by legal frameworks.
13
 Privacy 
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International describes some IT Corporations as "an endemic threat to privacy."
14
 It criticized 
IT Corporation's "aggressive use of invasive or potentially invasive technologies and 
techniques" and claimed the company "fails to follow generally accepted privacy practices 
such as the OECD Privacy Guidelines and elements of EU data protection law."
15
 The EU 
data protection regulators had launched an investigation into Google's data retention and 
privacy practices,
16
 which was extended to cover other search engines as well.
17
 Moreover, 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a leading right to privacy advocate, filed a 
complaint with the Federal Trade Commission, arguing Google's contemplated merger with 
long-time privacy nemesis Double-Click must be blocked.
18
 In 2012 the EPIC appealed to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking disclosure of any 
communications between NSA and Google Inc. regarding encryption and cyber security.
19
 
The case may lead to the revelation of the cooperation between NSA and IT Corporation 
which impact to Personal Data Protection will be discussed in this Chapter. 
 
 3.1.2. Big IT corporation’s Policy and Practice on Personal Data Protection 
IT Corporation records all search queries linked to a specific Internet Protocol (IP) 
address.
20
 Thus the Policy and Practice of IT Corporation will definitely influence the right to 
personal data protection of millions people in cyberspace. 
In IT Corporations‘ privacy policy, the company usually states: Our servers 
automatically record information that your browser sends whenever you visit a web site. 
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These server logs may include information such as your web request, Internet Protocol 
address, browser type, browser language, the date and time of your request and one or more 
cookies that may uniquely identify your browser.
21
 
IT Corporations cumulate Big Data by using the ‗Compulsory Consent terms and 
Conditions‘ model. This contract of application form is usually used by ISPs to address issues 
of data privacy. Nonetheless users are given ‗freedom of choice‘ to opt in to or opt out of data 
collection activities
22
without reading the Terms and Conditions for using such services 
carefully. 
IT Corporation has been criticized both for disclosing too much information to 
governments too quickly and for not disclosing information that governments need to enforce 
their laws. In April 2010, Google the most prominent IT Corporation, for the first time, 
released details about how often countries around the world ask it to hand over user data or to 
censor information.
23
 Online tools make the updated data available to everyone.
24
 
Most IT Corporations also analyzes search-query logs for revenue-generating 
purposes, particularly for targeting and maximizing the effectiveness of advertisements, such 
as Google, after all, is an advertising company.
25
 The predominant business model for search 
engines is contextual advertising, in which, alongside organic search results, users are 
displayed advertisements, most commonly textual, that are relevant to their search.
26
 The 
name of the game in online advertising, which is dominated by the pay-per-click (PPC) 
method of billing,
27
 is maximizing click-through rate (CTR), that is, the number of times 
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users who visit a web page featuring an advertisement actually click the ads.
28
 And in order 
to maximize CTR, search engines gauge user tastes, preferences, interests and needs. Google 
CEO Eric Schmidt stated: ―If we target the right ad to the right person at the right time and 
they click it, we win.‖29 Targeting ―the right ad to the right person at the right time‖30 
requires knowing the users; and knowing the users means analyzing their search history,
31
 
given the increasingly small costs of data warehousing,
32
 and makes data processing more 
profitable. 
Even Google may said the ―search engines do not sell users‘ personally identifiable 
information to third parties,
33
  However, Search engines do share user data with subsidiaries, 
affiliated companies, and other ―trusted‖ business partners for the purpose of data processing 
and the provision of services.
34
 In addition, they retain the right to transfer data to a third 
party in case of a merger or consolidation.
35
 
The transparent of IT Corporations can be reflected by their report of Transparency, in 
Google Report, which describes the cooperation with Governments around the world. 
Between July and December 2009, Brazil topped the list for user data requests with 3,663, 
while the US made 3,580, the UK 1,166, and India 1,061. Brazil also made the largest 
number of requests to remove content with 291, followed by Germany with 188, India with 
142, and the US with 123. Google, who stopped offering search services in China a month 
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before the data was released, said it could not release information on requests from the 
Chinese government because such information is regarded as a state secret.
36
 
Google's chief legal officer said, "The vast majority of these requests are valid and the 
information needed is for legitimate criminal investigations or for the removal of child 
pornography"
37
. The main problem of cooperation with State Authority is whether all 
coordination is reported or announced only the cases which are in the line of the law. 
 
3.1.3. How have IT corporation done their duty as the Data Controller and 
Processor  
This section brings the 6 basic principles of Data Controller and Processor included in 
EU Directive and relating instruments as a framework to analyze the practice and policy of IT 
Corporation. For easier understanding, IT Corporation‘s service which will be used as 
example is Search Engine, either solo search engine or hybrid browser-search engine, since it 
is popular and gain plenty personal data form internet users. 
Principle 1 – purpose and manner of collection of personal data 
The prohibition against secret databases is one of the doctrinal foundations of 
European data protection law, survived following decades of totalitarian regimes that used 
information in secret databases to police and terrorize citizens into conformity and 
submission.
38
 Data aggregation is the ―gathering together of information about a person.‖39 
Solove explains that ―combining information creates synergies". When analyzed, aggregated 
information can reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would be known 
about her when the original, isolated data was collected.‖40 User search-query logs aggregate 
vast amounts of data from tiny bits of information revealed by user click by click search by 
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search history.
41
 This evident gave the wealth and depth of information collected in search 
query logs that contain vast majority of searches aggregated over a period of uses. Even the 
few users who are aware of search engines‘ data compilation practices probably 
underestimate the impact of search-query logs on their privacy, effectively making their lives 
―transparent‖ over time.42 
Data log or Big Data collection concentrated is the nature of the search-engine 
industry. There are voluminous data being compiled by search engine controller and then 
processor. Furthermore, Government, private litigants, and hackers alike know that IT 
Corporations store this personal information. It creates new type of risk and insecure by 
gather Mega Data Mine and even worse when collects data more than the legitimate purpose. 
The more it collects the more devastate result it could affect to the protection of personal 
data. 
Principle 2 – accuracy and duration of retention of personal data 
This section concern of the distortion of information, which is ―the manipulation of 
the way a person is perceived and judged by others, and involves the victim being 
inaccurately exposed to the public.‖43  Recognizing the potentially harmful effects of 
inaccurate information, the EU Data Protection Directive provides that personally identifiable 
information must be ―accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the 
purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or 
rectified.‖44 In addition, individuals in the EU enjoy the right to access their personally 
identifiable information without delay, and to rectify, erase, or block data that are inaccurate 
or incomplete.
45
 The combination of inaccurate and misleading data, ease of government 
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access, and lack of transparency and accountability to users, makes user search-query logs 
highly problematic from a privacy perspective. 
Moreover, after many cases in Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) which will 
describe later, the right to be forgotten is the direct reflection from this kind of search engine 
effect. Since anything pop-up on internet once it almost has never been erased, the wrong 
searchable information could lead to misunderstanding to target people. Even sometime the 
fault story has been rectified in real world but the information is still online somewhere ready 
for searched. 
Similarly, Information in search-query logs may be highly misleading, with 
potentially troubling results for users.
46
 A user searching for ―Death of King or President‖ is 
not necessarily a terrorist or criminal intention; instead, it might be a researcher finding for a 
history evident or primary school students did their homework. As well as, a user searching 
for ―how to plant opium‖ is not absolutely considering an agricultural endeavor; it may be a 
social worker concerned with growing drug use in neighborhood or it‘s a part of PhD thesis.  
Principle 3 – use of personal data 
EU Data Protection Directive includes the principle of purpose specification.
47
 Under 
the purpose specification principle, personally identifiable information obtained for one 
purpose must not be used or made available for another purpose without the affected 
individual‘s prior informed consent.48 Because secondary use of personally identifiable 
information ―creates a dignitary harm . . . emerging from denying people control over the 
future use of their data, which can be used in ways that have significant effects on their 
lives.‖49 Solve points out that ―secondary use resembles breach of confidentiality, in that 
there is a betrayal of the person‘s expectations when giving out information.‖50 
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In case of user search-query logs, users may expect that information to be used by IT 
Corporation to respond to your query only and users most certainly do not expect IT 
Corporation to disburse this information to the government or private parties engaged in 
litigation against you.
51
 When IT Corporation uses the information in your search-query log 
for purposes diverging from those you reasonably envisaged, it breaches your trust, your 
―reasonable expectation of privacy‖,52 as well as the purpose specification principle. 
In reality, IT Corporation not only aggregate your current query with all of your past 
searches and mine the data in order to improve its service but also make use of this 
information to target you with effective advertising or analyze your ad-viewing behavior.
53
 
The consent of user is needed, implicitly at least, to all of these uses, since they are specified 
in IT Corporation‘s privacy policy but not many users may notice the terms and conditions 
that written in instant contract. Nevertheless, implicit consent argument is tenuous at 
fundamental as a clause to invoke an unfair instant contract.  
First, consent is based in this case on a browse-wrap agreement,
54
 which must be 
assembled from several distinct web pages
55
 and is hard to comprehend. Second, Search 
Engine Corporation‘s privacy policy remains constructively opaque concerning the primary 
use of search-query logs, rendering secondary use all the more difficult to accept.
56
 
IT Corporation‘s use of search data for secondary purposes and the privacy issues it 
raises expose a broad rift between U.S. and European privacy law. The purpose specification 
principle, so deeply ingrained in EU law,
57
 is not at all evident in the United States, where the 
underlying assumption has traditionally been that as between any individual and a company 
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collecting her personally identifiable information, it is the company that owns the data and 
may use, reuse, or sell it to third parties at will.
58
 
Principle 4 – security of personal data 
In order to government and private actors serving legal process, IT Corporation‘s 
information goldmine is bound to attract hackers and data thieves. Valuable databases get 
infiltrated all the time, regardless of the robustness of security measures. Security breaches 
abound even in highly guarded industries such as financial services, health services, and 
telecommunications.
59
 Unfaithful employees may sell data to marketing company or 
criminals; negligent employees lose laptops; computers are stolen and back-up tapes lost; 
passwords are possibly compromised and firewalls lowered. 
The point is that no matter what security measures are in place, data stored will 
eventually be data breached. The best method to secure data, and consequently guard 
individuals‘ privacy, 60 is not to store them in the first place.61 To sum up, far from being 
restricted to use by search engines themselves, search-query logs may haunt users in future 
government investigations or private litigation and can be illicitly accessed by hackers and 
data thieves.
62
 
Principle 5 – information to be generally available 
An analogy of the basic prohibition on confidential databases is the right of 
individuals in Europe to be notified which data are collected about them, by whom, and for 
what purposes.
63
 Solove refers to ―the failure to provide individuals with notice and input 
                                                             
58
 Cohen, Julie E. "Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object." Stanford Law 
Review, 2000, pp.1373-4. 
59
 Kennedy, John B. ―Slouching towards Security Standards: The Legacy of California‘s SB 1386.‖ 
Privacy Law Institute (Seventh Annual), 2006, pp. 91, 97–98. 
 
60
 Brin, David. The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose between Privacy and 
Freedom?. Basic Books, 1999. pp. 8–9. 
61
 LoPucki, Lynn M. "Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem." Tex. L. Rev., vol. 80, 
2001, pp. 89, 108. 
62
 Tene, Omer. "What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines." Utah Law Review, 
Forthcoming, 2007, p. 1457. 
63
 EU. Directive 95/46/EC. Articles 10–11. 
191 
 
about their records as exclusion.‖64 He explains that ―exclusion creates a sense of 
vulnerability and uncertainty in individuals. . . . In a world where personal information is 
increasingly used to make important decisions about our lives, powerlessness in this arena 
can be significantly troublesome.‖65 
Public awareness to the extent of data collection by search engines is minimal. A 
survey held pursuant to the government‘s request for Search Engine Corporation‘s search 
records reveals that ―89% of respondents believe that their Web searches are kept private, and 
77% believe that Google web searches do not reveal their personal identities.‖66 To a great 
extent, then, many users think Google‘s collection of search queries is a de facto ―secret 
database.‖ 67 
In its complaint to the FTC concerning the Google/Double Click merger, EPIC points 
out that a user must click on four links from Google‘s ubiquitous homepage68 in order to 
obtain information concerning the company‘s data collection practices.69 Moreover, even the 
full privacy policy fails to explain clearly what Google does with information in search-query 
logs. In addition, it is not clear whether and to what extent users have access to their search-
query logs.
70
 
Principle 6 – access to personal data 
Individuals are entitled to access their personally identifiable information and, if 
necessary, correct or amend them.
71
  User access to search-query logs is now provided as part 
of the IT Corporation Web History service. Users of IT Corporation Web History may access 
their search-query logs and edit or delete items therein. Yet such access comes at a significant 
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privacy cost, because IT Corporation stores not only the search queries of Web History users, 
but also the web pages visited. Moreover, the users who do not subscribe to Web History, 
ostensibly due to that very ―cost‖, 72 are arguably already paying a similar privacy price, 
given IT Corporation‘s retention of their search-query logs. 
Finally, counter to Web History users, search engine users are not provided with the 
opportunity to edit or delete search-query logs (at least not by simple means).
73
 
 
 
3.2.  Hard Case Study under US legal system  
 This section will bring in the cases from the practice in the real-life situations and the 
case studies present in the courts. The cases from the everyday-life practice illustrate the 
relationship between the IT Corporation and State Authority. The Court Case studies 
emphasize the legal precedent of Personal Data Protection when it encounters with 
inconvenient incidents in various scenarios. 
 
3.2.1. Suspicion cases on the Relation between Corporations and State Agencies  
The exploration of the cooperation or relationship between State and IT Corporation 
is crucial to understand the impacts of Data Processing on Personal Data Protection. It seems 
to be sure that IT Corporation has a power to control over personal data. People do not know 
whether IT Corporation will share it with government or not while some IT Corporations 
usually share personal data and information with state agencies.
74
 This kind of relation 
implies that there might be consistently sharing of information among State Authorities and 
Private Companies on the basis of reciprocity or by the mandate law enforcement.  
In addition to personal data protection and exercising security technologies, sustaining 
trust in cyberspace requires rules, transparent practices, accountability standards, and means 
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of redress acceptable to users.
75
 Accordingly, International efforts for agreements to protect 
and sustain cyberspace security are unavoidable in the macro policy of State and micro 
practice of IT Corporation. 
However, do you think it is just the IT Corporation who really uses 
processed/collected data? On the contrary, state especially government and security agencies 
do sharing, mining and processing the information with IT Corporation
76
 occasionally. The 
Old School excuses of the state are: to support the flourishing of economy and protect 
National Security
77
 which are vague and undermine the fundamental rights of individual as a 
customer and people. As such, the Dilemma like theme question has been sprouted. 
The notorious US Global Internet Surveillances on PRISM program, NSA cooperates 
with 9 big ICT Corporations on Electronic Mass Surveillance,
78
 gave evidences confirming 
the threats from IT Corporation on Personal Data Protection of Internet citizen worldwide. 
The problems on data collection, mining and processing sharing of ISPs start the 
controversial arguments at first place.
79
 The reveals of state massive electronic surveillance, 
interception and collection of personal communication and data are highly spotted because 
US has targeting surveillance on the executive of other states and mass surveillance
80
 on 
everyone in the world. As NSA‗s PRISM project collect data from the most powerful IT 
Corporations of the world such as Google,
81
 Yahoo, Facebook etc. The PRISM project has 
main objective to watch on every communication devices which connect to the Internet; 
CPU, Laptop, Pad, Mobile phone. The identification of place time and activity of people 
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could be track and trace orderly from the Big Data Collection
82
 that gathering from 
Everyday-Life practice. 
PRISM was enabled under President Bush by the Protect America Act 2007 and by 
the FISA Amendments Act 2008, which immunizes private companies from legal action 
when they cooperate with U.S. government agencies in intelligence collection. In 2012 the 
act was renewed by Congress under President Obama for an additional five years, through 
December 2017.
83
 According to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, it gives mandate for 
"specifically authorizes intelligence agencies to monitor the phone, email, and other 
communications of U.S. citizens for up to a week without obtaining a warrant" when one of 
the parties is outside the U.S.
84
 which means the rights of Non-US Citizen are ignored. 
Internal NSA presentation slides included in the various media disclosures show that 
the NSA could unilaterally access data and perform "extensive, in-depth surveillance on live 
communications and stored information" with examples including email, video and voice 
chat, videos, photos, voice-over-IP chats (such as Skype), file transfers, and social 
networking details.
85
 
The NSA databank, with its years of collected communications, allows analysts to 
search that database and listen "to the calls or read the emails of everything that the NSA has 
stored, or look at the browsing histories or Google search terms that you‘ve entered, and it 
also alerts them to any further activity that people connected to that email address or that IP 
address do in the future."
86
  
PRISM data using terms intended to identify suspicious communications of targets 
whom the analysts suspect with at least 51 percent confidence to not be US citizens. Training 
materials for analysts tell them that while they collect of foreign U.S. data, "it's nothing to 
                                                             
82
 Ingram, Mick. "Google Publishes Figures on Government Requests for Data." World Socialist Web Site, 
26 www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/04/goog-a26.html. Accessed 31 Oct. 2014. 
83
 Shane, Peter M. "Foreword: The NSA and the Legal Regime for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance." 
2014, p. 25. 
84
 McAllister, Neil. "Senate Votes to Continue FISA Domestic Spying through 2017-All Proposed Privacy 
Amendments Rejected." The Register, 29 Dec. 2012. 
85
 Greenwald, Glenn and MacAskill, Ewen. "NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google 
and Others." The Guardian, vol. 7, no. 6, 2013, pp. 1-43. 
86
 Rea, Kari. "Glenn Greenwald: Low-Level NSA Analysts Have ‗Powerful and Invasive‘search Tool." 
ABC News, vol. 28, 2013. 
195 
 
worry about"
87
 which shows the ignorance to the right to data protection of Non-US citizen 
worldwide. 
 
3.2.2. Legal Analysis on IT Corporation cases in the US Court  
Various court cases brought against US National Security Authorities as the many 
agencies have diverse surveillance programmes which may breach right to personal data 
protection of Internet users worldwide. The United States Court of Appeals held decisions in 
regard to non-governmental organization request relating communications between NSA and 
IT Corporation. The problem come from the validation that court had given under the broad 
ambit of Sections of the National Security Agency Act because any internal risk assessment 
conducted by NSA constitutes as an undisputed NSA function. The result is that the court 
protects IT Corporation and National Security Authority interests at the expense of individual 
rights regarding personal data protection. These decisions benefit private sector and 
intelligence unit because they get to work with each other in handling cyber security issues 
without the fear of potential critiques from the public as a result of information being 
revealed to individuals as a result of a information request. Despite the court decision were 
supported in a legal context, its decision to place national security concerns ahead of the right 
to access government-held information undermines Individual and Public the ability for to 
know about the effects of cyber attacks on businesses and the coordination between IT 
Corporation and National Intelligence Authority. The effects of court decisions to personal 
data protection will be scrutinized below as well as the changes that court may post through 
their verdicts. 
 
3.2.2.1. Right to Personal Data Protection of Individual 
The decisions that US Courts have made set the precedent on Data Collecting 
and Sharing of IT Corporation and State Authority because they are the subjects under US 
jurisdiction.
88
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On December 16, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
ruled in Klayman v. Obama that the NSA's bulk collection of domestic telephone call detail 
records likely violated the Fourth Amendment (right to privacy, data privacy and personal 
data protection). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the Plaintiff, as a 
Verizon customer, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the NSA's collection of 
call detail records.
89
 This case celebrated the full constitutional rights enjoyment of US 
citizen but the protection for Non-US citizen stills remain a question.
90
 
Since this collection was not based on any particularized suspicion of 
wrongdoing, all call records were collected in bulk from ISPs every day. Specifically, the 
FISA order required that Verizon turn over ―all call detail records or 'telephony metadata' 
created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) 
wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.‖ Once revealed, the 
government confirmed the existence of the Verizon order and of the telephone metadata 
program.
91
 In this case, the Plaintiff, a Verizon Wireless customer, brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of D.C., alleging that the government is conducting a "secret 
and illegal scheme to intercept and analyze vast quantities of domestic telephone 
communications [and] of communications from the Internet and electronic service 
providers."
92
  
On May 7, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a 
lower court decision and held that the "bulk telephone metadata program is not authorized by 
[Section] 215" of the USA PATRIOT Act. The court first rejected the Government's 
argument that the ACLU and other plaintiffs lacked "standing" to bring the case under Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution. The court found that the plaintiffs in this case "need not speculate 
that the government has collected, or may in the future collect, their call records.  To the 
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contrary, the government‘s own orders demonstrate that appellants‘ call records are indeed 
among those collected as part of the telephone metadata program." Finally, the court rejected 
the Government's argument that the NSA metadata collection was authorized under Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows the FBI to apply to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court for an order requiring the production of records or "tangible things" that 
are "relevant to an authorized investigation."
93
 Specifically, the court rejected the 
Government's interpretation of the term "relevant" to include all domestic telephone records. 
The court found that "such an expansive concept of 'relevance' is unprecedented and 
unwarranted" under the law, and would not be equivalent to the permissible scope of a 
subpoena in the grand jury context. The court also rejected the argument that Congress 
"implicitly" endorsed this broad interpretation of the term "relevance" when it reauthorized 
the provision in 2010 and 2011.
94
 The court declined to rule on the Fourth and First 
Amendment issues because it found the program was not legitimate by the statute. 
The decision in the Hearst Case is a reasonable indicator where U.S. courts 
are coming from: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a newspaper 
was not required to remove stories about a woman‘s arrest, even though the arrest was later 
expunged from her record.
95
 In so holding, the judge observed that the expunged record is a 
legal fiction that ―does not and cannot undo historical facts or convert once-true facts into 
falsehoods.‖96 Although in a recent defamation case before a New York state trial court, a 
judge commented that a statutory ―right to be forgotten‖ would, ―under certain conditions, 
give plaintiffs the opportunity to attain the redress they deserve,‖97 the comment remains an 
outlier without precedential effect. 
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In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency
98
, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NSA‘s 
Glomar response, in regard to EPIC‘s FOIA request regarding communications between NSA 
and Google, was valid under the broad ambit of Section 6 of the National Security Agency 
Act because any threat assessment conducted by NSA constitutes as an undisputed NSA 
function.
99
 The result is that the court protects business interests at the expense of individual 
rights regarding free access to information.
100
 This decision benefits businesses because they 
get to work with NSA in handling cyber security issues without the fear of potential backlash 
from the public as a result of information being turned over to individuals as a result of a 
FOIA request.
101
 Even though the decision was supported in a legal context, its decision to 
place national security concerns ahead of the right to access government-held information 
undermines FOIA and the ability for the public to know about the effects of cyber attacks on 
businesses.
102
 
Since the orders of the FISC are classified and companies are required to 
maintain secrecy with regard to the assistance they are required to provide, there are no 
avenues, judicial or administrative, for either EU or US data subjects to be informed of 
whether their personal data is being collected or further processed.
103
 There are no 
opportunities for individuals to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or 
administrative or judicial redress which are data subjects‘ rights.  
Even though some of these cases are not directly base on the communication 
in Cyberspace but it also contains the same basis on arbitrary interference communication by 
State. Especially the relationship between ICT Corporation and National Security Agency, 
the case can shine the light to more accountable procedure to conduct mass surveillance or 
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non-targeting spy on vast majority people. The court decision make standard and precedent 
on exception of exercising data subject‘s right to personal data protection which base on more 
precise conditions. 
 
3.2.2.2. Obligation of the Data Controller and Data Processor 
  On March 17, 2009, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a 
complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), urging an investigation into Google's 
cloud computing services to determine "the adequacy of the privacy and security safeguards." 
The complaint followed a reported security breach of Google Docs.
104
 EPIC observed that 
Google repeatedly assured consumers that their services stored user-generated data securely, 
but had opted to not encrypt the personal information stored or transmitted on its computer 
network by default, automated process decision without embedded privacy by design, which 
might compromise the integration of personal data. 
On February 4, 2010, EPIC filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 
request with the National Security Agency ("NSA"). EPIC requested the following agency 
records (Data Retention):
105
 
 All records concerning an agreement or similar basis for collaboration, final 
or draft, between the NSA and Google regarding cyber security;  
 All records of communication between NSA and Google concerning Gmail, 
including but not limited to Google's decision to fail to routinely encrypt 
Gmail messages prior to January 13, 2010; and 
 All records of communications regarding NSA's role in Google's decision 
regarding the failure to routinely deploy encryption for cloud-based 
computing service, such as Google Docs. 
In Elecronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the NSA‘s Glomar response sufficiently satisfied the exemption 
requirements of the Act because threat assessment is an undisputed NSA function and, 
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therefore, the NSA was not required to confirm or deny existence of any responsive 
records.
106
 In reaching this holding, the court correctly determined that if private companies 
knew their attempts to contact the NSA could be made public through a FOIA request, these 
companies might not contact the agency, thereby limiting NSA‘s activities or functions.107 
This decision not only puts federal agencies in a power position but also facilitates public-
private partnerships in combating cyber threats.
108
 However, this decision negatively impacts 
the purpose of FOIA and the rights of individuals,
109
 and ultimately goes too far by ignoring 
the public‘s interest in ensuring their information is under constant protection by 
companies.
110
 
The D.C. Circuit‘s holding McConnell‘s idea, A relationship between the 
private sector and the Government that revolves around national security issues,
111
 by 
allowing the NSA to issue Glomar responses in regards to EPIC‘s request for information 
regarding NSA communications with Google.
112
 By justifying the NSA‘s decision to issue 
Glomar responses, the court opens the door for businesses to begin communicating with NSA 
without fear that their problems will be exposed as a result of a FOIA request.
113
 This has 
huge benefits to businesses, which can use NSA resources without fear of private 
communications with government agencies becoming exposed.
114
The D.C. Circuit analyzed, 
in the event of a cyber attack on its operations or servers, would be reluctant to work with 
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federal agencies.
115
 If private companies are unwilling to report cyber attacks, it would likely 
limit the ability of federal agencies, such as the 
NSA or CIA, to determine the source of these cyber attacks, how to stop or 
contain them, and analyze the attacks so that they do not happen again. This decision firmly 
puts businesses in the driver seat and gives the government the means to pursue stronger 
methods of defense.
116
 The NSA can justify its actions based on its Information Assurance 
mission.
117
 
The justification of secret relationship between IT Corporation and National 
Security Authority is the fact that an agency‘s judgment to issue a Glomar response is given 
―substantial weight‖118 and the D.C. Circuit did not find it necessary to overturn the NSA‘s 
decision to issue a Glomar response in this scenario. Section 6 of the NSA Act was already 
regarded as broad enough to allow agencies to defend their withholding of records more 
easily.
119
 But this broad scope granted to Section 6 of the NSA Act allows government 
officials to consider information to be classified even when the public already knows about 
the information.
120
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3.2.2.3. Implementation of Personal Data Protection 
  There are obstacles for public to check the abuse of power of National 
Security Authorities as most of National Security laws contain a barrier in order to seal the 
secret by using National Security Matters excuse. Most of the laws, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, Homeland Security Act and Patriot Act set up internal mechanism to 
approve the subpoena and order for such task force to conduct surveillance. When it comes to 
the case that public skeptic on the relation between Intelligence Units and IT Corporations, 
the individual or non-governmental organization must launch complaint to exact Authority or 
file a law suit to the court.  
In EPIC vs. NSA and Google case, EPIC file complaint by letter dated March 
10 that the NSA acknowledged receipt of EPIC's FOIA Request and granted EPIC's request 
for a fee waiver. The NSA's letter invoked FOIA exemption b (3) and Section 6 of the 
National Security Agency Act in order to issue a Glomar response. A Glomar response is the 
Agency's act of neither confirming nor denying the existence of Agency records responsive to 
the Request.
121
 
On May 7, 2010, EPIC filed an administrative appeal stating that the NSA had 
failed to present factual evidence that the requested documents fell within Section 6 and that 
established FOIA exemptions could sufficiently conceal protected information. The NSA 
never replied to EPIC's appeal or produced responsive documents.
122
 EPIC filed a complaint 
in United States District Court for the District of Columbia on September 13, 2010.
123
 The 
NSA argued that the Agency was under no obligation to conduct a search prior to 
determining that any potentially responsive records would implicate the Agency's functions 
or activities. Judge Richard Leon deferred to the NSA's judgment in a Memorandum Opinion 
dated July 8, 2011.
124
 EPIC filed a Notice of Appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court on September 
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9, 2011.
125
 Oral argument is schedule for March 20, 2012 before Judge Brown, Judge 
Kavanaugh, and Judge Ginsburg.
126
   
On May 7, 2015, the U.S. Court rejected the Government's argument that the 
ACLU and other plaintiffs lacked "standing" to bring the case under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution. The court then rejected the Government's argument that judicial review of the 
NSA program was precluded by law, finding that Congress "did not intend to preclude targets 
of [Section] 215 orders . . . from bringing suit" and found that the plaintiffs could challenge 
the program under the Administrative Procedure Act.
127
 
The intent of the US FISA (and PATRIOT) laws to acquire ―foreign 
intelligence information‘ concerning people who are not American citizens or legal residents 
while they are not protected by US laws; Constitution, Privacy Act and Freedom of 
Information Act. Problems that emerged from FISA were left to the interpretation (in secret 
proceedings) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC and the higher Review 
court FISCR) whose judges are appointed solely by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It 
appears that the FISA courts agree with the government's argument that it is common in 
investigations for some indefinitely large corpus of records to be considered ―relevant‖, in 
order to discover the actual evidence.
128
 Some official de-classifications of the secret 
FISC(R) Opinions might be progress, but have not that far described this logical anomaly.  
The targeting and minimisation procedures approved by FISC under Section 
702 are aimed at reducing the collection, retention and dissemination of personal data of or 
concerning US persons. These procedures do not impose specific requirements or restrictions 
with regard to the collection, processing or retention of personal data of individuals in the 
EU, even when they have no connection with terrorism, crime or any other unlawful or 
dangerous activity.
129
 Oversight of the surveillance programmes aims exclusively at 
protecting US persons.  
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These cases have shown the complicated situations for Non-US citizen data 
subjects. If EU citizen want to know whether their sensitive personal data is compromised 
they have no channel to request for acknowledgement or lodge the complaints. Since the 
Close system of US National Security Laws require the complaint to walk through many 
stages before reaching the very final end and most of the paths are not for Non-US citizen, 
EU citizen.  
Various layers of oversight by the three branches of Government apply to 
activities on the base of Section 215 of Patriot Act and Section 702 of FISA. There is judicial 
oversight for activities that imply a capacity to compel information, including FISC orders for 
the collection under Section 215 and annual certifications that provide the basis for collection 
under Section 702. There is no judicial approval of individual selectors to query the data 
collected under Section 215 or tasked for collection under Section 702. The FISC operates ex 
parte and in camera. Its orders and opinions are classified, unless they are declassified. There 
is no judicial oversight of the collection of foreign intelligence outside the US under 
Executive Order 12333,
130
 which are conducted under the sole competence of the Executive 
Branch.  
Nonetheless, the FISC is extremely resolute, and careful, about ensuring that 
the NSA and FBI comply with the terms of the FISC‘s own orders, including the so-called 
―minimization‖ requirements–in part because the lawyers in . . . Department of Justice 
(DOJ)‘s National Security Division, take very seriously their responsibility to bring to the 
court‘s attention any compliance problems. When it comes to the more fundamental legal 
questions about the proper statutory and constitutional scope of a proposed program, 
however, the FISC process is not nearly as thorough or reliable, in large measure because the 
court hears from only one side.
131
 
Moreover, it remains unclear whether Article III of US Constitution would 
permit a designated advocate to appeal FISC orders to a higher court or whether it is possible 
                                                             
130
 Ibid, p. 27. 
131
 Lederman, Marty. ―The Kris Paper, and the Problematic FISC Opinion on the Section 215 ―Metadata‖ 
Collection Program.‖ Just Security, 1 Oct. 2013, http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/kris-paper-legality-
section-215-metadata-collection/. Accessed 14 Feb. 2017. 
205 
 
to conduct an effectively adversarial system consistent with the level of secrecy that a system 
of foreign intelligence surveillance might well require.
132
 
As the normal Court of Justice in US has a basic function of adjudicative 
authority, the court can sanction various measure to implement the right to personal data 
protection; civil damage, criminal punishment and administrative action. However, the 
sophisticate cases come from the special internal court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) under the provision of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which 
attached to the security administrative sector. The check-and-balance functions of FISC as 
adjudicative authority or oversight mechanism turn to be a ―Rubber Stamp‖ for 
administrative authority in order to penetrate into personal data collection.  
To wrap up failures from US system, in many cases the personal data has been 
transferred from the private data controller/processor, IT Corporation, to state authority such 
as NSA without well standard oversight. The incompetent of US IT Corporation to set forts, 
precautionary measure or data breach notification or alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism, for protecting customers from the mass electronic surveillance of US 
government may drop the level of data protection standard to the lower point. This weak 
guard and absent of redress mechanism are definitely less than what EU personal data 
protection regime expected. 
 
3.3.  Hard Case Study under EU legal system  
This section will bring in the cases from the practice in the everyday-life situations 
and the court decisions. The cases from the real-life practice illustrate the penetration to the 
filling system of the IT Corporation did by State Agency. The Court Case studies, Court of 
Justice of European Union (CJEU), point out the legal baseline of Personal Data Protection 
when it faces with difficult circumstances in many situations. 
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3.3.1. Tension across Atlantic due to the relationship between IT Corporation 
and US Authority 
The research explores the cooperation among States and IT Corporation. It seems to 
be sure that IT Corporation has a power over personal data processing. People will never 
know whether they share it with government or not. IT Corporation usually share personal 
data and information with state agencies
133
 which consistently exchange the information on 
political basis and IT Corporation may gain economical benefit in return as article has shown 
on the above section.  
Ultimately, are just the internet surfers who really use IT Corporation‘s information? 
On the contrary, State especially government and security agencies do processing, mining 
and sharing the information with IT Corporation.
134
 The orthodox excuses of the state are; to 
support the flourishing of economy and protect National Security
135
 which is vague and 
undermine the fundamental rights of individual as a customer and people. 
This leads to the question whether the acts of IT Corporation as US Internet spy on 
Global Citizen could harm the right to privacy and Personal Data Protection in diverse 
aspects. 
The scandalous US Global Internet Surveillances on MUSCULAR program, NSA 
wire tapping in marine cable of famous ICT Corporations, gave evidences confirming the 
threats from IT Corporation on Personal Data Protection of Global Netitizen. 
The NSA‘s acquisitions directorate sends millions of records every day from internal 
IT Corporation networks to data warehouses at their agency‘s headquarters in Maryland. The 
program operates via an access point known as DS-200B, which is outside the United States, 
and it relies on an unnamed telecommunications operator to provide secret access for the 
NSA and the GCHQ.
136
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According to the LIBE Report on Mass Electronic Surveillance, the MUSCULAR 
program collects more than twice as many data points compared to the better known PRISM. 
Unlike PRISM, the MUSCULAR program requires no (FISA or other type of) warrants.
137
 
Because of the huge amount of data involved, MUSCULAR has presented a special 
challenge to NSA's Special Source Operation. The NSA's PINWARE database (their primary 
analytical database for the Internet) was quickly overwhelmed with the data coming from 
MUSCULAR.
138
 
Closely related program are called INCENSER and TURMOIL. TURMOIL, 
belonging to the NSA, is a system for processing the data collected from MUSCULAR.
139
 
According to the presentation these Program, the exploitation relied on the fact that 
(at the time at least) data was transmitted unencrypted inside IT Corporation's private cloud, 
with "Google Front End Servers" stripping and respectively adding back SSL from/to 
external connections. There is a strong confirm that "Two engineers with close ties to Google 
exploded in profanity when they saw the drawing."
140
 After the information about 
MUSCULAR was published by the press, many IT Corporations announced that it was 
working on deploying encrypted communication between its datacenters. 
141
 
After the Revelations in 2013, IT Corporation like Google made the announcement 
that "Google cares deeply about the security of our users' data. We disclose user data to 
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government in accordance with the law, and we review all such requests carefully. From time 
to time, people allege that we have created a government ―back door‖ into our systems, but 
Google does not have a backdoor for the government to access private user 
data."
142
 Furthermore, "Any suggestion that Google is disclosing information about our users' 
Internet activity on such a scale is completely false"
143
 but suspicious from society remains as 
it has shown from revelations. 
The coordinate of IT Corporations and their inter-action with State Agencies put 
personal data at risk. The more IT Corporation collects, processes and shares data, the more 
individual rights are arbitrary breached. In economical law perspective, it brings the 
consumer rights problems into E-market which could deter customer confident to spend on 
Internet. In civil and political rights perspective, it harms the democratic legitimacy sphere. 
 
3.3.2. Legal Analysis on IT Corporation cases in the CJEU 
The Court of Justice of European Union took a pro-active stand, aimed at providing 
EU citizens with data protection under the pre-reform legal frameworks as it did in the 
famous cases; Google Spain and Schrems or even in less notable case, Digital Rights Ireland, 
Weltimmo and Bara case. The CJEU ensured that companies could not avoid the law of the 
Member State where they pursue the real activities in the context of which the personal data 
is processed, by artificially attaching themselves to the law and enforcement regime of 
another, more lenient, Member State . In Digital Rights Ireland and Schremes cases, the 
CJEU protected the right of the individual data subject to be informed about the collection 
and/or transmission of his or her personal data, subject to specific exceptions laid down by 
law and not just an internal and unpublished governmental protocol. Notably, although these 
judgments concern interpretations of the Directive 95/46/EC and invalidate Data Retention 
Directive and Safe Harbour Agreement, even Directive 95/46/EC will remain relevant until 
25 May 2018, when the GDPR will apply. While the GDPR will change the legal situation in 
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both cases, its provisions seeks to affirm at least an equivalent protection of personal data 
standard as recognized by the CJEU and provided by Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. 
 
 3.3.2.1. Right to Personal Data Protection of Individual 
In the Weltimmo case
144
, the CJEU considers the meaning of ―establishment‖ 
in the sense of Art. 4 (1) a) of the Directive 95/46/EC.
145
  That article prescribes that each 
Member State shall apply its national rules adopted pursuant to the Directive when the 
processing of personal data takes place in the context of the activities of the establishment of 
the controller on that Member State‘s territory. The CJEU repeats its argumentation from 
the Google Spain case and states that the concept of establishment, justifying the application 
of EU law, ―implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements‖.146 The legal form of those arrangements, including the place of incorporation, 
does not matter,
147
 nor does the extent of the real activity.
148
  The CJEU finds that Weltimmo 
did pursue an effective and real activity in Hungary, since it runs a website in Hungarian, 
aimed at Hungarian properties, which charges fees after the introductory period of one month 
has lapsed.
149
  Thus, for the purposes of the Directive, it is established in Hungary.
150
  The 
CJEU then goes on to examine whether the processing of personal data by Weltimmo was 
carried out in the context of that establishment. It finds, referring to its Google 
Spain and Lindqvist cases
151, that there can be no doubt that Weltimmo‘s activity of loading 
personal data on its Internet page must be considered as a processing of personal data in the 
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sense of Art. 2 (d) of the Directive.
152
 Therefore, Hungarian law applies to Weltimmo‘s 
processing of personal data and under Art. 4, read in conjunction with Art. 28 of the 
Directive, the Hungarian Data Protection Authority (HDPA) is competent to act
153
, being an 
organ of the Hungarian State. 
The extraterritorial application of EU data protection law was re-affirmed 
more strongly in Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez
154
 from May 2014. One 
of the issues in this case was whether EU data protection law could apply when a company 
(in this case Google Inc.) has an establishment in an EU Member State that promotes a search 
engine that orients its activity towards the inhabitants of that State, even though the actual 
data processing is carried out by the establishment‘s parent company located outside the EU. 
In finding that EU data protection law did apply in such a case, the Court noted that the 
Directive should be interpreted to have ‗a particularly broad territorial scope‘.155  
The essential components of data protection are included in the International 
Instruments and not left to the discretion of the Member States.
156
 These precedents give a 
path for EU internet users to exercise their rights with Trans-Border IT Corporations even 
such Legal Persons are not EU nationals.
157
 
The CJEU again takes a data protection friendly view in the Bara case
158
, 
requiring the data subject to be informed beforehand in all cases where his or her personal 
data is being transferred, even between public authorities. Nonetheless, articles 11(2) and 13 
of the Directive allow national legislators to enact rules deviating from this right to prior 
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information.
159
 Exception to exercise right to personal data protection must rely on historical 
or scientific research purposes and legitimate exemptions. 
On October 6, 2015, the CJEU issued a decision that invalidated Safe Harbor 
(effective immediately), as currently implemented. The CJEU decision stemmed from a 
complaint brought to the Irish DPA by an Austrian national, Maximillian Schrems, 
concerning Facebook‘s transfer of some or all of his data from Facebook‘s EU-based servers 
in Ireland to its servers located in the United States in light of the unauthorized disclosures in 
June 2013 of U.S. surveillance activities.
160
 
On 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Case, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union repealed the Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of telecommunications 
data because of its disproportionate intrusion into the fundamental right to data protection.
161
 
The judgments of the Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland
162
 and, 
recently, in Schrems
163
 further confirm the importance of a high level of protection especially 
in connection with law enforcement and national security. In Digital Rights Ireland, the 
Court warns that the instrument of data retention was ―likely to generate in the minds of the 
persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance‖164. In Schrems, the Court considers that access of public authorities on a 
generalized basis to the content of electronic communications affects the very essence of the 
right to privacy
165
.  
The essential components of data protection, laid down in Article 8 of the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the Union, are respected and that exceptions fulfill the 
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strict test of proportionality, as specified in Digital Rights Ireland
166
. In this Opinion, it can 
be pointed particularly on the principle of purpose limitation, on the right to access of 
individuals to their personal data and on the control by independent data protection 
authorities
167
.  
In considering the broad category of data to be retained, the CJEU observed 
that such data may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of 
the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or 
temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relationships of those persons and the social environment.
168
 The Court observed that under 
such circumstances, even though it is not permissible to retain the content of 
communications, it is possible that the freedom of expression of subscribers or registered 
users might be in jeopardy.
169
  
In Google Spain v AEPD and González, The Court also held that the right to 
delete data under the EU Data Protection Directive applies to the results of Internet search 
engines (popularly referred to as the ‗right to be forgotten‘).170 The CJEU held that search 
engine operators are, in certain circumstances, obliged to de-list links to third-party webpages 
(URLs) from the list of search results when searching for the individual‘s name.171 This is 
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commonly referred to as ‗the right to be forgotten‘ (right to erasure). The Court found that the 
use by search engine operators of information published by third parties amounts to the 
processing of personal data for the purposes of the Data Protection Directive. It also found 
that searching for a person by name is likely to return information about their private life in a 
structured format, which allows the searcher to build a profile of the person searched for. As 
a result, the processing is likely to significantly affect a person‘s right to privacy and right to 
data protection. In such circumstances the search engine operator is a data controller and 
must ensure that its activities comply with the requirements of the Data Protection 
Directive.
172
 The Court ruled that personal data in search results is incompatible with the 
Data Protection Directive where, in light of all the circumstances of the case and the amount 
of time that has passed, the data is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive to the 
specified purpose for which it was originally processed.
173
 
The CJEU stated that the retention of data in order to allow access by the 
competent national authorities constitutes processing of data and therefore affects two basic 
rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: (a) the right to private life guaranteed by article 
7, and (b) the protection of personal data guaranteed by article 8.
174
  
In examining the issue of interference with the rights to privacy and the 
protection of personal data, the CJEU made the following observations:
175
  
 The obligation imposed on providers of electronic communications services 
or public communications networks ―constitutes in itself an interference 
with the rights guaranteed by article 7 of the Charter,‖  
 Access of the national authorities to data ―constitutes a further interference 
with that fundamental right,‖ and  
 The interferences described above also violate the right to protection of 
personal data. 
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Article 52(1) of the Charter requires that any limitation on the exercise of rights guaranteed 
by the Charter must be provided by law and must respect the essence of such rights.  Any 
limitations are subject to a proportionality test and can be imposed only if they are necessary 
and meet the objectives of general interest as recognized by the EU or the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.
176
 
The Court went on to state that the retention of data affects not only persons 
whose data may contribute to the initiation of legal proceedings, but also those for whom 
there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that their conduct might be connected to a serious 
crime.  It also observed that no one is exempted from this rule; it even applies to those whose 
communications are subject to professional secrecy, according to national rules.
177
  
In further discussing the Directive, the CJEU observed the absence of any link 
between the data retained and a threat to public security.  It also noted that the restriction is 
not limited to the data of persons related to a particular time period, or to a particular 
geographic zone, or to a group of persons who could possibly have a tie to a serious crime.
178
 
Moreover, the CJEU reviewed whether the Directive contained any general 
limits on the right of national authorities to access the retained data.  In this regard, the CJEU 
observed the lack of any general limits.  Then, it proceeded to state that the Directive (a) fails 
to establish either substantive or procedural limits on access by competent national authorities 
to the data retained,
179
 (b) fails to make access by national authorities conditional on a prior 
review carried out by a court or any other independent administrative authority whose review 
is essential in order to limit access to the data and their use to what it is absolutely necessary, 
and (c) does not require the Member States to establish such limits.
180
 
                                                             
176
 Ramos, Mario H. "Una Vuelta De Tuerca Más a Las Relaciones En Materia De Protección De Datos 
Entre La Ue Y Los Estados Unidos: La Invalidez De La Decisión Puerto Seguro." Revista General de 
Derecho Europeo, no. 39, 2016, p. 31. 
177
 CJEU. Case C–293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources. 8 Apr. 2014, para. 58. 
178
 Ramos, Mario H. "Una Vuelta De Tuerca Más a Las Relaciones En Materia De Protección De Datos 
Entre La Ue Y Los Estados Unidos: La Invalidez De La Decisión Puerto Seguro." Revista General de 
Derecho Europeo, no. 39, 2016, p.32. 
179
 CJEU. Case C–293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources. 8 Apr. 2014, paras. 59–61. 
180
 Ibid, para. 62. 
215 
 
The Court reasoned that, based on the above, the Directive does not establish 
clear and precise rules that regulate the ―extent of interference with the fundamental rights of 
Article 7 and 8 of the Charter‖.  Therefore, it concluded that the Directive ―entails a wide-
ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order 
of the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure 
that it is actually limited to what it is strictly necessary.‖181 
In Schrems Case, the CJEU ruling found that U.S. national security, public 
interest, and law enforcement requirements have ―primacy‖ over the Safe Harbor principles, 
and that U.S. undertakings are bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective rules laid 
down by that scheme where they conflict with such requirements. Consequently, the CJEU 
concluded that the Safe Harbor scheme ―enables interference‖ by U.S. authorities ―with the 
fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data is or could be transferred from the 
European Union to the United States.‖182 Moreover, the CJEU noted that the 2000 
Commission‘s Decision on Safe Harbor does not refer to either the existence of U.S. rules or 
effective U.S. legal protections intended to limit such interference, such as the possibility of 
judicial redress.
183
 
Furthermore, in Schrems, the Court stated that the accessing of private 
communications originating within a person‘s home by State Authorities directly engages the 
Constitutional right to privacy and the right to inviolability of the dwelling under Article 
40.5.
184
 The interception of private communications by the State is not in itself necessarily 
unlawful. The Court stated that where appropriate safeguards are in place, the interception or 
electronic surveillance of communications may be lawful where it is indispensable for the 
preservation of State security.
185
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These are just the examples of an approach in these cases and confirmed by 
the highest EU Court, which emphasizes the need for strong protection of individuals, as part 
of the value of the European Union.
186
 This oversight and accountability approach must be 
brought into the EU General Data Protection Regulation and Directive on Criminal and 
Judicial Matters. Furthermore, the bilateral agreements between EU and US must also include 
the respective legal obligations laid down in International Human Rights Laws and EU laws.  
 
3.3.2.2. Obligation of the Data Controller and Data Processor 
The concept of adequate level of protection has been defined by the Court of 
Justice in the Schrems case, as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its 
domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union.
187
 
The Court of Justice has also stated that the Commission‘s discretion as to the adequacy of 
the level of protection ensured by a third Country should be limited, considering, first, the 
important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the fundamental right 
to respect for private life and, secondly, the large number of persons whose fundamental 
rights are liable to be infringed where personal data is transferred to a third country without 
ensuring an adequate level of protection
188
. In that respect it should be underlined that data 
processing in the police and criminal justice context was a field left until now outside EU 
law; that‘s why practically all Member States have bilateral agreements with third countries 
permitting the exchange of personal data for law enforcement related purposes, 
notwithstanding any ―adequacy‖ finding in respect of the recipients‘ data protection 
safeguards.  
On April 8, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) delivered a much-anticipated judgment
189
 concerning the legality of Directive 
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No. 2006/24/EC, commonly referred to as the Data Retention Directive.
190
 The Directive was 
challenged on the grounds of infringement of the right to private life, and the right to the 
protection of personal data of individuals, as guaranteed in articles 7 and 8, respectively, of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
191
  
The Data Retention Directive required the providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services or public communications networks to retain traffic and 
location data belonging to individuals or legal entities.  Such data included the calling 
telephone number and name and address of the subscriber or register user, user IDs (a unique 
identifier assigned to each person who signs with an electronic communications service), 
Internet protocol addresses, the numbers dialed, and call forwarding or call transfer 
records.
192
 The retention period was to last for a minimum period of six months and up to two 
years, and the sole purpose of processing and storing the data was to prevent, investigate, 
detect, and prosecute serious crimes, such as organized crime and terrorism.
193
 The content of 
the communications of individuals was not retained.
194
  
The CJEU took note of the basic objective of the Data Retention Directive, 
which is to assist the EU Members in their fight against serious crime and to contribute to 
maintaining public security.  It also noted that the fight against international terrorism 
constitutes an objective of general interest.  In this regard, it acknowledged that data retention 
is a valuable tool for the national authorities in their pursuit of fighting serious 
crime.
195
  Based on these observations, the CJEU reached the conclusion that retention of 
data in order to give an opportunity to national authorities to access such data for the 
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prevention and investigation of serious crimes ―genuinely satisfies an objective of general 
interest.‖196  
In this regard, the Court stated that the EU legislation in question must contain 
clear and precise rules pertaining to the retention of personal data and must also include 
certain safeguards to ensure that individuals whose data are retained have certain guarantees 
to protect their personal data ―against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and 
use of that data.‖197  
The CJEU then proceeded to examine whether the interference by national 
authorities was proportionate to the objective pursued.  In this regard, according to the settled 
case law, the standards to be met are that of being ―appropriate‖ and ―necessary‖198 in order 
to achieve the objectives:  
 As far as the question of whether the retention of data was appropriate to 
achieve the objectives of Directive 2006/24/EC, the CJEU, after 
acknowledging that the means of electronic communication play a vital role 
in the investigation of crimes and at the same time the need of national 
authorities to access data, stated that retention of data is ―a valuable tool‖ 
and ―may be considered to be appropriate‖ to achieve the Directive‘s 
objectives.
199
  
 As far as the necessity test, and whether the interference is limited to what 
is necessary, the Court made three significant observations: (a) the 
Directive requires the retention of all traffic data generated from a wide 
range of electronic communication modes, including fixed telephony, 
mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet email, and Internet telephony; 
(b) the Directive‘s scope extends to all subscribers and registered users; and 
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(c) the Directive interferes with the fundamental rights of the entire 
European Union population.
200
 
 As far as the period of retention, which runs from six months up to two 
years, the CJEU noted that the Directive does not set any objective criteria 
to determine the appropriate period of retention ―to what is strictly 
necessary.‖201  
Regarding the security and protection of data to be retained, the CJEU held 
that Directive 2006/24/EC does not contain sufficient safeguards, as required by article 8 of 
the Charter, to ensure effective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and 
against any unlawful access and use of that data.  Article 8 of the Charter requires, inter alia, 
the consent of the data subject for the processing of personal data, and processing must be 
done for a specific person. The Court went on to state that Directive 2006/24/EC does not 
contain rules.
202
 which are specific and adapted to (i) the vast quantity of data whose 
retention is required by that directive, (ii) the sensitive nature of that data and (iii) the risk of 
unlawful access to that data, rules which would serve, in particular, to govern the protection 
and security of the data in question in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure their full 
integrity and confidentiality.  Furthermore, a specific obligation on Member States to 
establish such rules has also not been laid down.
203
 
In Bara case, the CJEU only refers to the provision of the Directive 95/46/EC, 
it is important to note that the requirement of a legislative basis for transfers of personal data 
flows directly from the EU Charter. First, personal data must be processed fairly, on the basis 
of consent of the data subject or on another ground, laid down by law (Art. 8(2), first 
sentence EU Charter). Second, even when personal data has initially been processed lawfully, 
any restriction of an EU citizen‘s right to data protection must be provided by law and meet 
the principle of proportionality (Art. 8 read together with Art. 52(1) EU Charter). Since 
                                                             
200
 Ibid, para. 56. 
201
 Ibid, para. 64. 
202
 Ramos, Mario H. "Una Vuelta De Tuerca Más a Las Relaciones En Materia De Protección De Datos 
Entre La Ue Y Los Estados Unidos: La Invalidez De La Decisión Puerto Seguro." Revista General de 
Derecho Europeo, no. 39, 2016, p. 30. 
203
 CJEU. Case C–293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources. 2014, para.  66. 
220 
 
transferring personal data between authorities without the data subject‘s consent or 
knowledge constitutes such a restriction, the Charter requires Member State law to expressly 
provide for it.
204
 
The judgment in Schrems Case confirms the strict conditions for transfer of 
personal data to third countries. The CJEU found Safe Harbor to be invalid. The CJEU found 
that according to Article 25 of the Directive 95/46/EC, the European Commission is required 
to examine the domestic laws or international commitments of a third country prior to making 
a determination on the adequacy of their data privacy protection.
205
 Since the 2000 
Commission Decision recognizing the Safe Harbor Agreement did not make any such 
finding, that Decision is now invalid.
206
 However, as Safe Harbor no longer provides a legal 
basis for U.S.-EU data transfers anymore, other methods such as Standard Contractual 
Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) can be used instead. 
 
3.3.2.3. Implementation of Personal Data Protection 
On 6 October 2015, the CJEU issued its judgment and declared the Safe 
Harbor Decision invalid. In its ruling
207
, the CJEU also confirmed that a national EU Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) is always empowered to challenge the adequacy of data transfers 
and only the CJEU can invalidate a Commission's decision of adequacy.
208
 
In Weltimmo case, activity of loading personal data on its Internet page must 
be considered as a processing of personal data in the sense of Article 2 (d) of the 
Directive.
209
 Thus, Hungarian law applies to Weltimmo‘s processing of personal data and 
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under Article 4, read in conjunction with Art. 28 of the Directive, then Hungarian Data 
Protection Authority (HDPA) is competent to act
210
, as an organ of the Hungarian State. 
The CJEU also addresses the question what action the HDPA could have taken 
had Slovakian law been applicable.
211
  The CJEU holds that in any case, the HDPA may 
investigate any complaint it receives, before even knowing the applicable law.
212
  However, 
when the HDPA or another national data protection authority comes to the conclusion that the 
law of another Member State is applicable, it cannot impose penalties or sanctions outside the 
territory of its own Member State because those sanctions have their legal basis in the 
national law of said Member State.
213
  In such a case, the national data protection authority in 
question has, under the duty of cooperation of Art. 28(6) of the Directive, to request the 
supervisory authority of the Member State whose law is applicable to intervene, potentially 
on the basis of the information gathered by the first national data protection authority.
214
  
On 9 March 2010, the CJEU ruled that 'complete independence' means that 
DPAs may not be subject to state oversight or scrutiny.
215
  They must be 'free from any 
external influence'. The Court also stated that any directions or any other external influence, 
whether direct or indirect, which could call into question the performance by those authorities 
consisting of establishing a fair balance between the protection of the right to private life and 
the free movement of personal data must be avoided.
216
 Also, the risk that other authorities 
could exercise a political influence over the decisions of the supervisory authorities is enough 
to hinder the latter authorities' independent performance of their tasks
217
 and thus not 
consistent with the requirement of independence. 
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The CJEU stated that the guarantee of the independence of national 
supervisory authorities is intended to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the 
monitoring of compliance with the provisions concerning protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and must be interpreted in the light of that aim. It 
was established in order to strengthen the protection of individuals and bodies affected by the 
decisions of those authorities.
218
 
As every person in the scope of EU laws can pursuit for legal remedy from 
competence authorities including domestic courts and regional courts, which based on the 
jurisprudence anyone can go to court if they have a legitimate reason to suspect an 
interference of their fundamental rights.
219
 The entitled natural person or group of person 
could lodge their complaint to available mechanism. 
In January 2016, Digital Rights Ireland (DRI), a privacy advocacy group, 
commenced legal proceedings against the Irish State challenging the independence of the 
Commissioner.
220
 In the legal papers served on the State, DRI alleged that the Commissioner 
did not effectively monitor databases containing personal data that had been created by public 
bodies and, as a result, failed to act independently.
221
 Furthermore, the legal papers noted that 
the Commissioner is integrated with the Department of Justice and that her staffs are civil 
servants.
222
  The CJEU has described the independence of NDPAs as being ―an essential 
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data‖. 
The CJEU has also confirmed that NDPAs must be free to perform their duties free of 
external influence,
223
 including political economy influence. 
The CJEU also held that the security and protection of personal data cannot be 
fully guaranteed in the absence of review of compliance by an independent authority of the 
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rules on data protection, as required by article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
224
 as 
well as the decision issued in Schrems Case.
225
 Foremost, the CJEU found that the existence 
of the Commission Decision on the Safe Harbor Agreement does not eliminate or reduce the 
powers available to the national DPAs. The CJEU found that national DPAs ―must be able to 
examine, with complete independence, any claim concerning the protection of a person‘s 
rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him‖ and assess 
their compliance with the DPD
226
 and the EU‘s Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The concerns of the legality of Directive No.2006/24/EC case arose before the 
CJEU as preliminary questions from the High Court of Ireland and the Constitutional Court 
of Austria.  The national courts, in adjudicating cases, have the right to refer legal inquires to 
the CJEU.  The CJEU decides on the validity of European Union law, or the interpretation of 
treaties or secondary legislation, and the decision on the specific case is left to the national 
court.
227
 Accordingly, the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedy Principle must be applied to the 
case before referring the case to Regional Court.  
Consequently, the High Court in Ireland had to adjudicate a dispute between 
the Irish company Digital Rights Ireland and the Irish authorities on the legality of national 
measures implementing the retention of data of electronic communications.
228
 Meanwhile, 
the Austrian Constitutional Court (CC) had before it several actions filed by a large number 
of applicants seeking the annulment of the Austrian telecommunications law that transposed 
the Data Retention Directive into national laws. Whereas, the domestic court is the primary 
mechanism to protect data subjects‘ rights, not the Regional one which is the supplementary 
redress. 
Base on the decision of CJEU on Digital Rights Ireland Case, it can be 
concluded that the EU legislative bodies, by adopting Directive 2006/24/EC, exceeded the 
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limits imposed by the principle of proportionality in light of articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the 
Charter.  Consequently, it held the Directive invalid.
229
 The Data Retention Directive 
becomes invalid ab initio (invalidated since the first day it was entry into force), that is from 
the time it became effective in 2006, since the CJEU did not specify otherwise.
230
  The EU 
Members that have transposed the Directive into their national legal systems are required to 
revise their legislation or take further steps to ensure compliance with the judgment. 
In exercising its right to initiative, the European Commission will have to 
adhere to the CJEU‘s judgment when it introduces new legislation on data protection and 
privacy.  Any pending legislation must also be in conformity with the CJEU‘s case law 
affecting personal data.  In particular, the proposal for the Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for 
purposes of addressing criminal offenses must be in conformity with the CJEU‘s ruling.231 
Put a highlight on the Sanctions and Enforceability of right to personal data 
protection, the Right to be Forgotten/Erasure is a good case to use as example. From the 
decision of CJEU on Google Spain Case, the obligation of Google Inc. to de-list the links, 
lead to the out-of-date information of data subject, must be balanced against other 
fundamental rights and freedoms and the interest of the public in having access to the 
information, such as the role the individual plays in public life. The assessment and the 
decision to de-list are made by the relevant search engine operator on a ―case-by-case 
basis‖.232 The decision does not constitute a universal precedent to delist any links or contents 
from the Internet promptly. On the contrary, it need a specific court order to delete specific 
link which is out-of-date or not meet the old purpose data subject given consent for processed 
or published. Therefore, the decision of one case does not represent the interpretation or 
precedent of further relevant cases in the future, in term of sanctions and remedies. 
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In the Weltimmo Case, the CJEU clearly honours the territoriality principle 
that underpins the system of the Directive. Following this approach, national laws provide for 
the precise extent of the powers of the national data protection authorities, and the 
jurisdictional reach is territorially limited not only because of the national nature of the laws 
in question, but also because of the conflicting jurisdiction of the neighboring Members 
States, having their own national laws on the subject and their own supervisory data 
protection authorities, all based on the Directive.
 233
 The decision also prevents companies 
from escaping the harsher enforcement of one EU Member State by creating an alternate 
corporate reality linking them to another. In doing so, the CJEU aims to protect the right to 
privacy and data protection of the EU citizens dealing with such corporate actors. The 
companies have an interest at all in attaching themselves to the law and supervisory authority 
of a different Member State is because at the present time not all national data protection 
authorities are equally active and a certain disparity in the rules transposing the Directive into 
national law cannot be avoided.
 234
 
Not only the domestic mechanism to protect their nationals within their own 
territory but also the extraterritorial protection. Thus, National DPA should be able to 
monitor the Trans-border activities done by alien Legal Person. In Schrems Case, the CJEU 
considered whether the Irish DPA could conduct an investigation into Facebook‘s data 
protection practices to assess their adequacy or whether the Irish DPA had to defer to the 
European Commission‘s earlier approval of the Safe Harbor framework.235  
To propose new Instruments such of the EU Directive on Criminal Matters or 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement on Criminal Cooperation, it should be reconsidered with due 
respect to the Schrems case judgment. This means any adequacy decision must be based on a 
full assessment of the law enforcement sector.
236
 The adequacy decision principle must not 
deprive the supervisory authority of the power to investigate on a specific transfer and to take 
enforcement action in case the transfer does not meet the standard required. 
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The new regime on EU and EU-US personal data protection should reflect that 
right to personal data protection of data subject is a crucial core value for individual internet 
users and for cyber society. 
 
 
3.4.  Preliminary remarks from the Court decisions on Personal Data Protection  
 This last section of the Chapter will highlight the parameter precedents that the Courts 
set in cases concerning personal data protection in EU and US regimes which are directly 
affect to the standard of data subjects‘ protection. 
 First of all, the decisions of the US Courts, predominant country in Cyberspace and 
the Head Quarter State of most powerful IT Corporation, will be reviewed. Some US court 
cases have shown the shortfalls of US legal system, on protecting data subjects around the 
world, especially the ones without US nationality. 
 
Rights of Data Subject 
The US Court celebrated the full constitutional rights enjoyment of US Nationals data 
subject but the protection for Non-US citizen stills remain a question.
237
 The production of 
records (data retentions) or "tangible things" must be "relevant to an authorized 
investigation." 
238
 Bulk telephone metadata program is not authorized by Section 215 of 
Patriot Act and not legitimate by Fourth and First Amendment. However, there are no 
opportunities for individuals to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or 
administrative or judicial redress which are data subjects‘ rights. 
 
Obligation of Duty Bearer 
In US National Security Agency‘s decision to issue Glomar Responses (A Glomar 
response is the Agency's act of neither confirming nor denying the existence of Agency 
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records responsive to the Request
239
) Case, the court opens the door for businesses to begin 
communicating with NSA without fear that their problems will be exposed as a result of a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
240
 This has huge benefits to businesses, which 
can use NSA resources without fear of private communications with government agencies 
becoming exposed.
241
 This broad scope granted to Section 6 of the NSA Act allows 
government officials to consider information to be classified even when the public already 
knows about the information.
242
  
 
Legal Implementation 
The intent of the US FISA and PATRIOT laws to acquire ―foreign intelligence 
information‖ concerning people who are not American nationals or legal residents while they 
are not protected by US laws; Constitution, Privacy Act and FOIA. For Non-US citizen data 
subjects, If EU citizen want to know whether their sensitive personal data is compromised 
they have no channel to request for acknowledgement or lodge the complaints Since the 
Close system of US National Security Laws and only US Nationals entitle to appeal so it 
impossible for Non-US citizen, EU citizen,
243
 to gain the redress in such remedy mechanism.  
There is no judicial oversight of the collection of foreign intelligence outside the US 
under Executive Order 12333, which are conducted under the sole competence of the 
Executive Branch. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) under the provision of 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which attached to the security administrative 
sector.
 244
 The check-and-balance functions of FISC as adjudicative authority or oversight 
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mechanism turn to be a ―Rubber Stamp‖ for administrative authority in order to penetrate into 
personal data collection. 
On the contrary, the CJEU have given many progressive realizations for taking in to 
legal reformation account, within EU and US Single E-Market regimes, as will be 
crystallized below. 
 
Rights of Data Subject 
In Wltimmo Case the application of EU law, ―implies the effective and real exercise 
of activity through stable arrangements‖, the legal form of those arrangements, including the 
place of incorporation, does not matter, nor does the extent of the real activity.
245
 
Furthermore, the extraterritorial application of EU data protection law was re-affirmed more 
strongly to have ‗a particularly broad territorial scope‘246 in Google Spain Case. These 
precedents give a path for EU internet users to exercise their rights with Trans-Border IT 
Corporations even such Legal Persons are not EU nationals.  
The CJEU also held the right to delete data under the EU Data Protection Directive 
applies to the results of Internet search engines
247
 (‗right to be forgotten‘ or ‗right to erasure‘) 
which give a light to apply the data protection law to forthcoming innovative information 
technology. 
In the Bara case, The CJEU takes a data protection friendly view requiring the data 
subject to be informed beforehand in all cases where his or her personal data is being 
transferred, even between public authorities.
248
 Nonetheless, the Directive 95/46/EC allows 
national legislators to enact rules deviating from this right to prior information but Exception 
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to exercise right to personal data protection must rely on historical or scientific research 
purposes and legitimate exemptions
249
 only.  
 
Obligation of Duty Bearer 
In Digital Rights Ireland Case, CJEU emphasize on the principle of purpose 
limitation,
250
 on the right to access of individuals to their personal data and on the control by 
independent data protection authorities.
251
 However, data retention needs a shred of evidence 
to suggest that their conduct might be connected to a serious crime and no one is exempted 
from this rule; it even applies to those whose communications are subject to professional 
secrecy, according to national rules.
252
 The retention of personal data must include certain 
safeguards to ensure that individuals whose data are retained have certain guarantees ―against 
the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data.‖253Aftermath, the Data 
Retention Directive was invalidated by CJEU since it did not meet the EU principle of 
proportionate
254
  and necessary
255
 exemptions. 
The concept of adequate level of protection has been defined by the CJEU in the 
Schrems case,
 256
 as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law 
or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
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that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union.
257
 The CJEU 
ruling found that U.S. national security, public interest, and law enforcement requirements 
have ―primacy‖ over the Safe Harbor principles, and that U.S. undertakings are bound to 
disregard, without limitation, the protective rules laid down by that scheme where they 
conflict with such requirements.
258
 Consequently, the CJEU concluded that the Safe Harbor 
scheme ―enables interference‖ by U.S. authorities ―with the fundamental rights of the persons 
whose personal data is or could be transferred from the EU to the US.‖259 Then the CJEU 
invalidated Safe Harbor since October 2015. 
 
Legal Implementation 
 In Digital Rights Ireland Case, the access to data subject‘s personal data must be 
controlled by independent data protection authorities.
260
 As well as Schrems Case, the CJEU 
observed that Safe harbor and US legislation do not providing for any possibility for an 
individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or 
to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data compromises the essence of this 
fundamental right, which is an important component of the rule of law.
261
 The CJEU stated 
that the guarantee of the independence of national supervisory authorities is intended to 
ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the monitoring of compliance.
262
 Thus, the Safe 
Harbor Decision did not contain sufficient remedy measure for individual in case of violation 
by IT Corporation or State National Authority. 
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These prerequisite precedents give a set of remarks for drafting EU and EU-US data 
protection instruments which will trigger the change in relationship of EU and the counterpart 
state US. These regulation and directive make impact both on domestic legal system of the 
US and the bi-lateral agreement between EU-US relevant to Personal Data Protection. The 
reforms which had taken place in EU then US and in between EU-US during 2013-2016 will 
be scrutinized in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Reform of the EU and EU-US regime on Personal Data Protection in 
Cyberspace 
 
There have been initiatives from US and EU to address the problem of personal data 
protection in digital age. The US and EU appointed committee to create changes for better 
solution to handle the problems. US Government had launched a set of laws to reform their 
surveillance activity and provide Non-US citizen stronger protection of their personal data. 
Accordingly, EU approves General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Directive on 
judicial and criminal matters then brought US to sign agreement to implement those 
standards which are EU-US Privacy Shield for general data protection and EU-US Umbrella 
Agreement on judicial and criminal matters. These instruments show improvements on 
personal data protection in digital age is possible. As a sign of better consumer protection in 
their E-Market, those instruments boost a stronger Trans-Atlantic relation because of the trust 
restoration among EU-US. The Chapter will start with the reforms launched by the US to 
meet the requirements that EUCJ has set and to reach the adequacy criterions of EU‟s new 
regime. The changes in EU regime will be reviewed as there are some value-added and 
prominent provisions that created to handle the problems in Digital Age. However, the 
shortcomings of both EU and EU-US regime will be reflected too.  Theses EU-USA reforms 
give important clues for the conditions under which a „universal approach or regime‟ must be 
developed, which will be set forth in chapter 5. 
 
 
4.1.  Reform of the US legal framework on Personal Data Protection: US president 
Review of signal intelligence 2014, Freedom Act 2015 and Redress Act 2016 
For embracing the precedents given by US Courts‟ verdicts and CJEU‟s decisions, US 
Government had launched a set of regulation reforms; Presidential Policy Directive 28, the 
revised Freedom Act and the improved Judicial Redress Act, from 2014 to 2016 respectively. 
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Presidential Policy Directive 28  
In March 2014, the US government adopted six privacy principles to govern 
surveillance.
1
  Secretary of State John Kerry announced the forthcoming US Framework at 
the Freedom Online Coalition conference.
2
 President Obama issued Presidential Policy 
Directive
3
 28 (PPD-28),
4
 which imposes important limitations for intelligence operations. It 
specifies that data collection by the intelligence services should be targeted. Additionally, the 
PPD-28 limits the use of bulk collection of data to six national security purposes (detect and 
counter threats from espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threats to the Armed 
Forces or transnational criminal threats)
5
 to better protect personal data of all persons 
including non-U.S citizens worldwide. 
The Obama administration‟s principles provide a framework for US compliance with 
its own stated objectives (the US Framework).
6
 The US Framework largely mirrors several of 
the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance (Principles), an evaluative framework for assessing how human rights 
obligations and norms apply when conducting surveillance.
7
 Below, there are comparisons of 
“US surveillance practices” to its own stated “Framework and the Principles”. 
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Nov. 2015; Kerry, John. “Remarks to the Freedom Online Coalition Conference.” US Secretary of State, 28 
Apr. 2014, www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/04/225290.htm. Accessed 14 Nov. 2015. 
7 International Coalition of Communication. International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance. 10 Jul. 2013. 
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The US Framework expands upon President Obama‟s Presidential Policy Directive 28 
(PPD-28) which establishes principles to guide surveillance. The six principles endorsed by 
the US are (1) rule of law, (2) legitimate purpose, (3) non-arbitrariness, (4) competent 
external authority, (5) meaningful oversight, and (6) increased transparency and democratic 
accountability.
8
 However, there are overlaps between the US Framework and the Principles 
that US policy fails to comply with the US Framework: 
1) Rule of law – In his speech setting out the US Framework, Assistant Secretary 
Busby discussed how surveillance operates “pursuant to statutes and executive 
orders that were adopted as part of our democratic process.” This principle further 
requires that laws, and their subsequent policies, provide clarity for individuals 
within the jurisdiction. US surveillance policy has proven to be anything but clear 
and accessible to the public. Instead, surveillance practices often depend on loose 
legal interpretations written in secret, approved by secret courts, and overseen by 
secret Congressional committees. By contrast, the Principles require that the law 
contains a “standard of clarity and precision” 9 to provide users notice of the 
application of surveillance. 
2) Legitimate purpose – The US Framework would permit surveillance only on the 
“basis of articulable and legitimate foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence 
purposes.” This does not match the standard of the legitimate aim principle, which 
requires surveillance to be conducted only in the furtherance of a “predominantly 
important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic society.” Further, PPD-28 
permits bulk collection only for “detecting and countering” certain enumerated 
threats, and expressly prohibits the use of bulk collection for suppression of 
dissent, discrimination, or promoting US commercial interests. However, no 
similar restriction is placed on other non-bulk, yet highly intrusive forms of 
surveillance authorized under Section 702.
 10
 The government should specify – and 
                                                             
8 Office of the Press Secretary. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28. The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, 17 Jan. 2014. 
9 Stepanovich, Amie. Mitnick, Drew and Robinson, Kayla. “United States: the necessary and proportionate 
principle and US Government.” Global Information Society Watch 2014: Communication Surveillance in 
Digital Age, 2014, p. 263. 
10 Ibid. 
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identify meaningful limits to – the purposes for which it acquires and collects 
foreign intelligence. 
3) Non-arbitrariness – Non-arbitrariness, as articulated by the US Framework, 
requires surveillance to be tailored and intrusiveness minimized.
 11
 This element 
matches up to the proportionality, necessity and adequacy principles. 
4) Competent authority – While the US Framework seeks guidance from a 
“competent external authority”, the Principles specify that the authority be judicial. 
In contrast to the Principles, the Framework expressly retains an exception for 
some operational decisions to be made within intelligence agencies. FISC, the 
judicial authority that reviews surveillance programmes and applications, has been 
repeatedly misled by US intelligence agencies in their applications, which makes 
its rulings inherently unreliable.
12
 
5) Oversight – The US Framework calls for meaningful oversight. To underscore US 
adherence to this element, Assistant Secretary Busby highlighted extant internal 
oversight mechanisms. However, despite claims that the NSA‟s activities have 
been approved by all three branches of government, the NSA has reportedly lied to 
or misled all three branches.
13
 
6) Increased transparency and democratic accountability – The final element of 
the US Framework is transparency. Assistant Secretary Busby pointed to recent 
efforts to declassify FISC opinions and the government‟s intention to release the 
statistics on the issuance of national security orders and requests.
14
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
12 Cushing, Tim. “Declassified FISA Court opinion shows NSA lied repeatedly to the Court as well.” Techdirt, 
21 Aug. 2013, www.techdirt.com/articles/20130821/16331524274/declassifiedfisa-court-opinion-shows-nsa-
lied-repeatedly-to-court-as-well.shtml. Accessed 14 Nov. 2015. 
13
 Ackerman, Spencer. "NSA Illegally Collected Thousands of Emails before FISA Court Halted Program." The 
Guardian, vol. 21, August 2013. 
14 Stepanovich, Amie and Mitnick, Drew and Robinson, Kayla. “United States: the necessary and proportionate 
principle and US Government.” Global Information Society Watch 2014: Communication Surveillance in 
Digital Age, 2014, pp. 264-5. 
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Freedom Act 
Another improvement is the review of USA Freedom Act, in June 2015, which would 
have achieved a number of significant human rights reforms, including preventing bulk 
collection by requiring a nexus to an investigation, bringing clarity to Section 215, increasing 
FISC oversight and introducing a special advocate, increasing the ability of companies to 
disclose government national security data requests, and increasing the power of internal 
oversight bodies, as well as adding external checks.
15
 However, the White House retarded 
some of the reforms. 
Congress‟ failure to enact reforms is a great disappointment. The US must change its 
laws if it is to bring its surveillance programmes closer in alignment with the Principles and 
other international human rights standards.
16
 While the president‟s policy statement is an 
admirable standpoint to surveillance reform, the greater legal restrictions and increased 
external oversight of these programmes can assure the protection of personal data, and 
reaffirm the internet users that the US Government conducts its surveillance activities with 
more concern on Human Rights of people in World Wide Web.  
The Congress passed the USA Freedom Act, which, among other things:
17
  
1) prohibits bulk collection of intelligence information under Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act and other authorities;  
2) increases transparency reporting by both companies and the U.S. government, by 
permitting companies to publish statistics on the national security requests they 
receive and requiring robust reporting by the U.S. government;  
3) codifies the Administration‟s practice of systematically declassifying FISC 
decisions;  
4) provides for “expert[s] in privacy and civil liberties” to advise the FISC. 
The USA Freedom Act has created an Amicus Curiae advisory panel to the FISA Court to 
give (optional) advice in case of significant new legal interpretation. Their task is however to 
                                                             
15 Ibid, p. 265. 
16 Ibid, p. 266. 
17 ITI. The U.S. Privacy and Data Protection Framework: Basic Characteristics and Recent Reforms. 18 Jan. 
2016, p. 2. 
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provide unbiased advice, and not to defend the interest of a specific individual upon his/her 
request.
18
  
Judicial Redress Act 
The most important improvement might be the Judicial Redress Act, which has been 
signed by President Obama since 24
th
 February 2016. It extends to EU citizens the same 
rights that U.S. citizens enjoy under the Privacy Act of 1974 with respect to the data 
protection obligations of U.S. government agencies. However, the limited application of the 
Judicial Redress Act (both in terms of substance as it excludes national security but also in 
relation to the persons who can rely upon the law), the many exemptions and the legal 
uncertainty regarding the agencies to which the Judicial Redress Act will apply, do not satisfy 
the requirement to offer an effective redress mechanism to all individuals concerned in 
national security intelligence surveillance cases.
19
  
The Judicial Redress Act will give EU citizens access to U.S. courts to enforce 
privacy rights in relation to personal data transferred to the U.S. for law enforcement 
purposes. The Judicial Redress Act will extend the rights US citizens and residents enjoy 
under the 1974 Privacy Act also to EU citizens. This is a long-standing demand of the EU as 
President Juncker stated in his political guidelines: “The United States must [...] guarantee 
that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts, whether or 
not they reside on U.S. soil. Removing such discrimination will be essential for restoring trust 
in transatlantic relations”20. So EU citizens will have the right to seek judicial redress before 
US courts in case of the US authorities deny access or rectification, or unlawfully disclose 
their personal data.  
 However, there remains debate whether the U.S. redress legislation will be sufficient 
to satisfy European critics. For example, the current legislation does not provide citizens of 
EU countries with redress that is exactly on par with that which U.S. persons enjoy under the 
Privacy Act. One area of particular concern is that the legislation currently being discussed 
does not extend privacy protections to records pertaining to non-U.S. persons collected by all 
                                                             
18 European Data protection Supervisor. Opinion 1/2016. 12 Feb. 2016, p. 44. 
19 European Data protection Supervisor. Opinion 1/2016. 12 Feb. 2016, p. 43. 
20 European Commission. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Frequently Asked Questions. Press Release Database, 
Brussels, 29 Feb. 2016. 
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U.S. agencies. Personal information collected by non-law enforcement agencies (such as the 
Department of Health and Human Services, for example) would not be covered. 
21
 
 The United States has also implemented several reforms to provide additional 
protections and safeguards with respect to U.S. surveillance activities., since 2013, the 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology (“Review Group”)22 and the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”)23 have provided independent, expert 
recommendations on how the United States can reform its approaches to surveillance to 
respect privacy and civil liberties while advancing national security.
24
 
 
 
4.2.  Reform of the EU law on Personal Data Protection: general trends 
Not only because of the cases analyzed in Chapter 3 but also for many other reasons, 
EU data protection law was based on Directive 95/46/EC needed a reform. From 1995 to 
present there have been significant advances in information technology, and fundamental 
changes to the ways in which individuals and organizations communicate and share 
information. In addition, the various EU Member States have taken divergent approaches to 
implement the Directive, creating compliance difficulties for many businesses.  
Since early 2012 the EU data protection legal framework was totally being revised in 
order to establish a comprehensive, consistent, modern and solid system for all data 
processing activities in the Union; whereas in January 2012 the Commission presented a 
package of legislative proposals: a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
25
, which will 
replace Directive 95/46/EC and establish a uniform law throughout the EU, and a Directive
26
, 
which will lay down a harmonized framework for all data processing activities by law 
enforcement authorities for law enforcement purposes and will reduce the current 
divergences among national laws.  
                                                             
21 Weiss, Martin A and Archick, Kristin. "Us-Eu Data Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield." 
Congressional Research Service, 2016, p. 15. 
22 Look at the reports on their website at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/review-group 
23 Look at the reports on their website at https://www.pclob.gov/ 
24 ITI. The U.S. Privacy and Data Protection Framework: Basic Characteristics and Recent Reforms. 18 Jan. 
2016, p. 2. 
25 European Commission. COM(2012)0011. 25 Jan. 2012. 
26 Ibid. 
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Also a series of internal developments made a general review necessary: the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which acknowledged a “right to data protection”27 separate 
from the “right to privacy”; the aging provisions of the 1995 Data Protection Directive;28 the 
release of sector-specific instruments such as the E-Privacy Directive.
29
 On 21 October 2013 
the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE 
Committee) adopted its legislative reports on the two proposals and a decision on the opening 
of negotiations with the Council with a view to having the legal instruments adopted during 
this legislative term. Although the European Council of 24/25 October 2013 called for the 
timely adoption of a strong EU General Data Protection framework
30
 in order to foster the 
trust of citizens and businesses in the digital economy.
31
 After four years of deliberations, on 
27 April 2016, the Council has been able to arrive at a general approach on the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) replace Directive 95/46/EC.  
The EU‟s legislative bodies have reached a political agreement on an updated and 
more harmonized data protection law (the “Regulation”). The GDPR will significantly 
change EU data protection law, strengthening individual‟s rights, expanding the territorial 
scope, increasing compliance obligations and improving regulator enforcement powers.
32
 The 
formal adoption is in April 27
th
 2016, with the Regulation applying from May 25
th
 2018. 
Organizations will have two years to implement changes to their data protection compliance 
programmes, business processes, and IT infrastructure to reflect the Regulation‟s new 
requirements.  
In addition, already-existing data protection instruments that protect security-related 
processing, such as the 2008 Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA(Police and Criminal Justice 
                                                             
27 EU. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 1957, Article 16.1, referred in O.J. C. 83, 30/3/2010. 
28 As opened by the European Commission‟s Communication, A comprehensive approach on personal data 
protection in the European Union. COM(2010) 609 final. Brussels, 4 Nov. 2010. 
29 Papakonstantinou, Vagelis and de Hert, Paul. "The Amended Eu Law on Eprivacy and Electronic 
Communications after Its 2011 Implementation; New Rules on Data Protection, Spam, Data Breaches and 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights." J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., vol. 29, 2011, pp. 29-74. 
30 Look at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/139197.pdf 
31 LIBE Committee Inquiry. Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU citizens. 2014, p. 23. 
32 Hustinx, Peter. “Recent developments in the European Union.” 30 years after: the impact of the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, Joint ICCP-WPISP Roundtable, Paris, 10 Mar. 2010. 
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Authorities Directive),
33
 be properly substituted by the new Directive on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data (Directive 2016/680) 
on April 27
th
 2016 the same day as GDPR. 
After three years of trilogies negotiations between the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council, an agreement was reached in December 2015 on the final text 
of the Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive in relation to data protection in the 
police and justice sectors.  
Member States have a two-year period in which to implement the Police and Criminal 
Justice Authorities Directive into their national law; Member States must adopt any relevant 
legislative acts for compliance with the Directive by 6 May 2018.  
Here is the time-table of the process
 
for GDPR launching which was first released on 
25 January 2012 and the EU Council aimed for formal adoption in spring 2016. The schedule 
is:
34
 
 21 October 2013: European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) had its orientation vote. 
 15 December 2015: Negotiations between European Parliament, Council and 
Commission (Trilogue) have resulted in a joint proposal. 
 17 December 2015: European Parliament's LIBE committee voted positively on the 
outcome of the negotiations between the three parties. 
 8 April 2016: Adoption by the Council of the European Union.  
 14 April 2016: Adoption by the European Parliament.  
 The regulation will enter into force 20 days after its publication in the EU Official 
Journal. Its provisions will be directly applicable in all member states two years 
after this date. 
                                                             
33
 EU. Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the 
Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. 2008. 
34 “Timeline of the new EU Data Protection Regulation – latest developments and implementation.” 
Allen&Overy, www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/data-protection/Pages/Timetable.aspx. Accessed 21 
Jan. 2017. 
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 The GDPR will replace the Directive 95/46/EC and will be directly applicable in 
all Member States without the need for implementing national legislation on 25
th
 
May 2018.  
On the other hand, The Directive 2016/680 on Criminal and Judicial Matters will 
replace the effect of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The Directive entered into 
force on 5 May 2016 but Member States have until 6 May 2018 to adopt and publish the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions to comply with the Directive requirements. 
The set of EU data protection instruments will trigger the change in relationship of 
EU and the counterpart state US. These regulation and directive make impact both on 
domestic legal system of the US and the bi-lateral agreement between EU-US relevant to 
Personal Data Protection. 
Indeed, EU data protection model is heavily reconstructed through GDPR and 
Directive on Criminal Matters. Consequently, also EU-US data protection legal frameworks 
needed to be reviewed in order to establish a comprehensive, consistent, modern and robust 
system for all data processing activities in the Union and across Atlantic. The set of EU-US 
reforms have been done through: Exchange of personal data between the EU and the U.S. for 
commercial purposes are addressed by the Safe Harbor Decision which provides a legal basis 
for transfers of personal data from the EU to companies in the U.S. which adhere to the Safe 
Harbor Principles. In July 12
th
 2016 EU-US have agreed to sign a new Personal Data 
Protection bilateral agreement, Privacy Shield, which replace the old Safe Harbor Agreement. 
In addition, the EU and the US were also negotiating a framework agreement on data 
protection in the field of police and judicial cooperation area, “Umbrella Agreement”, which 
allow competent authorities to share the personal data among criminal matters organization in 
order to prevent and suppress crime including terrorism. Negotiations were launched on 28 
March 2011 and, after more than 5 years of plenty discussing rounds, it was agreed in June 
2
nd
 2016 and was adopted by Council of the European Union on December 2
nd
 2016. 
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4.3.  Legal content and consequences of the reform of the EU-US Personal Data 
Protection regime  
This section will concentrate on 4 instruments; The EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data (Directive on Criminal Matters),The EU-
US Privacy Shield (Privacy Shield) and The EU-US Umbrella Agreement (Umbrella 
Agreement), which setting a treaty-binding standard for personal data protection and State 
parties have obligation to comply with such instruments domestically and internationally. 
Mention the consequences of 4 Instruments to state parties. It found the stronger 
obligation and brings in rights for individual and duty for controller/processor then creating a 
concrete system to monitor, remedy and sanction. The value added, improvements and 
shortcomings of those instruments will be reviewed in 12 different categories below. 
 
4.3.1. Individual’s Right to Personal Data Protection 
First of all, the harmonization these 4 instruments try to create will be described. 
Then, the scope of application and definition of important terms will be illustrated. Third, the 
improvements in some rights due to the progress of information technology will be shown. 
Lastly, it draws the line of balance, between rights of Individual and the exception for to limit 
the full enjoyment of right to personal data protection for specific reason. All 4 issues that 4 
instruments have given in their E-Market Regime will be the fundamental baseline for 
individual protection. 
 
4.3.1.1. Legal Approval of Personal Data Protection 
This section will concentrate on how these 4 instruments try to unify the 
regime of data protection in EU and EU-US E-Market. The achievements and failures of 
general protection of personal data and in specific area of criminal matters between EU and 
US regime will be depicted. 
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EU GDPR 
General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data(Regulation 
level) (the “GDPR”), and repealing Directive 95/46/EC35.  
On 6 April 2016 the Council of the European Union published the final text of 
the GDPR. The GDPR will enter into force on 24 May 2018, two years after its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union (“OJ”) and it will implement a harmonized data 
protection regime throughout the EU. The EU institutions agreed the text of the GDPR in 
December 2015 and this text was then translated and refined for publication in the OJ.  
The GDPR will replace Directive 95/46/EC (the current European data protection law), on 
which the primary Irish data protection legislation, the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003, 
is based.
36
 The GDPR contains a number of provisions which will serve to increase 
accountability of data controllers and processors including expansion of the duties of data 
controllers and processors; increased reporting obligations; and strengthened individual 
rights.  
GDPR create Greater harmonization
37
: The Regulation introduces a single-
legal framework that applies across all EU Member States without the need for national 
implementation. This means that businesses will face a more consistent set of data protection 
obligations from one EU Member State to the next, which should aid overall compliance. 
However, harmonization will not be complete and some differences will persist across the EU 
Member States.
38
 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
From May 6
th
 2018, the Directive on Criminal Matters will harmonize the 
laws in the Member States in respect of the exchange of information between police and 
                                                             
35
 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 94. 
36 Arthur Cox. “Data Protection Update – New Legislation.” Technology & Innovation, 2016, p. 1. 
37 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Preamble Recital 2. 
38 Hunton&Williams. Overview of the EU General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, p. 1. 
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judicial authorities, whilst leaving discretion in specific areas (for example, penalties for 
breach of the Directive) in order to respect the different legal traditions of the Member States. 
The Directive applies to both cross-border and domestic processing of personal data and it 
aims to improve cooperation of the Member States in the fight against terrorism and other 
serious crime across the EU, in that, it guarantees that personal data transferred outside the 
EU by criminal law enforcement authorities will be adequately protected. The key principles 
of processing personal data only when necessary, proportional and pursuant to a specific 
purpose are also reflected in the Directive. 
As Directive 95/46/EC does not apply to the processing of personal data in the 
course of an activity which falls outside the scope of European Community law and the 
Framework Decision 20008/977/ JHA does not regulate internal data processing activities of 
law enforcement, the Police and Criminal Authorities Directive bridges this legislative gap.
39
 
The Directive on Criminal Matters will create a coherent framework for data processing 
activities performed for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the 
prevention of threats to public security. 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
On 29 February 2016, the European Commission published a Communication, 
a draft adequacy decision and the annexed texts constituting a new framework for 
transatlantic exchanges of personal data for commercial purposes: the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield, which seeks to replace the previous U.S. Safe Harbor invalidated by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union on 6 October 2015, in the Schrems case. The Privacy Shield 
could be assessed both the commercial aspects and the possible derogations to the principles 
of Personal Data Protection for national security, law enforcement and public interests 
purposes. 
The Privacy Shield is the first adequacy decision that has been drafted and 
agreed since the texts of the GDPR were approved. Still, many of the improvements on the 
level of data protection offered to individuals are not reflected in the Privacy Shield. The 
review of this adequacy decision has taken place shortly after the GDPR enters into 
                                                             
39 Arthur Cox. “Data Protection Update – New Legislation.” Technology & Innovation, 2016, p. 2. 
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application in May 2016.
40
 Moreover, the adequacy decisions issued for other third countries 
must be considered as well to meet the standard of GDPR. 
The principles and guarantees afforded by the Privacy Shield are set out in 
both the adequacy decision and in its annexes makes the information both difficult to find, 
and at times, inconsistent. These separated documents affect the understanding of data 
subjects because of an overall lack of clarity regarding the new framework. As well as 
making accessibility for data subjects, organizations, and data protection authorities more 
difficult. Similarly, the language used lacks clarity.
41
 
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework ensures an adequate level of 
protection for personal data transferred to the U.S. The EU-US Privacy Shield consists of 
Privacy Principles that companies must abide by and commitments on how the arrangement 
will be enforced (written commitments and assurance by the State Secretary John Kerry, 
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, the Federal Trade Commission and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, amongst others).
42
 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The EU-US data protection "Umbrella Agreement" puts in place a 
comprehensive high-level data protection framework for EU-US law enforcement 
cooperation. The Agreement covers all personal data (for example names, addresses, criminal 
records) exchanged between the EU and the U.S. for the purpose of prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorism. The provisions of the 
Umbrella Agreement aim at the protection of the fundamental right to the protection of 
personal data and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, as enshrined, 
respectively, in Article 8 and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. 
                                                             
40 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy 
decision. 13 Apr. 2016, p. 58.  
41 Ibid, p. 3.  
42 European Commission. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Frequently Asked Questions. Press Release Database. 
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The Umbrella Agreement will provide safeguards and guarantees of 
lawfulness for data transfers, thereby strengthening fundamental rights, facilitating EU-U.S. 
law enforcement cooperation and restoring trust. In particular, EU citizens will benefit from 
equal treatment: they will have the same judicial redress rights as US citizens in case of 
privacy breaches. This point was outlined by President Juncker in his political guidelines, 
when he stated: “The United States must [...] guarantee that all EU citizens have the right to 
enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts, whether or not they reside on U.S. soil. 
Removing such discrimination will be essential for restoring trust in transatlantic 
relations”.43 However, implementation by EU Member States will be necessary, but no major 
changes in the laws are to be expected since the substantive provisions of the Umbrella 
Agreement reflect to a large extent rules that are already applicable to EU and national 
authorities under EU and/or national law. 
The Umbrella Agreement is expected to have a significant impact on police 
and law enforcement cooperation with the United States. By establishing a common and 
comprehensive framework of data protection rules and guarantees, it will enable the EU or its 
Member States, on the one hand, and U.S. criminal law enforcement authorities on the other 
hand to cooperate more effectively with each other. Moreover, it will ensure that existing 
agreements contain all necessary protections. This will enable continuity in law enforcement 
cooperation while ensuring greater legal certainty when transfers are made. The Agreement 
will also facilitate the conclusion of future data transfer agreements with the U.S. in the 
criminal law enforcement sector, as data protection safeguards have been agreed and will thus 
not have to be negotiated again and again.
44
 Accordingly, setting common standards in this 
key but complex area of cooperation is an important achievement that can significantly 
contribute to restoring trust in transatlantic data flows. 
In addition, Umbrella Agreement clearly states that "the protections and 
remedies set forth in this Agreement shall benefit individuals and entities in the manner 
                                                             
43 European Commission. Questions and Answers on the EU-US data protection "Umbrella agreement". 
Brussels, 8 Sep. 2015, p. 1. 
44 European Commission. Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of 
personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offenses. 
29 Apr. 2016, p. 3. 
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implemented in the applicable domestic laws of each Party",
45
 which means that the 
Agreement, in order to be effective ("to benefit individuals and entities"), needs to be 
implemented in the domestic legal systems of the Parties. Further analysis is needed to verify 
to which extent, also in the light of the Medellin jurisprudence,
46
 the Agreement can be 
considered as a self-executing agreement in the US legal order and which substantive 
provisions may be needed to be implemented by the US Congress
47
 in order to make it 
binding domestic law. 
 
4.3.1.2. Definition and Scope of Personal Data Protection 
These 4 Instruments harmonize the basic terms, scope and element of Personal 
Data Protection in to one direction. Moreover, the most important issue on jurisdiction, the 
fragmented jurisdictions to deal with trans-border activities, will be resolved by the 
application of these instruments, at least within EU-US E-Market regime. This section will 
highlight on the influence of GDPR as the prominent law that others instrument refer to. 
 
EU GDPR 
Personal data is defined as "any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person".
48
 A low bar is set for "identifiable" – if anyone can identify a 
natural person using “all means reasonably likely to be used” 49 the information is personal 
data, so data may be personal data even if the organization holding the data cannot itself 
identify a natural person. A name is not necessary either – any identifier will do such as an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or other factors which may identify 
that natural person. 
Online identifiers are expressly called out in Recital 30 with IP addresses, 
cookies and RFID tags all listed as examples. Although the definition and recitals are broader 
                                                             
45 EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 5(2). 
46 Garcia, Michael J. "International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon Us Law." Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, marzo, 2013. 
47 European Data protection Supervisor. Opinion 1/2016. 12 Feb. 2016, p. 8. 
48 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 4. 
49 Ibid, Recital 26. 
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than the equivalent definitions in the Directive 95/46/EC, for the most part they are simply 
codifying current guidance and case law on the meaning of 'personal data'.
 50
 
GDPR also includes a broader definition of "special categories" of personal 
data which are more commonly known as sensitive personal data.
 51
 The processing of these 
data is subject to a much more restrictive regime. 
A new concept of 'pseudonymisation' is defined as the processing of personal 
data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is 
kept separately and is subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.
52
 Organizations 
which embed pseudonymisation techniques gain various benefits under GDPR. 
Hence, the Regulation introduces a concept of 'pseudonymised data' (i.e., key-
coded or enhanced data). Pseudonymous data will still be treated as personal data, but is 
likely to help organisations comply with the Regulation and reduce the risks of non-
compliance. The „key‟ necessary to identify individuals from the pseudonymised data must 
be kept separately and subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-
attribution to an identified or identifiable person.
53
 
GDPR applies to processing of personal data “in the context of the activities of 
an establishment”54 of any organization within the EU. For these purposes “establishment” 
implies the “effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements” 55 and “the 
legal form of such arrangements…is not the determining factor” 56, so there is a wide range of 
what might be covered from fully functioning subsidiary undertakings on the scope, to 
potentially any individual sales representative depending on the situations.  
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The Regulation elucidate that it also applies to companies established in a 
third country if they are offering goods and services, or monitoring the behavior of 
individuals, in the EU. Companies placed outside of the EU will be obliged to the same rules 
as companies based in the EU. This ensures the comprehensive protection of EU individuals' 
rights. It generates an arena between EU and foreign companies, thereby avoiding 
competitive imbalances between EU and foreign companies when operating in the EU or 
targeting consumers in the EU. Even if an organization is able to prove that it is not 
established within the EU, it will still be caught by GDPR if it processes personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union where the processing activities are related "to the offering of 
goods or services"
57
 (no payment is required) to such data subjects in the EU or "the 
monitoring of their behaviour"
58
 as far as their behavior takes place within the EU. Internet 
use profiling
59
 is expressly referred to as an example of monitoring. 
Compared to the old Directive 95/46/EC, GDPR will capture many more 
overseas organizations. US tech should particularly take note as the provisions of GDPR have 
clearly been designed to capture them.
60
 Overseas organizations not established within the 
EU who is nevertheless caught by one or both of the offering goods or services or monitoring 
tests must designate a representative within the EU
61
. 
GDPR also include an expanded territorial scope
62
: Non-EU businesses will be 
subject to the Regulation if they: (i) offer goods or services to EU residents; or (ii) monitor 
the behaviour of EU residents. Many non-EU businesses that were not required to comply 
with the Directive 95/46/EC will be required to comply with the Regulation.
 63
 
 
 
 
                                                             
57 Ibid, Article 3(2)(a). 
58 Ibid, Article 3(2)(b). 
59 Ibid, Recital 24. 
60 DLA Piper. "EU General Data Protection Regulation - Key Changes." www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/focus/eu-
data-protection-regulation/key-changes/. Accessed 10 May 2016. 
61 EU. General Data Protection Regulation. 2016, Article 27. 
62 Ibid, Article 3. 
63 Hunton&Williams. Overview of the EU General Data Protection Regulation. p. 1. 
251 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
The Scope of data protection and free movement of data processed by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties has been designated 
by the directive, allowing Member States a certain level of flexibility while incorporating it 
into their respective national laws,
64
 whereas a regulation was adopted for regulating general 
processing of personal data. In this way the EU acknowledged a two-speed process in the 
effort to harmonize all EU personal data processing. 
The new Directive on Criminal Matters has 3 perspectives, which scope is 
drawn and legal terms are defied, differently from the GDPR:  
First, its scope is restricted to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, not covering personal data 
processing in the context of criminal court proceedings. In other words, where the personal 
data are processed in the course of a criminal investigation and court proceedings in criminal 
matters, Member States may provide for the exercise of the right to information, access and 
rectification or erasure of personal data to be carried out in accordance with their national 
law
65
. In this respect, therefore, the real added value of the Directive for data protection in the 
police and justice sectors depends on its implementation in national law and the willingness 
of national court to ensure that the Directive for data protection in the police and justice 
sectors is applied in a uniform manner across the EU.
 66
  
Second, the Directive on Criminal Matters does not regulate the processing of 
data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law
67
. That provision 
has been interpreted
68
 as relating to activities concerning national security, activities of 
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agencies or units dealing with national security issues and the processing of personal data by 
the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of 
Title V of the Treaty of European Union. The formulation of that provision is therefore 
partially contradictory with the inclusion within the purposes set out in Article 1 of 
safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. Even if it is not defined 
in the text, the concept of activities concerning public security seems to include the activities 
of safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public security. Until the Court of Justice 
interprets it, the scope of the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors 
depends again on the interpretation that national courts will give to the expression “activity 
which falls outside the scope of Union law” and of the way the Member States decide to 
implement the Directive
69
 for data protection in the police and justice sectors.  
Finally, the Directive on Criminal Matters does not apply to the processing of 
personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. In other words, the data 
processing by the European institutions and bodies will continue to be governed by 
Regulation n.45/2001, which has not been amended yet. Unlike the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA, the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors will actually 
regulate processing of personal data by Member States and not only intra-Member States 
exchanges of data, but it is still far from ensuring maximum harmonization of data processing 
in the criminal field. That is confirmed by Article 1(3), which states that the Directive for 
data protection in the police and justice sectors shall not preclude Member States from 
providing higher safeguards than those established in the Directive
70
 for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of the data subject. Directive, unlike the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA, also applies to domestic processing of personal data. 
Spy agencies and national security agencies are not bound by this Directive. 
(That means that it‟s okay for them to gather personal data, subject to their own mandates and 
contesting regulations.). As well as the Anonymous information is not covered by this 
Directive. 
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As far as the scope of the Directive for data protection in the police and justice 
sectors is concerned, despite the apparent broad approach of the Directive for data protection 
in the police and justice sectors, its actual scope is more limited than it seems at first glance.  
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
EU Data Protection laws apply not only to the processing operations carried 
out by data controllers established on EU member states territory, but also where data 
controllers (although not established in the EU), make use of equipment situated on EU 
territory, in particular for the collection of personal data. Hence, The Privacy Shield 
Principles will apply from the moment the data transfer takes place.
71
 Moreover, the data 
controllers established in the EU and transferring data to a data processor in the U.S. remain 
subject to EU data protection law. 
The Privacy Shield which allows personal data to be transferred from the EU 
to a company in the United States, provided that the company there processes (e.g. uses, 
stores and further transfers) personal data according to a strong set of data protection rules 
and safeguards. The protection given to user‟s personal data applies regardless of whether 
data subjects are an EU citizen or not. 
When compare Privacy Shield to the Safe Harbor, improvements can be 
noticed on the addition of some key definitions such as „personal data‟, „processing‟ and 
„controller‟.  
The Principles apply immediately upon organization‟s register to certification. 
However, organization shall certify within the two first months following the Privacy 
Shield‟s framework effective date of entry into force. In any event they should do so no later 
than nine months
72
 from the date upon which they certify to the Privacy Shield. 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The key terms of the Umbrella Agreement are defined in Article 2. The 
definitions of "personal information", "processing of personal information", "Parties", 
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"Member State" and "Competent Authority" are substantially in line with how these concepts 
have been defined in other EU-U.S. agreements and/or in the EU data protection acquis.
73
 
The Agreement is proposed to achieve the policy objective of establishing a framework for 
the protection of personal data when transferred between the United States, on the one hand, 
and the European Union or its Member States, on the other, in the context of law 
enforcement;
74
 for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences, including terrorism. By specifying that the Umbrella Agreement in itself shall not 
be the legal basis for any transfer of personal information and that a (separate) legal basis 
shall always be required, Article 1 also makes clear that the Umbrella Agreement is a genuine 
fundamental right agreement establishing a set of protections and safeguards applying to such 
transfers.
 75
 This includes transfers on the basis of domestic laws, EU-US agreements, 
Member States-U.S. agreements (e.g. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) as well as specific 
agreements providing for the transfer of personal data by private entities for law enforcement 
purposes.
76
 The bilateral agreements between the Member States and the US are also brought 
in the scope of the Agreement. However, The Intelligence Authorities and national security 
agencies are not in the scope of the Agreement, pursuant to Article 3(2)
77
 for example Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) which is under Privacy Shield provisions. 
This means that the Umbrella Agreement must be seen in a wider context than 
just transatlantic law enforcement cooperation: it clearly links to:
78
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 cooperation including data sharing between the Legal Enforcement 
Agencies (LEAs) of the EU and/or of the EU Member States (MSs), the 
security-related agencies of the EU, and the National Security Agencies 
(NSAs) of the MSs; 
 cooperation and data sharing between LEAs of the USA and its NSAs 
(including the NSA); 
 cooperation and data sharing between the NSAs of the EU MSs and those 
of the USA; and 
 cooperation and data sharing between the NSAs of the EU MSs and those 
of the USA and the NSAs of other states (“third parties” in the terms of the 
Umbrella Agreement). 
Umbrella Agreement does not contain any specific reference to the rationae 
personae scope of the Agreement. It establishes a wide rationae materiae scope.
79
 This 
general reference to personal information seems to imply that the personal information of any 
individual equally enjoys the safeguards enshrined in the Agreement. This interpretation is 
encouraged by specific references to a wide personal scope of “Access” 80, “Rectification” 81 
and “Administrative redress” 82 (since they refer to “any individual”). However, it may be 
contradicted by the general “Non-discrimination” provision in Article 4. According to this 
Article, each Party must comply with the obligations of the Agreement to protect “personal 
information of its own nationals and the other Party’s nationals” without arbitrary 
discrimination. In addition, Article 19 “Judicial redress” only applies to “Nationals” of the 
Parties. 
The agreed provisions will thus immediately increase the level of protection 
guaranteed to EU data subjects “when” data is transferred to the U.S. It will also increase 
legal certainty for transatlantic law enforcement cooperation by ensuring that exiting 
agreements contain all necessary protections and can thus withstand possible legal challenges 
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between EU State Members and US.
83
 Nonetheless, the Agreement would not be compliant 
with the protection afforded by Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, according to which the fundamental rights to privacy, personal data protection and an 
effective remedy apply to "everyone" in the EU, irrespective of nationality or status.
84
 
 
4.3.1.3. Content of Data Subjects’ Right to Data Protection 
These 4 instruments unite the detail of Data Subjects‟ Rights. The content of 
Right includes some important issues that reflect the changing manner of data protection in 
the era of Internet, especially the Right to be Forgotten/Right to Erase and Data Portability. 
Furthermore, they give a more concise edge for all rights relate to Personal Data Protection. 
The instruments make it clear that the Right to Personal Data Protection is specific right, 
separate from right to privacy, but have some legal interaction to some other human rights. 
 
EU GDPR 
GDPR builds on the rights of individual data subjects under the Directive 
95/46/EC, ensuring existing rights and offering a new right to data portability. These rights 
are supported with provisions making it easier to claim redress for compensation and for 
consumer groups to enforce rights on behalf of data subjects. 
Those individual rights are as follows: 
Transparency: One of the main constructing sets of GDPR‟s realized rights 
for data subjects is the requirement for clearer transparency. Vary information must be 
provided by controllers to data subjects in a concise, transparent and easily accessible form, 
using easy and understandable language
85
. 
The following information must be given at the time the data is acquired:
 86
  
 the identity and contact details of the controller 
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 the Data Protection Officer's contact details (if there has to be) 
 both the purpose for which data will be processed and the legal basis for 
processing including if relevant the legitimate interests for processing 
 the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data 
 details of transborder transfers 
 the period for which personal data will be stored or, if that is not possible, 
the criteria used to determine this 
 the existence of rights of the data subject including the right to access, 
rectify, require erasure (the “right to be forgotten”), restrict processing, 
object to processing and data portability; where applicable the right to 
withdraw consent, and the right to lodge complaint to supervisory 
authorities 
 the consequences of failing to meet data necessary to enter into a contract 
 the presence of any automated decision making and profiling and the 
consequences for the data subject. 
 In addition, where a controller intends to process existing data for a new 
purpose, they must notice data subjects of that further processing, providing 
the information mentioned above. 
Slightly different transparency requirements apply where information have not been obtained 
from the data subject.
 87
 
Subject access rights: These widely follow the existing regime set out in the 
Directive 95/46/EC though some supplementary information must be revealed and there is no 
longer a right for controllers to charge a fee, with some narrow limitations. Information 
requested by data subjects must be provided within one month as a default with a limited 
right for the controller to extend this period for up to three months.
88
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Right to rectify: Data subjects continue to enjoy a right to require inaccurate 
or incomplete personal data to be corrected or completed “without undue delay”.89 However, 
GPDR does not give a specific meaning and scope of the condition mention above.
 
 
Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten'):
 
This forerunner of this right made 
headlines in 2014 when Europe‟s highest court ruled against Google90 as mentioned before in 
Chapter 4, in effect requiring Google to remove search results relating to historic proceedings 
against a Spanish national for an unpaid debt on the basis that Google as a data controller of 
the search results had no legal basis to process that information. 
The right to be forgotten now has a separate single Article in GDPR. 
However, the right is not absolute; it only arises in quite limited situations notably where the 
controller has no legal basis for processing the information. As demonstrated in the Search 
Engine, requiring a search engine to remove search links does not mean the underlying 
content controlled by third party websites will necessarily be removed. In many cases the 
controllers of those third party websites may have entirely legitimate grounds to continue to 
process that information, even if that the information is less likely to be found if search 
results are removed from search engine results.
91
 
The possible impact of Google Spain decision has been a great number of 
requests made to search engines for search results to be removed raising concerns that the 
right is being used to remove information that it is in the public interest to be accessible. 
Right to restriction of processing: Data subject enjoys a right to restrict 
processing of their personal data in defined circumstances. These include where the accuracy 
of the data is contested; where the processing is unlawful; where the data is no longer needed 
save for legal claims of the data subject, or where the legitimate grounds for processing by 
the controller and whether these override those of the data subject are contested.
 92
 
Right to data portability: This is an obviously modes right in GDPR and has 
no previous in the Directive 95/46/EC. Where the processing of personal data is justified 
either on the basis that the data subject has given their consent to processing or where 
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processing is necessary for the performance of a contract, or where the processing is carried 
out be automated means, then the data subject has the right to receive or have transmitted to 
another controller all personal data relating them in a structured, commonly used and digital-
readable format. This right is a good example of the regulatory downsides of relying on 
consent or performance of a contract to justify processing.
 93
  
The right to data portability comes with various packages under GDPR 
relative to other justifications for processing. Where the right is likely to arising controllers 
will need to develop procedures to facilitate the collection and transfer of personal data when 
requested to do so by data subjects.
 94
 
Right to object: The Directive 95/46/EC's right to object to the processing of 
personal data for direct marketing purposes at any time is maintained.  
Supplementary, data subjects have the right to object to processing which is 
legitimized on the grounds either of the legitimate interests of the data controller or when 
processing is in the public interest. Controllers will then have to suspend processing of the 
data until such time as they expose “compelling legitimate grounds” for processing which 
overshadow the rights of the data subject or that the processing is for the establishment, 
exercise or defense of legal claims.
 95
 
The right not to be subject to automated decision taking, concerning 
profiling: This right expands the old Directive 95/46/EC right not to be subject to automated 
decision making, profiling. GDPR specially refers to profiling as a representation of 
automated decision making. Automated decision making and profiling "which produces legal 
effects concerning [the data subject] … or similarly significantly affects him or her" are only 
permitted where:
96
  
(a) necessary for entering into or performing a contract 
(b) authorized by EU or Member State law, or  
(c) the data subject has given their explicit (i.e. opt-in) consent. 
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The scope of this right is possibly broad and may throw into question 
legitimate profiling for example to detect fraud and cybercrime. It also presents challenges 
for the online advertising industry and website operators who will need to revisit consenting 
mechanics to justify online profiling for behavioral advertising. This is an area where further 
guidance is needed on how Article 22 will be applied to specific types of profiling.
 97
 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
One of the main differences between GDPR and Directive on Criminal 
Matters lies essentially in the rights of information and of access to personal data. If such 
rights provided for in the Data Protection Regulation were exercised to the fullest possible 
extent within the ambit of criminal law,
 98
 it would effectively make criminal investigations 
impossible. 
Where the data subject is required to comply with a legal obligation, the data 
subject has no genuine and free choice, so that the reaction of the data subject could not be 
considered to be a freely given indication of his or her wishes. Whether the correct balance 
between individual data protection and the interests of the police and criminal justice process 
is respected depends once again on how Member States implement the exemptions
99
 
contained in the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors. 
Consent is not needed for the collection of personal data for the purposes of 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties since the nature of investigation is undercover to keep secret from 
targeted convicts. 
Data subject have the right to know who has collected personal data about 
them and the purposes of the collection, and the right to lodge a complaint and have the data 
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expunged.
100
 If the data controller refuses, then the reasons for the refusal have to be 
disclosed. 
Data subject be free from “automatic processing” that “profiles” them and 
they should have the right to challenge any profiling. “Profiling” means any form of 
automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyze or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, interests, reliability, behavior, location or movements.
 101
  
The issue of further processing could be permitted as long as the controller 
was authorized to process the personal data for such purpose according to either Union or 
Member State law and that the processing was necessary and proportionate to the other 
purposes in accordance with Union or Member State law.
 102
 
The right to access has been restricted, the Member States must provide that 
controller informs the data subject of the reasons for this refusal, unless the purpose of the 
measure, for example an investigation would be jeopardized if the data subject would be 
informed
103
  about the reasons for the restriction. 
The data subject has the right to rectify, erase or restrict the processing of his or her 
personal data. The data subject can restrict his or her personal data instead of erasing them in two 
specified cases. The first situation is where the data subject contests the accuracy of the data and it is 
not possible to verify whether the data is accurate or not. The other case relates to situations where the 
personal data is kept for the purpose of evidence.
 104
 The corresponding recital specifies that examples 
of the latter case can be situations where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the legitimate 
interests of the data subject could be affected. In the latter situation the data can be processed only for 
the reasons which prevented their erasure.  
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EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield maintains the Safe Harbor‟s access principle, including the 
rights to amend, correct, or delete inaccurate data. The Privacy Shield improves these rights, 
enabling data subjects to correct, amend, or delete even accurate personal data where such 
information is processed in violation of the Privacy Shield principles.
105
 
The Privacy Shield provides for a right to opt-out to disclosure of personal 
information to a third party or to the use of personal information for a purpose materially 
different.
106
 In addition, individuals benefit from an „opt-out‟ right to the use of personal 
information for direct marketing purpose at any time.
107
 
Data subject have the right to ask the Privacy Shield organization to give data 
subject access to personal data of data subject.
108
 This means that data subjects have a right to 
have data communicated to them but also to get information about the purpose for which the 
data are processed,
109
  the categories of personal data concerned and the recipients to whom 
the data are disclosed.  
Data subject can then request the company to correct, change or delete them if 
they are not accurate, outdated or have been processed in violation of the Privacy Shield 
rules.
110 
The company also has to confirm whether or not it holds or processes personal data.
 
111
  
Data subject are normally not obliged to give any reasons as to why data 
subject would like to access personal data, however, the company may ask data subject to do 
so if the request is too broad or vague.
 112
 The company has to respond to data subject‟s 
access request within a reasonable time frame. A company may sometimes be able to limit 
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access rights of data subject, but only in specific situations such as when providing access 
would undermine confidentiality, breach professional privilege or conflict with legal 
obligations.
113
  
The right to access can be particularly useful if personal data are used for a 
decision which might significantly affect data subject. In those situations where this typically 
becomes relevant
114
 (e.g. a positive or negative decision about a job, a loan etc.), U.S. law 
provides additional rights that allow data subject to better understand
115
 to what extent 
personal data have been taken into account. 
If the company does not follow the rules of the Privacy Shield and violates its 
obligation to protect your personal data,
116
 data subjects have the right to complain and obtain 
a remedy, free of any cost.
117
 For instance data subject can choose alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) or submit to the oversight of a national Data Protection Authority (DPA).  
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Umbrella Agreement provides for several rights of the data subject: the 
right to be informed
118
, the right of access
119
, the right to rectification - which also refers to 
erasure and blocking
120
, the rights to administrative and judicial redress
121
 and the right not to 
be subject to automated decisions
122
. The rights of the data subject, and in particular the 
rights to access and rectification, are enshrined as essential elements of the right to personal 
data protection in Article 8(2) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.  
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The Excessive expenses may not be imposed as a condition to access one's 
data
123
 due to the precise exemptions listed in article 16(2).  
The right to rectification entitles any individual to request the correction or 
rectification of his or her personal data in case it is either inaccurate or it has been improperly 
processed. This may include supplementation, erasure, blocking or other measures or 
methods
124
 for addressing inaccuracies or improper processing. The article 17(3) allows data 
subjects to appoint Oversight Authority or representative for acting on their behalf. The 
Competent Authority (Data Controller/Processor) must response to data subject „if correction 
or rectification is denied or restricted‟125, setting forth the reasons for the denial or restriction 
of access or rectification, without undue delay. 
However, The Umbrella Agreement fails to meet important substantive 
requirements of EU data protection law.
126
 The Agreement does not contain a general human 
rights clause prohibiting the “sharing” or “onward transfers” of data on EU persons, provided 
subject to the Agreement, with or to other agencies, in the USA or elsewhere, in 
circumstances in which this could lead to serious human rights violations, including arbitrary 
arrest and detention, torture or even extrajudicial killings or “disappearances” of the data 
subjects (or others).
127
 
 
4.3.1.4. Exception to the exercise of Right to Personal Data Protection 
By taking the court verdicts, analyzed in Chapter3, and the revelations of 
global data surveillance program of US into account. These 4 instruments give more precise 
category of limitations on exercising right to personal data protection of individual. They also 
draw the scope of necessary conditions, on what extent state can limit the right of person, and 
requirements, on how state must undertake the proportionate measure, in order to relieve the 
effects of such restrictions. 
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EU GDPR 
EU Member States domestic data protection laws were very different among 
Member States. This is partly due to the vague in the Directive 95/46/EC being interpreted 
and implemented differently and partly due to the Directive allowing Member States to 
implement different or additional rules in some areas. As GDPR will become supranational 
direct effect implementing laws, there will be a higher degree of harmonization relative to the 
current regime. However, GDPR retains the right for Member States to introduce different 
domestic laws in many important areas and as a result we are likely to continue to see a 
patchwork of various data protection laws among Member States, for certain types of 
processing. 
Each Member State is permitted to restrict the rights of individuals and 
transparency obligations
128
 by legislation when the restriction "respects the essence of 
fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a 
democratic society" to safeguard one of the following:
 129
 
(a) national security 
(b) defense 
(c) public security 
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of breaches of ethics   
for regulated professions, or crime, or the execution of criminal penalties 
(e) other important objectives of general public interest of the EU or a Member 
State, in particular economic or financial interests 
(f) the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings 
(g) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected with national 
security, defence, public security, crime prevention, other public interest or 
breach of ethics 
(h) the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others 
(i) the enforcement of civil law claims 
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To be a valid exemption for the purposes of GDPR, any legislative exemption must contain 
specific provisions setting out:
 130
 
(a) the purposes of processing 
(b) the categories of personal data 
(c) the scope of the restrictions 
(d) the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer 
(e) the controllers who may rely on the restriction 
(f) the permitted retention periods 
(g) the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects 
(h) the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless 
prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction 
Further to these permitted exemptions, Chapter IX of GDPR sets out various specific 
processing activities which include additional derogations, exemptions and powers for 
Member States to impose additional requirements. These include:  
 Processing and freedom of expression and information
131
  
 Processing and public access to official documents
132
  
 Processing of national identification numbers
133
  
 Processing in the context of employment
134
  
 Safeguards and derogations to processing for archiving purposes in the 
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes
135
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 Obligations of secrecy
136
  
 Existing data protection rules of churches and religious associations
137
  
These necessary cases also appear in the Directive 95/46/EC, though in many cases have 
been amended or varied in GDPR.  
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
There are differences between GDPR and Directive on Criminal Matters. 
Attempting to strike a balance between the individual right to data protection and the 
processing interests and concerns of the police and other law enforcement-related agencies, 
limitations on the rights to information, access and rectification have been included in 
Directive on Criminal Matters. Because it would undermine much of the work done by the 
police and the competent authorities within the criminal justice system if individual exercise 
to their fullest extent of these rights.
138
 The level of flexibility accorded to this end depends 
once more on the breadth of national legislative measures implementing the Directive for 
data protection in the police and justice sectors, which can restrict, wholly or partly, the data 
subject‟s right in order to assure the due performance of investigations and protect national 
security, as set out in Article 15. 
That is why special security-related needs have to be accommodated in the 
text of the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors. The Directive on 
Criminal Matters aims at balancing the data protection objectives with the security policy 
objectives and, while certainly contributing to the creation of a less fragmented general 
framework,
 139
 it doesn‟t solve all the shortcomings which had emerged before its entry into 
force. For example, the nature of investigation is undercover to keep secret from targeted 
convicts which against the principle of data subject‟s consent and noticed. 
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EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Principles in Annex II of the Privacy Shield contain a derogation 
that is identical to the derogation that was laid down in the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. 
Consistent with the goal of enhancing privacy protection, organizations should 
moreover strive to implement the Principles fully and transparently, including indicating in 
their privacy policies where exceptions to the Principles permitted by the U.S. legal 
framework will apply on a regular basis. For the same reason, where the option is allowable 
under the Principles and/or U.S. law, organizations are expected to opt for the higher 
protection where possible.
 140
 
The Privacy Shield is stated that, adherence to the Privacy Principles may be 
limited:
141
  
(a) to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law 
enforcement requirements;  
(b) by statute, government regulation, or case law that creates conflicting 
obligations or explicit authorizations, provided that, in exercising any such 
authorization, an organization can demonstrate that its non-compliance 
with the Principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet the 
overriding legitimate interests furthered by such authorization; or  
(c)  if the effect of the Directive or Member State law is to allow exceptions or 
derogations, provided such exceptions or derogations are applied in 
comparable contexts. 
  Nonetheless, there are rules in place in the United States designed to limit any 
interference for national security purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons whose 
personal data are transferred from the EU to the US under the Privacy Shield to what is 
strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question.
142
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Privacy Shield requires the US authorities to set out the safeguards and 
limitation and oversight mechanism in place for any access to data by public authorities for 
national security purposes. Therefore, US affirm that there is no indiscriminate, mass 
surveillance. For complaints on possible access by national intelligence authorities, a new 
Ombudsperson mechanism will be set up for monitoring, independent from the intelligence 
services.
143
 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
  Umbrella Agreement has given the sweeping exceptions and exemptions from 
the normal rules, already provided for in US law for the benefit of “national security”, which 
is itself excessively widely defined in US law, and for “protecting law enforcement-sensitive 
information”.144 Article 16(2) and 20(2) would be a smaller shield to the US legislative 
authorities which could effectively neutralize the transparency seemingly provided for by the 
Agreement. The differences between the old and new regime therefore remain: in the US, 
subject access can be denied when this is “reasonable” to protect law enforcement activities, 
while in Europe, the denial must be “indispensable” to that end. 145 As such the different 
between EU and US standard stills prevail. 
Even though the Umbrella Agreement set a clear list of exemptions
146
 but the 
exemptions in practice, de facto, would bar the possibility for the person to have access to 
their own data. Even if limited or performed by a trusted third party in situations where 
access is denied to protect sensitive law enforcement information.
147
 In the sense of Article 
16(4) it provides for an indirect form of access, but its application is limited only to cases 
„permitted under applicable domestic law‟. Hence, the practice of US Authorities, especially 
National Intelligence Agencies, remains the substantial threats to the right of internet users 
around the world. 
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4.3.2. Obligation of the Data Controller and Data Processor 
These 4 instruments relate to the role of both Private and Public Organizations who 
may produce effect to the enjoyment of right to personal data protection. By determining the 
basic obligations to such duty bearers, the instruments contribute critical improvements: 
design of the up-to-date obligation concerning the information technology in digital era, 
precise conditions and strong requirements in case of data processing and data retention, firm 
risk-based assessment measures and definite adequacy criterions for data transfer across 
border. This section not only surveys the progress but also analyzes the inferiors these 
instruments may retain. 
 
4.3.2.1. Basic Duty of Data Controller and Processor 
The Instruments draw scope on who are the controller and Processor. It 
becomes clear in the GDPR that all actors are included except the secret service authorities/ 
intelligence agencies. The implementation of GDPR and EU Directive are extra-territorial, 
burden of Data Controller and Processor apply beyond the border of EU. Furthermore, the 
bilateral agreements between EU and US cover the fundamental obligations duty bearer need 
to give. Nevertheless, these instruments do not apply to Non-EU Nationals even they are 
living in EU State Members‟ territory. 
 
EU GDPR 
For the first time, GDPR directly regulates data processors. As the old 
Directive 95/46/EC generally regulates controllers (i.e. those responsible for determining the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data) rather than “data processors”. 
Under GDPR, processors will be required to comply with a number of specific 
obligations, including to maintaining adequate documentation
148
, implement appropriate 
security standards
149
, carry out routine data protection impact assessments
150
, appoint a data 
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protection officer
151
, comply with rules on international data transfers
152
 and cooperate with 
national supervisory authorities
153
. These are in addition to the requirement for controllers to 
ensure that when appointing a processor, a written data processing agreement is put in place 
meeting the requirements of GDPR
154
. Repeatedly, these requirements have been enhanced 
and flourished compared to the equivalent requirements in the Directive 95/46/EC.  
Processors will be directly liable to sanctions
155
 if they fail to meet these 
criteria and may also face private claims by individuals for compensation
156
. 
The Regulation also requires detailed provisions in third-party processing 
contracts. This will have an impact on both controllers and processors, as they identify their 
processor agreements, review their commercial and legal positions for future agreements and 
renegotiate existing agreements.
 157
 
GDPR introduces a momentous new governance burden for those 
organizations which are covered by the new requirement to appoint a Data Protection Officer 
(DPO). Although this is already a requirement for most controllers in some countries under 
their own domestic data protection laws, it is an entirely new requirement for many 
organizations and might cost. 
Here are the criterion of organizations which must appoint a DPO:
158
 
 public authorities 
 controllers or processors whose core activities consist of processing 
operations which by virtue of their nature, scope or purposes require regular 
and systemic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale 
 controllers or processors whose core activities consist of processing 
sensitive personal data on a large scale. 
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DPOs must have "expert knowledge"
159
 of data protection law and practices though perhaps 
in recognition of the current shortage of experienced data protection professionals, it is 
possible to outsource the DPO role to a service provider
160
. 
Controllers and processors are required to ensure that the DPO is involved 
"properly and in a timely manner in all issues which relate to the protection of personal 
data."
161
 The role is therefore a sizeable responsibility for bigger controllers and processors. 
The DPO must directly report to the highest management level, must not be 
told what to do in the exercise of their tasks and must not be dismissed or penalized for 
performing their tasks.
 162
  
The specific tasks of the DPO are set out in GDPR including:
 163
 
 to inform and advise on compliance with GDPR and other Union and 
Member State data protection laws 
 to monitor compliance with law and with the internal policies of the 
organization including assigning responsibilities, awareness raising and 
training staff 
 to advise and monitor data protection impact assessments 
 to cooperate and act as point of contact with the supervisory authority 
Accountability is a persisting theme of GDPR. Data governance is no longer 
just a case of doing the good thing; organizations need to be able to verify that they have 
done the correctness to regulators, to data subjects and probably to shareholders and the 
media more frequent after a decision was taken. 
GDPR requires each controller to demonstrate compliance with the data 
protection principles.
164
 This general principle reveals itself in specific enhanced governance 
obligations which include: (besides appointment of DPO) 
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 Keeping a detailed record of processing operations  
The requirement in current data protection laws to notify the national data 
protection authority about data processing activities is repealed and 
supplanted by a more general obligation on the controller to retain extensive 
internal records of their data protection activities.
165
 The level of detail 
required is far more gigantic compared to many existing Member State 
notification requirements. There is some relief granted to organizations 
employing fewer than 250 people though the exemption is very narrowly 
drafted.
 166
 
 Notifying and keeping a comprehensive record of data breaches
167
  
 Implementing data protection by design and by default  
GDPR introduces the concepts of "data protection by design and by 
default".  "Data protection by design" requires taking data protection risks 
into account throughout the process of designing a new process, product or 
service, rather than treating it as an afterthought. This means assessing 
carefully and implementing appropriate technical and organizational 
measures and procedures from the outset to ensure that processing complies 
with GDPR and protects the rights of the data subjects.
168
  
"Data protection by default" requires ensuring mechanisms are in place 
within the organization to ensure that, by default, only personal data which 
are necessary for each specific purpose are processed. This obligation 
includes ensuring that only the minimum amount of personal data is 
collected and processed for a specific purpose; the extent of processing is 
limited to that necessary for each purpose; the data is stored no longer than 
necessary and access is restricted to that necessary for each purpose.
 169
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In GDPR, it destroys the line between “Privacy by Design” and “Privacy by 
Default” Model and combines it into the comprehensive data protection package for Data 
Subject in digital era. As priority, GDPR emphasize the advancement of information 
technology by employing either the Principle of “Data Protection by Design” and the “Data 
Protection by Default”: IT Corporations and State Authorities will be required to implement 
data protection by design (e.g., when creating new products, services or other data processing 
activities) and by default (e.g., by implementing data minimization techniques when collect 
or process data).
170
  They will also be required to perform data protection impact assessments 
to identify privacy risks in new products launching to E-Market.  
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
The Directive will be applied by competent authorities either domestically or 
when transmitting personal data between EU Member States or transferring personal data to 
third countries or international organizations. The competent authorities are defined as public 
authorities or anybody or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority 
and public powers.
 171
 The provisions of the Directive will be applied by public authorities 
and, under certain circumstances, private bodies.
172
  When competent authorities as defined 
in this Directive are processing personal data not for the purposes of the Directive they must 
apply the Regulation.  
The controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
ensure and be able to demonstrate compliance of their processing. The obligations of the processor 
such as to only act on instructions from the controller; ensure that the persons authorized to process 
the data respect confidentiality; make available to the controller all information that show that they are 
fulfilling their obligations.
173
 
The Member States must provide for the controllers to designate a data 
protection officer. Member States should however be able to exempt courts and other judicial 
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authorities when acting in their judicial capacity from this obligation.
174
 The purpose of 
designating a data protection officer is to improve compliance with the Directive. 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield notice requirements are more specific and detailed than 
what was required by the Safe Harbor regime. Safe Harbor required a privacy policy to 
provide information on data processing activities and address conformity with the Safe 
Harbor‟s privacy principles, but the Privacy Shield imposes a number of specific new 
additions.
175
 
A Privacy Shield company must inform data subject about:
176
 
• The types of personal data it processes; 
• The reasons why it processes personal data; 
• If it intends to transfer personal data on to another company and the reasons 
why; 
• Right to ask the company to access data subject‟s personal data; 
• Right to choose whether you allow a company to use personal data in a 
“materially different” way or to disclose it to another company (also known 
as the right to “opt-out”). When the data are sensitive, (that is, data that 
reveal, for example, ethnic origin or the state of your health) the Privacy 
Shield company has to inform data subject about the fact that it may only use 
or disclose such data if you allow this (also known as the right to “opt-in”); 
• How to contact the company if data subject have a complaint about the use of 
personal data; 
• The independent dispute resolution body, either in the EU or the U.S., where 
data subject can bring case; 
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• The government agency in the U.S. that is responsible to investigate and 
enforce the company‟s obligations under the framework; 
• The possibility that it may have to respond to lawful requests from U.S. 
public authorities to disclose information about you. 
The Privacy Shield companies must provide data subject with a link to its privacy policy if it 
has a public website or where data subject can access it in case it does not have a public 
website.
 177
 It must also provide data subject with a link to the Privacy Shield List on the 
Department of Commerce website so that data subject can easily check the Privacy Shield 
status of the company.
 178
 
  Under certain conditions and taking into account the purpose for which it 
received your personal data, the Privacy Shield companies may transfer them to another 
company. This can happen for instance when a company shares data subject‟s data (with a 
company that itself decides how to use the data, a so-called “controller”) without data subject 
objecting to that or concludes a service contract with a (sub-) processor (a so-called 
“agent”).179 
Privacy Shield companies are obliged to provide an independent recourse 
mechanism to investigate unresolved complaints.
180
 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Umbrella Agreement, without any arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between its own nationals and those of the other Party, provides safeguards to individuals 
such as access, rectification and administrative redress. It ensures that European nationals 
will benefit, in principle,
181
 from equal treatment with U.S. citizens when it comes to the 
practical implementation of these provisions by U.S. authorities. However, the obligation is 
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not covered by the agreement to Non-EU peoples, living in or traveling via the EU, the 
parties can collect, share or retain data as many distinctions
182
 as they like.  
Hence, Individuals are entitled to receive information regarding the purpose of 
processing and possible further use of their personal data. The person has right to know the 
laws or rules under which such processing takes place, the identity of third parties and to 
whom their personal information may be disclosed. As well as the access, rectification and 
redress mechanisms must be available for data subject.
183
 Article 20 of the Umbrella 
Agreement appears to allow US domestic law to stipulate that any of the matters listed in 
Article 20(1) shall not be made public, as long as such a restriction on transparency is 
“reasonable” in US-domestic-legal terms. Given the sweeping exceptions and exemptions 
from the normal rules, already provided for in US law for the benefit of “national security” – 
which is itself excessively widely defined in US law – and for “protecting law enforcement-
sensitive information” 184. 
In simple terms: Article 14 does not in any way ensure accountability of the 
parties in respect of their compliance, or non-compliance, with the Agreement. There is no 
solid accountability between the state parties and no accountability towards the general public 
authority oversight bodies (such as National DPA), State Parliaments or to general public 
authority.
185
 
Organizations have duty to raise the individuals' awareness as to why and by 
whom their data is processed contribute to the possibility for individuals to exercise their 
rights to access, rectification or redress.
186
 
4.3.2.2. Condition and Requirement of Data Collection and Processing 
The main conditions and requirements are mentioned is the principle of 
accountability and transparency. These instruments set the category of condition and push the 
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duty on controller/processer to acknowledge data subject in various details, different periods 
and with explicit manner. As GDPR is the most comprehensive legal instrument ever written 
about data processing, it will be the baseline of Data using conditions and requirements. How 
did the other three instruments embrace the principle of GDPR to their contents, and in which 
way, will be the mission of this section. As well as the consistencies and differences among 
these 4 instruments, conditions and requirements of Data Processing/Collection, will be 
reviewed. 
 
EU GDPR 
Even the core themes of the data protection principles in GDPR remain mainly 
as they were in the Directive 95/46/EC, though there has been an important boost of the 
standard for legitimate processing and the new principle of accountability has been put in. 
GDPR emphasize that Personal data must be:
 187
 
 Processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner (the "lawfulness, 
fairness and transparency principle") 
 Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes (the 
"purpose limitation principle") 
 Adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purpose(s) (the "data minimization principle") 
 Accurate and where necessary kept up to date (the "accuracy principle") 
 Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary for the purpose(s) for which the data are processed (the 
"storage limitation principle") 
 Processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data, using appropriate technical and organizational measures (the "integrity 
and confidentiality principle") 
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The controller is responsible for and must be able to prove compliance with the above 
principles (the "accountability principle"). 
The lawfulness, fairness and transparency principle amongst other things 
demands processing to fall within one or more of the approved legal justifications for 
processing. Where special categories of sensitive personal data are mentioned, additional 
much more restrictive legal justifications must also be reached.  
Although the structure was present in the Directive 95/46/EC, the changes 
introduced by GDPR will make it much tougher for organizations to stay within the legal 
justifications for processing. Failure to comply with this principle is subject to the very 
highest fines,
188
 whichever is the greater. 
In particular: 
 The bar for valid consents has been raised much higher under GDPR. 
Consents must be fully unbundled from other terms and conditions and will 
not be valid unless freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.
189
 
Consent also attracts additional baggage for controllers in the form of extra 
rights for data subjects (the right to be forgotten and the right to data 
portability) relative to some of the other legal justifications. Consent must 
be as easy to withdraw consent as it is to give – data subjects have the right 
to withdraw consent at any time – and unless the controller has another 
legal justification for processing any processing based on consent alone 
would need to cease once consent is withdrawn.
190
 
 To compound the challenge for controllers, in addition to a hardening of the 
requirements for valid consent, GDPR has also narrowed the legal 
justification allowing data controllers to process in their legitimate interests. 
This justification also appears in the Directive 95/46/EC though the 
interpretation of the concept in the old regime has varied significantly 
among the different Member States with some such as the UK and Ireland 
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taking a very broad view of the justification and others such as Germany 
taking a much more restrictive interpretation. GDPR has followed a more 
Germanic approach, narrowing the circumstances in which processing will 
be considered to be necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests of 
the controller or a third party. In particular, the ground can no longer be 
relied upon by public authorities.
191
 Where it is depended upon, controllers 
will need to specify what the lawful interests are in information notices and 
will need to consider and document why they consider that their lawful 
interests are not overshadow by the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subjects, such in Children‟s right case. 
The justification allowing processing necessary for the performance of a contract to which 
the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject to enter into 
a contract is preserved in GDPR, though continues to be narrowly drafted. Processing which 
is not necessary to the performance of a contract will not be covered. The less good news for 
controllers relying on this justification is that it comes with additional burdens under GDPR, 
including the right to data portability and the right to be forgotten
192
 (unless the controller is 
able to rely on another justification).  
Other justifications incorporate where processing is necessary for compliance 
with a legal duty; where processing is necessary to protect the critical benefits of a data 
subject or another person where the data subject is ineligible of expressing consent; where 
processing is necessary for conduct of a task undertake in the public interest in the exercise of 
official authority empower in the controller. These widely reflect justifications in the 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
It is frequent the case that organizations will want to process data collected for 
one purpose for a new purpose which was not exposed to the data subject at the time the data 
was first collected. This is possibly in contra with the essence principle of purpose limitation 
and to certify that the rights of data subjects are protected, GDPR draws a set of prerequisites 
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that the controller must ensure whether the new process is compatible with the purposes for 
which the personal data were primarily collected. These considerations include:
 193
 
 any link between the original purpose and the new purpose 
 the context in which the data have been collected 
 the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of 
data or data relating to criminal convictions are processed (with the 
inference being that if they are it will be much harder to form the view that 
a new purpose is compatible) 
 the possible consequences of the new processing for the data subjects 
 the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or 
pseudonymisation. 
If the controller sumps up that the new purpose is incompatible with the initial purpose, then 
the only groundes to justify the new purpose are a new consent or a legal obligation (more 
specifically an EU or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society). 
As compare to the Directive 95/46/EC, GDPR sets a higher bar to justify the 
processing of special categories of personal data. These are defined to include "data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union 
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex 
life or sexual orientation."
 194
 Processing of these data are prohibited unless one or more 
specified grounds are met which are broadly similar to the grounds set out in the Directive. 
Processing of special categories of personal data is only permitted:
 195
 
 with the explicit consent of the data subject 
 where necessary for the purposes of carrying out obligations and exercising 
rights under employment, social security and social protection law or a 
collective agreement  
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 where necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another 
natural person who is physically or legally incapable of giving consent 
 in limited circumstances by certain not-for-profit bodies 
 where processing relates to the personal data which are manifestly made 
public by the data subject 
 where processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of 
legal claims or where courts are acting in their legal capacity 
 where necessary for reasons of substantial public interest on the basis of 
Union or Member State law, proportionate to the aim pursued and with 
appropriate safeguards 
 where necessary for preventative or occupational medicine, for assessing 
the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, provision of 
health or social care or treatment of the management of health or social care 
systems and services 
 where necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, 
such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring 
high standards of health care and of medical products and devices 
 where necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with 
restrictions set out in Article 89(1) 
The requirements and conditions for processing sensitive data is the unique issue where 
Member States are allowed to introduce domestic laws including greater conditions and 
restrictions for processing. 
  GDPR urges the data controller to perform data protection impact assessment 
for high risk processing.
196
 A data protection impact assessment will become a mandatory 
pre-requisite before processing personal data for processing which is likely to result in a high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Specific examples are set out of high risk 
processing requiring impact assessments including: automated processing including profiling 
that produce legal effects or similarly significantly affect individuals; processing of sensitive 
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personal data; and systematic monitoring of publicly accessible areas on a large scale. DPOs, 
where in place, have to be consulted. Where the impact assessment indicates high risks in the 
absence of measures to be taken by the controller to mitigate the risk, the supervisory 
authority must also be consulted
197
 and may second guess the measures proposed by the 
controller and has the power to require the controller to impose different or additional 
measures.
198
 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
GDPR largely mirrors the requirements of the Directive on Criminal Matters. 
This data may only be processed under official authority or when authorized by the Union or 
Member State law
199
 which means this is another area where legal requirements and practice 
is likely to diverge among the different Member States. 
Collaboration between the E.U. and Interpol are strengthened by promoting 
the exchange of personal information, but that exchange is balanced against personal rights 
regarding the “automatic processing of personal data”. 
Processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent, and only for 
the purposes were laid down by law. However, this does not prevent the criminal justice 
system from carrying out covert investigations or video surveillance for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including keeping the public safe from threats, but always in accordance 
with the law.
 200
  This is declared to be necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic 
society, with due regard for the legitimate interests of the data subjects involved. The right of 
“fair data processing” 201  is different from the right to a fair trial. 
The purposes for which the personal data are processed must be explicit and 
legitimate and determined at the time of the collection of the personal data. The personal data 
processed base on adequate and relevant purposes. The collection of personal data must not 
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be excessive and data must not be kept longer than necessary for the purposes. Personal data 
could be processed only if the purpose of the processing would not reasonably be fulfilled by 
other means.
 202
  Personal data collected must be accurate. Incorrect personal data must not be 
knowingly shared. 
The Directive on Criminal Matters has the different articles on data protection 
and connected rights compare to GDPR. However, several principles relating to processing of 
personal data are the same as those enshrined in the GDPR.  Because of the peculiarity of the 
field, while the basic data protection principles are included in its text, some of those set out 
in the GDPR are not included in the Directive on Criminal Matters. For example, as far as the 
characteristics the data should have in order to be processed by the competent authorities are 
concerned, it may be observed that not all the conditions required by the GDPR in order to 
consider the data processing lawful and fair need to be met.
 203
  The consent of the data 
subject, for instance, is not a necessary condition for processing personal data by the 
competent authorities when they order natural persons to comply with requests made in order 
to perform the tasks of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal 
offences.
204
  
The regulation of profiling deserves a separate mention, profiling is especially 
problematic in the police and criminal justice context, because if profiles are misused they 
can lead to stressful situations for individuals, who could be put under surveillance or 
arrested on the grounds of automated processing of personal data. The compatibility with the 
presumption of innocence can be questioned.
 205
  It is necessary to underline here that in this 
regard the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors provides substantial 
and procedural safeguards. Member States are prohibited from providing for a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling,
 206
  which produces an adverse legal 
effect concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her, unless authorized by 
Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate 
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safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject.
 207
  The Directive also stresses that 
profiling resulting in discrimination against natural persons shall be prohibited.
208
 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
In principle, a Privacy Shield company can use data subject‟s personal data 
only for the purpose for which it has originally collected your data or which data subjects 
have subsequently authorized.
209
 If it wants to use data subject‟s data for a different purpose, 
this depends on how much the original purpose diverges from the new purpose:
210
 
• Using personal data for a purpose that is incompatible with the original 
purpose is never allowed
211
; 
• If the new purpose is different but related to the original one (i.e. “materially 
different”), the Privacy Shield company may only use your data if data 
subject do not object or, in the case of sensitive data, only if data subject 
consent.
212
 
• If the new purpose is different from the original one but still close enough 
that it would not be considered as materially different, such use is 
permissible.
213
 
The lack of definition of what is to be regarded as a „materially different‟ 
purpose will lead to confusion and legal uncertainty. It should be clarified that in any case, 
the Choice principle cannot be used to circumvent the Purpose limitation principle.
214
 Choice 
should be applicable only where the purpose is materially different but still compatible since 
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the processing for incompatible purpose is prohibited.
215
 It has to be clarified that the right to 
opt-out cannot enable the organization to use data for incompatible purposes.  Hence, it 
recommends harmonizing the related wording by using a single and defined wording (e.g. 
“materially different but nevertheless compatible purpose”). 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Umbrella Agreement applies the purpose limitation principle to all 
transfers of personal data covered by the Umbrella Agreement. Processing can take place 
only for explicit and legitimate purposes within the scope of the Agreement. Further 
processing of personal information by other (law enforcement, regulatory or administrative) 
authorities than the first receiving authority of a Party is allowed on condition that it is not 
incompatible with the purposes for which it was originally transferred. The personal 
information shall only be processed if "directly relevant to and not excessive or overbroad in 
relation to the purposes of such processing".
216
 
Article 6 is a key provision of the Agreement: it ensures that the application of 
the safeguards to the entire "life cycle": the right of data subject will be protected in all steps 
of the extended process. It confirm the protection to the given personal data set from the 
original transfer from the EU to its processing by a US competent authority and vice-versa, as 
well as its possible further sharing with/processing by another US authority. In the case of a 
data transfer from the US to a competent authority of the EU or (one of ) its Member States 
and its possible further sharing with/processing by another EU or Member State authority 
will be regulated under the Article 6.
217
 
Data quality and integrity of information Principle is ensured that transferred 
personal data is maintained with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness as is 
necessary and appropriate for lawful processing of the information. The receiving or 
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transferring authority must give feasible advises to transferring/receiving authority of threats 
to information integrity.
218
  
The processing of sensitive personal may only take place when appropriate 
safeguards are in place in accordance with law requiring supervisory approval to access the 
information. Agreements allowing the "bulk transfer" of personal data will have to further 
specify the standards and conditions under which special categories of data can be 
processed.
219
 The provisions on special categories of data are coherent with the requirement 
that processing shall be directly relevant and not excessive purpose and use limitations under 
Article 6.  
Data processing that may result in decisions having negative consequences on 
an individual (Automated decision-making e.g. in the context of profiling) may not be based 
solely on the automated processing of personal information, unless authorized by domestic 
law, and provided that appropriate safeguards are in place,
220
 including the possibility to 
obtain human intervention. This is especially important in the area of law enforcement, where 
the consequences of profiling on individuals are potentially more severe. However, the 
threshold to be met before triggering the applicability of Article 15 is quite high, because it 
requires the decisions to produce "significant adverse actions" in order not to be solely based 
on automatic processing.
221
 While EU law usually prohibits such profiling, it also requires 
„appropriate safeguards that include the possibility to obtain human intervention‟ if the 
automated decision-making has taken place. 
 
4.3.2.3. Data Security 
The 4 instruments especially the Umbrella Agreement and Directive on 
Criminal Matters, which protect personal data relate to criminal matters, create the stronger 
protection when it deal with State Authority who may generate more sensitive issues to Data 
Security. Nonetheless, all of 4 instruments set out the common standard on Risk Assessment 
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Procedure, that urge the data controller/processor to carry out assessment of their filing 
system and have the monitoring protocol for their system in period of time. 
 
EU GDPR 
The prominent change to be introduced by GDPR is a European wide 
requirement to notify data breaches to supervisory authorities and affected individuals. In the 
US, data breach notification laws are now in force in 47 States
222
 and the hefty penalties for 
failing to notify have fundamentally changed the way US organizations investigate and 
respond to data incidents. Not notifying has become a high risk option.  
In contrast, Europe currently has no universally applicable law requiring 
notification of breaches. In the majority of Member States there is either no general 
obligation to notify or minimal sanctions for failing to do so; for many organizations not 
notifying and thereby avoiding the often damaging media fall-out is still common practice in 
Europe. That is set to change fundamentally when GDPR comes into force. 
GDPR requires "the controller without undue delay, and where feasible, not 
later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, [to] notify the … breach to the 
supervisory authority" 
223
 When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to 
the rights and freedoms of individuals the controller is also required to notify the affected 
individuals "without undue delay"
224
. Processors are required to notify the controller without 
undue delay having become aware of the breach
225
. 
The notification to the regulator must include if capable the categories and 
approximate numbers of individuals and records concerned, the name of the organization‟s 
DPO or other contact, the likely consequences of the breach and the measures taken to relieve 
harm
226
. 
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Although the obligation to notify is conditional on awareness, controllers are 
required to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures together with a 
process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of those measures to 
ensure the security of processing
227
. Controllers are also required to retain a record of all data 
breaches
228
, whether or not notified to the supervisory authority, and allow monitors by the 
supervisory authority. 
GDPR urge duty bearer to undertake risk-based approach to compliance. The 
Regulation recognizes a risk-based approach, under which IT Corporations would bear 
responsibility for assessing the degree of risk that their processing activities lay to data 
subjects which means Low-Risk processing activities encounter a decreased compliance 
burden. On the contary, the data protection impact assessments report will be required for 
high-risk processing activities. These compliance steps will need to be integrated into future 
product cycles
229
 which will launch to the E-Market. 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
Under this Directive, there is an obligation on Data Controller to carry out an 
impact assessment which is necessary before the controller can carry out a processing where 
the processing is likely to result in a high risk for the rights and freedoms of natural persons. 
The Directive sets out the situations in which an impact assessment is compulsory in similar 
terms as the text of the Regulation. The elements that the impact assessment must contain are 
however less detailed than in the GDPR.
230
 The assessment must contain at least a general 
description of the processing to be carried out, an assessment of the risks to the rights and 
freedoms of the data subjects, safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the 
protection of personal data
231
  and to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of the 
Directive. 
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EU-US Privacy Shield 
Data security requirements are unchanged under the Privacy Shield 
Framework. Organizations joining the Privacy Shield Framework must take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to protect EU personal data from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration, and destruction, taking into “due account” the risks232 involved in the 
processing and the nature of the personal data. 
Thus, The registered company must ensure that any personal data are kept in a 
safe environment and secured against loss, misuse, unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration 
or destruction, taking due account of the nature of the data and the risks involved in the 
processing.
233
 The data security risk assessment process may be introduced to routinely 
supervision. 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Article 9 and 10 of Umbrella Agreement contribute to ensuring a high 
level of security of personal data exchanged by the parties.  
The employment of appropriate technical, security and organizational 
arrangements will be put in place by the Parties for the protection of personal information 
against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss, and unauthorized disclosure, 
alteration, access or other processing.
234
 Moreover, accession to personal data would be 
granted only to the authorized staff.  
In case of a security incident presenting a significant risk of damage, 
appropriate action shall be promptly taken to mitigate the damage, including notification to 
the transferring authority and, where appropriate given the circumstances of the incident, the 
individual concerned.
235
 Exceptions to the notification obligation are exhaustively listed in 
the provision and correspond to reasonable limitations (public safety, national security). The 
notification of information security incidents, Article 10(2)(b) allows for the omission of the 
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notification of a data breach where the notification "may endanger national security",
236
 with 
a vague effect on the ground of a possible consequence, „may‟, on national security is 
unclear. The necessity of omitting the notification altogether, and not merely delaying it or 
restricting for security reasons the quality of recipients entitled to receive the information. 
Moreover, specific conditions for delaying notifications to the transferring Competent 
Authority are not referred to in the text.
 237
 
 
4.3.2.4. Data Retention 
Although all 4 instruments contain the set of provision relate to Data 
Retention, There are 2 specific instruments adopted to fix the problem of CJEU verdict that 
invalidate old EU Data Retention Directive. Not only the new EU Data Retention Directive 
but also the EU-US Umbrella agreement set up a better oversight system and bring in a 
Check and Balance Principle to data retention in criminal and security realm. All 4 
instruments give rights to data subject to access, rectify, noticed and appeal to such data 
controllers/processors who detain their personal data for particular purpose. 
 
EU GDPR 
GDPR largely reflects the requirements of the Directive on Criminal Matters. 
This data may only be processed under official authority or when authorized by Union or 
Member State law
238
 which means this is another area where legal requirements and practice 
is likely to diverge among the different Member States. 
Under GDPR, processors will be required to comply with a number of specific 
obligations, including to maintaining adequate documentation
239
, comply with rules on 
international data transfers
240
 and cooperate with national supervisory authorities
241
. These 
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requirements have been supplemented and crystallized due to the data retention requirements 
in the 2016 Directive on criminal matters.  
This general principle manifests itself in specific enhanced governance 
obligation to keeping a detailed record of processing operations.
242
 The requirement in the old 
data protection laws, to notify the national data protection authority about data processing 
operations, is eradicated and repealed by a more general obligation on the controller to keep 
comprehensive internal records of their data protection practices.  
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
Public authorities (e.g., taxing authorities) that collect personal information are 
not to have their databases of personal information interlinked with those of the criminal 
justice system. Instead, requests for information should follow existing requirements of being 
in writing, authorized, and ad hoc. 
Criminal justice authorities may collect data that extends beyond the amount 
required for the direct purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties,
 243
  if they need to do so in order to 
understand the criminal activities or make links between criminal offences. 
Data collected about persons for the purposes of the administration of criminal 
justice should distinguish between who is a subject, who is accused, who is convicted, who is 
a victim, who is a witness, etc. 
There are obligations to the controller to provide a sufficient amount of 
information to fulfill the purpose of the records. It is for example compulsory for the 
controller to add information about categories of recipients to whom the personal data have 
been or will be disclosed, the categories of transfers of personal data to a third country or an 
international organization or where possible the envisaged time limits for erasure of the 
different categories of personal data.
244
 The controller must also provide information about 
profiling, which is not the case in the GDPR. 
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It is important to keep logs for making it possible to establish the justification, date 
and time of certain processing operations in automated processing systems, such as collection, 
consultation, disclosure and transfers. Logs of consultation and disclosure also allow to identifying the 
person who has consulted or disclosed personal data as well as the identity of the recipient. A new 
element in the Directive on Criminal Matters is that the logs can also be used for criminal 
proceedings.
 245
 However, bringing automated processing systems into conformity is a very 
significance, lengthy and costly process. A supplementary extension for bringing automated 
processing systems into conformity is foreseen in exceptional cases for a particular automated 
processing system set up before the entry into force of the Directive
246
  if this would otherwise cause 
serious difficulties for the operation of that particular automated processing system. 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield includes more detail on compatible purposes and includes 
new language on data retention limit: “Information may be retained in a form identifying or 
making identifiable the individual only for as long as it serves a purpose [consistent with the 
purpose limitation principle].”247 The new framework explicitly states that, even if an 
organization terminates its certification in Privacy Shield, the organization remains bound by 
the Privacy Shield principles with respect to any personal data it retains that was collected 
under the Privacy Shield. Organizations must continue to affirm their commitment to apply 
the principles to any retained data.
 248
 
The Privacy Shield companies may only receive and process personal data to 
the extent they are relevant for the purpose of processing, and they have to ensure that the 
data used is accurate, reliable, complete and up to date. It is only allowed to keep data 
subject‟s personal data for as long as necessary for the purpose of processing. Companies 
may keep personal data for longer periods only if they need them for certain specified 
purposes such as archiving in the public interest, journalism, literature and art, scientific or 
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historical research, or for statistical analysis.
249
 If personal data continue to be processed for 
these purposes, the company must of course comply with the Privacy Principles. 
Monitoring and oversight
250
 
The new arrangement will be transparent and contain effective supervision 
mechanisms to ensure that companies follow the rules they submitted themselves to. The US 
has committed to stronger oversight by the Department of Commerce as well as stronger 
cooperation between European Data Protection Authorities and the Federal Trade 
Commission. This will transform the system from a self-regulating one into an oversight 
system that is more responsive as well as proactive. 
However, the lack of provisions imposing a limit on the retention of data 
under the Privacy Shield gives organizations the possibility to keep data as long as they wish, 
even after leaving the Privacy Shield, which is not in line with the essential data retention 
limitation principle.
251
 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Parties shall have in place effective methods (such as logs) for 
demonstrating the lawfulness of processing and use of personal information. This 
requirement represents a significant safeguard for individuals, as it puts the onus on law 
enforcement authorities to demonstrate that a given data processing operation was carried out 
in accordance with the law. The obligation to document data processing operations entails, in 
particular, that there will be a "trace" in case of unlawful processing.
252
 This should facilitate 
the handling of complaints and the introduction of claims regarding the lawfulness of the 
processing operations.  
Under the Umbrella Agreement, the processing of data will be subject to 
specific retention periods in order to ensure that data will not be retained for longer than 
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necessary and appropriate. To determine the duration of these retention periods, a number of 
elements will have to be taken into account, in particular the purpose of processing or use, the 
nature of the data and the impact on the rights and interests of the data subjects concerned.
253
 
It is also specified that, where the Parties conclude an agreement on the transfer of "bulk 
data", such agreement must contain a specific provision on the applicable retention period.
254
 
With this provision, the Parties accept the principle that such bulk transfer agreements shall 
contain a specific retention period, which therefore will not have to be negotiated again and 
again, taking into account the principles of proportionality and necessity. 
The retention periods will be subject to periodic reviews to determine whether 
changed circumstances require any modification of the applicable period. To ensure 
transparency, retention periods will have to be made publicly available or otherwise 
published. 
 
4.3.2.5. Data Transfer  
These 4 instruments are adopted on the fundamental data transfer Principle, 
Adequacy criterions of protection. Attempting to create a single E-Market, these instruments 
especially EU-US bilateral Agreements try to construct a Bloc of protection, with the same 
standard level, across Atlantic. However, there is a convenience from the US side since the 
duty does not automatically oblige to all IT corporations. Only the Privacy Shield registered 
company are abiding themselves to the EU standard in order to access EU E-Market. On the 
other hand, all EU entrepreneurs are bided to follow the standard in Mid-2018 due to the 
direct effect of GDPR and further Directive on Criminal Matters implementation in EU 
Member States. The adaptation path to common regime of EU-US E-Market will be 
elucidated in this section as it will displays possible options to reach the adequacy principle. 
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EU GDPR 
International transfers and particularly those to the US have regularly made 
front page headline news over the last 12 months with the successful torpedoing of the 
EU/US Safe Harbor regime by Europe's highest court. Data Controller/Processor duty to 
Adequacy principle, Most of GDPR part will not make any material changes to the current 
rules for transfers of personal data cross-border, largely it will reflect the same regime under 
the Directive 95/46/EC. On the contrary to the old regime where sanctions for breaching 
transfer restrictions are small, failure to comply with GDPR's transfer requirements attract the 
highest category of fines. 
Transfers of personal data to third countries outside the EU are only permitted 
where the conditions laid down in GDPR are met.
255
  
Transfers to third countries, territories or specified sectors or an international 
organization which the Commission has decided ensures an adequate level of protection do 
not require any specific authorization.
256
 The adequacy decisions made under the Directive 
95/46/EC shall remain in force under GDPR until amended or repealed
257
; so before 25
th
 May 
2018 transfers to some countries, accession to the old Directive 95/46/EC, are permitted. 
Transfers are also permitted where adequate safeguards have been given by 
the controller or processor and on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective 
legal remedies for the data subject are available. There are possible ways to transfer data from 
EU such as the list of adequate safeguards, binding corporate rules (BCR), which now 
enjoyable under GDPR and standard contractual clauses.
258
 Again, decisions on adequacy 
made under the Directive 95/46/EC will generally be valid under GDPR until amended, 
replaced or repealed. 
GDPR Binding Corporate Rules (“BCRs”), BCRs are binding data protection 
corporate policies and programmes that are used to lawfully transfer personal data globally 
within a group of companies. The GDPR formally recognizes BCRs. They will still require 
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SA approval, but the approval process should become less onerous than the current system. 
BCRs are available to both controllers and processors.
259
 
Two new mechanics are introduced by GDPR to justify international transfers: 
controllers or processors may also depend on a verified code of conduct pursuant to Article 
40 or an approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 together in each case with 
binding and enforceable commitments in the third country to apply these safeguards 
including as concerns data subjects' rights. GDPR also discards the need to notify and in 
some Member States pursue prior approval of model clauses from supervisory authorities.
 260
 
GDPR includes a list of derogations similar to those included in the Directive 
permitting transfers where: 
261
 
(a) explicit informed consent has been obtained 
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract or the 
implementation of pre-contractual measures 
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interests of the data subject between the controller and 
another natural or legal person 
(d) the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interest 
(e) the transfer is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal 
claims 
(f) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject where consent cannot be obtained 
(g) the transfer is made from a register which according to EU or Member 
State law is intended to provide information to the public, subject to certain 
conditions.  
There is a very limited derogation to transfer when no other mechanic is 
available and the transfer is necessary for the purposes of compelling lawful benefits of the 
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controller which are not overcome by the interests and rights of the data subject; notification 
to the supervisory authority is required if basing on this derogation. 
Transfers given precedents by courts, tribunals or administrative authorities of 
countries outside the EU are only recognized or enforceable (within the EU) where they are 
based on an international agreement such as a mutual legal assistance treaty in force between 
the requesting third country and the EU or Member State; otherwise transfer in response to 
such requests, where there is no other legal basis for transfer, may violate GDPR's 
restrictions.
 262
 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
With regard to the transfer of personal data to third countries or international 
organizations the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors requires that 
personal information be allowed to be transmitted by an EU Member State to a third country 
only if the Commission has decided that the recipient ensures an “adequate” level of 
protection. The concept of adequate level of protection has been defined by the Court of 
Justice in the Schrems case as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its 
domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union. 
Therefore, here again the Directive for data protection in the police and justice 
sectors had to maintain a careful balance between, on the one hand, the requirements of 
police and criminal justice work and existing bilateral agreements and, on the other, the 
requirement for an increased level of personal data protection. The Directive for data 
protection in the police and justice sectors does little to affect bilateral agreements already in 
place. Admittedly this wording automatically turns all bilateral agreements into definite term 
ones, in need of amendment to match the Directive‟s standards immediately when the first 
opportunity arises.
263
 However, if Member States – that are called upon, but not obliged to 
actively seek to amend bilateral agreements in the foreseeable future – do not take action, the 
prolonged existence of those bilateral agreements which apply lower standards than the 
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Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors could undermine the whole 
international data transfer edifice.
264
 
The general principles lay down the choices for the controllers to transfer personal 
data, in descending order of preference, starting with the adequacy decisions. In the articles on 
transfers by way of appropriate safeguards and derogations for specific situations, such transfers must 
be documented and that the documentation must be made available to the supervisory authority
265
  as 
well as the elements that the documentation must contain. 
The personal data can be transferred only if the controller in the third country or 
international organization is an authority competent for the purposes in Article 1(1) of the draft 
Directive. Therefore allows the above-mentioned competent authorities, in individual and specific 
cases, and as long as the other provisions of the Directive are complied with and that a number of 
exhaustively listed conditions are fulfilled, to transfer personal data directly to recipients because 
international agreements do not always allow for the swift reply that may be required.
 266
  These 
conditions include that the transfer is strictly necessary for the performance of a task of the 
transferring competent authority as provided for by Union or Member State law for the purposes set 
out in Article 1(1), the transferring competent authority considers that the transfer to an authority that 
is competent for the purposes referred to in Article 1(1) in the third country is ineffective or 
inappropriate, in particular because the transfer cannot be achieved in good time and that the 
transferring authority informs the recipient of the specified purpose or purposes for which the 
personal data must be processed.
267
 Like for the transfers on the basis of safeguards and on the basis 
of derogations of specific situations, an obligation of documentation of the transfer has been added.
 
Such transfers could be particularly useful where there is an urgent need to transfer personal data to 
save the life of a person who is in danger of attacking,
268
  a victim of a criminal offence or in the 
interest of preventing an imminent perpetration of a crime, including terrorism.  
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EU-US Privacy Shield 
The well-publicized gap for transfers from the EU to US following the ruling 
that Safe Harbor is invalid then will be filled with the new EU-US Privacy Shield. To transfer 
personal data from the EU to the U.S. different tools are available such as contractual clauses, 
binding corporate rules and the Privacy Shield. If the Privacy Shield is used, U.S. companies 
must first sign up to this framework with the U.S. Department of Commerce. The obligation 
applying to companies under the Privacy Shield are contained in the “Privacy Principles”.269 
In order to be able to certify, companies must have a privacy policy in line with the Privacy 
Principles. They must renew their “membership” to the Privacy Shield on an annual basis. If 
they do not, they can no longer receive and use personal data from the EU under that 
framework. The Privacy Shield List on the website of the Department of Commerce. This list 
gives details of all the companies taking part in the Privacy Shield, the kind of personal data 
they use, and the kind of services they offer. Data subject can also find a list of companies 
that are no longer part of the Privacy Shield. This means they are no longer allowed to 
receive data subject‟s personal data under the Privacy Shield.270 Also, these companies may 
only keep personal data if they commit to the Department of Commerce that they will 
continue to apply the Privacy Principles. 
The Privacy Shield imposes new requirements (and liability for) onward 
transfers of data to third parties.
 271
 The Privacy Shield provides for a right to opt-out to 
disclosure of personal information to a third party or to the use of personal information for a 
purpose materially different
272. In addition, individuals benefit from an „opt-out‟ right to the 
use of personal information for direct marketing purpose at any time
273
. 
Data subject also have a right to choose whether data subject allow a Privacy 
Shield company to pass on your personal data to another company, whether in the U.S. or in 
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another non-EU country.
274
 While data subject‟s do not have such a choice when your data 
will be sent to another company (also known as an “agent”) for processing on behalf,  in the 
name and under the instructions of the Privacy Shield company,
 275 
the Privacy Shield 
company will have to sign a contract with the agent that obliges the latter to provide the same 
data protection safeguards as contained in the Privacy Shield framework.
276
 And the Privacy 
Shield companies can be held liable for its agent‟s actions if the agent does not respect the 
rules. 
Irrespective of its location, within or outside the U.S., the company that 
receives the data must ensure the same level of protection of your personal data as guaranteed 
under the Privacy Shield framework. This requires a contract between the Privacy Shield 
organization and the third party setting out the conditions under which the third party can use 
your personal data and its responsibilities to protect your data.
277
 This contract will have to 
require the third party to inform the Privacy Shield company of situations where it cannot 
continue to meet its obligations, in which case it must stop using the data. Stricter rules apply 
where a third party is acting as an agent on behalf of a Privacy Shield company.
278
  
Accordingly, the duty to put in place contracts to ensure that a third party 
Controller will provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the 
Privacy Shield principles.
279
 The purpose is to ensure that personal data continue to be 
protected adequately,
280
 even after having been transferred onward. 
The controller and agent must sign contract which has the same rules as 
GDPR Binding Corporate Rules (“BCRs”).281 Hereafter, the Privacy Shield organizations 
could be held liable for the sanctions of an agent that do not follow its obligations to protect 
personal data of data subject.
282
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However, guarantee will not apply in case an organization has chosen to 
cooperate with a DPA.
283
  
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The onward transfer limitations in Umbrella Agreement entail that in case a 
U.S. authority intends to further transfer data it has received from the EU or one of its 
Member States to a third country/international organization not bound by the agreement,
284
 it 
will first have to obtain the consent from the law enforcement authority in the EU which has 
originally transferred the data to the United States. This rule equally applies in case an 
authority of the EU or one of its Member States intends to further transfer data it has received 
from the U.S. to a third country/international organization.  
When deciding to grant its consent, the original transferring authority will 
have to take into due account all relevant factors, including the purpose for which the data 
was initially transferred and whether the third country or international organization offers an 
appropriate level of protection of personal information.
285
 It may also subject the transfer to 
specific conditions.  
Furthermore, as for the articles on purpose limitation
286
, retention periods
287
  
and sensitive data
288
, this Article expressly takes into account the special sensitivity of the 
transfer in bulk of data of unsuspected persons (e.g. PNR data of every passenger taking a 
flight, independently of any specific suspicion), in that it requires that any further transfer of 
personal information "other than in relation to specific cases"
289
 may only take place under 
                                                             
283 Ibid, Annex II, III.5.a in fine. 
284 Ibid, Article 7. 
285 European Commission. Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of 
personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal 
offenses. 29 Apr. 2016, p. 8. 
286 EU-US. Umbrella Agreement. 2016, Article 6. 
287 Ibid, Article 12. 
288 Ibid, Article 13. 
289 European Commission. Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of 
303 
 
specific conditions set forth in the agreement that provide due justification for the onward 
transfer.  
The specific situation of onward transfers to another State within the EU (e.g. 
the French police sharing with the German police information received from the U.S. FBI) is 
also addressed in this Article
290
  by providing that if under applicable rules such transfers are 
subject to prior consent, the authority which has originally sent the information (e.g. the U.S. 
FBI) will not be able to refuse consent or impose conditions on data protection grounds
291
 (all 
the criminal matters authorities involved are bound by the Umbrella Agreement). 
 
4.3.3. Implementation of Personal Data Protection 
The most controversial issue in the negotiations among EU Member states and 
between EU and US to adopt these instruments is the implementation measures. As the old 
regime leave the implementation measure with domestic judicial system or National Data 
protection Authority, it depends on various domestic data protection laws. The value-added 
of new regime will be exhibited in three areas; monitoring, redress and enforcement. 
However, the obstacles to full enjoyment of right to personal data protection that come from 
the imperfections of EU-US regime will be mentioned too. 
 
4.3.3.1. Monitoring Body and Supervisory Authority  
EU GDPR provides One-stop shop for EU citizen to recourse their right in 
single channel but the solid mechanism has not been concluded yet. Old Directive 95/46/EC 
leaves each member state to set up the oversight/monitor system relate to the diversified of 
criminal procedure of each state. EU-US Privacy Shield use a regime of Self-Regulate which 
mean the registered must contain themselves in line otherwise they may be disapproved when 
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the case is raise to Federal Trade Commission. EU-US Umbrella Agreement adopted a joint-
committee to periodically oversight the data controller/processor. 
 
EU GDPR 
The long for a one-stop-shop ensuring that controllers present in multiple 
Member States would only have to answer to their lead home regulator failed to make it into 
the final draft. GDPR includes a complex, bureaucratic procedure allowing multiple 
'concerned' authorities to input into the decision making process. Currently, a Data Protection 
Authority (“DPA”) may exercise authority over businesses established in its territory or 
otherwise falling within its jurisdiction.
292
 Under the Regulation, where a business is 
established in more than one EU Member State, the supervisory authority (“SA”) of the main 
establishment of the business will act as the lead authority for data processing activities that 
have an impact throughout the EU and will co-ordinate its work with other SAs. In addition, 
each SA will have jurisdiction over complaints and possible violations of the Regulation in 
their own Member State.
293
 
The starting point for enforcement of GDPR is that controllers and processors 
are regulated by and answer to the supervisory authority for their main or single 
establishment, the so-called "lead supervisory authority".
294
  
Nonetheless, the lead supervisory authority is required to coordinate with all 
other "concerned" authorities and there are powers for a supervisory authority in another 
Member State to enforce where violation occur on its territory or essentially affects data 
subjects only in its territory.
295
  
In circumstances where many supervisory authorities are involved in an 
investigation or enforcement process there must be a cooperation procedure
296
 involving a 
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lengthy decision making process and a right to refer to the consistency mechanism
297
 if a 
decision cannot be pursued, ultimately with the European Data Protection Board having the 
mandate to make a binding decision. 
GDPR supply the Broad investigative and corrective powers. Supervisory 
authorities also enjoy wide investigative and corrective powers
298
including the power to 
undertake in-field data protection monitors and the power to issue public warnings, 
reprimands and orders to carry out specific reparation activities. 
There is an urgency procedure for exceptional circumstances in GDPR, which 
allows a supervisory authority to adopt provisional measures on an interim basis where 
necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
 299
  
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
There is requirement to establishment of an independent supervisory authority 
entrusted with the task of monitoring the application of data protection law within the 
respective EU Member State. The Directive for data protection in the police and justice 
sectors permits assignment of this role to the authority established for similar purposes under 
the Data Protection Regulation. Data Protection Authorities, as independent supervisory 
authorities, have been already introduced by Directive 95/46 and have become the basic 
mechanism for enforcement and monitoring of data protection in the EU today. An ostensibly 
significant change brought by the EU data protection reform package to the EU data 
protection systems concerns the replacement of the old Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party by the European Data Protection Board. The Board will replace the Article 29 Working 
Party but, as far as the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors is 
concerned, only apparently since it will essentially retain the same powers as. In this respect 
it should be noted that, while in the Data Protection Regulation the EU legislator assigned a 
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central role to the Board, especially in the consistency mechanism,
300
  no such role is 
provided for in the Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors.
 
 
However, in the police and criminal justice context conflicts pertaining to 
processing of personal data may arise between the Data Protection Authority and the judicial 
authorities in order to determine if Data Protection Authority may monitor processing done 
by judicial authorities. The Directive for data protection in the police and justice sectors, in 
order to limit the discretionary power of the Member States, provides that the processing of 
data by judicial authorities must not be affected by its provisions when acting within their 
judicial capacity.
301
 In spite of that it should be noted that Article 1 permits Member States to 
maintain a higher level of data protection which could ultimately be a cause of problems.
 
 
The monitoring of the Directive as well as the Regulation will be carried out 
by supervisory authorities. The rules on the supervisory authorities in the Directive are to a 
large extent taken over from the text of the Regulation. Member States are allowed to provide 
for the supervisory authorities established in the Regulation to be supervising the Directive as 
well.
302
  The Directive however excludes the supervision by the supervisory authorities as 
defined in the Directive of processing operations of courts when they act in their judicial 
capacity.
 303 
Member States should be able to exclude the supervision by supervisory 
authorities as defined in the Directive of processing operations of other independent judicial 
authorities when they act in their judicial capacity. 
The supervisory authorities powers should have in each Member State the same tasks 
and effective powers to allow them to carry out the tasks of effective, reliable and consistent 
monitoring of compliance with and enforcement of the Directive throughout the Union.
304
  The 
powers of the supervisory authority, that have to be set out bylaw, in three different categories, 
namely effective investigative, corrective and advisory powers as well as the power to bring 
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infringements of the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive
305
 to the attention of judicial 
authorities.  
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
A Data Protection Authority is established in each EU Member State and is 
responsible for protecting and enforcing the data protection rules at national level.
306
 
There is Monitoring and oversight
307
 system, the new arrangement will be 
transparent and contain effective supervision mechanisms to ensure that companies follow 
the rules they submitted themselves to. The US has committed to stronger oversight by the 
Department of Commerce as well as stronger cooperation between European Data Protection 
Authorities and the US Federal Trade Commission.
308
 This will transform the system from a 
self-regulating one into an oversight system that is more responsive as well as proactive. 
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Commerce 
(DOC) will monitor and actively verify that companies' privacy policies are in line with the 
relevant Privacy Shield principle and readily available to the public. US companies will 
register to be on the Privacy Shield list and self-certify that they meet the high data protection 
standards set out by the arrangement.
309
 They will have to renew their registration every year. 
US companies have to commit to comply with advice by the competent EU 
Data Protection Authority (DPA), while other companies may voluntarily make such a 
commitment.
310 
The Commission encourages companies to do so. EU citizen may take their 
complaint to DPA in their own „home‟: The DPA in each EU member state will refer the 
complaint to the US Department of Commerce, who will respond within 90 days, or the 
                                                             
305 EU. Statement of the Council’s reasons: Position (EU) No 5/2016 C158/46. 2016, p. 8. 
306 European Commission. Guide to EU-US Privacy Shield. 2016, p. 12. 
307 European Commission. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Frequently Asked Questions. Press Release Database, 
Brussels, 29 Feb. 2016, p. 4. 
308 EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Annex II, III.7.e. 
309 European Commission. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Frequently Asked Questions. Press Release Database, 
Brussels, 29 Feb. 2016, p. 2. 
310 EU-US. Privacy Shield. 2016, Annex II, III.5.a. 
308 
 
Federal Trade Commission,
311
 if the Department of Commerce is unable to resolve the 
matter.  
The Privacy Shield sets up a new independent redress mechanism in the area 
of national security: the Ombudsperson Mechanism.
 
The Privacy Shield Ombudsperson is a 
senior official within the U.S. Department of State who is independent from U.S. intelligence 
agencies. Assisted by a number of staff, the Ombudsperson will ensure that complaints are 
properly investigated and addressed in a timely manner, and that you receive confirmation 
that the relevant U.S. laws have been complied with or, if the laws have been violated, the 
situation has been remedied.
 312
 In carrying out its duties, and following up on the complaints 
received, the Ombudsperson will work closely with and obtain all the information from other 
independent oversight and investigatory bodies necessary for its response when it concerns 
the compatibility of surveillance with U.S. law.
 
These bodies are the ones responsible to 
oversee the various U.S. intelligence agencies. This mechanism is not Privacy Shield specific. 
It covers all complaints relating to all personal data and all types of commercial transfers 
from the EU to companies in the U.S.,
313
 including data transferred on the basis of alternative 
transfer tools such as standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules (BCR). 
The Ombudsperson will process data subject‟s request and, if it has any 
questions or if requires more information, it will contact the referring body. Once the 
Ombudsperson has determined that your request is complete, it will pass it on to the 
appropriate U.S. bodies. When the request relates to the compatibility of surveillance with 
U.S. law, it will be able to cooperate with one of the independent oversight bodies with 
investigatory powers. The Ombudsperson will have to receive the necessary information to 
be able to provide a response.
 
It will confirm that your request has been properly investigated 
and that U.S. law has been complied with or, if not, that any violation of U.S. law has been 
remedied.
314
  The response will not state whether you have been the target of surveillance by 
U.S. national intelligence services. 
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There is Regular review of adequacy decisions The EU and the US have now 
agreed to establish a new mechanism to monitor the functioning of the Privacy Shield 
through an annual joint review. The European Commission and the US Department of 
Commerce will carry out this review, which will serve to substantiate the commitments 
made.
 315
 The joint review would involve, as appropriate, representatives of the US 
intelligence community and will provide a dynamic and ongoing process to ensure that the 
Privacy Shield is functioning in accordance with the principles and commitments made.  
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
In terms of transparency and oversight, the Umbrella Agreement falls 
significantly short of fundamental European data protection and human rights 
requirements.
316
 
The is the requirement under Article 21(1)(a) that oversight authorities must 
“exercise independent oversight functions and powers”. However, also in the light of the 
current debate regarding the effective powers to enforce data protection and privacy law of 
some of the US oversight authorities
317
 enumerated in Article 21(3), we consider as essential 
that a bilateral explanatory declaration to the Agreement is signed by the parties to 
specifically list: 
318
  
 the supervisory authorities that have competence in this matter and the 
mechanism for the Parties to inform each other about future changes;  
 the effective powers they may exercise;  
 the identity and coordinates of the contact point which will assist with the 
identification of the competent oversight body (see Article 22(2)). 
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By the provision of article 21, the Parties shall have in place one or more 
public authorities exercising independent oversight functions and powers, including review, 
investigation and intervention. These authorities shall have the power to accept and act upon 
complaints made by individuals relating to the measures implementing the Umbrella 
Agreement and refer violations of law related to this Agreement for prosecution or 
disciplinary action.
319
 Taking into account the particularities of the U.S. system, a 
combination of supervisory authorities into a committee, will cumulatively exercise the 
oversight functions that data protection authorities carry out in the EU. Moreover, the 
composition of the authority, the method for appointing its members, the duration of exercise 
and conditions of cessation of their functions, the allocation of sufficient resources to the 
authority or the adoption of decisions without being subject to external orders or 
injunctions
320
. 
But overall, Article 22 does not ensure cooperation between the EU and US 
authorities that can result in real, effective, binding enforcement of the principles in the 
Agreement against the receiving US Legal Enforcement Authorities.
321
  More in particular, 
the European DPAs have no formal standing in that regard at all. 
 
4.3.3.2. Redress Mechanism and Individual Remedy 
GDPR entitle right to remedy for EU citizen to complain in any state that EU 
citizen live in or violator settled the business appearance. EU Directive gives member states 
chance to establish their own system but use directive as minimum standard. Depend on EU-
US agreements, general fine on private organization could be appeal from Civil Court in any 
countries of EU. But the sue against US Public Authority must be taken to US federal court 
since US has amended Judicial Redress Act to allow EU citizen to bring the case to US court. 
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EU GDPR 
GDPR supply data subject a Right to claim compensation makes it 
considerably easier for individuals to bring private claims against data controllers and 
processors. In particular: 
 Any person who has suffered "material or non-material damage" as a 
result of a violation of GDPR has the right to claim compensation from 
the controller or processor.
 322
 The inclusion of “non-material” damage 
means that individuals will be able to appeal complaint for distress and 
hurt feelings even where they are not able to prove financial loss.
 
 
 Suffers have the right to ask a consumer protection body to exercise rights 
and bring claims on their behalf.
323
 Although this falls short from a US 
style class action right, it definitely escalates the risk of group privacy 
claims against consumer businesses.  
Individuals also enjoy the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority
324
  
All natural and legal persons, including individuals, controllers and processors, have the right 
to an effective judicial remedy against a decision of a supervisory authority concerning them 
or for failing to make a decision
325
. 
Data subjects enjoy the right to an effective legal remedy against a controller 
or processor.
326
 
 
EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
The powers of the supervisory authority, that have to be set out by domestic 
law of each member state, the power to bring infringements of the provisions adopted 
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pursuant to the Directive to the attention of judicial authorities
327
 of each country that 
breached citizen bound with. 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
As an individual, data subject have several possibilities to lodge a complaint, 
namely with the:
328
 
1) US Privacy Shield company itself; 
2) Independent recourse mechanism, such as ADR or DPA; 
3) US Department of Commerce, only through a DPA; 
4) US Federal Trade Commission (or the U.S. Department of Transportation if 
complaint relates to an airline or ticket agent); 
5) Privacy Shield Panel, only once certain other redress options have failed. 
Individual can obtain redress in the US if their data is misused by commercial 
companies. Any individual who considers that his or her data has been misused will have 
several redress possibilities under the new arrangement:
 329
 
- Lodge a complaint with the company itself: Companies commit to reply to 
complaints within 45 days. In addition, any company handling human 
resources data from individuals has to commit to comply with advice by the 
competent EU Data Protection Authority (DPA), while other companies 
may voluntarily make such a commitment. The Commission encourages 
companies to do so. 
- Take their complaint to their „home‟ DPA: The DPA will refer the 
complaint to the Department of Commerce, who will respond within 90 
days, or the Federal Trade Commission, if the Department of Commerce is 
unable to resolve the matter. 
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- Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, a free of charge tool to which US 
companies may sign up as one of the redress mechanisms required for 
participation under the Privacy Shield. The companies will be required to 
include information in their published privacy policies about the 
independent dispute resolution body where consumers can address their 
complaints. They must provide a link to the website of their chosen dispute 
resolution provider and the Department of Commerce will verify that 
companies have implemented this obligation. 
- If a case is not resolved by any of the other means, as a last resort there will 
be an arbitration mechanism. Individuals will be able to have recourse to 
the Privacy Shield Panel, a dispute resolution mechanism that can take 
binding decisions against U.S. self-certified companies. It ensures that 
every single complaint is being dealt with and that the individual obtains a 
remedy. Several 'consumer-friendly' features (e.g. no cost, possibility to 
participate by video-conference, free of charge translation and 
interpretation) ensure that individuals are not discouraged from making use 
of the panel. 
There will be a number of ways to address complaints, starting with dispute 
resolution by the Privacy Shield companies and free of charge alternative dispute resolution 
solutions. Individuals can also go to the Data protection authorities who will work together 
with the U.S. Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission to ensure that 
complaints by individuals are investigated and resolved. If a case is not resolved by any of 
the other means, as a last resort there will be an arbitration mechanism.  
The arbitration will take place in the U.S. because the company you are 
complaining about is based there. At the same time, there are several “consumer friendly” 
elements that will greatly benefit you:
 330
 
•  right to ask for local DPA‟s assistance to prepare your claim; 
•  possibility to join the proceedings by telephone or video-conference, so 
there is no requirement to be physically present in the U.S.; 
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• possibility to obtain free of charge interpretation and translation of 
documents from English into another language; 
• arbitral costs (except for lawyer‟s fees ) will be offset from a fund 
specifically set up by the Department of Commerce and funded from the 
Privacy Shield companies‟ annual contributions. 
 
Redress in the area of national security for individuals will be handled by an 
Ombudsperson independent from the US intelligence services.
331
 The protection of your 
personal data may also be affected by U.S. public authorities when they access your data. The 
Privacy Shield ensures that this will occur only to the extent necessary for pursuing a public 
interest objective such as national security or law enforcement. While existing U.S. law 
provides you with protections and remedies in the law enforcement area, the Privacy Shield 
framework for the first time creates a special instrument to address national security access, 
the so-called Ombudsperson mechanism.
332
 
The possibility for redress in the area of national security for everybody whose 
data is transferred to the U.S. will be handled by an Ombudsperson, independent from the 
US intelligence services. This is a new mechanism introduced by the Privacy Shield 
arrangement. The Ombudsperson mechanism will deal with individual complaints from 
individuals if they fear that their personal information has been used in an unlawful way by 
US authorities in the area of national security.
 333
 This redress mechanism will inform the 
complainant whether the matter has been properly investigated and that either US law has 
been complied with or, in case of non-compliance, this has been remedied. 
However, the Privacy Shield does not follow the earlier recommendation of 
Working Party 29 according to which EU individuals should be “able to bring claims for 
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damages in the European Union” as well as be “granted the right to lodge a claim before a 
competent EU national court.”334  
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The Umbrella Agreement also fails to meet important requirements of EU data 
protection law in terms of data subject rights and data subjects‟ access to real and effective 
remedies.
 335
 
Data subject will be entitled to seek administrative redress. As for access and 
rectification, to facilitate the effective exercise of this right, the data subject concerned is 
entitled to authorize an oversight authority (national data protection authority for an EU data 
subject of each member state) or another representative,
336
 where permitted under applicable 
domestic law. The competent authority from which relief is appealed will provide the data 
subject concerned with a written response indicating, where applicable, the ameliorative or 
corrective actions taken.
337
 
The citizens of each Party shall be able to seek judicial redress for the i) denial 
of access, ii) denial of rectification or iii) unlawful disclosure by the authorities of the other 
Party.
338
 
At the moment, if an EU citizens' data is transferred to US law enforcement 
authorities and if their data is incorrect or unlawfully processed, EU citizens – non-resident in 
the US- are unable to obtain redress in US courts (unlike US citizens, who could ask for 
redress in European courts). The Umbrella Agreement will introduce the equal treatment of 
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EU citizens, as called for by President Juncker in his political guidelines.
 339
 A bill extending 
the core of the judicial redress provisions of the US Privacy Act of 1974 to EU citizens has 
been formally introduced in the US Congress on 18 March 2016 (Judicial Redress Bill). Once 
adopted, it will give EU citizens the right to seek judicial redress before US courts in case US 
authorities have denied access or rectification, or unlawfully disclose their personal data. The 
adoption of the Judicial Redress Bill will allow for the conclusion of the umbrella agreement. 
The Umbrella Agreement does not provide for equal rights and remedies for 
EU- and US nationals in the USA; but worse, non-EU citizens living in EU Member States 
who are not nationals of the Member State concerned – such as Syrian refugees or Afghan or 
Eritrean asylum-seekers, or students from Africa or South America or China – and non-EU 
citizens who have flown to, from or through the EU and whose data may have been sent to 
the USA, are completely denied judicial redress in the USA under the Umbrella 
Agreement.
340
 
 
4.3.3.3. Enforceability of Right 
Among other things, the EU system has created a new solid administrative 
measures and criminal sanctions to implement those rules in data protection instruments. 
Criminal penalties are introduced to both in general data protection and protection of personal 
data in criminal relating matters. The most interesting is the GDPR, damage institutes fine up 
to 4% of worldwide revenue or 20 million Euros. The other criminal sanction is up to the 
domestic law of EU states and US federal law. 
 
EU GDPR 
GDPR increased enforcement powers. Currently, fines under EU Member 
State law vary, and are comparatively low (e.g., the UK maximum fine is £500,000). The 
Regulation will significantly increase the maximum fine to €20 million, or 4% of annual 
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worldwide turnover, whichever is greater. In addition, national data protection supervisory 
authorities will be co-ordinating their supervisory and enforcement powers across the EU 
Member States, likely to lead to a more pronounced enforcement impact and risk for 
businesses.
341
 
GDPR bring in revenue based fines principle, joins anti-bribery and anti-trust 
laws, as having some of the very highest sanctions for non-compliance including revenue 
based fines of up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover.
342
 
To compound the risk for multinational businesses, fines are imposed by 
reference to the revenues of an undertaking rather than the revenues of the relevant controller 
or processor. Recital 150 of GDPR states that “undertaking” should be understood in 
accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union which prohibit anti-competitive agreements between undertakings and abuse of a 
dominant position. Unhelpfully the Treaty doesn‟t define the term either and the extensive 
case-law is not entirely straightforward with decisions often turning on the specific facts of 
each case.
 343 
However, in many cases group companies have been regarded as part of the 
same undertaking. This is bad news for multinational businesses as it means that in many 
cases group revenues will be taken into account when calculating fines, even where some of 
those group companies have nothing to do with the processing of data to which the fine 
relates provided they are deemed to be part of the same undertaking. The assessment will turn 
on the facts of each case.
 344 
 
Fines are split into two broad categories: 
1) The highest fines up to 20,000,000 Euros or in the case of an undertaking 
up to 4% of total worldwide turnover of the preceding year, whichever is higher apply to 
breach of:
 345
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 the basic principles for processing including conditions for consent 
 data subjects‟ rights 
 international transfer restrictions 
 any obligations imposed by Member State law for special cases such as 
processing employee data 
 certain orders of a supervisory authority 
2) The lower category of fines is up to 10,000,000 Euros or in the case of an 
undertaking up to 2% of total worldwide turnover of the preceding year, whichever is the 
higher apply to breach of:
 346
  
 obligations of controllers and processors, including security and data breach 
notification obligations 
 obligations of certification bodies 
 obligations of a monitoring body 
Supervisory authorities are not required to impose fines but must ensure in each case that the 
sanctions imposed are effective, proportionate and dissuasive
347
.  
Fines can be imposed in combination with some other sanctions. 
There is an urgency procedure for exceptional circumstances which permits a 
supervisory authority to adopt provisional measures on an interim basis where necessary to 
protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
348
 
GDPR establish wide corrective powers. Supervisory authorities also enjoy 
broad investigative and corrective powers
349
including the power to undertake on-site data 
protection audits and the power to issue public warnings, reprimands and orders to carry out 
specific remediation activities.
350
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EU Directive on Criminal Matters 
The supervisory authorities powers may have in each Member State the same 
tasks and effective powers to allow them to carry out the tasks of effective, reliable and 
consistent enforcement of the Directive throughout the Union. The powers of the supervisory 
authority, that have to be set out bylaw, in two different categories, corrective and advisory 
powers as well as the power to bring infringements of the provisions adopted pursuant to the 
Directive
351
 to the attention of judicial authorities. The enforcement is sanctioned by the 
domestic law relevant to personal data protection. 
 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield creates far stronger enforcement obligations and 
establishes new recourse mechanisms.
352
 The US has committed to maintaining an updated 
list of current Privacy Shield members and removing those companies that have left the 
arrangement. 
To verify that the self-certification is effective in practice, Privacy Shield 
organizations can make self-assessment or outside compliance reviews on the basis of “Self-
Assessment”.353 The Department of Commerce will ensure that companies that are no longer 
member of Privacy Shield must still continue to apply its principles to personal data received 
when they were in the Privacy Shield, for as long as they continue to retain them.
354
 
If the Privacy Shield Panel finds evidence of a violation of the Privacy 
Principles it can impose relief such as access, correction, deletion, or return of data subject‟s 
personal data. Even if the Privacy Shield Panel cannot award data subject monetary damages, 
individual has the possibility to obtain such relief in court. If data subject are not satisfied 
with the outcome of the arbitration, he can challenge it under U.S. law under the Federal 
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Arbitration Act.
355
 The arbitration procedure will be finished within 90 days and response to 
the complainant within 45 days from the day data subject has sent notice to the company. 
On behalf of Ombudsperson, it can order non-compliance to be remedied. In 
combination with the lack of clarity concerning the investigatory powers, it moreover 
remains unclear to what extent the Ombudsperson as such will be effectively capable of 
ordering non-compliance to be remedied and what the result of such an exercise would be.
356
 
Moreover, the Privacy Shield does not provide for any appeal against or 
review of the “decision” by the Ombudsperson. The communication of the Ombudsperson to 
the complainant after her examination of a complaint, the Ombudsperson must not reveal, if 
there has been any unlawfulness behavior of the intelligence community.
357
 The answer 
provided will always be the same and it will be unspecific. 
 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement 
The effective implementation of the articles concerning individual rights 
(access, rectification, administrative and judicial redress), as well as the issue of transfers to 
territorial entities not covered by the Agreement (i.e. U.S. States). The first joint review will 
be conducted no later than three years from the entry into force of the Agreement and 
thereafter on a regular basis.
358
 
The Competent Authority from which relief is sought will carry out the 
appropriate inquiries and verifications and without undue delay will respond in written form, 
including through electronic means, with the result, including the ameliorative or corrective 
action taken where applicable.
359
 Notice of the procedure for seeking any further 
administrative redress shall be provided. 
In practice, an EU citizen‟s name is identical to that of a suspect in a 
transatlantic criminal investigation. Their data has been transferred from the EU to the US 
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and erroneously gets collected and included on a US "black list". This can lead to a series of 
adverse consequences from the refusal of an entry visa, to a possible arrest. The EU citizen 
should be able to have their name deleted by the authorities – if necessary by a judge – once 
the mistake is discovered. Europeans (and Americans) have those rights in the EU. They 
should have them when their data is exchanged with the US too. The citizen who believes 
that their data is inaccurate also can authorize, where permitted under domestic law, an 
authority (for instance a Data Protection Authority) or another representative to seek 
correction or rectification on his or her behalf. If correction or rectification is denied or 
restricted, the US authority processing the data should provide the individual or the data 
protection authority acting on their behalf with a response explaining the reasons for the 
denial or restriction of correction or rectification.
 360
 
 
 
4.4.  Prerequisite considerations for International Personal Data Protection Reform 
The reforms of the EU-US E-Market regime create many effects in the near future 
which can categorize into 12 issues. The ramifications of reformation are not just legal 
binding area but socio-economic perspective. The model of their agenda could be use as a 
strategy to enlarge the E-Market and Informative Society with better harmonized standard. 
These prerequisite considerations, extracted from the EU and EU-US E-Market 
regime, in 12 issues are: 
1) Legal Approval: The Regime must create greater harmonization by introducing a 
single-legal framework. It may requires the periodically reviews. Especially in the context of 
criminal law enforcement cooperation, it should include harmonized rules for international 
transfers of personal data, data sharing and data retention. Besides, the regime must cover 
core data protection principles. For tight-integrated international organization or regional 
integration, it may suggest supra-national direct effect upon all State Party / Member State 
without further enacting domestic law.  
2) Definition and Scope: The Regime should apply to organizations established in a 
third country if they are offering goods and services, or monitoring the behavior of 
individuals, in its E-Market. The instrument must give the common definition on basic data 
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protection terms. The regime must harmonize rules for law enforcement cooperation within 
Member States or State Parties in every level. It must guarantees that personal data 
transferred outside their territory by criminal law enforcement authorities will be adequately 
protected. The person covered by instrument should apply to all relevant Legal Persons, who 
offer services, and State Intelligence Agencies, who collect and process personal data, of 
State Parties‟ nationals. 
3) Contents of Data Subjects‟ Right: The inventive Regime must affirm the rights 
relevant to digital age; right to data portability, right to be forgotten/erasure, right to access 
and rectify the out-of-date data. In the realm of Criminal Matters, it should raise the level of 
protection for individuals; victims, witnesses, and suspects of crimes, specifically the 
protection in the context of a criminal investigation or profiling. The fundamental rights 
relevant protection of personal data must be approved; Right to be noticed, make a choice, 
access the data and gain Redress. Furthermore, the instrument shall provide data subject 
judicial redress rights; right to denial of access, denial of rectification and unlawful 
disclosure.  
4) Exception: As any instruments are inter-state law so the conditions and 
requirements of exception, necessary and proportionate principle, as written in UN 
Declaration on Human Rights and other International Human Rights Treaties must be 
reconfirmed. While the instrument relevant to data protection on Criminal Matters, the level 
of flexibility accorded to the exception conditions and requirements may depend more on the 
breadth of national legislative measures. Nevertheless, it should provide clear necessary 
restrictions, proportionate safeguards and oversight mechanisms for access by state agencies 
for law enforcement and national security purposes. The exemptions in practice, de facto, 
would bar the possibility for the person to have access to their own data, so its application 
must be limited only to cases “permitted under applicable domestic law”. 
5) Basic Duty: The Regime should put the direct obligation to Data Processor. It 
should promote the mixing approach between “Privacy by Default and Privacy by Design” to 
Data Controller/Processor. Organizations who collect and control personal data must appoint 
DPO to take care of protection and cooperate with DPA. It must embrace the “Right to opt-
out” data transfer or data processing and “Right to opt-in” when company is going to process 
data. The participating organizations must provide data subject with a link to its privacy 
policy if it has a public website. It should urges organizations to raise the individuals' 
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awareness as to why and by whom their data is processed and contribute to the possibility for 
individuals to exercise their rights to access, rectification or redress. 
6) Data Collection and Processing: The Regime should introduce the anonymity for 
data subject consist of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or 
“pseudonymisation”. It is needed to take risk impact assessments in case of processing highly 
sensitive personal data, profiling. The profiling resulting in discrimination against natural 
persons shall be prohibited. The Fair Use principle must be embedded in data processing 
conditions and requirements; Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer and Data Integrity/Purpose 
Limitation. It has to be clarified that the right to opt-out cannot enable the organization to use 
data for incompatible purposes. It must ensure the application of the safeguards to the entire 
"life cycle" of a given data set from the original transfer from the host country to its 
processing by a competent authority in Counterpart-State and vice-versa. It also requires 
„appropriate safeguards that include the possibility to obtain human intervention‟ if the 
automated decision-making, profiling, has taken place. 
7) Data Security: The Regime must employ breach notification, to fulfill the provision 
on data security, organizations must notify the national supervisory authority of serious data 
breaches promptly, "without undue delay". So the data subjects can take appropriate 
measures then it clarifies the situation when derogations can be used. The Regime should 
acknowledge the existence of a risk-based approach to compliance of State Parties. For 
precautionary, set out the criterions in which an impact assessment is compulsory. In similar 
terms, requirements, risk assessment process, should be introduced to routinely supervision. 
It should ensure that appropriate action will be promptly taken to mitigate the damage, 
including notification to the transferring authority and, where appropriate given the 
circumstances of the incident, the individual concerned. 
8) Data Retention: The proposed Regime should give the clear data retention limits, 
restrictions and safeguards. This data may only be processed under official authority or when 
authorized by State Party‟s law. Most importantly, it must raise the level of protection for 
individuals during data retention in the context of a criminal investigation or a law 
enforcement action. Oversight is ensured by independent national data protection authorities 
and data subjects can afford effective judicial recourse. There must be an obligation of data 
controller/processor to document data processing operations entails, in particular, that there 
will be a "trace" in case of unlawful processing. The retention periods will be subject to 
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periodic reviews and to ensure transparency, retention periods will have to be made publicly 
available or otherwise published. It is also specified that, where the Parties conclude an 
agreement on the transfer of "bulk data", such agreement must contain a specific provision on 
the applicable retention period. The data controller must also provide information about 
profiling. 
9) Data Transfer: The new Regime must provide comprehensive, detailed and 
transparent rules for data transfers to third countries including the power to suspend data 
flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international organization who does not meet 
the adequacy standard.. While remains essentially tools, as well as certain derogations to 
transfer personal data outside the State Parties‟ territory, while reducing Red Tape. It should 
introduce some new tools for international transfers, Adequacy decisions, by providing more 
precise and detailed elements that must take into account when assessing the level of data 
protection provided in the legal order of a third country. The instrument should contain 
Onward Transfer principle but it include statements concerning the enforcement body, an 
arbitration right, disclosures to public authorities, and the legal person‟s liability for onward 
transfers. 
10) Monitoring Body and Supervisory Authority: The instrument provisions on the 
independence, functions and powers of Collective; Universal, International or Regional, Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) must be expressed out in more detail and substantially enhanced. 
It should provide an effective monitor and sanctions by harmonizing the powers of national 
data protection supervisory authorities (DPAs). In the area of Criminal Matters, Supervision 
is ensured by independent national data protection authorities or domestic courts. To race up 
the changes of information technology, it should establish mechanisms regarding the 
enforcement bodies: ADR, Ombudsperson and old style DPA with greater competence. It 
should transform the oversight system from self-regulating to more responsive and proactive 
system, verification and annual re-verification process must proposed, the monitor 
compliance could be done via detailed questionnaires. Moreover, it should expand to the 
whole law enforcement sector the principle of independent oversight including effective 
powers to investigate and resolve individual complaints. 
11) Redress Mechanism and Individual Remedy: The Regime should create One-
Stop-Shop redress for data subject by addressing that any suffering individual can lodge their 
complaint to their own National DPA then the DPA will work internationally with other State 
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Party‟s DPA. In the case of Criminal Matters, it should remind State Members to make sure 
that individuals can afford effective judicial remedies. The direct accessible channel for 
individual such as ADR and Ombudsperson should be provided. It should also create an 
arbitration right for unresolved complaints for individual. Redress mechanism will inform a 
complainant of an access or surveillance matter has been properly investigated and obliged 
with the instrument, and proper remedies will be given. Remedy mechanisms must determine 
time period for responses by a subject organization.   
12) Enforceability of Rights: The inventive Regime must expressly include the power 
to suspend data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international organization in 
case of non-compliance. The local DPAs or Courts will be empowered to impose fines 
reaching up to EUR 20 million or up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of a 
company. To bear in mind, in the scope of criminal matters, the capability of enforcement 
bases on particular State Party‟s enforcement institutions; National DPAs and the Domestic 
Courts. It should supply enforcement body which can inform a complainant of an access or 
surveillance matter, disclosures to public authorities. In the case of non-compliance it will be 
properly remedied. Moreover, the precautionary system such as “Flag list” for organizations 
which are subjected to DPA or Court orders from violation cases. To support the efficiency of 
enforcement, solid powers to investigate and resolve individual complaints must be 
confirmed as well as the material sanctions even it depends on domestic Courts.  
Lastly, the instruments of the Regime must be subjected to periodic joint reviews, on 
critical provisions relate to individuals' rights; access, rectification, administrative and 
judicial redress. 
 
The reforms of the EU and EU-US regime set up a new harmonized standard for 
liberal market-economy country to follow. Their regime could be transformed to International 
Treaty open for other state to ratify because it will save the time and budget consuming 
during negotiation and drafting phrases. International Community may use these set of 
standards as a point of departure to draft International Instrument on Personal Data Protection 
for sign and accession. Due to the technological hegemony of US IT Corporation on 
Cyberspace and the mature of EU-US single E-Market, it would be the incentive for other 
States to conform to their legal regime for boosting the economy of respective States. Thus, 
creating the International Treaty that meet the Adequacy Criterion of EU would be beneficial 
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for all liberal market regime countries and very persuasive for wider spread accession. The 
more inclusive approach would solve the problem on jurisdiction, and makes the compliance 
of personal data protection to different jurisdiction possible. The comprehensive 
considerations above could be embedded in as the baselines or components for initiating 
Universal Regime. The synthesis for Universal and International levels will be displayed in 
the next Chapter. 
 
327 
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44 – 50 35 - 40 
II Principle 3, 7d 
III Principle 10bc 
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10. Supervisory  
      Mechanism 
51 – 59,  
60 – 76,  
90, 92, 93 
 
41 – 51, 58 
Overview 2, 
II Principle 7a(i),  
III Principle 5, 6, 
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21, 22-23 
11. Individual  
      Remedy 
65, 77 – 80, 82 
 
48, 52 - 56 
Overview 4, 
II Principle7a(iii),7bce  
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19.3, 19.4 
 
12. Enforcement/ 
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58, 65, 81 – 84 
 
51, 57 
Overview 3, 
II Principle 7a(ii),  
III Principle9cd, 11efg 
Annex Arbitral 
18.3, 19.2, 
23-26 
 
 
328 
 
 
329 
 
Chapter 5 Universal approach on Personal Data Protection in Cyberspace 
 
The goal of this Chapter is to crystallize the Universal Approach for supporting 
progressive realization of personal data protection internationally based on the International 
initiatives and comparative synthesis from the EU and EU-US approach. Eager to accomplish 
that goal, the first section will trace back to the root of the problem. Since protection of 
personal data deals with activities relating internet and Transnational IT Corporation, 
domestic law of single State cannot solve the highly trans-border complications. The Needs 
of International Regime to protect personal data on Cyberspace have been recognized by 
many reports and resolutions of International Organizations. The second section reveals the 
main concerns of UN Human Rights Council and many States on the Global Mass Electronic 
Surveillance undertaken by State Intelligence Agencies and in some cases with the 
coordination of IT Corporations. Accordingly, the third section will review the initiatives 
given by international governmental organizations and non-governmental movements on 
personal data protection. Then comparative synthesis from EU and EU-US regime will be 
brought to fill the loopholes in 3 main issues; Individual‟s Right of internet users around the 
world, obligation of the Transnational IT Corporation as a Data Controller/Processor and 
creating an implementation system of Personal Data Protection rules. The last section 
transforms all desires, protection of personal data in cyberspace globally, into benchmarks for 
initiating Universal Regime to take care of data subjects worldwide. 
 
 
5.1.  Background: The Needs of International Regime to protect Personal Data in 
Cyberspace 
Protection of Personal Data in Cyberspace is not an exclusive EU and US regime 
problem. Of course, there are several initiatives, from intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, trying to deal with this issue internationally. Some of them have 
already adopted useful documents to understand current shortcomings and they include the 
broad design of proposals to overcome them. The analysis in past chapters has shown how 
the new EU-US regime can be used to implement those proposals. Before jumping to the 
solutions, the essence problems from the activities in cyberspace will be analyzed first. 
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In the terms of Globalization Capitalism, “Google act upon reasons chosen by them. 
The liberal logic would be thus inverted but to a company that expects to be judged as doing 
no evil and, paradoxically, as being a champion of values of liberal nature”.1   State seems to 
be delight with the dynamics of business circle and gain benefit from personal data 
processing by Multinational IT Corporation. Even though the International Economic 
Organization, WTO, never has had a single case or precedent relevant to this issue yet but 
there is the provision that urges Member States to protect personal data.  
Over the past decade it has been the shift towards the market-driven and technology 
determinism models of the Service Providers (SPs) like IT Corporation that has changed the 
face of the internet. If the next such shift is one that favors privacy and autonomy, that could 
be on behalf of all people. However, the evidences from US former contractor have shown 
the main threats to Cyber Security by Global Surveillance Programs relate to IT Corporation. 
The threats came from the National Authority who breach in to data system of IT Corporation 
or even cooperate with IT Corporation, instead of protecting Cyber Security for the Internet 
Citizen.  
However, the International Community is struggling with the problem by initiating 
New Personal Data Protection and negotiating with various International Civil Societies to 
establish new Instrument on Personal Data Protection and harmonize the standard on 
international criminal cooperation matters. Still, there is no specific international instrument 
to handle these problems.  
The initiatives of UNHRC and Civil Society Organizations have shown the 
preparation to counter-strike data processing of IT Corporation in some certain but the 
implementation of Personal Data Protection Regime stills questioning. Since there has been 
neither mechanism to fulfill the obligation to protect personal data of UN nor International 
preventive measure for monitoring IT Corporation‟s threats yet. Besides, there has been no 
international measure to handle the wide spread of data surveillance done by State Authority 
on internet users around the globe.  
On international level, the Human Rights Council undertaken the mission of 
resolution 68/167 of the UN by approved the report from the Office of  High Commissioner 
                                                             
1 Thompson, Marcelo. "In Search of Alterity: On Google, Neutrality and Otherness." Google and the Law, 
Springer, New York, 2012, p. 360. 
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for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 30 June 2014, UN High Commissioner Report on the Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age.
2
 The report scope on the protection and promotion of the right 
to privacy in the context of mass electronic surveillance or digital communications 
interception and the collection of personal data, including a global scale surveillance.
3
 
OHCHR participated in a number of events and gathered information from a broad range of 
sources. On 24 February 2014, the High Commissioner delivered a keynote presentation at an 
expert seminar on “The right to privacy in the digital age”, which was co-sponsored by 
Austria, Brazil, Germany, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland,
4
 States whom 
were tapped by NSA due to US Global Internet Surveillances. Contributions to the resolution 
were received from 29 Member States from all regions, five international and/or regional 
organizations, three national human rights institutions, 16 non-governmental organizations 
and two private sector initiatives,
5
 which were referred before in Report A/HRC/23/40.  
In regional arena, since the US Global Internet Surveillances, there are significant 
signal which show the enthusiastic of EU to cope with the problem both by initiating new 
regulation and proposing new agreement with USA on personal data protection. Günther 
Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Digital Economy, said in the World Economic Forum 2015 
that “We need a UN agency for data protection and data security”6 for rebuilding trust among 
companies and consumers. The time for having personal data protection agency in UN 
Human Rights system has come. The set of Instruments, Umbrella Agreement between EU-
US on Implementation and enforcement measures relate to personal data, had been launched 
after the negotiation between EU and US was settled in Mid-2016. As well as the EU-US 
Privacy Shield that US give in the mutual agreement to meet the EU demand base on 
Fundament Right to protection of personal data. The EU approach is effective due to the clear 
present doctrine of personal data protection in EU legal system, rule of law. 
In terms of Precaution, personal data protection should be managed on the basis of 
rule of law, collective control, transparency, maximizing limited available resource and 
                                                             
2 UN. A/HRC/27/37. 2014, para. 5. 
3 Ibid, para. 15. 
4 Ibid, para. 7. 
5 All contributions are available at www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx.   
6 Wearden, Graeme and Treanor, Jill. “UN Needs Agency for Data Protection, European Commissioner Tells 
Davos.” The Guardian, 22 Jan. 2015, section Technology, www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/22/un-
agency-data-protection-davos-edward-snowden. Accessed 12 Nov. 2016. 
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reflexive mechanisms. Thus, the recognition of threats from IT Corporation and National 
Security Authority must be responded by harmonized international regulation and trans-
national competence mechanism. 
 
 
5.2.  Recognition of problems relating personal data protection by International 
Community 
The US Global Internet Surveillances also underscore the precarious position that 
companies, Trans-National Corporation, offering these services and technologies in one 
country is placed in other territory. Though the scope and quantity of data collected and held 
by an intermediary, IT Corporation, vary depending on the type of intermediary. Since IT 
Corporations offer many services to countless customers and locate its infrastructure cover 
vast area, governments have recognized the important role of them as Intermediary. 
Particularly in their ability to assist with state surveillance efforts by providing efficient 
access to a great number of user data and identifying potentially harmful or threatening 
content. Within this context, there is a shift from reactive government surveillance that is 
based on a request and authorized order, to partially privatized surveillance, with companies 
identifying and reporting potential threats, retaining information, and facilitating access to 
law enforcement. Indeed, the OHCHR in the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age report notes 
that the US Global Internet surveillance programs were facilitated in part by “strategic 
relationships between Governments, regulatory control of privacy companies, and 
commercial contracts.”7 The 2 dominant actors in this problem were recognized by 
International Organization respectively; IT Corporation and State Authority. 
 
 5.2.1. Problems from IT Corporation’s activities 
As individuals utilize intermediary platforms on a daily and routine basis, from 
searching for information on the internet, to posting updates to a social media account, to 
using voiceover-internet-protocol (VoIP) services to connect with friends and colleagues, or 
using the services of a cyber cafe, intermediaries host; IT Corporation, Data Controller and 
Data Processor, retain and have access to vast amounts of personal data of their users across 
                                                             
7 UN. A/HRC/27/37. 2014, Preamble. 
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the world, irrespective of jurisdiction. In this context, company practices and a country‟s 
legal regulations have a far-reaching impact on the rights, specifically right to personal data 
protection, of both national and foreign users.
8
 
When intermediaries, Service Providers, implement legal requirements for the 
blocking or filtering of content, they do so by employing different techniques and 
technologies such as key word filtering software, firewalls, image scanning, URL databases, 
technologies that enable deep packet inspection, etc.
9
 Similarly, complying with legal 
mandates for interception or monitoring of communications also requires intermediaries to 
install and use technology on their networks. As pointed out by La Rue, technologies used for 
filtering also facilitate monitoring and surveillance as they have the ability to identify and 
track words, images, websites and types of content, as well as identify individuals using, 
producing or associated with the same.
10
 For example, YouTube offers copyright holders the 
option of YouTube‟s “Content ID” system to manage and identify their content on the 
platform. Actions that copyright owners can choose from include muting audio that matches 
the music of copyrighted material, blocking a video from being viewed, running ads against a 
video, and tracking the viewer statistics of the video. These options can be implemented at a 
country-specific level.
11
 
Instances such as the IT Corporations; Facebook, Google, Apple etc., demonstrate the 
complexity of issues related to intermediary liability and surveillance and raise questions 
about reasonable expectations regarding internet company practices and responses 
(particularly multinational companies), adequate national legislation, international guidelines, 
and appropriate public response. As noted in The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, “the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, endorsed by the Human Rights Council 
in 2011, provide a global standard for preventing and addressing adverse effects on human 
                                                             
8 Hickok, Elonnai. “Intermediary liability and state surveillance.” Global Information Society Watch 2014: 
Communication Surveillance in Digital Age, Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India, 2014, p. 46. 
9 “Whitepaper: Understanding Web Filtering Technologies.” BLOXX, 
www.bloxx.com/downloads/US/bloxx_whitepaper_webfilter_us.pdf. Accessed 16 Nov. 2016. 
10 La Rue, Frank. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.” United Nations General Assembly, 17 Apr. 2013.  
11 YouTube. “How Content ID Works.” https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en. Accessed 
16 Nov. 2016. 
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rights linked to business activity. The responsibility to respect human rights applies 
throughout a company‟s global operations regardless of where its users are located, and exists 
independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.” This is a high 
standard that intermediaries must adhere to. Some companies such as Google,
12
 has policies 
in place for addressing requests from law enforcement as mentioned before in Chapter 3. 
The cooperation between IT Corporation and State Authority is increasingly 
formalized: as telecommunications service provision shifts from the public sector to the 
private sector, there has been a “delegation of law enforcement and quasi-judicial 
responsibilities to Internet intermediaries under the guise of „self-regulation‟ or 
„cooperation‟”.13 The enactment of statutory requirements for companies to make their 
networks “wiretap-ready” is a particular concern, not least because it creates an environment 
that facilitates sweeping surveillance measures.
14
 
As pointed out by Frank La Rue in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, legal frameworks 
that hold intermediaries (rather than the individual) liable for content are needed, transfering 
the role of monitoring the internet to the intermediary.
15
 Some jurisdictions do not have 
specific legal provisions addressing intermediary liability, but do issue court or executive 
orders to intermediaries for the restriction of content, as well as placing obligations – 
including technical obligations – on service providers via operating licenses. Legal provisions 
and orders pertaining to intermediary liability are not always limited to removing or disabling 
pre-defined or specified content. Requests for the removal of content can be accompanied 
with requests for user information including IP address and basic subscriber information. 
Some jurisdictions, such as India, have incorporated retention mandates for removed content 
and associated information in legal provisions addressing intermediary liability.
16
 
Human Rights Council draw conclusions about corporate responsibilities for 
communication security, it is nonetheless clear that, given the threats to right to personal data 
                                                             
12 Google, “Google Transparency Report.” www.google.com/transparencyreport. Accessed 16 Nov. 2016. 
13 European Digital Rights. "The Slide from “Self-Regulation” to Corporate Censorship." Jan. 2011. 
14 UN. A/HRC/27/37. 2014, para. 42. 
15 La Rue, Frank. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.” United Nations General Assembly, 17 Apr. 2013. 
16 WIPO. The Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules. 2011, Rule 3(4). 
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protection online, IT Corporation actors should review the adequacy of their practices with 
regard to human right norms. At a minimum, companies should adhere to principles such as 
those laid out in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Global Network 
Initiative‟s Principles on Right to personal data protection and Privacy, the European 
Commission‟s ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, and the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue Guiding Principles. 
Companies, like States, should construct the International Regime to avoid blocking or 
limiting the transmission of encrypted communications and permit anonymous 
communication.
17
 Furthermore, the initiative to regulate corporation actors that supply 
technology to undermine encryption and anonymity would be beneficial to govern their 
products and customers with transparency principle.
 18
 Consequently, attention should be 
given to efforts to expand the availability of encrypted data-centre links, support secure 
technologies for websites and develop widespread default end-to-end encryption.  
 
 5.2.2. Problems caused by State Authority 
The protection and promotion of the right to privacy in the context of domestic and 
extraterritorial surveillance and/or the interception of digital communications and the 
collection of personal data, including on a mass scale surveillance undertaken by State 
Agencies
19
 had been emphasized by UN Human Rights Council Resolution. UN HRC 
approved the analysis and findings on the impacts of human rights in the context of mass 
surveillance, metadata collection and retention, and the recommendations to apply human 
rights to extraterritorial actions of government collects.
20
 The resolution analysis brought 
dramatic global concerns on data protection on Internet since the US Global Internet 
Surveillances in June 2013 into the content.  
One year after US Global Internet Surveillances in 2013, The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
                                                             
17
 UN. A/HRC/29/32. 2015, para. 62. 
18 Ibid, para. 61. 
19 UN. A/HRC/23/40. 2013, paras. 38-39. 
20 Ibid, para. 40. 
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Rights (OHCHR) was published.
21
 The Report recognizes the relationship between service 
providers and surveillance and the increasing trend of privatized surveillance, noting: There 
is strong evidence of a growing reliance by Governments on the private sector to conduct and 
facilitate digital surveillance. On every continent, Governments have used both formal legal 
mechanisms and covert methods to gain access to content, as well as to metadata. This 
process is increasingly formalized: as telecommunications service provision shifts from the 
public sector to the private sector, there has been a “delegation of law enforcement and quasi-
judicial responsibilities to Internet intermediaries under the guise of „self-regulation‟ or 
„cooperation‟”.22 This report also explores how legal requirements, practices and policies 
pertaining to intermediary liability are feeding into this growing trend through the 
incorporation of requirements for intermediaries that facilitate surveillance for government. 
The A/HRC/27/37 report‟s analysis and findings are of human rights in the context of 
mass surveillance, metadata collection and retention, and the application of human rights to 
extraterritorial actions of governments.
23
 Report found that Mass surveillance by its very 
nature interferes with the right to privacy, and recommended that all stakeholders take steps 
to ensure that effective and independent oversight regimes and practices are in place, with 
attention to the rights of victims and to effective remedies.
24
  On every continent, 
Governments have used both formal legal mechanisms and covert methods to gain access to 
content, as well as to metadata. The response from Non-governmental organizations on 
Internet Rights and Privacy is good, the report and discussions are underway about how best 
to take this work forward to ensure data privacy rights protection.
25
  
Jurisdiction and the applicability of local law is a tension that arises in the context of 
intermediary liability and surveillance. Some facets of this tension include: to what extent do 
legal restrictions on content apply to multinational platforms operating in a country? To what 
extent can states access the communications passing or being stored in its territory? And to 
what extent do domestic protections of fundamental rights – including freedom of expression 
and privacy – apply to foreigners as well as nationals? The OHCHR in The Right to Privacy 
                                                             
21 UN. A/HRC/27/37. 2014. 
22
 Ibid, Recommendations. 
23 Ibid, para. 3. 
24 Ibid, para. 49. 
25 Ibid, para. 51. 
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in the Digital Age shed some light on these questions, drawing upon a number of 
international instruments and firmly asserting that any interference with the right to privacy 
must comply with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity, regardless of the 
nationality or location of the individual.
26
  
Tensions around mass surveillance of foreign citizens and political leaders, and a lack 
of legal constructs domestically and internationally to address these tensions, have led to 
questions of direction and the future of internet governance discussed at forums like 
NETmundial, where principles relating to surveillance and intermediary liability were 
raised.
27
 Similarly, in March 2014, the US announced plans to relinquish the responsibility of 
overseeing the body tasked with regulating internet codes and numbering systems. This move 
has raised concerns about a backlash that could result in the division and separation of the 
internet, facilitating mass surveillance and content control.
28
 
However, Data retention, Broad mandatory data retention policies limit an 
individual‟s ability to remain anonymous. A State‟s ability to require Internet service and 
telecommunications providers to collect and store records documenting the online activities 
of all users has inevitably resulted in the State having everyone‟s digital footprint. A State‟s 
ability to collect and retain personal records expands its capacity to conduct surveillance and 
increases the potential for theft and disclosure of individual information.
29
 To fulfill right to 
personal data protection, States, international organizations, corporations and civil society 
groups should promote online security. Given the relevance of new communication 
technologies in the promotion of human rights and development, all those involved should 
systematically promote access to encryption and anonymity without discrimination.
30
 
Consequently, the prospect regime to tackle these problems is needed. 
 
 
                                                             
26 Ibid. 
27 Powles, Julia. "Big Business Was the Winner at Netmundial." 28 Apr. 2014. 
28 Kelion, Leo. “Future of the Internet Debated at NetMundial in Brazil.” BBC, 23/4/2014, 
<www.bbc.com/news/technology-27108869>, Accessed 16/11/2016. 
29 UN. A/HRC/29/32. 2015, para. 55. 
30 Ibid, para. 62. 
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5.3.  Initiatives to support the progressive realization of right to personal data 
protection  
While the Chapter 4 flash the light on the most advance legal regime for protection of 
personal data in EU-US regime, especially this section will search for the efforts in universal 
and international levels to push the protection of personal data to proper standard. Even 
though, the new EU-US regime may answer some of the requirements in EU and US E-
Market but there are some areas else without the regulation. The section will study on 
previous international proposals, which have identified as the „minimum‟ content of an 
International/Universal legal instrument, governing the issue of personal data protection in 
cyberspace. This is the case studies in this section and will be explained from their launching 
institution perspectives. 
 
5.3.1. Agenda of International Governmental Organizations  
UN General Assembly adopted on March 24
th
 2015 a resolution calling on the Human 
rights council to establish a special mandate on privacy. The Special Rapporteur on Right to 
Privacy had been created for the mandate 3 years period.
31
 One of many mandates is to 
illustrate the problems and propose a recommendation to promote the progressive realization 
of Personal Data Protection, including principles and best practices at the national, regional 
and international levels. This Special Rapporteur appointment decision is the direct result of 
the turning point triggered by US Global Internet Mass Surveillances. 
A year before resolution A/HRC/28/L.27 was approved, the Internet Rights and 
Principles Coalition (IRPC) Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet was 
adopted, Contribution to the Net Mundial Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of 
Internet Governance, 23-24 April 2014.
32
It was presented under the working group of United 
Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) which the representatives of States and 
International Civil Organization are participated. 
The output of IGF efforts is the Charter launched by Internet Rights and Principles 
Dynamic Coalition, an open network of individuals and organizations, which contains 10 
                                                             
31 UN. A/HRC/28/L.27. 24 Mar. 2015, pp. 3-4. 
32 UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition. 2014, 
Introduction p. 1. 
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principles and 20 rights for Internet users. The Charter includes the Right to Privacy and Data 
Protection in Principle 5 on Privacy and Data protection and the 9
th
 Right to Digital Data 
Protection. 
The charter recognizes the important of PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION by 
confirming that everyone has the right to privacy online. This includes freedom from 
surveillance, the right to use encryption, and the right to online anonymity. Everyone also has 
the right to data protection, including control over personal data collection, retention, 
processing, disposal and disclosure.
33
 
Furthermore, the Charter reaffirms the Right to Digital Data Protection as enshrined 
in Article 12 of the UDHR everyone has the right to privacy. It recalls the important aspect of 
this right is that everyone has the right to protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
In specific in the Internet, the right to protection of personal data includes:
34
 
a) Protection of Personal data: Fair information practices should be enacted into 
national law to place obligations on companies and governments who collect and process 
personal data, and give rights to those individuals whose personal data is collected.  
b) Obligations of data collectors: The collection, use, disclosure and retention of 
personal data must all meet transparent privacy-protecting standards. Everyone has the right 
to exercise control over the personal data collected about them and its usage. Whoever 
requires personal data from persons, shall request the individual‟s informed consent regarding 
the content, purposes, storage location, duration and mechanisms for access, retrieval and 
correction of their personal data. Everyone has a right to access, retrieve and delete the 
personal data collected about them. 
c) Minimum standards on use of personal data: When personal information is 
required, only the minimum data necessary must be collected and for the minimum period of 
time for which this is required. Data must be deleted when it is no longer necessary for the 
purposes for which it was collected. Data collectors have an obligation to seek active consent 
and to notify people when their information has been forwarded to third parties, abused, lost, 
or stolen. Appropriate security measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data 
                                                             
33 Ibid, p. 7. 
34 Ibid, p. 19. 
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stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorized destruction or accidental loss 
as well as against unauthorized access, alteration or dissemination. 
d) Monitoring by independent data protection authorities: Data protection should be 
monitored by independent data protection authorities, which work transparently and without 
commercial advantage or political influence. 
 The principles as seen in the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet 
have shown the relevant with the legal regime in Chapter 2: old regime, and 4: new regime, 
which had been reviewed before. In part a) Protection of Personal data, it has the same 
common ground with legal approval and contents of data subjects ‟rights as every instrument 
expected their State Parties to undertake. While part b) Obligation and c) Minimum Standard 
are relevant with the basic duty and data processing requirements of either old and new 
regime on protection of personal data. The last part d), try to create the competence body to 
regulate the instrument as well as other instruments desire. The Charter is the great 
expectation of International Community to create a comprehensive legal baseline for further 
drive to create common Universal/International instrument in the near future. 
 
5.3.2. Projects of International Civil Society Movements  
There are two important and interesting movements relating protection of personal 
data globally: the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
(ICDPPC) and the International Internet Coalition (IIC).  
The International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
(ICDPPC is a global forum of field experts and the highest authorities and institutions 
guaranteeing data protection and privacy.
35
 The ICDPPC is dedicated to identifying major 
challenges in the realm of privacy and data protection, and its main achievement in this field 
has been “The International Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy” 
(Madrid Resolution 2009). 
In 2009, the ICDPPC experts' meetings took place in Barcelona in January 2009 and 
Bilbao in June 2009, as well as the annual ICDPPC conference held in Madrid in November 
of 2009. At the ICDPPC experts' meetings in January and June 2009, participants discussed 
                                                             
35 ICDPPC. Madrid Resolution. 2009, presentation. 
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the development of a resolution on international privacy standards. In November 2009, the 
Joint Proposal for International Standards on the Protection of Privacy with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data (or “the Madrid Resolution”) was unveiled.36 In Madrid, on 6th 
of November 2009, The Joint Proposal on International Standards for the Protection of 
Privacy was positively welcomed by Protection Authorities of 50 countries gathered within 
the framework of the 31st International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy, through 
the adoption of the “Madrid Resolution”,37 The multiple approaches possible in the protection 
of personal data, integrating legislation from all five participating continents.  
Madrid Resolution is a Non-Legal Binding Instrument, According to the director of 
the AEPD, the Madrid Resolution will, thus, become a “soft law” tool, widely demanded 
mainly by international companies,
 
in order to respect the minimum data protection needs of 
citizens worldwide.
 38
 
The text‟s purpose is to define a series of principles and rights that guarantee the 
effective protection of privacy at an international level, as well as to ease the international 
flow of personal data, essential in a globalized world. Among the basic principles that must 
govern the use of personal data, and which have inspired the document, it founded those of 
loyalty, legality, proportionality, quality, transparency and responsibility; all of them are 
common to the different existing legal texts in the various regulations on the matter and enjoy 
wide consensus in their corresponding geographical, economic or legal application 
environments.
39
  
The Joint Proposal of International Privacy Standards includes, in addition, in its 
articulation, the need for the existence of supervisory authorities, and for the different states 
to cooperate and coordinate their activities. In addition with the set of rights such as access, 
rectification, cancellation and objection and the way in which they can be exercised.
40
 It also 
includes critical issues such as:  
                                                             
36 ICDPPC. Madrid Resolution. 2009. 
37
 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
38 Ibid, purpose. 
39 Ibid, Explanatory Note p.32. 
40 Ibid, pp. 19, 30 - 31. 
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Rights of Data Subject: The document defines sensitive data as that data that affects 
the most intimate side of a person or whose misuse can originate an illegal or arbitrary 
discrimination, or may imply a severe risk for the said person, 
41
and other legal terms 
relevant to Personal Data Protection.
42
 
Obligation of Duty Bearer: It ensures security of personal data, through those 
measures that are considered appropriate in each case, or confidentiality, which affects the 
controller as well as anyone who participates in any of the stages in which personal data is 
managed.
43
 In addition, in includes the requirements that must be met for the legal collection, 
preservation, use, revelation or erasure of personal data, such as, for example, the prior 
obtaining of the free, unequivocal and informed consent from the person providing the data. 
44
 A general rule, international personal data transfers may be performed when the State to 
which the data is transferred offers, at least, the level of protection foreseen in the document; 
or when whoever wants to transfer the data can guarantee that the addressee will offer the 
required level of protection, for example, through appropriate contractual clauses. 
45
 
Implementation Mechanism: The pro-active measures, which encourages States to 
promote a better compliance with the applicable laws regarding data protection matters, 
through instruments such as the establishment of procedures aimed at the prevention and 
detection of offences, or the periodic offering of awareness, education and training programs.
 
46
 
The resolution of corporate was supported by the Council of Europe. A group of 10 
large companies (Oracle, Walt Disney, Accenture, Microsoft, Google, Intel, Procter & 
Gamble, General Electric, IBM and Hewlett-Packard) have signed a declaration in which 
they proudly welcome the initiative from the 31st International Conference.
47
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In this declaration, the signing companies encourage Data Protection and Privacy 
Authorities to continue insisting and collaborating in the development of transparent systems 
that will allow the taking on of responsibilities and that will provide accurate information to 
the citizen, granting him/her the power to decide. Also, recently, the group on data protection 
from the Council of Europe, in a meeting celebrated just a few months ago, decided to 
support the initiative approved by the data protection authorities to adopt these international 
privacy standards and, with this, contribute to expand and promote a worldwide framework 
for the protection of privacy.
 48
 
The Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) as the main supporter to 2009 
Privacy Conference established a Working Group which has been working since then to 
elaborate this Joint Proposal, assuming that all these common principles and approaches 
contribute valuable elements to the defense and promotion of privacy and personal 
information, with the aim of extending those criteria and incorporating applicable solutions.
49
 
The Working Group has been undertaking research and drafting further resolution for late 
years. 
The second most interesting Non-Governmental Movement initiative related to 
International Personal Data Protection, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, is The 
International Internet Coalition (IIC), more than 600 Civil Society Organizations around the 
world until May 2014,
50
 have endorsed the International principles on State Surveillance. The 
Principles officially launched at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in September 2013 
by the host of Germany. The FINAL VERSION May 2014 has been posted at the Official 
Website of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights. The 
document pursues state to regard these principles: 
Principle 1 LEGALITY: Any limitation to human rights must be prescribed by law. 
The State must not adopt or implement a measure that interferes with these rights in the 
absence of an existing publicly available legislative act, which meets a standard of clarity and 
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precision that is sufficient to ensure that individuals have advance notice of and can foresee 
its application.
51
 
Principle 2 LEGITIMATE AIM: Laws should only permit Communications 
Surveillance by specified State authorities to achieve a legitimate aim that corresponds to a 
predominantly important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic society.
 52
 
Principle 3 NECESSITY: Surveillance laws, regulations, activities, powers, or 
authorities must be limited to those which are strictly and demonstrably necessary to achieve 
a legitimate aim.
 53
 
Principle 4 ADEQUACY: Any instance of Communications Surveillance authorized 
by law must be appropriate to fulfill the specific Legitimate Aim identified.
 54
 
Principle 5 PROPORTIONALITY: Communications surveillance should be regarded 
as a highly intrusive act that interferes with human rights threatening the foundations of a 
democratic society.
 55
 
These principles require a State, at a minimum, to establish the following measures: 
Principle 6 COMPETENT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: Determinations related to 
Communications Surveillance must be made by a competent judicial authority that is 
impartial and independent.
 56
 
Principle 7 DUE PROCESS: Due process requires that States respect and guarantee 
individuals‟ human rights by ensuring that lawful procedures that govern any interference 
with human rights are properly enumerated in law, consistently practiced, and available to the 
general public.
57
 
Principle 8 USER-NOTIFICATION AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REMEDY: 
Those whose communications are being surveilled should be notified of a decision 
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authorizing Communications Surveillance with enough time and information to enable them 
to challenge the decision or seek other remedies and should have access to the materials 
presented in support of the application for authorization. States should enact legislation 
criminalizing illegal Communications Surveillance by public or private actors.
 58
 
Principle 9 TRANSPARENCY: States should be transparent about the use and scope 
of Communications Surveillance laws, regulations, activities, powers, or authorities.
 59
 
Principle 10 PUBLIC OVERSIGHT: States should establish independent oversight 
mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of Communications Surveillance.
 60
 
Principle 11 INTEGRITY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SYSTEMS: In order to 
ensure the integrity, security and privacy of communications systems, and in recognition of 
the fact that compromising security for State purposes almost always compromises security 
more generally, States should not compel service providers or hardware or software vendors 
to build surveillance or monitoring capability into their systems, or to collect or retain 
particular information purely for State Communications Surveillance purposes.
61
 
Principle 12 SAFEGUARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: In 
response to changes in the flows of information, and in communications technologies and 
services, States may need to seek assistance from foreign service-providers and States.
 62
 
Principle 13 SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ILLEGITIMATE ACCESS: States should 
also enact laws providing that, after material obtained through Communications Surveillance 
has been used for the purpose for which information was given, the material must not be 
retained, but instead be destroyed or returned to those affected.
 63
 
However, it is a non-legal binding document. 
Those three initiatives from the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) and the 
International Civil Society Coalition have given the prospect to draft and adopt an 
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International Legal Instrument to regulate relevant organizations which collect, process and 
transfer of personal data. For supporting that goal, further studies in detail to prevent the 
illegitimate wrongdoings must be done on specific issue.  
There are some productive benchmarks from the EU-US legal regime could be 
adapted to assist the draft of International/Universal instrument on protection of personal data 
in cyberspace. Because of the long negotiation and drafting process of EU and the further 
reconciliation in complicated issues with the US, the set of rules from EU-US regime would 
be the best model for comparative legal studies. The comprehensive benchmarks in 12 issues 
will be synthesis below.  
 
 
5.4. Comparative Synthesis from the perspective of the EU-US E-Market regime  
Referencing to the 2016 EU and EU-US reformation process, this reform has tried to 
answer the same challenges that international community has confronted the worldwide 
internet users hold the nationality of some other countries which are not US citizen and the 
most of Mega IT Corporation who offer services in cyberspace are US Entities. The case of 
EU and US would be a suitable case study to be observed. 
The legal scheme implemented for the trans-Atlantic exchange of personal 
information is, in effect, a craftwork legal solution constructed on a bi-lateral basis. As it has 
been already analyzed, it includes the EU GDPR and EU-US Data Privacy Shield for 
fundamental personal data exchanges and EU Directive on Criminal Matters and EU-US 
Umbrella Agreement for protection of natural persons with regard to criminal matters.  
The EU-US regime covers 2 areas of E-Market which have persuasive factors: Most 
of competent organizations who may violate rights of data subject are under US jurisdiction 
such as IT Corporations and State Authorities, Their E-Market is highly attractive because the 
ratio of internet penetration is very high and the consumers have online purchasing power. 
Besides, the standard EU has set will oblige trade-counterparts around the world if they want 
to access EU E-Market, the regime would expand to them ultimately. Whereas, Non-EU 
countries might want to conform their legal policy to meet EU Standard, without separately 
negotiate mutual agreement, by initiating the International Regime or establishing the 
Universal Standard to harmonize Global E-Market regime. 
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To be more specific to EU-US predominant case study, on each side of the Atlantic, 
largely different provisions govern the respective processing once personal data have been 
transmitted. The EU-US example is a powerful case for the advantages of introducing a 
single international data protection instrument that would has saved both parties from a 
multitude of complex and hard-to follow arrangements and, ultimately, a significant waste of 
resources in the respective negotiation and drafting processes.
64
 Nonetheless, these set of EU-
US instruments have potential to set standard for International Data Protection Initiatives and 
other regional organizations since it covers vast majority states in the regime of liberal market 
economy countries. 
 
5.4.1. Individual’s Right to Personal Data Protection 
EU internet users can represent internet user in other part of the world since they 
entitle the same rights approved by Universal Human Rights instruments such as UN 
Declaration on Human Rights. Furthermore, vast majority countries are State Parties of 
ICCPR. Thus what EU Nationals gained from US Entities should be provided to other 
internet users. Besides, the protection can bring in confident to online customer and generate 
more prosperity to Global E-Market. The personal data protection reform will allow people to 
regain control of their personal data. Two-thirds of Europeans (67%), according to a recent 
Eurobarometer survey, stated they are concerned about not having complete control over the 
information they provide online. Seven Europeans out of ten worry about the potential use 
that companies may make of the information disclosed.
65
 The International data protection 
reform will strengthen the right to data protection, which is a fundamental right in the World 
Wide Web, and allow e-consumer/internet citizen to have trust when they give their personal 
data out. 
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5.4.1.1. Legal Approval of Personal Data Protection  
  The international regime must introduce a single set of rules, to be applied 
uniformly across the world. While issues of interpretation can never be ruled out, even with 
regard to the same set of rules, this will eliminate the incentives and possibility for companies 
to artificially and strategically try to attach themselves to certain Member State with either 
more lenient rules or, more importantly, implementation deficits due to an inactive national 
data protection authority. It does not mean abandoning the territoriality principle in relation to 
competence altogether but it contains novel and inventive procedures for cooperation, mutual 
assistance, joint operations and a consistency mechanism.
66
 One single e-market, one regime: 
The regulation will establish one single set of rules which will make it simpler and cheaper 
for companies to do business in the market.  
The international regime will bring clear rules for better cooperation, Global 
Single common rules on data protection will enable police and criminal justice authorities to 
cooperate more effectively with each other based on mutual trust and legal certainty.
67
 
However, International Regime for data protection in criminal matters should not provide for 
a general data protection framework in the context of criminal law because of the nature of 
domestic type of criminal procedure implementation, voluntary/diversity chosen, and because 
the Regime for data protection in the police and justice sectors just sets minimum 
harmonization rules which open wide discretion to the Member States for its own fit. 
The problem may arise from the architecture of the reform package on data 
protection itself, whether the establishment of Hard law or Soft law international instrument. 
The level of protection in the Soft law for data protection in the police and justice sectors 
should be lower than the one laid down in the Data Protection in General. The option of a 
Hard law also covering the area of criminal law enforcement might be unacceptable for most 
State Parties; that is why finally EU decided to adopt a Soft law with the same substance as 
the Regulation in General, but subject to the relevant limitations and exceptions,
68
 and 
leaving more space for domestic implementation. On the contrary, international instrument 
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for general personal data protection should be in a Hard Law form since it obliges IT 
Corporation, transfer data for economic purpose, in the prospect Single Global E-Market. 
 
5.4.1.2. Definition and Scope of Personal Data Protection 
The International Regime must apply to companies established outside the 
party territory that process data related to the activities of State Party‟s organizations. Non-
Party companies will also be subject to the Treaty if they target State Party‟s residents by 
profiling, or proposing products or services.
69
 There must be a single set of rules on data 
protection, directly applicable in all international party states, thereby mitigating the current 
fragmentation of national data protection laws and implementation by using the driving force 
of WTO GATTS article XX on personal data protection as a base. To accomplish, 
establishment of common rules on State Party territory, companies based outside of party‟s 
territory will have to apply the same rules when offering services in the member state. 
The International Regime for data protection on criminal matters should have 
two faces. On one hand, it is innovative as its scope is now intended to cover all personal data 
processing undertaken in the context of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
70
 
regardless of whether the processing takes place within or outside national borders. On the 
other hand, criminal law enforcement authorities, therefore, will no longer have to apply 
different sets of data protection rules depending on the origin of the personal data. The term 
should avoid different interpretations and provide a clear delimitation of the tasks of the 
scope of the regime.  
By using EU GDPR and Directive on Criminal Matters, as baseline against 
criticism of its broad definition of "personal data", there is considered necessary in order to 
"future-proof" the instruments in the context of rapid technological change. Under the GDPR, 
any information related to a natural person who can be identified by ways likely to be used by 
the controller would be caught under the definition. In Directive, "personal data" is defined 
with respect to a person who is or can be directly or indirectly identified, particularly by 
                                                             
69
 “European General Data Protection Regulation finally adopted: are you ready?.” Data Protection, Privacy 
and Security Alert (US), DLA Piper, 14 Apr. 2016, p. 1. 
70 Maesa, Costanza D F. Balance Between Security and Fundamental Rights Protection: an Analysis of The 
Directive 2016/680 for Data Protection in The Police and Justice Sectors and the Directive 2016/681 on the 
Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR). 2016, p. 10. 
350 
 
"reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity." Thus, the GDPR allows for the 
possibility of technological advances leading a controller to identify an individual through 
other sorts of data, which would then be protected as "personal data" under the GDPR.
71
 Thus 
the definition in International Regime may use this definition to develop their term. 
 
5.4.1.3. Content of Data Subjects’ Right to Data Protection  
The new rules must address the concerns by strengthening the existing rights 
and empowering individuals with more control over their personal data. Most notably, these 
include:  
- A clarified "right to be forgotten" or “right to erasure”: allowing data 
subjects the right to require a controller to delete data files relating to them 
if there are no legitimate grounds for retaining it;
72
 
- The right to breach notification: For example, companies and 
organizations must notify the national supervisory authority of serious data 
breaches as soon as possible so that users can take appropriate measures
73
; 
- Right to be informed and access: make it easier access of data subject to 
their own data. Individuals will have more information on how their data is 
processed and this information should be available in a clear and 
understandable way
74
; 
- Right to access and rectification - Any individual will be entitled to 
access their personal data – subject to certain conditions, given the law 
enforcement context – and request it to be corrected if it is inaccurate75; 
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- Data portability: Organizations must ensure data subjects can easily 
transfer their data files from one service provider to another.
76
 
The Universal Regime must protect citizens' fundamental right to data 
protection when data is used by law enforcement authorities, it should be processed lawfully, 
fairly, and only for a specific purpose. All law enforcement processing under mandate must 
comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality and legality, with appropriate 
safeguards for the individuals. Supervision is ensured by independent national data protection 
authorities and effective judicial remedies must be provided.
77
 
 
5.4.1.4. Exception to the exercise of Right to Personal Data Protection 
Even in emergency situation, the clear safeguards and transparency obligations 
on government access is needed, The universal regime must set conditions for government 
that has given the assurance that the access of public authorities for law enforcement and 
national security is subject to clear limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms. 
Everyone in the jurisdiction of the treaty will benefit from redress mechanisms in this area.
78
 
The International Community must rule out indiscriminate mass surveillance on personal data 
transferred to third part under the International Agreement/Treaty. The requirement to Office 
of National Intelligence Authority for further clarification that bulk collection of data could 
only be used under specific preconditions and needs to be as targeted and focused as 
possible.
79
 The International Treaty must detail the conditions and safeguards in place for the 
use of data under such exceptional circumstances, emergency situation.  
The Personal Data Protection policies of self-certified companies should 
include information on the extent to which National law allows Public Authorities to collect 
and process data transferred under the Data Sharing Agreement. In particular companies 
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should be encouraged to indicate in their policies when they apply exceptions to the 
Principles to meet national security, public interest or law enforcement requirements.
 80
 It is 
crucial that the national security exception foreseen by the Data Sharing Agreement is used 
only to an extent that is strictly necessary to handle such emergency situation proportionately. 
The laws must be sufficiently precise to indicate to citizens in what 
circumstances and on what terms the public authorities are empowered to gather information 
on their private lives and make use of it. Such information should “be accessible to the person 
concerned and foreseeable as to its effects”, which means that it must be “formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate 
his conduct”.81 
Ultimately, there is a need for establishment an oversight/redress possibility in 
the area of national intelligence for individuals through an independence quasi-judicial 
mechanism, Ombudsperson, within the Data Supervisory Authority. 
 
5.4.2. Obligation of the Data Controller and Data Processor 
Can US IT Corporation cases in EU be used with other parts of the world? This 
question would be the main curiosity of internet users and technocrats around the world. In 
today's digital economy, personal data has acquired enormous economic significance, in 
particular in the area of big data or metadata collected and processed by Giant US IT 
Corporation. By unifying Europe's rules on data protection, lawmakers are creating a 
business opportunity and encouraging innovation, not only for EU IT Corporations but also 
US ones. Creating clear and predictable obligation would be preferable for IT Corporation 
because the can plan how to do business in any E-Market worldwide. However, the other 
approach on adopting International instrument to cover the personal data protection related 
activities would be beneficial in term of setting common rule for Global E-Market. Hence, 
promoting the personal data protection in the area of law enforcement should be at stake as 
well. 
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5.4.2.1. Basic Duty of Data Controller and Processor 
The Universal Regime must open-up diverse rules might fit for innovation. 
The rules must guarantee that data protection safeguards are built into products and services 
from the earliest stage of development (Data protection by design). Privacy-friendly 
techniques such as “pseudonomysation” will be encouraged, to reap the benefits of big data 
innovation while protecting privacy.
82
 Moreover, the policy which put personal data 
protection as a fundamental ground for Data Controller/Processor (Data protection by 
default) would be better for enlargement the global e-market. 
The encouragement of transparency governance will make organizations have 
increased responsibility and accountability on how they control and process personal data. 
The needs of increased transparency obligations will oblige them to make privacy notices 
which include much more detailed information.
83
 Public and Private organizations processing 
data on behalf of other companies/authorities will be required to comply with a number of 
specific personal data protection related obligations. They must be liable to sanctions if they 
fail to meet the criteria.  
The verified companies and certified authorities should publicly disclose their 
privacy policies. The Privacy policies of verified organizations‟ websites should always 
include a link to the National Data Protection Authority website which lists all the „current‟ 
members of the scheme. The policy should entail personal data conditions of any contracts 
they conclude with third party e.g. subcontractors, cloud computing services.
84
 Obvious 
emblems on the website of the National Data protection Authority all companies which are 
current members of the scheme and the watching list of threaten organization.  
The controller and the processor must appoint a data protection officer (DPO) 
who has expert knowledge on data protection law.
85
  The DPO will report to the highest 
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management level and make a periodic report of risks and threats they have found and 
warned. 
 
5.4.2.2. Condition and Requirement of Data Collection and Processing 
The Universal Regime should require a more active consent based model to 
support lawful processing of personal data; wherever consent is required for data to be 
processed, consent must be explicit, rather than implied.
86
 
The stronger protection for data processing that presents "specific risks," such 
as that which involves certain sensitive information, triggers the requirement for a data 
protection impact assessment. This assessment, which must describe the processing foreseen, 
shall assess risks to data subject rights, means of addressing these and those designed to 
protect personal data, and demonstrate compliance with the Regime. The data protection 
impact assessment is to be accomplished by or on behalf of the controller,
87
 and the 
International Data Authority may adopt further criteria by delegated acts. 
The common international regime is needed to slash red tape for state 
authorities, Police and criminal justice authorities will no longer have to apply different sets 
of data protection rules according to the origin of the personal data, saving time and budget. 
The new rules will apply to both domestic processing and cross-border transfers of personal 
data. Having more harmonized laws in all Treaty Party States will make it easier criminal 
enforcement officer to coordination.
88
 However, the rules in the legal instrument must take 
account of the specific requirements of the judicial and criminal justice sector and respect the 
different legal cultures in State Parties. 
Nonetheless, data controllers or processors will be required to report data 
breaches to the relevant data protection agency "without undue delay," and where feasible of 
notice of such a breach. Notifications after such time period will need to be justified. 
Processors must inform controllers of breaches immediately after their establishment, and the 
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controller must inform the data subject if the breach will likely have a negative effect on the 
protection of the subject's personal data or privacy, unless the controller can prove that the 
data was rendered "unintelligible" to unauthorized persons.
89
 
 
5.4.2.3. Data Security 
There are 2 main measures that Universal Regime should implant. Firstly, 
Risk-based approach: the rules must avoid a burdensome one-size-fits-all obligation and 
rather tailor them to the respective risks. Secondly, Impact Assessments: IT Corporations will 
have obligation to carry out an impact assessment no matter how low risk there is.
90
 The 
development of apparel Cybersecurity Strategy of many regional organizations and economic 
bloc may support the same mission to maintain stability of Internet and trust among online 
citizen. Thus, the Privacy impact assessment (PIA) will become a mandatory prerequisite 
before processing personal data for operations that are likely to present higher privacy risks to 
data subjects due to the nature or scope of the processing operation.
 91 
The rule must demand organizations to notify the local supervisory authority, and (in 
some cases) data subjects, of significant data breaches.
 92
 There must be an Authority to 
announce Information in case of data security breaches. A mechanism will be put in place so 
as to ensure notification of data security breaches to the competent authority and, where 
appropriate, the data subject.
93
 
 
5.4.2.4. Data Retention 
This Universal Regime should complement existing EU, EU-US and State 
Parties agreements between IT Corporation and law enforcement authority and among law 
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enforcement authorities themselves. Since it creates clear harmonized data protection rules 
and set a high level of protection for future agreements in the field of Data Retention; 
purposes, time period and competent authority.
94
 The International Instrument should provide 
the following protections to make sure that everyone's data are protected when collected, 
processed and shared the retained data between organizations.  
The rules must give clear limitations on data use. Personal data may only be 
used for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offences, 
and may not be processed beyond compatible purposes. Organization must be subject to the 
prior consent of the competent authority of the country which had originally retained personal 
data. The limit of Retention periods must be written obviously, Individuals' personal data 
may not be retained for longer than necessary or appropriate. These retention periods will 
have to be published or otherwise made publicly available. The decision on what is an 
acceptable duration must take into account the impact on people's rights and interests.
95
 
 
5.4.2.5. Data Transfer  
The tightening of conditions for the onward transfers of data to third parties 
will guarantee the same level of protection in case of a transfer from a registered company
96
 
must be prerequisite by International Regime. The Track and Trace-back system on the 
verified organizations (Accountability Principle – Nationality based) should be brought in to 
the Regime and make it a liability for Nationality State of the Head Quarter of such 
organizations to control their activities. 
The International Regime should provides for general principles and clear 
rules for the transfer of personal data by police and criminal justice authorities outside the 
treaty mandate, to ensure that these transfers take place with an adequate level of data 
protection (Adequacy Principle – Territorial based). The international regime must provide 
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robust rules on personal data exchanges at national, regional and international level
97
 so it 
would be easier and safer international cooperation. 
 
5.4.3. Implementation of Personal Data Protection 
The implementation phase has started: International community will countdown years 
to ensure data processing activities are in line with the newly adopted rules of big liberal free 
market bloc like EU, US. This means International cooperation needing to act now. It makes 
sense to undertake a snapshot assessment of the impact of the EU and EU-US Regime on the 
IT Corporation and Intelligence Authority, so that steps can be taken to identify and 
implement any necessary changes. Any assessment ought to be tailored to the specific needs 
of the data subjects but is likely to focus on key issues such as appointment of a Data 
Protection Authority/Officer and Monitoring body or providing individual redress and putting 
a sanction on non-compliance organization. Nonetheless, even EU new regime, it permits 
national legislators to diverge to a considerable extent from certain of the GDPR‟s provisions, 
including the provisions covering the situation at issue on conflict of applicable law in 
different jurisdictions. Consequently, the scenario will come down to the critical question on, 
why leaving the implementation to domestic court around the world is not enough? And 
should other citizen have the same redress rights as US&EU Nationals? Since the main 
service providers in cyberspace are US IT Corporation and the most dangerous threats are 
coming from US National Security Agency. 
 
5.4.3.1. Monitoring Body and Supervisory Authority  
The Universal Regime should contain novel and inventive procedures for 
cooperation, mutual assistance, joint operations and a consistency mechanism. Moreover, all 
national data protection authorities have to present activity reports periodically, which will be 
published. All of this aims at ensuring consistency in the application of the regulation by the 
national authorities. It also seeks to encourage the national supervisory authorities to take an 
active stance and aims to mobilize all of them to an optimal extent. It must provide the 
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harmonized rule, to apply in uniformity by supervisory authorities across the world to 
eliminate the problems on fragmented territories
98
 including the provisions covering the 
situation at issue on conflict of applicable law in different jurisdictions.   
The regime must support the better cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities with the new Data Protection Directive for Police and Criminal Justice 
Authorities, law enforcement authorities in Party States will be able to exchange information 
necessary for investigations more efficiently and effectively, improving cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism and other serious crime among state party. The Data Protection on 
Criminal Matters part will take account of the specific needs of legal enforcement.
99
 
Moreover, it must respect the different legal traditions in State Parties and is fully in line with 
the International Treaties of Human Rights.  
The needs of establishment the One-stop-shop, businesses and individuals will 
only have to deal with one single supervisory authority. Furthermore, a global data protection 
authority which will act as the lead regulator for compliance issues among the State Party, 
where the organization has multiple points of presence around the world. 
 
5.4.3.2. Redress Mechanism and Individual Remedy  
The Universal Regime must push forward a stronger remedy mechanism, 
better protection of citizens 'data Individuals' personal data will be better protected, when 
processed for any law enforcement purpose including prevention of crime. It must protect 
everyone, regardless of whether they are a victim, criminal or witness. Supervision is ensured 
by independent national data protection authorities, and effective judicial remedies must be 
provided. The Data Protection on Criminal Matters must provide clear rules for the transfer 
of personal data by law enforcement authorities outside the territory, to ensure that the level 
of protection of individuals guaranteed in the regimes‟ jurisdiction is not undermined.100 The 
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oversight body of such mission should be created in a form of independence Quasi-Judicial 
organization or impartial court.  
Even trying to create international regime but it is the duty of the national 
courts in cooperation with the international instrument on personal data protection to ensure 
the uniform interpretation of the International Personal Data Protection provisions
101
 
throughout the territory of state party.  
The One-stop-shop for individual complainant as mentioned above would be 
important path for effective remedy. This is estimated to save billions per year and provide 
greater opportunity for internet user to contact with oversight mechanism. The appointment 
of assistant or attorney for local victim to appeal in court or One-stop-shop must be initiated 
for free or pro-bono basis (founding trust fund to collect budget from the income of 
processing organizations or from fines). 
There must be an effective and accessible data personal protection remedy for 
individual internationally. The accessible and affordable dispute resolution mechanisms is 
Ideal, the complaint will be resolved by the company/authority itself; or free of charge 
Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) solutions will be offered. Individuals can also go to 
their national Data Protection Authorities (DPA), who will work with the international Data 
Protection Authority to ensure that complaints by State Party‟s citizens are investigated and 
resolved. If a case is exhaustion of domestic remedy, as a last resort there will be an 
arbitration mechanism.
102
 The National DPA should monitor more systematically ADR 
providers regarding the transparency and accessibility of information they provide concerning 
the procedure they use and the follow-up they give to complaints.
103
 Furthermore, redress 
possibility in the area of national security for State Party citizen must be handled by an 
Ombudsperson independent from the national intelligence services who involved.  
However, the most critical part would be the judicial redress and 
enforceability of rights of the Aliens in other jurisdiction, for example Spanish victim in US 
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Court. Since Foreign Citizens will have the right to seek judicial redress before Domestic 
courts of other Nation. In case of the State Party authorities deny access or rectification, or 
unlawfully disclose their personal data.
104
 This provision of the International Instrument 
depends on the adoption by such Party Legislator of the State‟s Judicial Redress Act has been 
launched. 
 
5.4.3.3. Enforceability of Right  
Universal Regime must impose that non-compliance could lead to solid 
sanctions. The revised EU enforcement regime is underpinned by power for regulators to levy 
financial sanctions can be substantial, with administrative fines authorized of up to a 
maximum of 20 million euros or 4% of total worldwide global turnover of the prior financial 
year, whichever is higher. The use of damage fine would be a real cost for IT Corporation to 
trigger the change in their policy and practice. 
The method of periodic report for conduct regular updates and reviews of 
participating companies, to ensure that companies follow the rules they submitted themselves 
to. If companies do not comply in practice they face sanctions and removal from the list.
105
 
The Trust-Mark emblem would be recruited to supplement the action and procure ambitious 
international IT Corporation to participate in order to market their services in global market. 
In compound with Annual joint review mechanism, the mechanism will monitor the 
functioning of the Treaty, including the commitments and assurance as regards access to data 
for law enforcement and national security purposes.
106
 The International and National Data 
Protection Authority will conduct the review and associate national intelligence experts from 
the State Party Authorities. The Commission will draw on all other sources of information 
available and will issue a public report to the Director or High level Commission of the 
Treaty. 
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Moreover, the recognition of investigative power of domestic and international 
supervisory authority must be landed as a procedure to point out wrongdoings internationally. 
Following the certification or recertification of IT Corporations under International Data 
Protection Treaty, a certain percentage of these IT Corporations should be subject to ex 
officio investigations of effective compliance of their data protection policies (going beyond 
control of compliance with formal requirements). Whenever there has been a finding of non-
compliance, following a complaint or an investigation, the IT Corporation should be subject 
to follow-up specific investigation
107
 thereafter. 
 
The time is counting down to the point that E-Market enlargement is non-avoidable so 
the harmonization of legal regime to regulate International market is needed. National data 
protection authorities, as well as the Regional and International data protection bodies which 
will be established in the future, must issue rules and interpretations to assist data 
controller/processor organizations to prepare themselves before converge to harmonized 
global e-market. 
 
5.5.  Benchmarks for the development of a specific Universal Regime 
Taking into account the results of the research, the needs to create 
International/Universal regime is obvious if building trust in E-Market is the aim. Since 
the court decision in diverse cases used the principle of territoriality and “Adequacy 
Principle” to effectively address the issue, there are some companies that might be inclined to 
artificially pick which national law to comply with and which national data protection 
authority to deal with. The EU and EU-US regimes will change that status quo by providing 
for a single set of rules, to be applied in uniformity by supervisory authorities across the EU 
and also extraterritorial.
108
 This should eliminate the jurisdiction problems presented in 
many past cases and will create a common future for Global Single E-Market 
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Despite the fact that within some two decades of intensive application, only small 
portion of countries have managed to pass EU adequacy criterion,
109
 which allows personal 
data transfers to them, the EU has been extremely active in exporting its data protection  
model.
110
 The new European data protection model and EU-US regime present a ready-made 
solution of substantial depth that can be tempting to countries with no previous data 
protection experience. If reaching the standard of EU, like the case of US and EU 
relationship, is the goal. So the main elements of the new data protection regime should 
consist of these elements: 
111
 
Empowerment of individuals‟ right  
• Right of data subjects to know how their personal data are handled and by whom.  
• Data portability: transferability of personal data between service providers.  
• “Right to be forgotten” is clarified and codified through the introduction of a “right 
to erasure”.  
• Breach Notification: Information about when personal data has been hacked, if the 
breach is likely to result in a high risk to the individual‟s rights and freedoms.  
• Allow Non-profit organizations to represent individuals in exercising their rights 
with regard to administrative and judicial remedies.  
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New rules for businesses competitiveness  
• One-stop-shop: businesses with establishments in more than one Member State 
will in many cases have to deal with one supervisory authority (lead supervisory 
authority) only.  
• Domestic rules on State territory: companies based outside of destination country 
will have to apply the same rules when offering services in the offshore country.  
• Risk-based approach: no one-size-fits-all obligation, obligations now tailored to 
potential risks; Data protection by default. 
• Data protection by design: the regulation guarantees that data protection safeguards 
are built into data processing from the earliest stage of development; producers of 
products and services are encouraged to take into account the right to data 
protection when developing new products and services that are based on or 
intended to process personal data. 
• Obligation to notify data breaches to supervisory authorities, in some instances also 
to individuals.  
• No more obligations to notify insignificant data processing to supervisory 
authorities every times.  
• Businesses are exempt from the obligation to appoint a data protection officer 
insofar as data processing is not their core business activity and this does not 
require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale, or the 
core business activities do not consist of processing on a large scale special 
category of data. Other Regional or national law may however extend this 
obligation. 
• Businesses will have no obligation to carry out an impact assessment unless there 
is a high risk to individuals‟ rights and freedoms.  
 
Data protection in the area of law enforcement efficiency 
• Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) can exchange information more efficiently 
and effectively.  
• LEAs must comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality and legality 
when processing personal data.  
• Supervision must be ensured by independent national data protection authorities.  
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• Effective judicial remedies must be provided.  
• Rules for transferring personal data to third countries are clarified.  
• Member States may introduce a higher level of protection into their national laws.  
 
After research through many proposals from relevant competent organizations, there 
are some requirements that could be crystals as the best practice elements. These remarks 
should be brought to oblige data controller/processor in order to support the progressive 
realization of right to personal data protection. For transforming this universal best practice to 
be the enforceable policy, these measures should be adapted for drafting a new legal 
instrument to regulate the duty bearer organization. The prospect measures are as follows: 
112
 
Progressive Realization and Obligation to Transparency 
1) State must publish the personal data protection or privacy policy of verified 
organizations  
2) Organization, Legal Persons such as state authority, business enterprises and non-
governmental organizations, must put the link to the supervisory and oversight 
authority website, which lists all the „current‟ members of the scheme, on the 
privacy policies of verified organizations‟ websites  
3) Organization must announce privacy conditions of any contracts verified 
organizations conclude with subcontractors, e.g. cloud computing services. (Data 
Controller and Data processor) 
4) State must show the clearly flag of all organizations which are not current 
members of the scheme on the website of the supervisory and oversight authority.  
Supervisory and Redress 
5) State and Organization must appoint the supervisory and oversight authority to 
monitor more systematically ADR providers regarding the transparency and 
accessibility of information they provide concerning the procedure they use and 
the follow-up they give to complaints.  
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6) Organization must include a link to the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
provider on the verified organizations‟ websites of personal data protection 
policies. 
7) Organization must provide the ADR which is readily available and affordable.  
Implementation and Enforcement 
8) Following the verification or recertification of organizations under International 
Agreement, a certain percentage of these organizations should be subject to ex 
officio investigations of effective compliance of their personal data protection 
policies (going beyond control of compliance with formal requirements).  
9) Whenever there has been a finding of non-compliance, following a complaint or 
an investigation, the organization should be subject to follow-up specific 
investigation once again after 1 year. 
10) In case of doubts about an organization's compliance or pending complaints, the 
Supervisory or Oversight Authority should inform the competent State data 
protection authority. 
11) Even there are false claims of International Agreement adherence, still need to 
continue investigation. 
Exceptions and Access by State Authorities 
12) Personal data protection policies of verified organizations must include 
information on the extent to which Domestic law allows public authorities to 
collect and process data transferred under the International Agreement. In 
particular organizations should be encouraged to indicate in their personal data 
protection policies when they apply exceptions to the Principles to meet national 
security, public interest or law enforcement requirements. 
13) The national security exception must be oversight and only use by the 
prerequisite condition of International Agreement. Exemption is used only to an 
extent that is strictly necessary and proportionate. 
 
In summary, there is a need to providing a single set of rules to be applied in 
uniformity by supervisory authorities across the world. This would eliminate the problems 
366 
 
present in many past cases including the provisions covering the situation at issue on conflict 
of applicable law in different jurisdictions. Furthermore, the more “Accountability Principle” 
approach may be introduced to trace and track the activity of Trans-National IT Corporations 
and National or International Intelligence Agencies because of the different competences on 
the implementation ability among various States. Conclusively, the recognition of 
investigative power of domestic and international supervisory authority must be landed as a 
procedure to point out wrongdoings internationally. Whenever there has been a finding of 
non-compliance did by either private or public entities, following a complaint or an 
investigation, such IT Corporation and State Authority should be subject to follow-up 
specific investigation thereafter. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The uses of personal data from internet are no longer performed locally, or even 
within well-scoped physical territories. Besides, trans-border personal data processing 
became personalized. Domestic data controllers are no longer needed to transmit their data 
subjects’ data across borders to other data controllers in order for trans-border exchanges to 
occur. At present, Social Network applications enable users to upload their personal data to 
the “Account” or “Webpage”, going to and from unidentified destination. With regard to data 
protection, it must be decided how, if at all, data can be protected to the same extent in the 
cyberspace as in the “real” world. It is usual that attempts to create a safe online society result 
in even harder than in an offline environment because the amount of processed data is far 
greater than the past. Within this general context of problems and challenges, our research 
makes possible to obtain some conclusions and to formulate some recommendations that can 
help to their solution and management. 
 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
6.1.1. Personal Data Protection under the EU and EU-US E-market legal regime  
prior 2013 reforms: main deficiencies/shortcomings and problems 
Even though, the goal of this research is to harmonize the provision and 
implementation of Personal Data Protection, for creating International Regime, but at the 
starting point show the overlap and insufficient of the old instruments. Specially, the old set 
of personal data protection laws, which was enacted before the reformation process of EU 
and US, had been heavily based on the implementation at the domestic level. 
 
6.1.1.1. Predominance of the US Entities and its effects on Global Netizen  
Most prominently, the discontents US system brought to the personal data 
protection recourse came from the directly clash with the State intelligence operation in 
National Security realm. The intention of US government to conduct mass electronic 
surveillance on activities relate to terrorism, especially on foreigner who is out of the full US 
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constitutional protection, may put further complicated situations for internet users around the 
world. Since most of dominant IT Corporations are subjected to US or transfer personal data 
to the servers in US territory, the different standard would be the main threat to Non-US 
citizen internet users. 
US IT Corporation are subjected to US domestic laws whereas Rights of 
Global Neitizen are in the realm of US jurisdiction when such data transferred to US territory 
or entity and it may be compromised by the exercise of US Authorities. 
Data Controller, US IT Corporation, has obligation to secure their data system 
and notify data subjects and State Data Protection Authority (DPA), when data breach 
happen. US DPA, Federal Trade Commission under Ministry of Commerce, has a duty to 
provide preparatory and supporting advices especially when there were wide spread of 
massive electronic data surveillance by US National Security Agency. Before the revelations 
on June 5th of 2013, both US DPA and IT Corporation had done nothing. To meet the 
Adequacy Criterion of EU, the transfer of data across Atlantic had been under provision of 
EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement, legalizing trans-border data flows. 
The effectiveness of the enforcement regimes in various countries is on the 
extent of judicial interpretation and on other comparative aspects of data protection laws. 
There are processing dispute resolution procedures in EU but not in the Safe Harbor 
Agreement. The mass transfer of data of Non-US citizens to US companies and authorities 
and the lack of appropriate redress mechanism for them is an issue of extreme concern. 
The EU data protection regulators had launched an investigation into Google's 
data retention and privacy practices, which was extended to cover other search engines as 
well. In 2012 the EPIC appealed to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking disclosure of any communications between National Security Agency 
(NSA) and Google Inc. regarding encryption and cyber security. Many cases lead to the 
revelation of the cooperation between NSA and IT Corporation which impact to Personal 
Data Protection. 
As NSA‘s PRISM project collect data from the most powerful IT Corporations 
of the world such as Google, Yahoo, Facebook etc., the identification of place time and 
activity of people could be tracked and traced orderly from the Big Data Collection that 
gathering from Cyberspace globally including Non-US Citizen outside US territory. 
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Since the US Courts have made decisions which set the precedent on Data 
Collecting and Sharing of IT Corporation and State Authority because they are the subjects 
under US jurisdiction.  On December 16, 2013, the U.S. District Court ruled in Klayman v. 
Obama, that the NSA's bulk collection of domestic telephone call detail records likely 
violated the Fourth Amendment (right to privacy and personal data protection). This case 
celebrated the full constitutional rights enjoyment of US citizen but the protection for Non-
US citizen stills remain. 
On other side of Atlantic, Court of Justice of European Union CJEU had 
launched a series of decisions relating personal data protection by IT Corporation and State 
especially the case of US nationality Entities. Since there was the LIBE Report on Mass 
Electronic Surveillance, the MUSCULAR program, which collects more than twice as many 
data points compared to PRISM. The MUSCULAR program requires no warrants and 
operates by the coordination with UK,; so UK as EU Member State, have made direct breach 
on personal data of data subjects around the world. 
Facebook’s user, who claims his data was breached by US Agencies, filed the 
case called Schrems Case after his name. The CJEU ruling found that U.S. national security, 
public interest, and law enforcement requirements have “primacy” over the Safe Harbor 
principles, and that US undertakings are bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective 
rules laid down by that scheme where they conflict with such requirements. Consequently, 
the CJEU observed that the Safe Harbor scheme “enables interference” by US authorities 
“with the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data is or could be transferred 
from the EU to the US.” 
The CJEU concluded that Safe harbor and US legislation do not providing for 
any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal 
data relating him or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data compromises the 
essence of this fundamental right, which is an important component of the rule of law. Thus, 
the Safe Harbor Decision did not contain sufficient remedy measure for individual in case of 
violation by IT Corporation or State National Authority. 
Therefore, CJEU invalidated Safe Harbor on 6 October 2015. EU and the US 
need to renegotiate new agreement to regulate data flows between both sides of Atlantic. 
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In conclusion, the difficulties come from the failure of US legal system for 
protecting personal data of data subjects. The inadequacy of US system brought deteriorates 
to the personal data protection. The program of US government to conduct mass electronic 
surveillance on activities relate to terrorism, especially on foreigner who is out of the full US 
constitutional protection, may put further obscure scenarios for internet users globally.  
 
6.1.1.2. Different standards and the difficulties from fragmented 
jurisdiction 
Personal Data protection has been recognized in diverse instruments from 
International Organization to EU Regional Bloc then Bilateral EU-US agreement. 
Accordingly, the legal binding consequence of each agreement is different because the legal 
nature of each one is up to the manner of its launching institution. Differences in the legal 
nature of data protection law between cultures and legal systems have made it more difficult 
to reach an international consensus on the subject. 
The commons and differences of definition and scope written in various 
sources, brings complicates to the implementation of personal data protection. Many 
activities in the public or the private sector are under scope of personal data protection 
instruments which cover large amount of information. But it has brought troubles to 
individual for exercising their right in other countries. However, the different scopes are on 
actor and jurisdiction as most powerful actor who control and process personal data, IT 
Corporation; Multi-National Legal Person, is under the appliance of the Law of specific 
territory but their activities are trans-border. 
The instruments recognizing right to personal data had been creating for 
decades so there is some out-of date provisions maintain in those legal documents. The more 
advance in technology the more complexity it brought into legal atmosphere. The 
implementation of data subjects’ right to personal data protection is increasingly complicated 
because the nature of data which is decentralized to various kinds of organizations.  
The ‘fairly and lawfully’ principle provides a ‘lens’ through which the other 
provisions in the Data Protection Directive should be interpreted. Since the data processor has 
no direct obligation to data subject, it will impact how data protection issues are addressed in 
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data processing business and data sharing on preventing and suppressing crime and terrorism 
especially when the Third Party is the Subject to Different Jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction of EU laws and extraterritorial application of EU data 
protection law was re-affirmed more strongly in Google Spain Case. In finding that EU data 
protection law did apply in such a case, the Court noted that the Directive should be 
interpreted to have ‘a particularly broad territorial scope’. The CJEU also held that the right 
to delete data under the EU Data Protection Directive applies to the results of Internet search 
engines (‘right to be forgotten’ or ‘right to erasure’). These precedents give a path for EU 
internet users to exercise their rights with Trans-Border IT Corporations even such Legal 
Persons are not EU nationals. 
In the European Union, various legal instruments and obligations provide 
individuals and regulators with a framework that allows the assertion of rights with regard to 
EU-based data processing. Thus, EU data protection authorities are obliged to cooperate with 
each other, and often do so in practice. Court decisions from one EU Member State can also 
be enforced in another Member State with relative ease. However, the same legal instruments 
do not apply to situations where a non-EU country is involved, meaning that such enhanced 
regulatory cooperation and ease of enforcement are not possible to fulfill. The difficulty of 
asserting legal rights abroad is not unique to data protection, but results from the fact that 
there is no global legal framework for the assertion of consumer rights in Cyberspace, or for 
the recognition and enforcement of court decisions in other countries. 
 
6.1.1.3. Vague exemptions and lack of supervisory over data surveillance 
in criminal procedure 
As well as other human rights, the right to personal data protection is not 
absolute; it can be restricted in certain situations and due to other rights. Most often deal with 
the relationship between state of emergency and personal data protection. The state 
authorities and courts must weigh up the reasons for accessing certain data and the potential 
effect on an individual of such state surveillance. A necessary precondition and proportionate 
solution must be provided, in which state/public interests as well as the interests of the data 
subject are taken into consideration. Nonetheless, US most influence IT Corporations are a 
subject under US national security laws; Patriot Act, Homeland Security Act and Foreign 
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Intelligence Surveillance Act which may compromise the full enjoyment of personal data 
protection,, 
Most data protection instruments impose a similar obligation on public 
authorities and private parties. After all, fundamental human rights primarily aim to limit the 
actions of public authorities in order to protect the activities of private parties, including the 
processing of personal data, from state interference. However, the effectiveness of access 
control of national security exceptions is relevant to the existence of any back doors or other 
means for accessing unencrypted personal data opened by Service Provider, IT Corporation.  
In Elecronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the NSA’s Glomar response (remain silent when face inquiry) sufficiently 
satisfied the exemption requirements of the Freedom of Information Act because threat 
assessment is an undisputed NSA function and, therefore, the NSA was not required to 
confirm or deny existence of any responsive records. This case affirmed the exemption power 
of national Security to exercise secrecy mission above the protection of civil rights. 
Problems have emerged from set of Security Laws were left to the 
interpretation in secret proceedings, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC and the higher Review court FISCR) whose judges are appointed solely by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. It appears that the FISA courts agree with the government's 
argument that it is common in investigations for some indefinitely large corpus of records to 
be considered “relevant”, in order to discover the actual evidence. Accordingly, the lack of 
Supervision and Oversight are the main threat to protection of personal data worldwide since 
it relies on US Administrative related Court decisions. Further, the Non-US Citizen has no 
right to appeal in US Court for such violations. 
In the Digital Rights Ireland Case, it can be pointed particularly on the 
principle of purpose limitation, on the right to access of individuals to their personal data and 
on the control by independent data protection authorities. However, data retention needs a 
shred of evidence to suggest that their conduct might be connected to a serious crime and no 
one is exempted from this rule; it even applies to those whose communications are subject to 
professional secrecy, according to national rules. Aftermath, the Data Retention Directive 
was invalidated by CJEU on 8th April 2014 since it did not meet the EU principle of 
proportionate and necessary exemptions. 
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6.1.2. Improvements and limits in Personal Data Protection after the 2013 
reforms of the EU and EU-US E-Market legal regime. 
After all benchmarks the US and EU Courts had been made in past cases, the US 
Government and EU Legislation Unit have launching set of laws in the interest of 
reformation.  
The US and EU appointed committee to create changes for better solution to handle 
the problems. Accordingly, EU approves General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
Directive on judicial and criminal matters then brought US to sign agreement to implement 
those standards which are EU-US Privacy Shield for general data protection and EU-US 
Umbrella Agreement on judicial and criminal matters. These reforms took place since April 
of 2016 and will be full implementation in 2018. 
Nevertheless, the starting point of these set of reforms can be traced back to the 
changes triggered by the US since late 2013 due to the International pressure on Global Mass 
Electronic Surveillance Programs of US Government, especially from EU the main E-Market 
trading counterparts. 
 
6.1.2.1. Responses of the US relating personal data protection for Non-US 
citizen Data Subject 
There are initiatives from US and EU to address the problem of personal data 
protection in digital age. The US Government had launched a set of laws to reform their 
surveillance activity and provide Non-US citizen stronger protection of their personal data. 
In March 2014, the US government adopted six privacy principles to govern 
surveillance.  This US Framework declared by President Obama Presidential Policy Directive 
28 (PPD-28), to better protect personal data of all persons including non-U.S citizens 
worldwide.  
The critical improvement is the Judicial Redress Act, extends to EU citizens 
the same rights that U.S. citizens enjoy under the Privacy Act of 1974 with respect to the data 
protection obligations of U.S. government agencies. Additionally, the Judicial Redress Act 
give EU citizen access to U.S. courts to enforce privacy rights in relation to personal data 
transferred to the U.S. for law enforcement purposes. 
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The EU GDPR applies to organizations established in a third country if they 
are offering goods and services, or monitoring the behavior of individuals, in the EU. It also 
introduces some new tools for international transfers, Adequacy decisions, the GDPR 
provides more precise and detailed elements that must take into account when assessing the 
level of data protection provided in the legal order of a third country. 
In Privacy Shield, redress mechanism will inform a complainant of an access 
or surveillance matter has been properly investigated and obliged with US law. In the case of 
non-compliance it will be properly remedied. EU citizens are capable to lodge complaints 
directly to their local DPAs. Remedy mechanisms determine period for responses by a 
subject organization. Privacy Shield also creates a new arbitration right for unresolved 
complaints. 
However, the Umbrella Agreement does not provide for equal rights and 
remedies for EU- and US nationals in the USA; but worse, non-EU citizens living in EU 
Member States who are not nationals of the Member State concerned and whose data may 
have been sent to the USA, are completely denied judicial redress in the USA under the 
Umbrella Agreement. 
 
6.1.2.2. Harmonization of Trans-Atlantic legal standards 
The GDPR applies to organizations established in a third country if they are 
offering goods and services, or monitoring the behavior of individuals, in the EU. It provides 
for an effective sanctions regime by harmonizing the powers of national data protection 
supervisory authorities (DPAs). They will be empowered to impose fines reaching up to EUR 
20 million or up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of a company.  
The EU-US Privacy Shield core principles are the same as Safe Harbor by 
harmonize the data protection within EU-US Single E-Market. Privacy Shield includes 
statements regarding the enforcement body, a new arbitration right, disclosures to public 
authorities, and the company’s liability for onward transfers. 
EU Directive on Criminal and Judicial Matters includes harmonized rules for 
international transfers of personal data in the context of criminal law enforcement 
cooperation. Meanwhile, it will enable the police and judicial authorities to cooperate more 
effectively, amongst Member States as well as between Member States and their international 
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partners, to combat crime and terrorism. It urges State to provide independent national data 
protection authorities that individuals can afford effective judicial remedies. 
EU-US umbrella Agreement protections and safeguards will apply to all data 
exchanges taking place in the context of transatlantic law enforcement co-operation in 
criminal matters in every level. The provision covers all the substance EU data protection 
principles; processing standards, safeguards and individual rights. Agreement provides data 
subject judicial redress rights concerning US domestic law reforms to support EU Citizen. 
Nevertheless, it contains some inferiors and threats to data protection standard of EU; 
different definition, oversight and rights of data subject to claim remedy especially Non-EU 
Citizen even they live in EU territory. 
 
6.1.2.3. Balancing the interests between data subject and State Authority 
concerning criminal matters 
Following a review by an independent panel appointed by President Obama, 
the US executive branch made significant changes to improve the compliance of its foreign 
intelligence practices with international human rights law. These include more specific 
definitions of the purposes for which surveillance can be undertaken.  
Since March 2014, the US government adopted Directive 28 (PPD-28), US 
Framework, to govern surveillance with six privacy principles. It imposes important 
limitations for intelligence operations. It specifies that data collection by the intelligence 
services should be targeted. Additionally, the PPD-28 limits the use of bulk collection of data 
to 6 purposes; detect and counter threats from espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, threats to the Armed Forces or transnational criminal threats. The six principles 
endorsed by the US are (1) rule of law, (2) legitimate purpose, (3) non-arbitrariness, (4) 
competent external authority, (5) meaningful oversight, and (6) increased transparency and 
democratic accountability. However, there are stills some overlaps between the US 
Framework and the Principles that US practice may fail to comply since the old court 
precedent, Glomar Response, is remained. 
Furthermore, US reviews the USA Freedom Act which would preventing bulk 
collection by requiring a nexus to an investigation, bringing clarity to Section 215 of Patriot 
Act, increasing FISC oversight and introducing a special advocate, increasing the ability of 
376 
 
companies to disclose government national security data requests, and increasing the power 
of internal oversight bodies, as well as adding external checks. 
The critical improvement is the Judicial Redress Act, extends to EU citizens 
enjoy under the Privacy Act of 1974 with respect to the data protection obligations of U.S. 
government agencies. However, the limited application of the Judicial Redress Act because 
there are many exemptions and the legal uncertainty regarding the agencies to which the 
Judicial Redress Act will apply, do not satisfy the requirement to offer an effective redress 
mechanism to all individuals concerned in national security intelligence surveillance cases. 
Additionally, the Judicial Redress Act give EU citizen access to U.S. courts to enforce 
privacy rights in relation to personal data transferred to the U.S. for law enforcement 
purposes. Stills Non-EU citizen are not entitled to enjoy these rights. 
GDPR provide comprehensive, detailed and transparent derogations to transfer 
personal data outside the EU, the reform clarifies those rules in many ways. The provisions 
on the independence, functions and powers of EU DPAs are expressed out in more detail and 
substantially enhanced. This expressly includes the power to suspend data flows to a recipient 
in a third country or to an international organization. 
Privacy Shield scopes clear data retention limits, restrictions, safeguards, and 
oversight mechanisms for access by state agencies for law enforcement and national security 
purposes. It transforms the oversight system from self-regulating to more responsive and 
proactive system, certification and annual recertification process remain, but the Department 
of Commerce will monitor compliance via detailed questionnaires. Moreover, the Federal 
Trade Commission will maintain a “Flag list” for organizations that are subject to FTC or 
court orders in Privacy Shield cases. 
EU Directive on criminal matters provides transparent, detailed and 
comprehensive rules for personal data transfers to third countries including the power to 
suspend data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international organization who 
does not meet the adequacy standard. The new Directive will raise the level of protection for 
individuals; victims, witnesses, and suspects of crimes are protected in the context of a 
criminal investigation or a law enforcement action. Supervision is ensured by independent 
national data protection authorities. 
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The EU-US Umbrella Agreement does not contain a general human rights 
clause prohibiting the “sharing” or “onward transfers” of data on EU persons, provided 
subject to the Agreement, with or to other agencies, in the USA or elsewhere, in 
circumstances in which this could lead to serious human rights violations, including arbitrary 
arrest and detention, torture or even extrajudicial killings or “disappearances” of the data 
subjects or others. It also expands to the whole law enforcement sector the principle of 
independent oversight including effective powers to investigate and resolve individual 
complaints. Nonetheless, in terms of transparency and oversight, it falls short of fundamental 
European data protection and human rights requirements because the data subjects cannot file 
their appeal in FISC. 
The reforms of EU and EU-US regime set a new harmonized standard for 
liberal market economy country to follow. It could be transformed to International Treaty 
open for other state to ratify. International Community may use these set of standards as a 
foundation to draft International Instrument on Personal Data Protection for sign and 
accession. The more inclusive approach, would solve the problem on jurisdiction, and make 
the compliance of personal data protection to different jurisdiction possible. 
 
 
6.2.  Recommendations on drafting International Regime for Personal Data 
Protection  
Due to the speedy widespread of Internet penetration in the last two decades, a new 
situation has now arisen whereby Multi-National IT Corporations collect a large amount of 
personal data either directly, though the user putting their data in Social Network or indirectly 
people using an search engine or tab bar that allow much information to be found out about 
them. Many private entities, including giant IT Corporations or State Agencies, have their 
own “Rule” and different structures for self-regulating their information system. But these are 
policies the organizations have themselves seen proper to enact and are mainly based on the 
self-verified of such Entities. Furthermore, domestic legislation is enacted regardless of the 
fact that the companies are multi-nationals and it may be tough to seek a direct link to a given 
jurisdiction in a specific case. Not withstand, laws could, in fact, prove hard to apply 
efficiently due to deadlocks relating jurisdiction. 
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6.2.1. Single set of common rules 
While data protection legislation has a cross-border dimension, its subsequent 
development acquired distinct national and regional characteristics. In order to accommodate 
the international cooperation of fundamentally different data protection legal systems, a series 
of initiatives have been undertaken, particularly during the last decade. 
The interesting legal scheme implemented for the trans-Atlantic exchange of personal 
information is, in effect, a patchwork legal solution constructed on EU-US bilateral basis. It 
includes the Privacy Shield for fundamental personal data exchanges and Umbrella 
Agreement for protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties.  
On each side of the Atlantic, largely different provisions govern the respective 
processing once personal data have been transmitted. The EU-US example is a powerful case 
for the advantages of introducing a single international data protection instrument that would 
has saved both parties from a multitude of complex and hard-to follow arrangements and, 
ultimately, a significant waste of resources in the respective negotiation and drafting 
processes. Nonetheless, these set of EU-US instruments have potential to set standard for 
International Data Protection Initiatives and other regional organizations since it covers vast 
majority states in the regime of liberal market economy countries. 
To providing a single set of rules, to be applied in uniformity by supervisory 
authorities across the world would eliminate the problems present in many past cases 
including the provisions covering the situation at issue on conflict of applicable law in 
different jurisdictions. 
 
6.2.2. Regulate the high capacity trans-border entity  
Since the court decision in many cases used the principle of territoriality and 
“Adequacy Principle” to effectively address the jurisdiction, so the issue that some IT 
Corporations might be tended to artificially select which national law to comply with and 
which national data protection authority to deal with. The more “Accountability Principle” 
may be introduced to trace and track the activity of Trans-National IT Corporations and 
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National or International Intelligence Agencies because of the different competences on the 
implementation ability among various States. 
 
6.2.2.1. Regulate Trans-National IT Corporation 
For employing Adequacy Principle, the Data protection related trust-marks, 
particularly web seals, flag, constitute the practical extension of self-regulatory attempts by 
trade-counterparts in E-Market. By affixing web seals onto Internet pages, members verify 
compliance to the data protection standards and best practices more or less in the same way 
that notification of the processing to data protection authorities confirms its lawfulness in the 
E-Market. Look at the Model of US, the web seal program TRUSTe (originally E-Trust) and 
used in an attempt to convince the EU on the adequacy of its data protection, and later used 
in negotiations for the conclusion of the Safe Harbor Agreement and then Privacy Shield that 
open for company to register. Privacy Shield is controlled and guaranteed by US Federal 
Trade Commission.  
By adapting the Accountability Principle of OECD Model, international and 
regional organizations have released various legal statuses and effectiveness personal data 
protection law. These codes of practice come in various formats and types. They range from 
self-regulatory instruments of voluntary compliance without any monitoring or enforcement 
mechanisms, to strict sets of rules introduced in cooperation with national data protection 
authorities and even ratified by law in strict EU-like data protection systems. In effect, these 
are universal codes of practice adopted by multinational groups of companies and ratified by 
the competent national data protection authorities, which define the group’s global data 
protection policy with regard to the international transfers of personal data within the same 
corporate group to entities located in countries that may not provide an adequate level of 
protection, as per EU standards.  
 
6.2.2.2. Regulate State Intelligence Agency  
The Data Protection for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities part, 
especially national and international intelligence units counter organized crime and terrorism, 
will take account of the specific needs of legal enforcement. It must protect everyone, 
regardless of whether they are a victim, criminal or witness, and the proposed International 
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Intelligence Codex must be under serious considerations. All law enforcement processing in 
the State Party must comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality and legality, 
with appropriate safeguards for the individuals. Oversight is ensured by independent national 
data protection authorities, and effective judicial remedies must be provided. Moreover, 
Rules for transferring personal data to third countries are clarified and Member States may 
introduce a higher level of protection into their own national laws. However, it must respect 
the different legal traditions in State Parties and is fully in line with the International Treaties 
of Human Rights. 
 
6.2.3. Establish an International Data Protection Institution 
The Universal or International regime should contain novel and inventive procedures 
for cooperation, mutual assistance, joint operations and a consistency mechanism. Moreover, 
all national data protection authorities have to present activity reports annually, which will be 
made public. All of this aims at ensuring consistency in the application of the regulation by 
the national authorities. Universal Regime must impose that non-compliance could lead to 
heavier and material sanctions. If companies do not comply in practice they face sanctions 
and removal from the list, such as Trustmark Emblems. 
Universal Regime should settle the One-stop-shop, businesses and individuals will 
only have to deal with one single supervisory authority. The One-stop-shop for individual 
complainant would be important path for effective remedy and provide greater opportunity 
for internet user to contact with oversight mechanism. The accessible and affordable dispute 
resolution mechanisms is Ideal, the complaint will be resolved by the company/authority 
itself; or free of charge Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) solutions. ADR should be 
offered if a case is exhaustion of domestic remedy, as a last resort there will be an arbitration 
mechanism. Furthermore, redress possibility in the area of national security for State Party 
citizen must be handled by an Ombudsperson independent from the national intelligence 
services who involved. 
The Data Protection for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities part needs of 
Supervision by independent national data protection authority or non-partial court, and 
effective judicial remedies for suffering data subjects must be provided.  
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The recognition of investigative power of domestic and international supervisory 
authority must be landed as a procedure to point out wrongdoings internationally. Whenever 
there has been a finding of non-compliance, following a complaint or an investigation, the IT 
Corporation should be subject to follow-up specific investigation thereafter. 
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